area handbook series 



HONDURAS 

a country study 




HONDURAS 

a country study 

Federal Research Division 
Library of Congress 
Edited by Tim L. Merrill 
Research Completed 
December 1 993 



On the cover: Carved marble base, Rio Uhia valley 



Third Edition, First Printing, 1995. 



Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data 

Honduras : a country study / Federal Research Division, Library of Con- 
gress ; edited by Tim L. Merrill. — 3rd ed. 

p. cm. — (Area handbook series, ISSN 1057-5294) 
(DA Pam ; 550-151) 

"Supersedes the 1983 edition of Honduras : A country 
study." — T.p. verso. 

"Research completed December 1993." 

Includes bibliographical references (pp. 269-284) and index. 

ISBN 0-8444-0836-0 (alk. paper) 

1. Honduras. I. Merrill, Tim L., 1949- . II. Library of 
Congress. 

Federal Research Division. III. Series. IV. Series: DA Pam ; 



550-151. 
F1503.H75 1994 
972.83— dc20 



94-43036 
CIP 



Headquarters, Department of the Army 



DA Pam 550-151 



For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office 
Washington, D.C. 20402 



Foreword 



This volume is one in a continuing series of books prepared by 
the Federal Research Division of the Library of Congress under 
the Country Studies/Area Handbook Program sponsored by the 
Department of the Army. The last two pages of this book list the 
other published studies. 

Most books in the series deal with a particular foreign country, 
describing and analyzing its political, economic, social, and national 
security systems and institutions, and examining the interrelation- 
ships of those systems and the ways they are shaped by cultural 
factors. Each study is written by a multidisciplinary team of social 
scientists. The authors seek to provide a basic understanding of 
the observed society, striving for a dynamic rather than a static 
portrayal. Particular attention is devoted to the people who make 
up the society, their origins, dominant beliefs and values, their com- 
mon interests and the issues on which they are divided, the nature 
and extent of their involvement with national institutions, and their 
attitudes toward each other and toward their social system and 
political order. 

The books represent the analysis of the authors and should not 
be construed as an expression of an official United States govern- 
ment position, policy, or decision. The authors have sought to 
adhere to accepted standards of scholarly objectivity. Corrections, 
additions, and suggestions for changes from readers will be wel- 
comed for use in future editions. 

Louis R. Mortimer 
Chief 

Federal Research Division 
Library of Congress 
Washington, DC 20540-5220 



iii 



Acknowledgments 



The authors would like to acknowledge the contributions of Mary 
W. Helms, Richard L. Millet, James A. Morris, Steve C. Ropp, 
and J. Mark Ruhl, who wrote the 1983 edition of Honduras: A Coun- 
try Study. The present volume incorporates portions of their work. 

The authors are grateful to individuals in various government 
agencies and private institutions who gave of their time, research 
materials, and expertise in the production of this book. These in- 
dividuals include Ralph K. Benesch, who oversees the Country 
Studies/ Area Handbook Program for the Department of the Army. 
None of these individuals is, however, in any way responsible for 
the work of the authors. 

The authors also would like to thank those people on the staff 
of the Federal Research Division who contributed directly to the 
preparation of the manuscript. They include Sandra W. Meditz, 
who reviewed drafts, provided valuable advice on all aspects of 
production, and conducted liaison with the sponsoring agency; Mar- 
ilyn L. Majeska, who managed editing and production; Andrea 
T. Merrill, who edited figures and tables; and Barbara Edgerton 
and Izella Watson, who did word processing. In addition, thanks 
go to Mary K. Caruthers, who edited chapters; Beverly Wolpert, 
who performed the final prepublication editorial review; Joan C. 
Cook, who compiled the index; and Linda Peterson of the Library 
of Congress Printing Management Section, who performed the 
phototypesetting, under the supervision of Peggy Pixley. 

Thanks also go to David P. Cabitto of the Federal Research Di- 
vision, who provided valuable graphics support and who, along 
with the firm of Greenhorne and O'Mara, prepared the maps. Spe- 
cial thanks go to Gustavo Arce, who designed the cover and illus- 
trations of each title page, and to Harriett R. Blood, who prepared 
the topographic map. Finally, the authors acknowledge the gene- 
rosity of the individuals and the public and private agencies who 
allowed their photographs to be used in this study. 



Contents 



Page 

Foreword iii 

Acknowledgments v 

Preface xiii 

Country Profile XV 

Introduction xxiii 

Chapter 1. Historical Setting 1 

Richard Haggerty and Richard Millet 

PRE-COLUMBIAN SOCIETY 4 

The Mayan Heritage 4 

Other Indigenous Groups 4 

SPANISH CONQUEST AND SETTLEMENT 5 

The Initial Explorations 5 

The Era of the Conquistadors 6 

COLONIAL HONDURAS 9 

The Spread of Colonization and the Growth of 

Mining 9 

Colonial Society, Economy, and Government 10 

Anglo-Spanish Rivalry 11 

THE EARLY INDEPENDENCE YEARS, 1821-99 12 

The Collapse of Spanish Rule 12 

The United Provinces of Central America 13 

The Development of an Independent Nation, 

1838-99 14 

BANANA BOATS AND GUNBOATS: THE RISE OF 

UNITED STATES INFLUENCE, 1899-1932 18 

The Growth of the Banana Industry 18 

The Expanded Role of the United States 20 

The Threat of Renewed Instability, 1919-24 24 

The Restoration of Order, 1925-31 27 

STRONGMAN RULE, 1932-63 28 

The Era of Tiburcio Carfas Andino, 1932-54 28 

Aborted Reform, 1954-63 33 

MILITARY RULE AND INTERNATIONAL 

CONFLICT, 1963-78 37 

War with El Salvador 39 

Military Rule and Reform 42 



vii 



THE RETURN TO CIVILIAN RULE, 1978-82 44 

HONDURAS IN THE MIDDLE: UNITED STATES 

POLICY AND THE CENTRAL AMERICAN CRISIS ... 46 
The Suazo Cordova Administration: Caudillo Politics 

in the Shadow of the Military 46 

Honduras and the Nicaraguan Conflict 52 

The Struggle of Electoral Democracy: The Elections 

of 1985 53 

FROM CONTADORA TO ESQUIPULAS: THE CRISIS 

ABATES 55 

The Contadora Process 55 

The Arias Plan 57 

Accord in Nicaragua 58 

Chapter 2. The Society and Its Environment 63 

Elisavinda Echeverri-Gent 

GEOGRAPHY 66 

Location and Boundaries 66 

Boundary Disputes 66 

Topography 69 

Climate 71 

Hydrography 74 

DEMOGRAPHIC TRENDS 74 

Population Density and Distribution 74 

Rural-to-Urban Migration 75 

Regional Emigration 77 

Population Growth 78 

SOCIAL SECTORS 80 

Background 80 

Advocates for Social Change 82 

The Upper Class 84 

The Middle Class 86 

The Lower Class 87 

FAMILY AND KIN 88 

LIVING CONDITIONS 94 

Rural Life 94 

Urban Life 95 

ETHNIC GROUPS 96 

Indigenous Groups 97 

Other Non-Ladino Groups 98 

RELIGION 100 

SOCIAL WELFARE 101 

Education 101 



viii 



Health 102 

THE ENVIRONMENT 104 

Chapter 3. The Economy 107 

Barbara Annis 

GROWTH AND STRUCTURE OF THE ECONOMY 109 

MACROECONOMIC TRENDS 112 

Recent Growth 112 

Inflation 114 

Unemployment 115 

ROLE OF GOVERNMENT 117 

Fiscal Policies 117 

Monetary and Exchange-Rate Policies 117 

Budget 118 

HUMAN RESOURCES 118 

Composition of Labor Force 118 

Employment Indicators and Benefits 119 

Labor Unions 120 

AGRICULTURE 123 

Land Use 123 

Agricultural Policy 125 

Land Reform . 126 

Traditional Crops 127 

Nontraditional Crops 128 

Livestock 128 

Fishing 130 

Forestry 130 

NATURAL RESOURCES AND ENERGY 132 

Mining and Minerals 132 

Energy Sources 132 

Electric Power 132 

INDUSTRY 134 

Manufacturing 134 

Construction 135 

SERVICES 136 

Banking and Financial System 136 

Tourism 137 

Telecommunications 137 

Transportation 138 

EXTERNAL SECTOR 142 

Trade 142 

Foreign Investment 142 



ix 



Chapter 4. Government and Politics 145 

Mark P. Sullivan 

CONSTITUTIONAL BACKGROUND 149 

GOVERNMENTAL INSTITUTIONS AND PROCESS 153 

Executive 153 

Legislative 159 

Judiciary 164 

Local Government 167 

The Electoral Process 170 

POLITICAL DYNAMICS 172 

Political Parties 172 

Interest Groups 181 

Domestic Human Rights Organizations 190 

The Press 193 

Civilian Democratic Rule 194 

FOREIGN RELATIONS 197 

The United States 198 

Central America 203 

Chapter 5. National Security 209 

Edmundo Flores 

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 212 

The Army as Political Instrument, 1838-1922 213 

Development of an Independent Military Identity, 

1922-63 214 

Consolidation and Organizational Maturity, 

1963-80 215 

CONSTITUTIONAL AND OTHER LEGAL 

PROVISIONS 216 

THE ARMED FORCES 221 

Army 221 

Air Force 223 

Navy 225 

Public Security Force 225 

Other Military Units 227 

Recruitment and Training 227 

Ranks, Insignia, and Uniforms 230 

MILITARY FINANCES 231 

Defense Budget 231 

Involvement in the Nation's Economy 234 

United States Military Assistance and Training 235 

Military Ties with Other Countries 241 



x 



THE PENAL SYSTEM AND HUMAN RIGHTS 242 

Penal System 242 

Respect for Human Rights 244 

Domestic Human Rights Organizations 245 

Appendix A. Tables 249 

Appendix B. Central American Common Market . . 257 

Ramon J. Miro 

Bibliography 269 

Glossary 285 

Index 287 

List of Figures 

1 Administrative Divisions of Honduras, 1993 xxii 

2 Honduras in Its Central American Setting 16 

3 Topography and Drainage 68 

4 Estimated Population by Age and Gender, 1985 76 

5 Gross Domestic Product (GDP) by Sector, 1992 116 

6 Economic Activity, 1993 124 

7 Transportation System, 1993 140 

8 Organization of the Government, 1993 154 

9 Organization of the Army, 1993 222 

10 Organization of the Public Security Force, 1993 228 

11 Officer Ranks and Insignia, 1993 232 

12 Enlisted Ranks and Insignia, 1993 233 



Preface 



Like its predecessor, this study is an attempt to examine objec- 
tively and concisely the dominant historical, social, economic, po- 
litical, and military aspects of contemporary Honduras. Sources 
of information included scholarly books, journals, monographs, 
official reports of governments and international organizations, and 
numerous periodicals. Chapter bibliographies appear at the end 
of the book; brief comments on sources recommended for further 
reading appear at the end of each chapter. To the extent possible, 
place-names follow the system adopted by the United States Board 
on Geographic Names. Measurements are given in the metric sys- 
tem; a conversion table is provided to assist readers unfamiliar with 
metric measurements (see table 1 , Appendix A). A glossary is also 
included. 

Although there are numerous variations, Spanish surnames for 
men and unmarried women usually consist of two parts: the 
patrilineal name followed by the matrilineal. In the instance of 
Roberto Suazo Cordova, for example, Suazo is his father's name; 
Cordova, his mother's maiden name. In informal use, the matri- 
lineal name is often dropped. When a woman marries, she gener- 
ally drops her matrilineal name and replaces it with her husband's 
patrilineal name preceded by a "de." Thus, when Cristina Gar- 
cia Rodriguez married Antonio Perez Cevallos, she became Cristina 
Garcia de Perez. In informal use, a married woman's patrilineal 
name is dropped (Cristina Perez is the informal usage). Some in- 
dividuals use only the patrilineal name in formal as well as infor- 
mal use. The patrilineal for men and unmarried women and the 
husband's patrilineal for married women are used for indexing and 
bibliographic purposes. 

The body of the text reflects information available as of Decem- 
ber 1993. Certain other portions of the text, however, have been 
updated. The Introduction discusses significant events that have 
occurred since the completion of research; the Country Profile and 
Glossary include updated information as available; several figures 
and tables are based on information in more recendy published 
sources; and the Bibliography lists recent sources thought to be par- 
ticularly helpful to the reader. 



xiii 



Country Profile 




Country 

Formal Name: Republic of Honduras. 
Short Form: Honduras. 
Term for Citizens: Honduran(s). 
Capital: Tegucigalpa. 

NOTE — The Country Profile contains updated information as available. 



XV 



Date of Independence: September 15, 1821, from Spain; Novem- 
ber 15, 1838, from United Provinces of Central America. 

National Holiday: Independence day, September 15. 

Geography 

Size: Second largest country of Central America; area of 1 12,088 
square kilometers. 

Topography: About 80 percent of country consists of interior high- 
lands, extremely rugged and mountainous with numerous inter- 
montane valleys. Long and narrow Caribbean lowlands widen 
in northeast, with numerous narrow river valleys reaching into 
interior mountains. Small Pacific lowlands along the Golfo de 
Fonseca. 

Climate: Entire country lies within tropics, but much regional var- 
iation because of mountains. Caribbean lowlands generally hotter 
and more humid than rest of country. More temperate conditions 
at higher elevations. Rainfall varies; Caribbean lowlands, especially 
in northeast, wettest. Distinct wet and dry season in Pacific lowlands 
and interior highlands. May to September wettest months. 

Society 

Population: In 1992 population estimated at nearly 5.1 million. 
Rate of annual growth 2.8 percent. Most of population lives in 
western part of interior highlands and Caribbean lowlands; north- 
eastern Honduras sparsely settled. Population about half rural but 
rapidly urbanizing. 

Education and Literacy: Literacy reportedly at about 60 percent 
in 1990 but varies widely regionally. Few people complete primary 
school. 

Health and Welfare: High degree of malnutrition; high infant and 
child mortality rates. Major diseases: malaria, enteric diseases and 
typhoid, influenza, tuberculosis, and pneumonia. Life expectan- 
cy: nearly sixty-five years in 1992. Medical care minimal for most 
of population. 

Language: Spanish official language and spoken as primary or 
secondary language by almost all of population. English also used 
on Caribbean coast. Miskito of northeastern Honduras speak na- 
tive language, as do Black Caribs of Caribbean coast. 



xvi 



Ethnic Groups: Approximately 90 percent of population mestizo. 
Caribbean coast population most diverse, with mestizo, Creole, and 
Black Carib. Northeastern Honduras population primarily Miskito. 

Religion: Predominantly Roman Catholic, although Protestant 
denominations growing rapidly. 

Economy 

Salient Features: One of poorest nations in the Western Hemis- 
phere. Economy dependent on two agricultural commodities, 
bananas and coffee. Small manufacturing sector. Poorly developed 
infrastructure. Heavily dependent on foreign aid. 

Gross Domestic Product (GDP): US$3.3 billion in 1992 (US$650 
per capita). 

Agriculture: Main products: bananas and coffee. Also cattle, corn, 
cotton, dry beans, sorghum, sugarcane, and tobacco. 

Industry: Mainly agricultural product processing and simple as- 
sembly operations; most items light consumer goods. Food, bever- 
ages, and tobacco products constitute 50 percent of production. 

Energy: Domestic needs met by petroleum imports, mainly from 
Mexico and Venezuela, as well as by hydroelectric electricity gener- 
ation. Electrification low and uneven, heavily concentrated in ur- 
ban areas and western and northern parts of country. 

Foreign Trade: Exports valued at US$843 million in 1992. Ex- 
ports: bananas, coffee, shrimp and lobster, sugar, minerals, wood 
products, and refrigerated beef. Imports valued at US$983 mil- 
lion in 1992. Major commodities: machinery, manufactured equip- 
ment, and raw or intermediate materials, such as petroleum. Major 
trading partners: United States, European Union, Central Ameri- 
can Common Market, Japan, Mexico, and Venezuela. 

Balance of Payments: Total external debt estimated at US$3 bil- 
lion in 1993. In 1980s and 1990s, most years had negative balance 
of payments. 

Foreign Aid: Most economic assistance provided by United States. 
Received substantial amounts of military aid from the United States 
in 1980s. 

Currency and Exchange Rate: US$1 =8.78 lempiras (L) in Au- 
gust 1994 (official rate). 

Fiscal year (FY): Calendar year. 



xvn 



Transportation and Telecommunications 

Roads: 8,950 kilometers in 1993; 1,700 kilometers paved. 

Ports: Puerto Cortes is country's major port. Puerto Castilla on 
Caribbean coast and San Lorenzo on Pacific coast secondary ports. 

Airports: Two international airports, at Tegucigalpa and San Pedro 
Sula; several secondary airports. 

Railroads: 785 kilometers in 1993, all in north. 

Telecommunications: Eleven television, 176 AM radio stations. 
International communications to other Central American coun- 
tries via Central American Microwave System, to rest of world via 
satellite ground stations near Managua. 

Government and Politics 

Government: In 1982 freely elected civilian president and National 
Congress inaugurated, returning country to constitutional rule after 
ten years of military-led government. New constitution, country's 
sixteenth, devised and ratified by Constituent Assembly in 1982. 
President, three presidential designees (vice presidents), deputies 
of 134-member Congress, and nine justices of Supreme Court of 
Justice all serve four-year terms. President appoints and dismisses 
twelve secretaries of state and two other agency directors, who form 
Council of Ministers, or cabinet. Most heads of various decentral- 
ized autonomous and semiautonomous agencies appointed by, or 
with concurrence of, president, who also appoints eighteen depart- 
mental governors. Local governments (municipios), including mayor 
and five- to seven-member council, normally elected every two to 
three years. 

Politics: Revolve around Liberal Party of Honduras and National 
Party of Honduras. Since late 1960s, armed forces have evolved 
as principal political force, governing directly, influencing general 
policy, or controlling national security affairs. Private enterprise 
sector, labor, peasants, teachers, and professionals all highly or- 
ganized and actively pursue own interests through a variety of 
means, including media, personal contact with officials, rallies, and 
demonstrations . 

Judicial System: Judicial system consists of Supreme Court of 
Justice, which handles both civil and criminal cases, courts of ap- 
peal, courts of first instance at departmental level, and justices of 
the peace at municipal level. 



xvni 



Administrative Divisions: Eighteen departments, further divid- 
ed into 291 municipalities. 

Foreign Relations: During 1980s focused on national defense 
and efforts to achieve peace and stability within Central Amer- 
ica. Regional political crisis, arrival of thousands of refugees in Hon- 
duras, and presence of anti-Sandinista counterrevolutionaries on 
Honduran territory burdened country and drew it closer to con- 
flict. Involvement in regional politics deepened as Honduras ex- 
panded military ties with United States through increased levels 
of military aid, modification and construction of airfields, estab- 
lishment of regional training center, and series of large military 
exercises. Following early 1990s' peace accords, relations with 
neighbors have improved, and Honduras has become less depen- 
dent on United States aid. 

International Agreements and Memberships: Membership in 
Organization of American States (OAS), Central American Com- 
mon Market, Central American Integration System, and United 
Nations and its specialized agencies. Important treaties include: 
1947 Inter- American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (Rio Treaty), 
Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America 
(Tlatelolco Treaty), and Central American Peace Agreement (Es- 
quipulas II). 

National Security 

Armed Forces: In mid- 1994 armed forces of about 20,000 person- 
nel organized into three service branches (army, air force, and navy) 
and national police. Largest branch, army, had an estimated 13,500 
troops; air force, 1,200; navy, 600; police, 4,500 personnel. 

Units: Military units assigned to one of ten regions. Primary troop 
component of army is light infantry battalion, of which there were 
sixteen in early 1990s. Number of specialized support units, in- 
cluding artillery, armored car, engineering, and special forces. 

Military Equipment: Equipment from United States and West 
European countries. Basic infantry weapon Belgian FAL and United 
States M-16. Fighter-bombers primarily from France by way of Is- 
rael; light tanks from Britain; and helicopters from United States. 

Defense Budget: Averaged at US$44.2 million in 1992-93, about 
1 percent of GDP. 

Police and Internal Security: Until April 1994, separate service 
branch with own general staff; police integral part of armed forces 



xix 



command structure. This branch was dissolved in early 1994; and 
as of July 1994, no replacement police force or internal security 
organization had been formed. 



xx 



International boundary 
Department boundary 
National capital 
Department capital 

25 50 75 100 Kilometers 



25 50 75 100 Miles 

NOTE -- Swan Islands, Honduran territory in the 
Caribbean Sea, are not pictured. 




DEPARTMENTS 



OCOTEPEQUE 
COPAN 

SANTA BARBARA 
CORTES 

ISLAS DE LA BAHIA 

ATLANTIDA 

YORO 

COLON 

GRACIAS A DIOS 
OLANCHO 

FRANCISCO MORAZAN 

COMAYAGUA 

INTIBUCA 

LEMPIRA 

LA PAZ 

VALLE 

CHOLUTECA 

EL PARAISO 




84 



Introduction 



HONDURAS'S RUGGED TOPOGRAPHY and lack of natural 
resources explain much of its history and present-day underdevelop- 
ment. The land has been underpopulated since precolonial times; 
the great civilizations of Middle America lay to the north, and Eu- 
ropean immigrants to the area were few in number because the 
region lacked mineral wealth and land suitable for farming. Exten- 
sive mountain ranges kept Honduras from being considered as a 
site for a transisthmian canal in the nineteenth century. This "re- 
jection, ' ' however, brought the unexpected advantage of isolating 
the new nation from much of the international intrigue that engulfed 
Honduras 's neighbors. Lack of large areas of flat land for planta- 
tions also had an unanticipated result: Honduras never produced 
a powerful landholding oligarchy like those that controlled the econ- 
omies and politics of many of the countries of Central America, and 
as a result it has a more egalitarian society with a less rigid class 
structure than its neighbors. 

Honduras has frequentiy been exploited by outsiders. Neighbors 
in Central America took advantage of Honduras 's weakness and 
repeatedly intervened in Honduran internal affairs. Countries out- 
side the region also manipulated Honduran politics from time to 
time to suit their own national interests. Intervention and manipu- 
lation were not limited to sovereign states. During the first half of 
the twentieth century, the Honduran economy was so dominated 
by the export of bananas that foreign banana companies often ex- 
ercised as much power as the national government. Increased na- 
tionalism and economic diversification have strengthened national 
institutions in recent decades, but Honduras remains a nation highly 
sensitive to and dependent on external forces. 

Although Honduras is the second largest country in Central 
America, it has little land available for cultivation. The terrain for 
the most part consists of rugged mountains, with narrow coastal 
plains to the north and south. Rainfall is abundant in the Caribbean 
lowlands and on some of the north- facing mountain slopes, but most 
of the arable valleys are fairly dry. When viewed from the air, most 
of the landscape appears barren. Unlike the more lush mountain 
areas of Guatemala and southern Mexico, the mountains and dry 
valleys of Honduras have always been rather inhospitable to setders. 

Honduras lay at the southern edge of the advanced civilizations 
of pre-Columbian Middle America. One of the most notable in- 
digenous groups was the Maya, whose civilization spread south from 



xxni 



Introduction 



HONDURAS'S RUGGED TOPOGRAPHY and lack of natural 
resources explain much of its history and present-day underdevelop- 
ment. The land has been underpopulated since precolonial times; 
the great civilizations of Middle America lay to the north, and Eu- 
ropean immigrants to the area were few in number because the 
region lacked mineral wealth and land suitable for farming. Exten- 
sive mountain ranges kept Honduras from being considered as a 
site for a transisthmian canal in the nineteenth century. This * 're- 
jection," however, brought the unexpected advantage of isolating 
the new nation from much of the international intrigue that engulfed 
Honduras 's neighbors. Lack of large areas of flat land for planta- 
tions also had an unanticipated result: Honduras never produced 
a powerful landholding oligarchy like those that controlled the econ- 
omies and politics of many of the countries of Central America, and 
as a result it has a more egalitarian society with a less rigid class 
structure than its neighbors. 

Honduras has frequently been exploited by outsiders. Neighbors 
in Central America took advantage of Honduras' s weakness and 
repeatedly intervened in Honduran internal affairs. Countries out- 
side the region also manipulated Honduran politics from time to 
time to suit their own national interests. Intervention and manipu- 
lation were not limited to sovereign states. During the first half of 
the twentieth century, the Honduran economy was so dominated 
by the export of bananas that foreign banana companies often ex- 
ercised as much power as the national government. Increased na- 
tionalism and economic diversification have strengthened national 
institutions in recent decades, but Honduras remains a nation highly 
sensitive to and dependent on external forces. 

Although Honduras is the second largest country in Central 
America, it has litde land available for cultivation. The terrain for 
the most part consists of rugged mountains, with narrow coastal 
plains to the north and south. Rainfall is abundant in the Caribbean 
lowlands and on some of the north-facing mountain slopes, but most 
of the arable valleys are fairly dry. When viewed from the air, most 
of the landscape appears barren. Unlike the more lush mountain 
areas of Guatemala and southern Mexico, the mountains and dry 
valleys of Honduras have always been rather inhospitable to setders. 

Honduras lay at the southern edge of the advanced civilizations 
of pre-Columbian Middle America. One of the most notable in- 
digenous groups was the Maya, whose civilization spread south from 



xxiii 



the Yucatan and Guatemala in the fifth century A.D. In what is 
now northwestern Honduras, the Maya built the major ceremonial 
center of Copan. For three and a half centuries, the city was one 
of the principal centers of Mayan culture and trade. Sometime in 
the ninth century A.D., Copan, as well as most other Mayan cit- 
ies, was abandoned. The reason for this abrupt event continues 
to puzzle archaeologists. Theories of civil war, disease, drought, 
overpopulation, and crop failure have all been proposed. Whatever 
the cause, the fall of the Mayan civilization apparendy affected only 
the city dwellers. Although the priests and rulers who built the tem- 
ples, inscribed the glyphs, and developed the astronomy and mathe- 
matics suddenly vanished, the peasants remained in the area and 
form a continuum of language and culture that exists to this day. 

European contact with Honduras began with Christopher 
Columbus in 1502, but little exploration or settlement by Europe- 
ans took place for the next two decades. Spanish conquistadors and 
a few settlers began arriving in the 1520s, but the area soon be- 
came a batdeground for competing colonial authorities. The popu- 
lation of the area dropped precipitously as the indigenous population 
was nearly wiped out by new diseases, mistreatment, and expor- 
tation of large numbers of persons to other colonies as slave labor. 
By 1539 only an estimated 15,000 native people remained under 
Spanish control; two years later, this figure had declined to 8,000. 
Most of the indigenous inhabitants were organized into encomien- 
das, a system that left the native people as vassals in their villages 
under the control of individual Spanish settlers. 

The colony began to grow in the 1540s as a variety of agricul- 
tural activities developed and limited gold and silver mining be- 
gan. However, gold production declined in the 1560s, the silver 
boom peaked in 1584, and economic depression returned shortly 
thereafter. By the seventeenth century, Honduras had become a 
poor and neglected backwater of the Spanish colonial empire, having 
a scattered population of mestizos (of mixed European and native 
ancestry), native people, blacks, and a handful of Spanish adminis- 
trators and landowners. Catde raising was the only important eco- 
nomic activity, and much of the Honduran interior and Caribbean 
coast remained uncolonized and outside effective Spanish control. 

The eighteenth century saw slow growth of the colony as agricul- 
ture diversified and grew and the central government increased 
its political control over the area. Conflict over trade policy, how- 
ever, sparked a rivalry between Honduras 's principal cities, Tegu- 
cigalpa and Comayagua, a rivalry that eventually became a feud 
lasting for almost 200 years. In Spain, the Bourbons assumed the 
throne in the early years of the century, and the revitalized Spanish 



xxiv 



government made several efforts to wrest control of the Caribbean 
coast from the British. 

In the early nineteenth century, Spanish power went into rapid 
decline. The Napoleonic wars created turmoil in Spain, and the 
Spanish colonies took advantage of this diversion of attention and 
resources in the motherland to establish themselves as sovereign 
nations. In 1821 the Central American provinces joined in the grow- 
ing New World chorus by declaring their independence from Spain. 
After some initial debate over whether Central America should face 
independence alone, in early 1822 the Central American provinces 
declared their allegiance to Mexico. 

The union with Mexico was brief. In 1823 the United Provinces 
of Central America broke free from Mexico. From its inception, 
however, the new federation faced a series of ultimately insoluble 
problems. Spanish rule had fostered divisions and local suspicions 
among the five provinces of the federation more than it had en- 
gendered any spirit of Central American unity. The federation was 
beset by constant political rivalry and fighting. Unable to main- 
tain any form of central control, the federation dissolved in 1838, 
and Honduras became a sovereign state. 

The new nation emerged with a Spanish-indigenous heritage that 
survives intact to the present. Most of the population (an esti- 
mated 90 percent in 1994) continues to be mestizo. The dominant 
language and religion were, and still are, Spanish and Roman 
Catholicism, although evangelical Protestant groups have made 
many converts in the late twentieth century. The largest racial and 
linguistic minority continues to be not the native peoples, who were 
almost completely eradicated or assimilated, but English-speaking 
blacks, a legacy of early British control of the Caribbean coast. 

The years after independence in the eighteenth century were 
neither peaceful nor prosperous in Honduras. The country's weak- 
ness attracted the ambitions of individuals and nations within and 
outside of Central America. Even geography contributed to its mis- 
fortunes. Alone among the Central American republics, Honduras 
shared land borders with its three potential rivals for regional 
hegemony — Guatemala, El Salvador, and Nicaragua. This national 
rivalry was exacerbated by political divisions and civil wars through- 
out the isthmus, struggles that often crossed country borders. For 
a century and a half after independence, Honduras was ruled by 
dictators and subject to a constant series of coups and coup attempts. 
The combined impact of civil strife and foreign interventions kept 
Honduras in a position of relative economic and social backwardness. 

The end of the nineteenth century and first decades of the twen- 
tieth century were a time of political and economic change. The 



xxv 



peaceful transfer of presidential power in 1899 was the first time 
in decades that a constitutional transition had taken place. But 1899 
was a watershed year in another, even more important sense. In 
that year, the first boatload of bananas was shipped from Hon- 
duras to the United States. The fruit found a ready market, and 
the trade grew rapidly. The United States-based banana compa- 
nies constructed railroad lines and roads to serve the expanding 
banana production. Perhaps even more significant, Honduras be- 
gan to attract the attention of the United States government. Un- 
til the early twentieth century, the United States played only a very 
limited role in internal Honduran political clashes. With its invest- 
ments growing, however, the United States showed increased con- 
cern over Honduras 's political instability. Although United States 
marines never occupied Honduras as they did neighboring 
Nicaragua, the United States frequently dispatched warships to 
waters near Honduras as a warning that intervention in Honduras 
was indeed a possibility if United States business interests were 
threatened or domestic conflict escalated. 

From 1920 through 1923, there were seventeen uprisings or at- 
tempted coups in Honduras. Despite an international conference 
and various accords to promote stability throughout the isthmus, 
political strife in Honduras and its neighbors increased. This in- 
stability contributed to growing United States concern over Cen- 
tral America. Warships were again dispatched to the western 
Caribbean, and political aspirants and successive governments in 
Honduras were urged to honor constitutional provisions and in- 
ternational agreements. The pressure by the United States had the 
desired result, and more stable governments were in power from 
1925 to 1931. 

Political stability did not result in democracy, however. From 
1932 to 1954, the country was successively ruled by two dictators — 
Tiburcio C arias Andino and Juan Manuel Galvez. Although repres- 
sive in rule, the two decades were a period of relative political calm. 
The administration of C arias sought to improve the military and 
engaged in a limited program of road building. Carias's succes- 
sor, Galvez, continued Carias's policy of road building and de- 
veloping coffee as an export crop; Galvez also gave increased priority 
to education. 

By the early 1950s, the economy had begun to diversify. Although 
bananas were still the most important crop, other agricultural 
products, such as coffee and cotton, became significant export earn- 
ers. For the first time in more than half a century, bananas ac- 
counted for less than 50 percent of export earnings at the end of 
the 1950s. 



XXVI 



Politically, the period from 1956 to 1958 marked a return to the 
instability that had characterized Honduras in the past. A coup 
in 1956 ousted the elected president and marked a turning point 
in Honduran history. For the first time, the armed forces acted 
as an institution rather than as the instrument of a political party 
or of an individual leader. For decades to come, the military would 
act as the final arbiter of Honduran politics. 

An election to return the country to civilian rule was scheduled 
for 1957 and won by a reformer, Ramon Villeda Morales. Although 
unhappy with many of his policies, the military allowed him to com- 
plete his term. When it appeared that another reformer, Ramon 
Ernesto Cruz, might win the 1963 elections, however, the mili- 
tary again seized power and installed General Oswaldo Lopez Ar- 
rellano as president. Growing economic problems made the military 
regime increasingly unpopular, and except for a brief period in 
1969 when the country united behind the military to fight the six- 
day Soccer War with El Salvador, pressure slowly built for a return 
to civilian government. 

An election was held in 1971, but after only nineteen months 
in power, the civilian president was again overthrown by the mili- 
tary. For a time, economic growth and land reform made the new 
military government popular. Toward the end of the decade, 
however, the economy again slowed, and rumors began to circu- 
late about governmental corruption and military involvement in 
narcotics trafficking. By 1978 it was clear that the military was losing 
control of the country. A coup in 1978 replaced the military presi- 
dent with a three-man junta, which promised to hold elections. A 
new constitution was drafted, elections were held, and in January 
1982, a civilian president was inaugurated. 

The new constitution kept the basic form of government Hon- 
duras had had under its fifteen previous constitutions. A strong 
president was to be elected by direct popular vote every four years. 
The National Congress, the unicameral legislature, was established 
with a varying number of members (128 in 1994) elected to four- 
year terms concurrent with the president. The judicial branch, the- 
oretically independent of the other two, was in reality subject to 
pressure from the president and has often been criticized for cor- 
ruption and inefficiency. 

Although democracy returned to Honduras in 1982, the con- 
tinued underdevelopment of the country produced a crisis of con- 
fidence in Honduran society throughout the 1980s. Indeed during 
that decade, mounting economic and social pressures produced an 
acute sense of disorientation in Honduran society. The combina- 
tion of a worldwide economic crisis, a sharp rise in crime, and the 



xxvn 



absence of an independent police force and judicial system left the 
average citizen with a pronounced sense of vulnerability. 

Three presidents — Roberto Suazo Cordova (1982-86), Jose Az- 
cona Hoyo (1986-90), and Rafael Leonardo Callejas (1990-94)— 
had the difficult task of consolidating democracy, appeasing the 
military, and spurring economic development, while insurgencies 
raged in all of Honduras 's neighbors. A campaign against leftists 
in the early 1980s led to frequent accusations of human rights 
abuses. Extensive military and economic aid came from the United 
States during this time, easing the effect of economic recession that 
enveloped all of Central America in the 1980s. The massive aid 
and presence of United States troops, however, evoked strong criti- 
cism from Honduran nationalists, as well as from many other seg- 
ments of society, forcing the government to distance itself from the 
United States in the early 1990s. 

Honduras 's fourth democratically elected president since the 
return to democracy, Carlos Roberto Reina Idiaquez, assumed 
power in January 1994. Reina, the candidate of the Liberal Party 
of Honduras (Partido Liberal de Honduras — PLH), one of Hon- 
duras 's traditional political parties, handily defeated Osvaldo Ra- 
mos Soto of the more conservative National Party of Honduras 
(Partido Nacional de Honduras — PNH). The 62 percent turnout 
for the elections was low by Honduran standards, however, and 
some political observers attributed the low turnout to a lack of en- 
thusiasm among the voters for either candidate. Analysts also in- 
dicated that although the 51 percent victory for Reina appeared 
to be a clear mandate, many of the voters cast ballots against the 
unpopular Ramos Soto rather than for Reina and his policies. 

During the campaign, Reina ran on a traditional PLH platform 
of antimilitarism and social reform. In addition, he called for a 
"moral revolution" to combat the widespread corruption that many 
felt permeated Honduran society and government. His clean image 
and calls for reform struck a sympathetic chord with the electorate. 
Reina was well known to Honduran voters — the sixty-seven-year- 
old lawyer was a lifelong politician who had been jailed in the 1970s 
for opposing policies of the military government, had worked dur- 
ing the 1980s for international human rights organizations, and 
had represented Honduras on the International Court of Justice. 

Economic problems were the first challenge to the new presi- 
dent. Although the previous administration followed strict fiscal 
policies in its first three years in power, it went on a spending spree 
during its last few months. Inflation for the first two months of 
1994 jumped to 16 percent, and the rapidly deteriorating economic 
situation forced the Reina administration to act quickly. It devalued 



xxviii 



the lempira (for value — see Glossary) from US$1 =6.2 to 
US$1 = 7.3 in February, froze the price of forty-four basic food- 
stuffs for seventy days, and announced plans to sell state enterprises. 

In March 1994, Reina outlined his administration's policies in 
his state-of-the-union address. Social programs, especially those 
designed to lower the number of people living in poverty, cut the 
infant mortality rate, and increase child nutrition programs, would 
be given priority. Although the overall budget was cut 10 percent, 
social programs would increase to 35 percent of total government 
expenditures. Reina blamed many of Honduras' s economic 
problems on corruption and urged the public and the nation's press 
to join him in his " moral revolution" to fight corruption at all levels. 
He vowed to rid the government of political appointees who did 
little work and promised to send a code of conduct for public em- 
ployees to the National Congress for approval. Reina also promised 
to reduce the size of the armed forces and end the draft. 

In the first step of his moral revolution, Reina established a new 
Ministry of the Public, charged with investigating charges of cor- 
ruption and abolished Fusep. Independent of the government, an 
additional responsibility of the Ministry of the Public was oversight 
of the Department of Criminal Investigation (Departamento de 
Investigaciones Criminales), created to replace the much-criticized 
National Directorate of Investigation (Directorio de Investigation 
Nacional), the special intelligence unit of the armed forces. 

In April a bill was submitted to the National Congress to end 
the military draft. Military service had been a major issue for most 
Hondurans because of the way recruits were obtained. Although 
all Honduran men are required to serve two years, draft lists were 
commonly ignored, and recruits were obtained by forced conscrip- 
tion of young, usually poor, men off the streets. The armed forces 
commander in chief, Luis Alonso Discua Elvir, complained that 
the armed forces would lack sufficient personnel if the draft (and 
the press-gang technique of gathering new soldiers) were abolished. 
In a surprise move, however, the military announced it would abide 
by the National Congress's decision, and the measure was even- 
tually passed. 

Despite attempts to increase social spending, the overall econo- 
my continued to deteriorate throughout 1994. The largest problem, 
however, proved not to be government fiscal policies but rather 
a severe energy crisis. A nationwide drought lowered the level of 
water in the Francisco Morazan dam, the country's principal source 
of electricity. The dam was producing only half of its 300-megawatt 
capacity in June after one of its four generators had to be shut down. 
Rotating blackouts of twelve hours per day crippled industrial 



xxix 



production. Food and fuel prices were increased in the autumn to 
compensate for increased transportation costs. By the end of 1994, 
officials of the Roman Catholic Church warned that social unrest 
would increase if the economic crisis continued to deepen. 

Although politically more stable than perhaps at any other time 
in its history, in late 1994 the country still faced daunting economic 
and social problems. The transportation and communication sys- 
tem was woefully inadequate for the nation's needs. Per capita in- 
come stood at US$650, one of the lowest figures in the Western 
Hemisphere. At least 40 percent of the total population was illiter- 
ate. Less than half the population completed elementary school. 
Health care for the rural population (about 50 percent of the total) 
and much of the urban poor was practically nonexistent. Malnutri- 
tion and disease were widespread. And despite government calls 
for increased spending on social programs, stringent budgetary 
measures presaged less, rather than more, money for government 
programs to improve health and education facilities. Given the grim 
social indicators, it is surprising that Honduras has managed to 
avoid, so far, the political violence that has plagued its neighbors 
with similar social problems. The question for Honduras in the 
future undoubtedly will be how best, with its limited resources, 
to deal with the growing pressures on its society while avoiding 
domestic unrest. 



December 22, 1994 Tim L. Merrill 



XXX 



Chapter 1. Historical Setting 




Altar with representation of Mayan death god, in Copdn 



THROUGHOUT ITS HISTORY, Honduras has been an under- 
developed area. Its rugged topography and lack of good ports on 
the Pacific coast have combined to keep it relatively isolated from 
the mainstream of social and economic development. The capital, 
Tegucigalpa, is located high in the central mountains, removed 
from the isthmus's main north-south transportation routes. 

The rugged topography and semi-isolation have provided Hon- 
duras some advantages as well as disadvantages. Unlike the neigh- 
boring republics of El Salvador and Guatemala, Honduras did not 
produce a totally dominant landholding oligarchy. It also escaped 
the turmoil over transisthmian transit routes that plagued Nicaragua 
and Panama. Finally, Honduras, alone among Central America's 
republics, is not dominated by a single city. The isolation of the 
capital led to the rise of San Pedro Sula in the twentieth century 
as the nation's commercial and industrial center. 

However, lack of development produced, for much of Honduras' s 
history, relatively weak social and political institutions. Much of 
the nation's history has been marked by long periods of political 
instability, frequent military coups, and considerable government 
corruption and inefficiency. External powers have consistently ex- 
ploited and aggravated these problems. Neighboring Central Ameri- 
can nations have repeatedly intervened in Honduran internal 
affairs, giving Hondurans a strong fear of foreign attack. Coun- 
tries outside the region also have manipulated Honduran politics 
from time to time to suit their own national interests. During the 
first half of the twentieth century, the Honduran economy was so 
dominated by the United Fruit Company and the Standard Fruit 
Company that company managers were frequently perceived as 
exercising as much power as the Honduran president. Increased 
nationalism and economic diversification have changed this situa- 
tion in recent decades, but in the early 1990s, Honduras remained 
a nation highly sensitive to and dependent on external forces. 
Despite both national and international efforts, Honduras remained 
poor and vulnerable. In the 1980s, security concerns centered on 
the Nicaraguan border; in the early 1990s, concern centered on 
El Salvador because of its insurgency problems and its boundary 
dispute with Honduras. 

Both a product and a victim of its past, in the mid-1990s, Hon- 
duras was striving to find some means of gaining the benefits of 



3 



Honduras: A Country Study 

modernization while avoiding the violent conflicts that wracked its 
neighbors in the 1980s. 

Pre-Columbian Society 
The Mayan Heritage 

Pre-Columbian Honduras was populated by a complex mixture 
of indigenous peoples representing a wide variety of cultural back- 
grounds and linguistic groups — the most advanced and notable of 
which were related to the Maya of the Yucatan and Guatemala. 
Mayan civilization had reached western Honduras in the fifth cen- 
tury A.D., probably spreading from lowland Mayan centers in 
Guatemala's Peten region. The Maya spread rapidly through the 
Rio Motagua Valley, centering their control on the major cere- 
monial center of Copan, near the present-day town of Santa Rosa 
de Copan. For three and a half centuries, the Maya developed the 
city, making it one of the principal centers of their culture. At one 
point, Copan was probably the leading center for both astronomi- 
cal studies — in which the Maya were quite advanced — and art. One 
of the longest Mayan hieroglyphic inscriptions ever discovered was 
found at Copan. The Maya also established extensive trade net- 
works spanning as far as central Mexico. 

Then, at the height of the Mayan civilization, Copan was ap- 
parently abandoned. The last dated hieroglyph in Copan is 800 
A.D. Much of the population evidently remained in the area after 
that, but the educated class — the priests and rulers who built the 
temples, inscribed the glyphs, and developed the astronomy and 
mathematics — suddenly vanished. Copan fell into ruin, and the 
descendants of the Maya who remained had no memory of the 
meanings of the inscriptions or of the reasons for the sudden fall. 

Other Indigenous Groups 

Following the period of Mayan dominance, the area that would 
eventually comprise Honduras was occupied by a multiplicity of 
indigenous peoples. Indigenous groups related to the Toltec of cen- 
tral Mexico migrated from the northwest into parts of what be- 
came western and southern Honduras. Most notable were the 
Toltec- speaking Chorotega, who established themselves near the 
present-day city of Choluteca. Later enclaves of Nahua- speaking 
peoples, such as the Pipil, whose language was related to that of 
the Aztec, established themselves at various locations from the 
Caribbean coast to the Golfo de Fonseca on the Pacific coast. 

While groups related to indigenous peoples of Mexico moved 
into western and southern Honduras, other peoples with languages 



4 



Historical Setting 



related to those of the Chibcha of Colombia were establishing them- 
selves in areas that became northeastern Honduras. Most promi- 
nent among these were the Ulva and Paya speakers. Along the 
Caribbean coast, a variety of groups settled. Most important were 
the Sumu, who were also located in Nicaragua, and the Jicaque, 
whose language family has been a source of debate among schol- 
ars. Finally, in parts of what is now west-central Honduras were 
the Lenca, who also were believed to have migrated north from 
Colombia but whose language shows little relation to any other in- 
digenous group. 

Although divided into numerous distinct and frequently hostile 
groups, the indigenous inhabitants of preconquest Honduras (be- 
fore the early 1500s) carried on considerable trade with other parts 
of their immediate region as well as with areas as far away as Pan- 
ama and Mexico. Although it appears that no major cities were 
in existence at the time of the conquest, the total population was 
nevertheless fairly high. Estimates range up to 2 million, although 
the actual figure was probably nearer to 500,000. 

Spanish Conquest and Settlement 
The Initial Explorations 

European contacts with the indigenous population of Honduras 
began with the final voyage of Christopher Columbus. In 1502 
Columbus sailed past the Islas de la Bahia (Bay Islands) and shortly 
thereafter reached the mainland of Central America. While at one 
of the islands, Columbus discovered and seized a large canoe loaded 
with a wide variety of trade goods. Evidence seems to indicate that 
the canoe's occupants were Mayan traders and that their encoun- 
ter with Columbus marked his first direct contact with the civili- 
zations of Mexico and northern Central America. Despite the fact 
that the canoe had been observed coming from the west, Colum- 
bus turned east and then south, sailing away from the civilizations 
and doing little exploring on the Honduran coast. His only direct 
legacy was the assigning of a few place-names on the Caribbean 
coast, notably Guanaja for one of the Islas de la Bahia, Cabo Gra- 
cias a Dios for the eastern extremity of Honduras, and Honduras 
(depths in Spanish) for the overall region. The latter name sug- 
gests the deep waters off the northern coast. 

Little exploration took place for the next two decades. Spanish 
navigators Juan Diaz de Soils and Vicente Yafiez Pinzon proba- 
bly touched on part of the Honduran coast in 1508 but devoted 
most of their efforts to exploring farther north. Some expeditions 
from the islands of Cuba and Hispaniola may have reached the 



5 



Honduras: A Country Study 



mainland and encountered the population of the Islas de la Bahfa 
in the second decade of the century, but otherwise the Honduran 
Caribbean coast was a neglected area. 

Interest in the mainland was dramatically revived as a result of 
the expedition of Hernan Cortes to Mexico. While Cortes was com- 
pleting his conquest of the Aztec, expeditions from Mexico, Pana- 
ma, and the Caribbean began to move into Central America. In 
1523 part of an expedition headed by Gil Gonzalez Davila discov- 
ered the Golfo de Fonseca on the Pacific coast, naming it in honor 
of Bishop Rodriguez de Fonseca. The following year, four separate 
Spanish land expeditions began the conquest of Honduras. 

The Era of the Conquistadors 

The nearly simultaneous invasions of Honduras in 1524 by rival 
Spanish expeditions began an era of conflict among rival Spanish 
claimants as well as with the indigenous population. The major 
initial expeditions were led by Gonzalez Davila, who hoped to carve 
out a territory for his own rule, and by Cristobal de Olid, who 
was dispatched from Cuba by Cortes. Once in Honduras, however, 
Olid succumbed to personal ambition and attempted to establish 
his own independent authority. Word of this reached Cortes in 
Mexico, and to restore his own authority, he ordered yet another 
expedition, this one under the command of Francisco de Las Ca- 
sas. Then, doubting the trustworthiness of any subordinate, Cortes 
set out for Honduras himself. The situation was further compli- 
cated by the entry into Honduras of expeditions from Guatemala 
under Pedro de Alvarado and from Nicaragua under Hernando 
de Soto. 

In the initial struggle for power, Olid seemed to gain the upper 
hand, capturing both Gonzalez Davila and Las Casas. His cap- 
tives, however, having managed to subvert the loyalty of some of 
Olid's men, took Olid prisoner, and then promptly beheaded him. 
Although later condemned for this action by a Mexican court, none 
of the conspirators ever suffered any real punishment. 

The arrival of Cortes in Honduras in 1525 temporarily restored 
some order to the Spanish conquest. He established his own authori- 
ty over the rival claimants, obtained the submission of numerous 
indigenous chiefs, and tried to promote the creation of Spanish 
towns. His own headquarters was located at Trujillo on the Carib- 
bean coast. In April 1526, Cortes returned to Mexico, and the re- 
maining Spaniards resumed their strife. 

Some order was again restored in October of that year when the 
first royal governor, Diego Lopez de Salcedo, arrived. Lopez de 
Salcedo's policies, however, drove many indigenous people, once 



6 




7 



Honduras: A Country Study 

pacified by Cortes, into open revolt. His attempt to extend his juris- 
diction into Nicaragua resulted in his imprisonment by the authori- 
ties there. After agreeing to a Nicaraguan- imposed definition of 
the boundary between the two provinces, Lopez de Salcedo was 
released but did not return to Honduras until 1529. 

The early 1530s were not prosperous for Honduras. Renewed 
fighting among the Spaniards, revolts, and decimation of the set- 
tled indigenous population through disease, mistreatment, and ex- 
portation of large numbers to the Caribbean islands as slaves left 
the colony on the edge of collapse by 1534. The Spanish crown 
renamed the depressed province as Honduras-Higueras, subdivid- 
ing it into two districts. Higueras encompassed the western part 
while the rest remained known as Honduras. The decline in popu- 
lation of the province continued, and only the direct intervention 
of Pedro de Alvarado from Guatemala in 1536 kept Higueras from 
being abandoned. Alvarado was attracted by the prospect of gold 
in the region, and, with the help of native Guatemalans who ac- 
companied him, he soon developed a profitable gold-mining in- 
dustry centered in the newly established town of Gracias. 

The discovery of gold and silver deposits attracted new settlers 
and increased the demand for indigenous labor. The enforced labor, 
however, led to renewed resistance by the native people that cul- 
minated in a major uprising in 1537. The leader of the uprising 
was a capable young Lenca chieftain known as Lempira (after whom 
the Honduran national monetary unit would eventually be named). 
Lempira established his base on a fortified hill known as the Pefiol 
de Cerqum and until 1538 successfully defeated all efforts to sub- 
due him. Inspired by his example, other native inhabitants began 
revolting, and the entire district of Higueras seemed imperiled. 
Lempira was ultimately murdered while negotiating with the 
Spaniards. After his death, resistance rapidly disintegrated, although 
some fighting continued through 1539. 

The defeat of Lempira' s revolt accelerated the decimation of the 
indigenous population. In 1539 an estimated 15,000 native Ameri- 
cans remained under Spanish control; two years later, there were 
only 8,000. Most of these were divided into encomiendas, a system 
that left the native people in their villages but placed them under 
the control of individual Spanish settlers. Under terms of the enco- 
mienda system, the Spaniards were supposed to provide the in- 
digenous people with religious instruction and collect tribute from 
them for the crown. In return, the Spaniards were entitled to a 
supposedly limited use of indigenous labor. As the native popula- 
tion declined, the setders exploited those remaining even more ruth- 
lessly. This exploitation led to a clash between the Spanish settlers 



8 



Historical Setting 



and authorities on one side and on the other side the Roman Catho- 
lic Church led by Father Cristobal de Pedraza, who in 1542 be- 
came the first bishop of Honduras. Bishop Pedraza, like others after 
him, had little success in his efforts to protect the native people. 

Colonial Honduras 

The Spread of Colonization and the Growth of Mining 

The defeat of Lempira's revolt, the establishment of the bishopric 
(first at Trujillo, then at Comayagua after Pedraza' s death), and 
the decline in fighting among rival Spanish factions all contributed 
to expanded settlement and increased economic activity in the 
1540s. A variety of agricultural activities was developed, including 
cattle ranching and, for a time, the harvesting of large quantities 
of sarsaparilla root. But the key economic activity of sixteenth- 
century Honduras was mining gold and silver. 

The initial mining centers were located near the Guatemalan 
border, around Gracias. In 1538 these mines produced significant 
quantities of gold. In the early 1540s, the center for mining shifted 
eastward to the Rio Guayape Valley, and silver joined gold as a 
major product. This change contributed to the rapid decline of Gra- 
cias and the rise of Comayagua as the center of colonial Honduras. 
The demand for labor also led to further revolts and accelerated 
the decimation of the native population. As a result, African slav- 
ery was introduced into Honduras, and by 1545 the province may 
have had as many as 2,000 slaves. Other gold deposits were found 
near San Pedro Sula and the port of Trujillo. 

By the late 1540s, Honduras seemed headed for relative pros- 
perity and influence, a development marked by the establishment 
in 1 544 of the regional audiencia (see Glossary) of Guatemala with 
its capital at Gracias, Honduras. The audiencia was a Spanish 
governmental unit encompassing both judicial and legislative func- 
tions whose president held the additional tides of governor and cap- 
tain general (hence the alternative name of Captaincy General of 
Guatemala). The location of the capital was bitterly resented by 
the more populous centers in Guatemala and El Salvador, and in 
1549 the capital of the audiencia was moved to Antigua, Guatemala. 

Mining production began to decline in the 1560s, and Honduras 
rapidly declined in importance. The subordination of Honduras 
to the Captaincy General of Guatemala had been reaffirmed with 
the move of the capital to Antigua, and the status of Honduras 
as a province within the Captaincy General of Guatemala would 
be maintained until independence. Beginning in 1569, new silver 



9 



Honduras: A Country Study 

strikes in the interior briefly revived the economy and led to the 
founding of the town of Tegucigalpa, which soon began to rival 
Comayagua as the most important town in the province. But the 
silver boom peaked in 1584, and economic depression returned 
shortly thereafter. Mining efforts in Honduras were hampered by 
a lack of capital and labor, difficult terrain, the limited size of many 
gold and silver deposits, and bureaucratic regulations and incompe- 
tence. Mercury, vital to the production of silver, was constantly 
in short supply; once an entire year's supply was lost through the 
negligence of officials. By the seventeenth century, Honduras had 
become a poor and neglected backwater of the Spanish colonial 
empire, having a scattered population of mestizos, native people, 
blacks, and a handful of Spanish rulers and landowners. 

Colonial Society, Economy, and Government 

Although mining provided much of the limited revenue Hon- 
duras generated for the Spanish crown, a majority of the inhabi- 
tants were engaged in agriculture. Attempts to promote agricultural 
exports had limited success, however, and most production re- 
mained on a subsistence level. If anything, the province became 
more rural during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. As 
a result of economic declines or foreign attacks, several town govern- 
ments simply ceased to function during this period. 

The cattle industry was probably the most important agricul- 
tural activity. Much of the cattie industry was on a small scale, 
but by 1714 six ranchers in the areas of the present-day depart- 
ments of Yoro and Olancho owned over 1 ,000 head of cattle each. 
Some of the cattle were driven to Guatemala for sale. Such sales, 
however, occasionally produced meat shortages in Honduras and 
led to conflicts between Guatemalan and Honduran provincial 
officials. 

Much of the Honduran interior remained uncolonized and out- 
side of effective Spanish control during the colonial era. The Ji- 
caque, fleeing into the hills, managed to retain considerable cultural 
autonomy. Other indigenous groups, however, were increasingly 
brought under Spanish influence and began to lose their separate 
identities. This assimilation was facilitated by occasional expedi- 
tions of government and church officials into new areas. One such 
expedition into Yoro in 1689 found forty villages of native people 
living outside of effective Spanish control. 

By the end of the seventeenth century, governing Honduras had 
become a frustrating, thankless task. Only Comayagua, with 144 
families, and Tegucigalpa, with 135, had over 100 Spanish set- 
tlers. The province boasted litde in the way of education or culture. 



10 



Historical Setting 



The lack of good ports, especially on the Pacific coast, limited con- 
tacts with the outside world. Whenever possible, the Spanish 
colonists forced native people to move to the Tegucigalpa area, 
where they were available for labor in the mines. However, illegal 
resettlement and corruption in the mining industry — where every 
available ruse was used to avoid paying taxes — created a constant 
series of problems for colonial authorities. Smuggling, especially 
on the Caribbean coast, was also a serious problem. 

Early in the eighteenth century, the Bourbon Dynasty, linked 
to the rulers of France, replaced the Habsburgs on the throne of 
Spain and brought change to Honduras. The new dynasty began 
a series of reforms throughout the empire designed to make ad- 
ministration more efficient and profitable and to facilitate the 
defense of the colonies. Among these reforms was a reduction in 
the tax on precious minerals and in the cost of mercury, which was 
a royal monopoly. In Honduras these reforms contributed to a 
revival of the mining industry in the 1730s. Efforts to promote the 
Honduran tobacco industry as a royal monopoly proved less ef- 
fective and encountered stiff local opposition. The same was true 
of plans to improve tax collection. Ultimately, the Bourbons 
abolished most of the corrupt local governmental units, replacing 
them in 1787 with a system of intendencias (the name of the new 
local unit and also its administrator, a royal official who super- 
vised tax collections and commercial matters, controlled prices and 
credit, and exercised some judicial functions). 

Anglo-Spanish Rivalry 

A major problem for Spanish rulers of Honduras was the ac- 
tivity of the English along the northern Caribbean coast. These 
activities began in the late sixteenth century and continued into 
the nineteenth century. In the early years, Dutch as well as En- 
glish corsairs (pirates) attacked the Caribbean coast, but as time 
passed the threat came almost exclusively from the English. In 1643 
one English expedition destroyed the town of Trujillo, the major 
port for Honduras, leaving it virtually abandoned for over a 
century. 

Destructive as they were, raiding expeditions were lesser problems 
than other threats. Beginning in the seventeenth century, English 
efforts to plant colonies along the Caribbean coast and in the Islas 
de la Bahia threatened to cut Honduras off from the Caribbean 
and raised the possibility of the loss of much of its territory. The 
English effort on the Honduran coast was heavily dependent on 
the support of groups known as the Sambo and the Miskito, ra- 
cially mixed peoples of native American and African ancestry who 



11 



Honduras: A Country Study 

were usually more than willing to attack Spanish settlements (see 
Boundary Disputes, ch. 2). 

British settlers were interested largely in trading, lumbering, and 
producing pitch. During the numerous eighteenth-century wars 
between Britain and Spain, however, the British crown found any 
activity that challenged Spanish hegemony on the Caribbean coast 
of Central America to be desirable. Major British settlements were 
established at Cabo Gracias a Dios and to the west at the mouth 
of the Rio Sico, as well as on the Islas de la Bahfa. By 1759 a Spanish 
agent estimated the population in the Rio Sico area as 3,706. 

Under the Bourbons, the revitalized Spanish government made 
several efforts to regain control over the Caribbean coast. In 1752 
a major fort was constructed at San Fernando de Omoa near the 
Guatemalan border. In 1 780 the Spanish returned in force to Truji- 
llo, which they began developing as a base for expeditions against 
British settlements to the east. During the 1780s, the Spanish 
regained control over the Islas de la Bahia and drove the majority 
of the British and their allies out of the area around Black River. 
A British expedition briefly recaptured Black River, but the terms 
of the Anglo-Spanish Convention of 1786 gave definitive recogni- 
tion to Spanish sovereignty over the Caribbean coast. 

The Early Independence Years, 1821-99 
The Collapse of Spanish Rule 

In the early nineteenth century, Spanish power went into rapid 
decline. Although Spain was allied with France during the 
Napoleonic Wars, in 1808 Napoleon Bonaparte forced the Span- 
ish king to abdicate and put a Bonaparte on the Spanish throne. 
In response, Spanish people erupted in revolt in Madrid and 
throughout Spain, setting off a chain of uprisings in Latin Ameri- 
ca. In Honduras, resentment against rule by the exiled Spanish 
king increased rapidly, especially because increased taxes for Spain's 
struggle against the French threatened the cattle industry. In 1812 
disturbances that broke out in Tegucigalpa were more linked to 
long-standing rivalry with Comayagua, however, than to opposi- 
tion to Spanish rule. The disturbances were quickly controlled, and, 
to appease local discontent, the municipal government of Tegucigal- 
pa was reestablished. 

The rivalry between Tegucigalpa and Comayagua helped precipi- 
tate the final collapse of Spanish authority in Honduras. A new 
Spanish administration attempted to transfer Comayagua' s tobacco 
factory to Tegucigalpa. This move led to defiance by Comayagua, 



12 



Historical Setting 



which refused to acknowledge the authority of the government in 
Guatemala. The weakened Spanish government was unable to end 
Comayagua's defiance, and for a time civil strife threatened to break 
out. Conflict was averted by the decision made by all the Central 
American provinces on September 15, 1821, to declare their in- 
dependence from Spain. This action failed to resolve the dispute 
between Tegucigalpa and Comayagua, however; the former now 
urged the creation of a unified Central American state, while the 
latter favored union with the Empire of Mexico under the rule of 
General Augustm de Iturbide. Ultimately, Comayagua's position 
prevailed, and in early 1822 the Central American provinces 
declared their allegiance to Mexico. 

This union lasted just over a year and produced few if any benefits^ 
for either party. In March 1823, Iturbide was overthrown in Mex- 
ico, and the empire was replaced by a republic. The Central Ameri- 
can Congress, in which Comayagua but not Tegucigalpa was 
represented, was quickly convened. With little debate, the United 
Provinces of Central America declared their independence from 
Mexico. Mexico's only effort to reverse this decision consisted in 
maintaining control over Chiapas, the northernmost of the six previ- 
ous provinces of Central America. 

The United Provinces of Central America 

From its 1823 inception, the new federation (the United Provinces 
of Central America) faced a series of ultimately unresolvable 
problems. Instead of engendering a spirit of unity, Spanish rule 
had fostered divisions and local suspicions. In the case of Honduras, 
this divisiveness was epitomized by the rivalry between Tegucigalpa 
and Comayagua. There was even some sentiment for admitting 
these two cities as separate provinces within the federation, but 
that proposal was ultimately rejected. In addition, much of the 
region was suspicious of Guatemalan ambitions to dominate Cen- 
tral America and wished to retain all possible local authority rather 
than surrender any to a central government. 

At least equally serious was the division of the politically active 
population into conservative and liberal factions. The conserva- 
tives favored a more centralized government; a proclerical policy, 
including a church monopoly over education; and a more aris- 
tocratic form of government based on traditional Spanish values. 
The liberals wanted greater local autonomy and a restricted role 
for the church, as well as political and economic development as 
in the United States and parts of Western Europe. The conser- 
vatives favored keeping native people in their traditional, subser- 
vient position, while the liberals aimed at eventually eliminating 



13 



Honduras: A Country Study 

indigenous society by incorporating it into the national, Hispanic 
culture. 

At the time of Central American independence (1823), Honduras 
was among the least-developed and least-populated provinces. In 
1824 its population was estimated at just over 137,000. Despite 
its meager population, Honduras produced two of the most promi- 
nent leaders of the federation, the liberal Francisco Morazan (nick- 
named the "George Washington of Central America") and the 
conservative Jose Cecilio del Valle. In 1823 del Valle was narrowly 
defeated by liberal Manuel Jose Arce for election as the federa- 
tion's first president. Morazan overthrew Arce in 1829 and was 
elected president of the federation in 1830, defeating del Valle. 

The beginning of Morazan 's administration in 1830 saw some 
efforts to reform and promote education. Success was limited, 
however, because of lack of funds and internal fighting. In the elec- 
tions of 1834, del Valle defeated Morazan, but del Valle died 
before taking office, and the legislature offered Morazan the 
presidency. With clerical support, a conservative uprising began 
in Guatemala in 1837, and within a year the federation had begun 
to dissolve. On May 30, 1838, the Central American Congress re- 
moved Morazan from office, declared that the individual states 
could establish their own governments, and on July 7 recognized 
these as "sovereign, free, and independent political bodies." 

The Development of an Independent Nation, 1838-99 

For Honduras, the period of federation had been disastrous. Lo- 
cal rivalries and ideological disputes had produced political chaos 
and disrupted the economy. The British had taken advantage of 
the chaotic condition to reestablish their control over the Islas de 
la Bahfa. As a result, Honduras wasted littie time in formally seced- 
ing from the federation once it was free to do so. Independence 
was declared on November 15, 1838, and in January 1839, an in- 
dependent constitution was formally adopted. Morazan then ruled 
only El Salvador, and in 1839 his forces there were attacked by 
a Honduran army commanded by General Francisco Ferrera. Fer- 
rera was defeated but returned to attack again in the summer, only 
to suffer another defeat. The following year, Morazan himself was 
overthrown, and two years later he was shot in Costa Rica during 
a final, futile attempt to restore the United Provinces of Central 
America. 

For Honduras, the first decades of independence were neither 
peaceful nor prosperous. The country's political turmoil attracted 
the ambitions of individuals and nations within and outside of Cen- 
tral America. Even geography contributed to its misfortunes. Alone 



14 



Historical Setting 



among the Central American republics, Honduras had a border 
with the three potential rivals for regional hegemony — Guatemala, 
El Salvador, and Nicaragua (see fig. 2). This situation was exacer- 
bated by the political division throughout the isthmus between liber- 
als and conservatives. Any liberal or conservative regime saw a 
government of the opposite ideology on its borders as a potential 
threat. In addition, exiled opposition figures tended to gather in 
states whose governments shared their political affiliation and to 
use these states as launching pads for efforts to topple their own 
governments. For the remainder of the century, Honduras 's neigh- 
bors would constantly interfere in its internal politics. 

After the fifteen-month interim presidency of Francisco Zelaya 
Ayes (1839-40), conservative General Ferrera became independent 
Honduras's first elected president. Ferrera's two-year term (1841-42) 
was followed by a five-year period in which he alternately named 
himself president or allowed the congress to name an interim presi- 
dent while he maintained control of the country by holding the post 
then known as minister of war. Ferrera's last notable act was the 
unsuccessful attempt to depose the liberal Morazan as president 
of El Salvador. In 1847 Ferrera allowed fellow-conservative Juan 
Lindo Zelaya to assume the presidency. Under Lindo's presiden- 
cy, a new constitution was adopted in 1848, and some effort was 
made to promote education, but any effort to make substantial im- 
provements in the country's situation was doomed by continuing 
turmoil. 

During Lindo's presidency (1847-52), the British began pres- 
suring Honduras for the payment of debts and other claims. In 
1849 a British naval force briefly occupied the port of Trujillo, de- 
stroying property and extorting 1,200 pesos from the local govern- 
ment. The following year, Lindo's own vice president revolted and 
was prevented from seizing power only through the military inter- 
vention of El Salvador and Nicaragua. All this turmoil may help 
to explain why Lindo refused an additional presidential term and 
instead turned over power in 1852 to the opposition liberals, headed 
by Trinidad Cabanas (1852-55). Three years later, the conservative 
government of Guatemala invaded Honduras and ousted Cabanas, 
installing in his place the conservative leader, Santos Guardiola. 

The fighting between liberals and conservatives was temporarily 
set aside because of the 1855 appearance in Central America of 
an American soldier of fortune, William Walker, who established 
himself as president of Nicaragua in 1856. Cabanas briefly consid- 
ered seeking Walker's aid in attempting to return to power. In- 
stead, armies from all the countries of Central America joined to 



15 



Honduras: A Country Study 




Figure 2. Honduras in Its Central American Setting, 1993 

oppose Walker, who was forced to abandon Nicaragua in 1857 and 
return to the United States. 

In 1859 the British agreed to a treaty that recognized Hondu- 
ran sovereignty over the Islas de la Bahia. Some of the British set- 
tlers in the area objected to this transfer and appealed to Walker 
for help. Walker evidentiy thought that his return to Central Ameri- 
ca would be welcomed by the Honduran liberals, who were once 
again trying to oust Guardiola. Walker landed on the Honduran 
coast in 1860 but found little support and encountered determined 
opposition from both the Hondurans and the British. He surren- 
dered to the British, who promptly handed him over to Honduran 
authorities. A few days later in 1860, he died in front of a Hondu- 
ran firing squad. 

The return of the Islas de la Bahfa and the death of Walker end- 
ed the immediate threat to Honduran territorial integrity, but other 
Central American nations continued to be involved in Honduran 
internal affairs. Guardiola was assassinated by his own honor guard 
in 1862, and the following decade witnessed the presidency change 
hands almost twenty times. General Jose Maria Medina served 



16 



Historical Setting 



as president or dictator eleven times during that period, but 
Guatemalan intervention in 1876 drove him and his conservative 
supporters from power. 

From 1876 until 1882, liberal president Marco Aurelio Soto 
governed Honduras with the support of Guatemalan strongman 
General Justo Rufino Barrios. Soto succeeded not only in restor- 
ing order but also in implementing some basic reforms in finance, 
education, and public administration. But in 1883, he too fell into 
disfavor with Barrios and was forced to resign. His successor, 
General Luis Bogran, survived in office until 1891 when General 
Poinciana Leiva (who had ruled briefly three times from 1873-76) 
was returned to power in a manipulated election. Although a liberal, 
Leiva tried to rule as an absolute dictator, dissolving the fledgling 
Liberal Party of Honduras (Partido Liberal de Honduras — PLH) 
and deporting its leaders. The result was another round of civil 
conflict from which the reconstituted PLH ultimately emerged vic- 
torious. The PLH was led by Policarpo Bonilla, with the support 
of Nicaragua's liberal dictator, Jose Santos Zelaya. 

When Bonilla assumed power in 1894, he began to restore a 
limited degree of order to the Honduran political scene. Another 
constitution was promulgated in 1895, and Bonilla was elected to 
a four-year term. Bonilla' s administration revised civil codes, im- 
proved communications, and began an effort to resolve the long- 
standing boundary dispute with Nicaragua. Bonilla also ensured 
that in 1899, at the end of his term, he would be succeeded by his 
military commander, General Terencio Sierra. 

The combined impact of civil strife and foreign interventions 
had doomed Honduras to a position of relative economic and so- 
cial backwardness throughout the nineteenth century. The coun- 
try had remained overwhelmingly rural; Tegucigalpa, Comayagua, 
and San Pedro Sula were the only towns of any size. In the early 
1850s, the total population was estimated at 350,000, the over- 
whelming majority of whom were mestizos. By 1914 the popula- 
tion had grown to only 562,000. 

Opportunities for education and culture were limited at best. 
Mid-nineteenth century records indicate that Honduras had no 
libraries and no regularly published newspapers. Two universities 
were maintained, although their quality was questionable. By the 
1870s, only 275 schools, having approximately 9,000 pupils, ex- 
isted in the entire country. In 1873-74, the government budgeted 
only the equivalent of US$720 for education, a sum designated for 
the national university. 

Throughout the nineteenth century, Hondurans looked to min- 
ing as a means of improving their economic position. The mining 



17 



Honduras: A Country Study 

industry had fallen into severe neglect in the first decades of the 
century, however. Many mines had been abandoned and flooded. 
During the years following independence, efforts to revive the 
industry were generally frustrating for both domestic and foreign 
entrepreneurs. Effort after effort was abandoned because of civil 
disturbances, lack of transportation, and poor health conditions. 

Mining was revived somewhat in the 1880s. A key factor in this 
revival was the activity of the New York and Honduras Rosario 
Mining Company (NYHRMC), which had expanded rapidly and 
had become a major economic and political power within Hon- 
duras. Owing in part to the company's efforts, the Honduran 
government had allowed foreign mining companies to operate in 
Honduras with a minimum of restrictions and a virtual exemp- 
tion from taxes. By 1889 the company was annually shipping bul- 
lion with a value of over US$700,000 to the United States. Profits 
from this operation were extremely high; the company's dividends 
for the first half of 1889 totaled US$150,000. 

The NYHRMC 's success attracted other companies to Hondur- 
as, and gold and silver exports became the principal source of 
foreign exchange for the rest of the century. The NYHRMC 's suc- 
cess stood alone, however; most of the nearly 100 other companies 
were total failures. The Yuscaran Mining and Milling Company 
sold over US$5 million in stock but failed to begin effective produc- 
tion. By the end of the nineteenth century, the brief mining boom 
was in decline, although the NYHRMC would remain a major factor 
in the Honduran economy until the mid- twentieth century. 

Although mining had provided foreign exchange, the vast major- 
ity of Hondurans gained their livelihoods from agriculture, usually 
on a subsistence level. Periodic efforts were made to develop agricul- 
tural exports, but they met with little success. Some tobacco, cat- 
tle, and hides were exported, mostly to neighboring countries. The 
recurring civil conflicts and the resultant confiscation of stock by 
various military commanders, however, put a damper on efforts 
to develop the cattle industry and contributed to its rather back- 
ward status. Some bananas and other fruits were exported from 
the Islas de la Bahia, much of this trade going to New Orleans, 
but the volume was small and the benefit for the rest of the nation 
almost imperceptible. 

Banana Boats and Gunboats: The Rise of United States 
Influence, 1899-1932 

The Growth of the Banana Industry 

Although the peaceful transfer of power from Bonilla to General 



18 



Historical Setting 



Sierra in 1899 was important as the first time in decades that such 
a constitutional transition had taken place, that year was a watershed 
in another, even more important, sense. In 1899 the Vaccaro 
brothers of New Orleans, founders of what would become the Stan- 
dard Fruit and Steamship Company (later known as Standard Fruit 
Company), shipped their first boatload of bananas from Honduras 
to New Orleans. The fruit found a ready market, and the trade 
grew rapidly. By 1902 local railroad lines were being constructed 
on the Caribbean coast to accommodate the expanding banana 
production. 

Sierra's efforts to perpetuate himself in office led to his over- 
throw in 1903 by General Manuel Bonilla, who proved to be an 
even greater friend of the banana companies than Sierra had been. 
Companies gained exemptions from taxes and permission to con- 
struct wharves and roads, as well as permission to improve interi- 
or waterways and to obtain charters for new railroad construction. 

Conservative Manuel Bonilla was an opponent rather than a rela- 
tive or friend of Sierra's liberal predecessor, Policarpo Bonilla. Dur- 
ing Manuel Bonilla' s term in office, he imprisoned ex-president 
Policarpo Bonilla for over two years and took other steps to sup- 
press his political opposition, the liberals, who were the only group 
with an organized political party. The conservatives were divided 
into a host of personalist factions and lacked coherent leadership. 
Manuel Bonilla made some efforts to reorganize the conservatives 
into a "national party." The present-day National Party of Hon- 
duras (Partido Nacional de Honduras — PNH) traces its origins to 
his administration. 

Manuel Bonilla promoted some internal improvements, nota- 
bly road building. He improved the route from Tegucigalpa to the 
Pacific coast. On the international front, he concluded friendship 
pacts with Nicaragua and later with Guatemala and El Salvador. 

Of perhaps greatest significance was the work accomplished dur- 
ing Manuel Bonilla' s administration to delineate the long-disputed 
border with Nicaragua. The area, called the Mosquitia region, was 
located in the eastern part of the country in the department of Gra- 
cias a Dios. The area was large but virtually unpopulated except 
for small groups of Miskito who owed little allegiance to either na- 
tion. In 1894 a treaty provided for the establishment of a bound- 
ary commission, composed of representatives of Honduras and 
Nicaragua, to resolve the dispute. By 1904 the commission had 
been able to agree on only the lower part of the boundary. In that 
year, to reach agreement on the upper part, the representatives 
of the two nations picked King Alfonso XIII of Spain as a neutral, 
third member of the commission, in effect making him the arbiter. 



19 



Honduras: A Country Study 



His decision, announced in 1906, gave the bulk of the disputed 
territory to Honduras, establishing the upper boundary line along 
the Rio Coco. At the time, both governments accepted the deci- 
sion, but in 1912 Nicaragua raised new objections. The dispute 
was finally resolved in favor of the 1906 arbitration only in 1960 
(see Foreign Relations, ch. 4). 

In 1906 Manuel Bonilla successfully resisted an invasion from 
Guatemala, but this was his last major success. The friendship pact 
with Guatemala and El Salvador signed in 1906 was interpreted 
as an anti-Nicaraguan alliance by the Nicaraguans. Nicaragua's 
powerful President Zelaya began to support exiled Honduran liber- 
als in their efforts to topple Manuel Bonilla, who had become, in 
effect, the Honduran dictator. Supported by elements of the Nic- 
araguan army, the exiles invaded Honduras in February 1907 and 
established a provisional junta. With the assistance of Salvador- 
an troops, Manuel Bonilla tried to resist, but in March his forces 
were decisively beaten in a battle notable for the introduction of 
machine guns into Central American civil strife. 

The Expanded Role of the United States 

Until the early twentieth century, the United States had played 
only a very limited role in internal Honduran political clashes. Be- 
cause there was not a resident United States minister in Tegucigal- 
pa, the minister to Guatemala had been accredited for that position. 
The presence of the United States in the Caribbean increased fol- 
lowing the Spanish- American War (1898), however. The decision 
to build a canal through Panama and expanded commercial ac- 
tivities led to a more active role for the United States government, 
as well as for United States companies. 

By 1907 the United States looked with considerable disfavor on 
the role Zelaya of Nicaragua was playing in regional affairs. When 
the Nicaraguan army entered Honduras in 1907 to overthrow 
Manuel Bonilla, the United States government, believing that 
Zelaya wanted to dominate the entire region, landed marines at 
Puerto Cortes to protect the North American banana trade. Other 
United States naval units prevented a Nicaraguan attack on Manuel 
Bonilla' s last position at Amapala in the Golfo de Fonseca. After 
negotiations conducted by the United States naval commander, 
Manuel Bonilla sought refuge on the U.S.S. Chicago, and the fight- 
ing came to an end. The United States charge d'affaires in 
Tegucigalpa took an active role in arranging a final peace settle- 
ment, with which Zelaya was less than happy. The settlement 
provided for the installation of a compromise regime, headed by 
General Miguel Davila, in Tegucigalpa. Davila was a liberal but 



20 



Historical Setting 



was distrusted by Zelaya, who made a secret arrangement with El 
Salvador to oust him from office. This plan failed to reach frui- 
tion, but the United States, alarmed by the threat of renewed con- 
flict in Central America, called the five Central American presidents 
to a conference in Washington in November. 

The Central American Peace Conference of 1907 made a major 
effort to reduce the level of conflict within the region. A Hondu- 
ran proposal to reestablish the political union of the Central Ameri- 
can states failed to achieve acceptance, but several other measures 
were adopted. The five presidents signed the General Treaty of 
Peace and Amity of 1907 pledging themselves to establish the Per- 
manent Central American Court of Justice, which would resolve 
future disputes. The treaty also committed the five countries to 
restrict the activities of exiles from neighboring states and provid- 
ed the basis for legal extraditions. Of special interest was a United 
States-sponsored clause that provided for the permanent neutrali- 
ty of Honduras in any future Central American conflicts. Another 
convention adopted by all five states committed the signers to with- 
hold recognition from governments that seized power by revolu- 
tionary means. The United States and Mexico, which had acted 
as cosponsors of the conference, indicated informally that they would 
also deny recognition to such governments. From the point of view 
of the United States Department of State, these agreements rep- 
resented a major step toward stabilizing Central America in general 
and Honduras in particular. 

The first test of the new treaty involved Honduras. In 1908 op- 
ponents of President Davila, probably supported by Guatemala and 
El Salvador, invaded the country. Nicaragua supported the Hon- 
duran president, and war seemed imminent. Perhaps motivated 
by the possibility of United States intervention, however, the par- 
ties agreed to submit the dispute to the new Central American court. 
The court ultimately rejected the Honduran and Nicaraguan com- 
plaints, but in the meantime the revolt collapsed, thus briefly restor- 
ing peace to Honduras. 

Along with fighting off efforts to overthrow him, President Davila 
made some attempts to modernize Honduras. He invited a Chilean 
officer to establish a regular military academy, which failed to sur- 
vive beyond his time in office. Like his predecessor, Davila en- 
couraged the activities of the banana companies. The companies, 
however, were less than totally happy with him, viewing his ad- 
ministration as ineffective. In addition, rivalry among the compa- 
nies became a factor in Honduran politics. In 1910 Davila' s 
administration granted the Vaccaro brothers a generous rail con- 
cession that included a provision prohibiting any rival line within 



21 



Honduras: A Country Study 

twenty kilometers. This concession angered Samuel Zemurray of 
the newly formed Cuyamel Fruit Company. Zemurray had en- 
couraged and even helped finance the 1908 invasion and was to 
continue to make trouble for the Davila administration. 

Despite the failure of the 1908 uprising, the United States re- 
mained concerned over Honduran instability. The administration 
of William Howard Taft saw the huge Honduran debt, over 
US$120 million, as a contributing factor to this instability and be- 
gan efforts to refinance the largely British debt with provisions for 
a United States customs receivership or some similar arrangement. 
Negotiations were arranged between Honduran representatives and 
New York bankers, headed by J. P. Morgan. By the end of 1909, 
an agreement had been reached providing for a reduction in the 
debt and the issuance of new 5 percent bonds: the bankers would 
control the Honduran railroad, and the United States government 
would guarantee continued Honduran independence and would 
take control of customer revenue. 

The terms proposed by the bankers met with considerable op- 
position in Honduras, further weakening the Davila government. 
A treaty incorporating the key provisions was finally signed in Janu- 
ary 1911 and submitted to the Honduran legislature by Davila. 
However, that body, in a rare display of independence, rejected 
it by a vote of thirty-three to five. 

An uprising in 1911 against Davila interrupted efforts to deal 
with the debt problem. The United States stepped in to mediate 
the conflict, bringing both sides to a conference on one of its war- 
ships. The revolutionaries, headed by former president Manuel 
Bonilla, and the government agreed to a cease-fire and the instal- 
lation of a provisional president who would be selected by the United 
States mediator, Thomas Dawson. Dawson selected Francisco Ber- 
trand, who promised to hold early, free elections, and Davila 
resigned. The 1912 elections were won by Manuel Bonilla, but he 
died after just over a year in office. Bertrand, who had been his 
vice president, returned to the presidency and in 1916 won elec- 
tion for a term that lasted until 1920. 

The relative stability of the 191 1-20 period was difficult to main- 
tain. Revolutionary intrigues continued throughout the period, ac- 
companied by constant rumors that one faction or another was being 
supported by one of the banana companies. Rivalry among these 
companies had escalated in 1910 when the United Fruit Compa- 
ny had entered Honduras. In 1913 United Fruit established the 
Tela Railroad Company and shortly thereafter a similar subsidi- 
ary, the Trujillo Railroad Company. The railroad companies were 
given huge land subsidies by the Honduran government for each 



22 



Historical Setting 



kilometer of track they constructed. The government expected that 
in exchange for land the railroad companies would ultimately build 
a national rail system, providing the capital with its long-sought 
access to the Caribbean. The banana companies, however, had 
other ideas in mind. They used the railroads to open up new banana 
lands, rather than to reach existing cities. Through the resultant 
land subsidies, they soon came to control the overwhelming share 
of the best land along the Caribbean coast. Coastal cities such as 
La Ceiba, Tela, and Trujillo and towns farther inland such as El 
Progreso and La Lima became virtual company towns, and the 
power of the companies often exceeded the authority wielded in 
the region by local governments. 

For the next two decades, the United States government was 
involved in opposing Central American revolutions whether the 
revolutions were supported by foreign governments or by United 
States companies. During the 1912-21 period, warships were fre- 
quently dispatched to areas of revolutionary activity, both to pro- 
tect United States interests and to exert a dampening effect on the 
revolutionaries. In 1917 the disputes among the companies threat- 
ened to involve Honduras in a war with Guatemala. The Cuyamel 
Fruit Company, supported by the Honduran government, had be- 
gun to extend its rail lines into disputed territory along the Guatema- 
lan border. The Guatemalans, supported by the United Fruit 
Company, sent troops into the area, and it seemed for a time that 
war might break out. United States mediation ended the immedi- 
ate threat, but the dispute smoldered until 1930 when a second 
United States mediation finally produced a settlement. 

The development of the banana industry contributed to the be- 
ginnings of organized labor movements in Honduras and to the 
first major strikes in the nation's history. The first of these occurred 
in 1917 against the Cuyamel Fruit Company. The strike was sup- 
pressed by the Honduran military, but the following year addi- 
tional labor disturbances occurred at the Standard Fruit Company's 
holding in La Ceiba. In 1920 a general strike hit the Caribbean 
coast. In response, a United States warship was dispatched to the 
area, and the Honduran government began arresting leaders. When 
Standard Fruit offered a new wage equivalent of US$1 .75 per day, 
the strike ultimately collapsed. Labor troubles in the banana area, 
however, were far from ended. 

World War I had a generally negative impact on Honduras. In 
1914 banana prices began to fall, and, in addition, the war reduced 
the overall amount of agricultural exports. The United States en- 
try into the war in 1917 diverted ships to the war effort, making 
imported goods, such as textiles, scarce. The shortages of goods in 



23 



Honduras: A Country Study 

turn led to inflation, and the decline in trade reduced government 
revenues from tariffs. The banana companies, however, continued 
to prosper; Standard Fruit reported earnings of nearly US$2.5 mil- 
lion in 1917. Despite its problems, Honduras supported the United 
States war effort and declared war on Germany in 1918. 

The Threat of Renewed Instability, 1919-24 

In 1919 it became obvious that Bertrand would refuse to allow 
an open election to choose his successor. Such a course of action 
was opposed by the United States and had little popular support 
in Honduras. The local military commander and governor of 
Tegucigalpa, General Rafael Lopez Gutierrez, took the lead in or- 
ganizing PLH opposition to Bertrand. Lopez Gutierrez also solicited 
support from the liberal government of Guatemala and even from 
the conservative regime in Nicaragua. Bertrand, in turn, sought 
support from El Salvador. Determined to avoid an international 
conflict, the United States, after some hesitation, offered to medi- 
tate the dispute, hinting to the Honduran president that if he re- 
fused the offer, open intervention might follow. Bertrand prompdy 
resigned and left the country. The United States ambassador helped 
arrange the installation of an interim government headed by Fran- 
cisco Bogran, who promised to hold free elections. However, Gen- 
eral Lopez Gutierrez, who now effectively controlled the military 
situation, made it clear that he was determined to be the next presi- 
dent. After considerable negotiation and some confusion, a for- 
mula was worked out under which elections were held. Lopez 
Gutierrez won easily in a manipulated election, and in October 
1920 he assumed the presidency. 

During Bogran' s brief time in office, he had agreed to a United 
States proposal to invite a United States financial adviser to Hon- 
duras. Arthur N. Young of the Department of State was selected 
for this task and began work in Honduras in August 1920, con- 
tinuing to August 1921. While there, Young compiled extensive 
data and made numerous recommendations, even persuading the 
Hondurans to hire a New York police lieutenant to reorganize their 
police forces. Young's investigations clearly demonstrated the 
desperate need for major financial reforms in Honduras, whose 
always precarious budgetary situation was considerably worsened 
by the renewal of revolutionary activities. In 1919, for example, 
the military had spent more than double the amount budgeted for 
it, accounting for over 57 percent of all federal expenditures. 
Young's recommendations for reducing the military budget, 
however, found little favor with the new Lopez Gutierrez adminis- 
tration, and the government's financial condition remained a major 



24 



Historical Setting 



problem. If anything, continued uprisings against the government 
and the threat of a renewed Central American conflict made the 
situation even worse. From 1919 to 1924, the Honduran govern- 
ment expended US$7.2 million beyond the amount covered by the 
regular budgets for military operations. 

From 1920 through 1923, seventeen uprisings or attempted coups 
in Honduras contributed to growing United States concern over 
political instability in Central America. In August 1922, the presi- 
dents of Honduras, Nicaragua, and El Salvador met on the U.S.S. 
Tacoma in the Golfo de Fonseca. Under the watchful eye of the Unit- 
ed States ambassadors to their nations, the presidents pledged to 
prevent their territories from being used to promote revolutions 
against their neighbors and issued a call for a general meeting of 
Central American states in Washington at the end of the year. 

The Washington conference concluded in February with the 
adoption of the General Treaty of Peace and Amity of 1923, which 
had eleven supplemental conventions. The treaty in many ways 
followed the provisions of the 1907 treaty. The Central American 
court was reorganized, reducing the influence of the various govern- 
ments over its membership. The clause providing for withholding 
recognition of revolutionary governments was expanded to preclude 
recognition of any revolutionary leader, his relatives, or anyone 
who had been in power six months before or after such an upris- 
ing unless the individual's claim to power had been ratified by free 
elections. The governments renewed their pledges to refrain from 
aiding revolutionary movements against their neighbors and to seek 
peaceful resolutions for all outstanding disputes. 

The supplemental conventions covered everything from the pro- 
motion of agriculture to the limitation of armaments. One, which 
remained unratified, provided for free trade among all of the states 
except Costa Rica. The arms limitation agreement set a ceiling 
on the size of each nation's military forces (2,500 men for Hon- 
duras) and included a United States-sponsored pledge to seek for- 
eign assistance in establishing more professional armed forces. 

The October 1923 Honduran presidential elections and the sub- 
sequent political and military conflicts provided the first real tests 
of these new treaty arrangements. Under heavy pressure from 
Washington, Lopez Gutierrez allowed an unusually open campaign 
and election. The long- fragmented conservatives had reunited in 
the form of the National Party of Honduras (Partido Nacional de 
Honduras — PNH), which ran as its candidate General Tiburcio 
Carias Andino, the governor of the department of Cortes. However, 
the liberal PLH was unable to unite around a single candidate and 
split into two dissident groups, one supporting former president 



25 



Honduras: A Country Study 



Policarpo Bonilla, the other advancing the candidacy of Juan Angel 
Arias. As a result, each candidate failed to secure a majority. C arias 
received the greatest number of votes, with Bonilla second, and 
Arias a distant third. By the terms of the Honduran constitution, 
this stalemate left the final choice of president up to the legisla- 
ture, but that body was unable to obtain a quorum and reach a 
decision. 

In January 1924, Lopez Gutierrez announced his intention to 
remain in office until new elections could be held, but he repeat- 
edly refused to specify a date for the elections. C arias, reportedly 
with the support of United Fruit, declared himself president, and 
an armed conflict broke out. In February the United States, warning 
that recognition would be withheld from anyone coming to power 
by revolutionary means, suspended relations with the Lopez Gutie- 
rrez government for its failure to hold elections. 

Conditions rapidly deteriorated in the early months of 1924. On 
February 28, a pitched battle took place in La Ceiba between 
government troops and rebels. Even the presence of the U.S.S. 
Denver and the landing of a force of United States Marines were 
unable to prevent widespread looting and arson resulting in over 
US$2 million in property damage. Fifty people, including a United 
States citizen, were killed in the fighting. In the weeks that fol- 
lowed, additional vessels from the United States Navy Special Ser- 
vice Squadron were concentrated in Honduran waters, and landing 
parties were put ashore at various points to protect United States 
interests. One force of marines and sailors was even dispatched in- 
land to Tegucigalpa to provide additional protection for the United 
States legation. Shortly before the arrival of the force, Lopez Gutie- 
rrez died, and what authority remained with the central govern- 
ment was being exercised by his cabinet. General Carias and a 
variety of other rebel leaders controlled most of the countryside 
but failed to coordinate their activities effectively enough to seize 
the capital. 

In an effort to end the fighting, the United States government 
dispatched Sumner Welles to the port of Amapala; he had instruc- 
tions to try to produce a settlement that would bring to power a 
government eligible for recognition under the terms of the 1923 
treaty. Negotiations, which were once again held on board a United 
States cruiser, lasted from April 23 to April 28. An agreement was 
worked out that provided for an interim presidency headed by 
General Vicente Tosta, who agreed to appoint a cabinet represent- 
ing all political factions and to convene a Constituent Assembly 
within ninety days to restore constitutional order. Presidential elec- 
tions were to be held as soon as possible, and Tosta promised to 



26 



Historical Setting 



refrain from being a candidate. Once in office, the new president 
showed signs of reneging on some of his pledges, especially those 
related to the appointment of a bipartisan cabinet. Under heavy 
pressure from the United States delegation, however, he ultimately 
complied with the provisions of the peace agreement. 

Keeping the 1924 elections on track proved to be a difficult task. 
To put pressure on Tosta to conduct a fair election, the United 
States continued an embargo on arms to Honduras and barred the 
government from access to loans — including a requested US$75,000 
from the Banco Atlantida. Furthermore, the United States per- 
suaded El Salvador, Guatemala, and Nicaragua to join in declar- 
ing that, under the 1923 treaty provision, no leader of the recent 
revolution would be recognized as president for the coming term. 
These pressures ultimately helped persuade Canas to withdraw his 
candidacy and also helped ensure the defeat of an uprising led 
by General Gregorio Ferrera of the PNH. The PNH nominated 
Miguel Paz Barahona (1925-29), a civilian, for president. The 
PLH, after some debate, refused to nominate a candidate, and on 
December 28 Paz Barahona won almost unanimous election. 

The Restoration of Order, 1925-31 

Despite another minor uprising led by General Ferrera in 1925, 
Paz Barahona' s administration was, by Honduran standards, rather 
tranquil. The banana companies continued to expand, the govern- 
ment's budgetary situation improved, and there was even an in- 
crease in labor organizing. On the international front, the Honduran 
government, after years of negotiations, finally concluded an agree- 
ment with the British bondholders to liquidate most of the immense 
national debt. The bonds were to be redeemed at 20 percent of 
face value over a thirty-year period. Back interest was forgiven, 
and new interest accrued only over the last fifteen years of this ar- 
rangement. Under the terms of this agreement, Honduras, at last, 
seemed on the road to fiscal solvency. 

Fears of disturbances increased again in 1928 as the scheduled 
presidential elections approached. The ruling PNH nominated 
General Canas while the PLH, united again following the death 
of Policarpo Bonilla in 1926, nominated Vicente Mejfa Colindres. 
To the surprise of most observers, both the campaign and the elec- 
tion were conducted with a minimum of violence and intimida- 
tion. Mejfa Colindres won a decisive victory — obtaining 62,000 
votes to 47,000 for Carfas. Even more surprising was Carias's public 
acceptance of defeat and his urging of his supporters to accept the 
new government. 



27 



Honduras: A Country Study 

Mejia Colindres took office in 1929 with high hopes for his ad- 
ministration and his nation. Honduras seemed on the road to po- 
litical and economic progress. Banana exports, then accounting for 
80 percent of all exports, continued to expand. By 1930 Honduras 
had become the world's leading producer of the fruit, accounting 
for one- third of the world's supply of bananas. United Fruit had 
come increasingly to dominate the trade, and in 1929 it bought 
out the Cuyamel Fruit Company, one of its two principal remain- 
ing rivals. Because conflicts between these companies had frequendy 
led to support for rival groups in Honduran politics, had produced 
a border controversy with Guatemala, and may have even con- 
tributed to revolutionary disturbances, this merger seemed to 
promise greater domestic tranquility. The prospect for tranquility 
was further advanced in 1931 when Ferrera was killed while lead- 
ing one last unsuccessful effort to overthrow the government. 

Many of Mejfa Colindres's hopes, however, were dashed with 
the onset of the Great Depression. Banana exports peaked in 1930, 
then declined rapidly. Thousands of workers were laid off, and the 
wages of those remaining on the job were reduced, as were the prices 
paid to independent banana producers by the giant fruit compa- 
nies. Strikes and other labor disturbances began to break out in 
response to these conditions, but most were quickly suppressed with 
the aid of government troops. As the depression deepened, the 
government's financial situation deteriorated; in 1931 Mejfa 
Colindres was forced to borrow US$250,000 from the fruit com- 
panies to ensure that the army would continue to be paid. 

Strongman Rule, 1932-63 

The Era of Tiburcio Cartas Andino, 1932-54 

Despite growing unrest and severe economic strains, the 1932 
presidential elections in Honduras were relatively peaceful and fair. 
The peaceful transition of power was surprising because the onset 
of the depression had led to the overthrow of governments else- 
where throughout Latin America, in nations with much stronger 
democratic traditions than those of Honduras. Mejfa Colindres, 
however, resisted pressure from his own party to manipulate the 
results to favor the PLH candidate, Angel Zuniga Huete. As a 
result, the PNH candidate, C arias, won the election by a margin 
of some 20,000 votes. On November 16, 1932, Carias assumed 
office, beginning what was to be the longest period of continuous 
rule by an individual in Honduran history. 

Lacking, however, was any immediate indication that the Carias 



28 



Historical Setting 



administration was destined to survive any longer than most of its 
predecessors. Shortly before C arias 's inauguration, dissident liber- 
als, despite the opposition of Mejfa Colindres, had risen in revolt. 
C arias had taken command of the government forces, obtained arms 
from El Salvador, and crushed the uprising in short order. Most 
of C arias 's first term in office was devoted to efforts to avoid finan- 
cial collapse, improve the military, engage in a limited program 
of road building, and lay the foundations for prolonging his own 
hold on power. 

The economic situation remained extremely bad throughout the 
1930s. In addition to the dramatic drop in banana exports caused 
by the depression, the fruit industry was further threatened by the 
outbreak in 1935 of epidemics of Panama disease (a debilitating 
fungus) and sigatoka (leaf blight) in the banana-producing areas. 
Within a year, most of the country's production was threatened. 
Large areas, including most of those around Trujillo, were aban- 
doned, and thousands of Hondurans were thrown out of work. By 
1937 a means of controlling the disease had been found, but many 
of the affected areas remained out of production because a signifi- 
cant share of the market formerly held by Honduras had shifted 
to other nations. 

C arias had made efforts to improve the military even before he 
became president. Once in office, both his capacity and his moti- 
vation to continue and to expand such improvements increased. 
He gave special attention to the fledgling air force, founding the 
Military Aviation School in 1934 and arranging for a United States 
colonel to serve as its commandant (see Development of an Indepen- 
dent Military Identity, 1922-63, ch. 5). 

As months passed, C arias moved slowly but steadily to strengthen 
his hold on power. He gained the support of the banana compa- 
nies through opposition to strikes and other labor disturbances. He 
strengthened his position with domestic and foreign financial cir- 
cles through conservative economic policies. Even at the height of 
the depression, he continued to make regular payments on the Hon- 
duran debt, adhering strictly to the terms of the arrangement with 
the British bondholders and also satisfying other creditors. Two 
small loans were paid off completely in 1935. 

Political controls were instituted slowly under C arias. The Com- 
munist Party of Honduras (Partido Comunista de Honduras — 
PCH) was outlawed, but the PLH continued to function, and even 
the leaders of a small uprising in 1935 were later offered free air 
transportation should they wish to return to Honduras from their 
exile abroad. At the end of 1935, however, stressing the need for 
peace and internal order, Carias began to crack down on the 



29 



Honduras: A Country Study 

opposition press and political activities. Meanwhile, the PNH, at 
the president's direction, began a propaganda campaign stressing 
that only the continuance of C arias in office could give the nation 
continued peace and order. The constitution, however, prohibit- 
ed immediate reelection of presidents. 

The method chosen by C arias to extend his term of office was 
to call a constituent assembly that would write a new constitution 
and select the individual to serve for the first presidential term un- 
der that document. Except for the president's desire to perpetuate 
himself in office, there seemed little reason to alter the nation's 
basic charter. Earlier constituent assemblies had written thirteen 
constitutions (only ten of which had entered into force), and the 
latest had been adopted in 1924. The handpicked Constituent As- 
sembly of 1936 incorporated thirty of the articles of the 1924 docu- 
ment into the 1936 constitution. The major changes were the 
elimination of the prohibition on immediate reelection of a presi- 
dent and vice president and the extension of the presidential term 
from four to six years. Other changes included restoration of the 
death penalty, reductions in the powers of the legislature, and denial 
of citizenship and therefore the right to vote to women. Finally, 
the new constitution included an article specifying that the incum- 
bent president and vice president would remain in office until 1943. 
But C arias, by then a virtual dictator, wanted even more, so in 
1939 the legislature, now completely controlled by the PNH, obe- 
diently extended his term in office by another six years (to 1949). 

The PLH and other opponents of the government reacted to these 
changes by attempting to overthrow C arias. Numerous efforts were 
made in 1936 and 1937, but all were successful only in further 
weakening the PNH's opponents. By the end of the 1930s, the PNH 
was the only organized functioning political party in the nation. 
Numerous opposition leaders had been imprisoned, and some had 
reportedly been chained and put to work in the streets of Tegucigal- 
pa. Others, including the leader of the PLH, Zuniga Huete, had 
fled into exile. 

During his presidency, C arias cultivated close relations with his 
fellow Central American dictators, generals Jorge Ubico in 
Guatemala, Maximiliano Hernandez Martinez in El Salvador, and 
Anastasio Somoza Garcia in Nicaragua. Relations were particu- 
larly close with Ubico, who helped C arias reorganize his secret police 
and also captured and shot the leader of a Honduran uprising who 
had made the mistake of crossing into Guatemalan territory. Re- 
lations with Nicaragua were somewhat more strained as a result 
of the continuing border dispute, but C arias and Somoza managed 
to keep this dispute under control throughout the 1930s and 1940s. 



30 




31 



Honduras: A Country Study 

The value of these ties became somewhat questionable in 1944 
when popular revolts in Guatemala and El Salvador deposed Ubico 
and Hernandez Martinez. For a time, it seemed as if revolution- 
ary contagion might spread to Honduras as well. A plot, involv- 
ing some military officers as well as opposition civilians, had already 
been discovered and crushed in late 1943. In May 1944, a group 
of women began demonstrating outside of the Presidential Palace 
in Tegucigalpa, demanding the release of political prisoners. Despite 
strong government measures, tension continued to grow, and C arias 
was ultimately forced to release some prisoners. This gesture failed 
to satisfy the opposition, and antigovernment demonstrations con- 
tinued to spread. In July several demonstrators were killed by troops 
in San Pedro Sula. In October a group of exiles invaded Honduras 
from El Salvador but were unsuccessful in their efforts to topple 
the government. The military remained loyal, and C arias continued 
in office. 

Anxious to curb further disorders in the region, the United States 
began to urge C arias to step aside and allow free elections when 
his current term in office expired. C arias, who by then was in his 
early seventies, ultimately yielded to these pressures and announced 
October 1948 elections, in which he would refrain from being a 
candidate. He continued, however, to find ways to use his power. 
The PNH nominated Carias's choice for president — Juan Manuel 
Galvez, who had been minister of war since 1933. Exiled opposi- 
tion figures were allowed to return to Honduras, and the PLH, 
trying to overcome years of inactivity and division, nominated 
Zufiiga Huete, the same individual whom C arias had defeated in 
1932. The PLH rapidly became convinced that it had no chance 
to win and, charging the government with manipulation of the elec- 
toral process, boycotted the elections. This act gave Galvez a vir- 
tually unopposed victory, and in January 1949, he assumed the 
presidency. 

Evaluating the C arias presidency is a difficult task. His tenure 
in office provided the nation with a badly needed period of rela- 
tive peace and order. The country's fiscal situation improved stead- 
ily, education improved slightly, the road network expanded, and 
the armed forces were modernized. At the same time, nascent 
democratic institutions withered, opposition and labor activities 
were suppressed, and national interests at times were sacrificed to 
benefit supporters and relatives of C arias or major foreign interests. 

Once in office, Galvez demonstrated more independence than 
had generally been anticipated. Some policies of the C arias adminis- 
tration, such as road building and the development of coffee ex- 
ports, were continued and expanded. By 1953 nearly one-quarter 



32 



Historical Setting 



of the government's budget was devoted to road construction. Gal- 
vez also continued most of the prior administration's fiscal poli- 
cies, reducing the external debt and ultimately paying off the last 
of the British bonds. The fruit companies continued to receive 
favorable treatment at the hands of the Galvez administration; for 
example, United Fruit received a highly favorable twenty-five-year 
contract in 1949. 

Galvez, however, instituted some notable alterations from the 
preceding fifteen years. Education received increased attention and 
began to receive a larger share of the national budget. Congress 
actually passed an income tax law, although enforcement was 
sporadic at best. The most obvious change was in the political arena. 
A considerable degree of press freedom was restored, the PLH and 
other groups were allowed to organize, and even some labor or- 
ganization was permitted. Labor also benefited from legislation dur- 
ing this period. Congress passed, and the president signed, 
legislation establishing the eight-hour workday, paid holidays for 
workers, limited employer responsibility for work-related injuries, 
and regulations for the employment of women and children. 

Aborted Reform, 1954-63 

The relative peace that Honduras had enjoyed for nearly two 
decades was shattered by a series of events during 1954, Galvez 's 
last year in office. Tension throughout the region had been increas- 
ing steadily as a confrontation developed between the left-leaning 
government of President Jacobo Arbenz Guzman in Guatemala 
and the United States. Part of the confrontation involved the ex- 
propriation of United Fruit Company lands and charges that the 
Guatemalan government was encouraging agitation among the 
banana workers. 

In 1952 the United States had begun considering actions to over- 
throw the Guatemalan government. Honduras had given asylum 
to several exiled opponents of Arbenz, including Colonel Carlos 
Castillo Armas, but Galvez was reluctant to cooperate in direct ac- 
tions against Guatemala, and the plans were not activated. By early 
1954, however, a major covert operation against Guatemala was 
being organized, this time with greater Honduran cooperation. One 
reason for the cooperation was the Honduran government's con- 
cern over increased labor tensions in the banana-producing areas, 
tensions that the fruit companies blamed, in part, on Guatemalan 
influence. 

Starting in early May 1954, the tensions escalated to strikes. First, 
a series of strikes broke out against United Fruit Company opera- 
tions on Honduras 's Caribbean coast. Within a few days, the strike 



33 



Honduras: A Country Study 

spread to include the Standard Fruit Company operations, bring- 
ing the banana industry in the country to a near standstill. The 
strikers presented a wide range of grievances, involving wages, 
working conditions, medical benefits, overtime pay, and the right 
to collective bargaining. Initial government efforts to end the strike 
failed, and work stoppages began to spread into other industries. 
By May 21, the number of strikers was approaching 30,000, and 
the nation's economy was under severe strain. 

As the strike was spreading, Honduras was also becoming more 
deeply involved in the movement to topple the Arbenz government 
in Guatemala. In late May, a military assistance agreement was 
concluded between the United States and Honduras, and large 
quantities of United States arms were quickly shipped to Honduras. 
Much of this incoming assistance was passed on to anti- Arbenz 
rebels commanded by Castillo Armas. In June these forces crossed 
into Guatemala and after several days of political maneuvering but 
little actual fighting, Arbenz fled into exile, and Castillo Armas 
became president. With the specter of foreign influence over the 
strike thus removed, negotiations began, and the strike ended in 
early July. Labor leaders who had been accused of having ties with 
Guatemala were jailed, and the final settlement, which met few 
of the original demands, was signed with elements more accepta- 
ble to the government and the fruit companies than to the work- 
ers. Despite the limited gains, however, the strike did mark a major 
step toward greater influence for organized labor in Honduras and 
a decline in the power of the fruit companies. 

In the midst of these conflicts, the campaign for the 1954 elec- 
tions continued. Unhappy with some of Galvez's gestures toward 
liberalization, C arias, despite his advanced age, decided to run for 
president and secured the PNH nomination. This move, however, 
split the party, and more moderate members broke away to form 
the National Revolutionary Movement (Movimiento Nacional 
Revolucionario — MNR). Their nominee was former vice presi- 
dent Abraham Williams Calderon. The split in the ruling party 
encouraged the PLH, who united behind Ramon Villeda Morales, 
a Tegucigalpa physician who was seen as somewhat to the left of 
center in the party's political spectrum. 

Both the campaign and the election were remarkably free and 
honest. On October 10, 1954, approximately 260,000 out of over 
400,000 eligible voters went to the polls. Villeda Morales won a 
large plurality with 121,213 votes, Carias received 77,041, and Wil- 
liams carried 53,041 . The PLH also gained a plurality in the legis- 
lature. Under Honduran law, however, a majority of the total votes 
was required to be elected president; Villeda Morales lacked a 



34 



Historical Setting 



majority by just over 8,000 votes. The stage was set for a repeat 
of the confusing paralysis of 1924 because the constitution required, 
first, that two-thirds of the members of the new legislature must 
be present and vote to choose a president and, second, that the 
victor must receive two- thirds of the legislature's vote. To compli- 
cate matters further, Galvez left for Miami, reportedly to obtain 
medical treatment although some sources claim he merely fled the 
country, leaving the government in the hands of Vice President 
Julio Lozano Diaz. 

Unable to reconcile their differences and unwilling to accept 
Villeda Morales as president, the PNH and MNR deputies boy- 
cotted the legislature, producing a national crisis. The constitu- 
tion provided that in case of congressional deadlock the Supreme 
Court of Justice would select the president. Dominated as the court 
was by Canas appointees, the PLH opposed such a course of ac- 
tion. At this juncture, Lozano Diaz suddenly suspended the legis- 
lature and announced that he would act as president until new 
elections could be held. He declared that he would form a national 
government with cabinet members taken from all major parties 
and received pledges of support from all three candidates in the 
1954 election. A Council of State, headed by a PLH member but 
including members of all three major parties, was appointed to 
replace the suspended congress until a constituent assembly could 
be chosen to write yet another constitution. 

Lozano Diaz began his period as president with a broad base 
of support that eroded rapidly. He unveiled an ambitious develop- 
ment plan to be financed by international loans and increased taxes 
and also introduced the nation's first labor code. This document 
guaranteed workers the right to organize and strike but gave em- 
ployers the right of lockout and forbade strikes in public services. 
The code also embodied some social welfare and minimum-wage 
provisions and regulated hours and working conditions. All these 
provisions gained him some labor support, but in later months re- 
lations between the president and labor began to sour. 

As time passed, it became clear that Lozano Diaz had ambitions 
to replace the traditional parties with one that he controlled and 
could use to help prolong his hold on power. He reduced the Council 
of State to a consultative body, postponed elections, and set about 
forming his own party, the National Unity Party (Partido de Unidad 
Nacional — PUN). The activities of other parties were limited, and, 
in July 1956, Villeda Morales and other PLH leaders were sud- 
denly arrested and flown into exile. A few weeks later, the govern- 
ment crushed an uprising by 400 troops in the capital. Public 



35 



Honduras: A Country Study 

opinion, however, was becoming increasingly hostile to the presi- 
dent, and rumors of his imminent fall had begun to circulate. 

Following the August 1956 uprising, Lozano Diaz's health began 
to deteriorate, but he clung stubbornly to power. Elections for the 
legislature in October were boycotted by most of the opposition, 
who charged that the process was openly rigged to favor the presi- 
dent 's supporters. The results seemed to confirm this charge, as 
the PUN candidates were declared the winners of all fifty-six seats 
in the congress. The joy of their victories was short, however. On 
October 21 , the armed forces, led by the commanders of the army 
and air force academies and by Major Roberto Galvez, the son 
of the former president, ousted Lozano Diaz and set up a military 
junta to rule the country. 

This coup marked a turning point in Honduran history. For the 
first time, the armed forces had acted as an institution rather than 
as the instrument of a political party or of an individual leader. The 
new rulers represented younger, more nationalistic, and reform- 
minded elements in the military. They were products of the in- 
creased professionalization of the 1940s and 1950s. Most had 
received some training by United States military advisers, either 
in Honduras or abroad. For decades to come, the military would 
act as the final arbiter of Honduran politics (see Political Dynamics, 
ch. 4; Consolidation and Organizational Maturity, 1963-80, ch. 5). 

The military's largest problem was the holding of elections for 
a legislature and the selection of a new president. A system of 
proportional representation was agreed upon, and elections were 
held in October. The PLH won a majority, and in November, by 
a vote of thirty- seven to twenty, the assembly selected Villeda 
Morales as president for a six-year term beginning January 1 , 1958. 

The new PLH administration undertook several major efforts 
to improve and modernize Honduran life. Funds were obtained 
from the International Monetary Fund (IMF — see Glossary) to 
stabilize the currency and from the World Bank (see Glossary) to 
begin paving a highway from the Caribbean coast to the capital. 
Other efforts were undertaken to expand education. The greatest 
attention was devoted to passing a new labor code, establishing a 
social security system, and beginning a program of agrarian reform. 

The reform program produced increasing opposition among the 
more conservative elements in Honduran society. There were scat- 
tered uprisings during Villeda Morales 's initial years in power, but 
the military remained loyal and quickly crushed the disturbances. 
Military support began to evaporate in the early 1960s, however. 
Waning military support was in part a result of rising criticism of 



36 



Historical Setting 



the government by conservative organizations such as the National 
Federation of Agriculturists and Stockraisers of Honduras (Fede- 
ration Nacional de Agricultores y Ganaderos de Honduras — 
Fenagh), which represented the large landowners. The shift in the 
military's attitude also reflected concern over what were viewed 
as more frequent rural disorder and growing radical influences in 
labor and peasant groups. Deteriorating relations with neighbor- 
ing states, notably Nicaragua, also contributed to the tension. The 
major causes of friction, however, were the president's 1957 crea- 
tion of the Civil Guard (Guardia Civil) — a militarized police com- 
manded directly by the president rather than the chief of the armed 
forces — and the prospect of another PLH victory in the 1963 
elections. 

The elections were scheduled for October 1963. As in 1954, the 
PLH was confronting a divided opposition. The PNH nominated 
Ramon Ernesto Cruz, but a faction split off and ran the son of 
ex-president Canas. The PLH ignored the wishes of its president 
and nominated Modesto Rodas Alvarado, a charismatic, highly 
partisan figure believed to be to the left of Villeda Morales. All 
signs pointed to an overwhelming victory for the PLH, an out- 
come that the military found increasingly unpalatable. 

Rumors of a coup began circulating in the late summer of 1963. 
The United States endeavored to make clear its opposition to such 
action — even dispatching a high-ranking officer from the United 
States Southern Command in the Panama Canal Zone to try to 
convince the chief of the armed forces, Air Force Colonel Oswaldo 
Lopez Arellano, to call off the coup. Villeda Morales also tried to 
calm military fears, taking the carbines away from the Civil Guard 
and opposing plans for a constitutional amendment to restore direct 
command of the military to the president. All these efforts failed, 
however. Before dawn on October 3, 1963, the military moved to 
seize power. The president and the PLH's 1963 presidential can- 
didates were flown into exile, Congress was dissolved, the consti- 
tution was suspended, and the planned elections were canceled. 
Colonel Lopez Arellano proclaimed himself president, and the 
United States promptly broke diplomatic relations. 

Military Rule and International Conflict, 1963-78 

Lopez Arellano rapidly moved to consolidate his hold on power. 
Growing radical influence had been one of the reasons advanced 
to justify the coup; once in power, the government disbanded or 
otherwise attacked communist, pro-Castro, and other elements on 
the left. The Agrarian Reform Law was effectively nullified, in part 
by the regime's refusal to appropriate money for the National 



37 



Honduras: A Country Study 

Agrarian Institute (Instituto Nacional Agrario — INA). The coun- 
try's two peasant unions were harassed, although a new organiza- 
tion of rural workers, the National Union of Peasants (Union 
Nacional de Campensinos — UNC), which had Christian Democratic 
ties, actually expanded in the mid- and late 1960s. Lopez Are- 
llano promised to call elections for yet another legislature, and early 
in 1 964 his government was recognized by the new United States 
administration of President Lyndon B. Johnson. Shortly thereafter, 
military assistance, which had been suspended following the coup, 
was resumed. 

Close ties soon developed between the military government and 
the PNH. A key factor in the development of these links was PNH 
leader Ricardo Zuniga Augustinius, who became secretary of state 
for the presidency, the key cabinet position. Numerous other party 
members served in the government, giving it a civil-military charac- 
ter but widening the gap between the administration and the PLH. 
Also linked to the government was a secret organization used to 
attack the left and intimidate political opponents. Known as the 
Mancha Brava (Tough Spot), it reputedly drew much of its mem- 
bership from the ranks of public employees. 

To give a semblance of legality to his government, Lopez Are- 
llano promulgated a new constitution with a unicameral Congress. 
He then called elections for this new Congress. A general amnesty 
for political figures was decreed in November, exiles were allowed 
to return, and the PLH resumed political activity. The PNH had 
pledged throughout the campaign that if it gained control of the 
Congress, its members would select Lopez Arellano as president. 
The vote was held on February 16, 1965; the PNH won thirty- 
five seats, the PLH twenty-nine. The PLH charged the govern- 
ment with fraudulently manipulating the results, and some party 
leaders urged their supporters to boycott meetings of the assem- 
bly. The PLH was unable to agree on this tactic, and enough PLH 
members took their seats when the Congress convened on March 
15 to provide the necessary quorum. The PNH delegates kept their 
promise and elected Lopez Arellano as president for a new six-year 
term, from 1965 to 1971. 

For a time, Lopez Arellano had success in foreign affairs. One 
of his government's first acts had been to join with Guatemala and 
Nicaragua in establishing the Central American Defense Council 
(Consejo de Defensa Centroamericana — Condeca), which was a 
military pact among these Central American states and the United 
States for coordination of counterinsurgency activities. El Salvador 
joined shortly thereafter, and in 1965 Condeca held its first joint 
military exercise on the Caribbean coast of Honduras. That same 



38 



Historical Setting 



year, Honduras contributed a small contingent of troops to the Or- 
ganization of American States (OAS) forces monitoring the elec- 
tion in the Dominican Republic. 

As the 1960s progressed, Honduras 's relations with Nicaragua 
and with the United States improved, but increasing problems de- 
veloped between Honduras and El Salvador. In May and June 
1967, a series of incidents along the border aggravated tensions 
considerably. One incident involved the capture of two Salvado- 
ran officers and thirty-nine enlisted men whose truck convoy had 
penetrated several kilometers into Honduras. The Salvadoran 
troops were finally returned over a year later, but the tensions con- 
tinued to mount. 

War with El Salvador 

By 1 968 the Lopez Arellano regime seemed to be in serious trou- 
ble. The economic situation was producing growing labor conflicts, 
political unrest, and even criticism from conservative groups such 
as Fenagh. Municipal elections were held in March 1968 to the 
accompaniment of violence and charges of open fraud, producing 
PNH victories but also fueling public discontent and raising the 
concern of the United States Embassy. Efforts at opening up a di- 
alogue were made in mid- 1968 but had litde success. Later in the 
year, a general strike was kept brief by government action that 
helped break the strike and exiled the leader of the major Caribbean 
coast labor federation. Unrest continued, however; in the spring 
of 1969, new strikes broke out among teachers and other groups. 

As the political situation deteriorated, the Honduran government 
and some private groups came increasingly to place blame for the 
nation's economic problems on the approximately 300,000 un- 
documented Salvadoran immigrants in Honduras. Fenagh began 
to associate Salvadoran immigrants with illegal land invasions, and 
in January 1969, the Honduran government refused to renew the 
1967 Bilateral Treaty on Immigration with El Salvador, which had 
been designed to regulate the flow of individuals across their com- 
mon border. In April IN A announced that it would begin to expel 
from their lands those who had acquired property under agrarian 
reform without fulfilling the legal requirement that they be Hon- 
duran by birth. Attacks were also launched in the media on the 
impact of Salvadoran immigrant labor on unemployment and wages 
on the Caribbean coast. By late May, Salvadorans began to stream 
out of Honduras back to an overpopulated El Salvador. 

Tensions continued to mount during June 1969. The soccer 
teams of the two nations were engaged that month in a three- game 
elimination match as a preliminary to the World Cup. Disturbances 



39 



Honduras: A Country Study 



broke out during the first game in Tegucigalpa, but the situation 
got considerably worse during the second match in San Salvador. 
Honduran fans were roughed up, the Honduran flag and national 
anthem were insulted, and the emotions of both nations became 
considerably agitated. Actions against Salvadoran residents in Hon- 
duras, including several vice consuls, became increasingly violent. 
An unknown number of Salvadorans were killed or brutalized, and 
tens of thousands began fleeing the country. The press of both na- 
tions contributed to a growing climate of near-hysteria, and on June 
27, 1969, Honduras broke diplomatic relations with El Salvador. 

Early on the morning of July 14, 1969, concerted military ac- 
tion began in what came to be known as the Soccer War. The Sal- 
vadoran air force attacked targets inside Honduras, and the 
Salvadoran army launched major offensives along the main road 
connecting the two nations and against the Honduran islands in 
the Golfo de Fonseca. At first, the Salvadorans made fairly rapid 
progress. By the evening of July 15, the Salvadoran army, which 
was considerably larger and better equipped than its Honduran 
opponent, pushed the Honduran army back over eight kilometers 
and captured the departmental capital of Nueva Ocotepeque. 
Thereafter, the attack bogged down, and the Salvadorans began 
to experience fuel and ammunition shortages. A major reason for 
the fuel shortage was the action of the Honduran air force, which — 
in addition to largely destroying the smaller Salvadoran air force — 
had severely damaged El Salvador's oil storage facilities. 

The day after the fighting had begun, the OAS met in an ur- 
gent session and called for an immediate cease-fire and a withdrawal 
of El Salvador's forces from Honduras. El Salvador resisted the 
pressures from the OAS for several days, demanding that Hon- 
duras first agree to pay reparations for the attacks on Salvadoran 
citizens and guarantee the safety of those Salvadorans remaining 
in Honduras. A cease-fire was arranged on the night of July 18; 
it took full effect only on July 20. El Salvador continued until July 
29 to resist pressures to withdraw its troops. Then a combination 
of pressures led El Salvador to agree to a withdrawal in the first 
days of August. Those persuasive pressures included the possibility 
of OAS economic sanctions against El Salvador and the dispatch 
of OAS observers to Honduras to oversee the security of Salvador- 
ans remaining in that country. The actual war had lasted just over 
four days, but it would take more than a decade to arrive at a final 
peace settlement. 

The war produced only losses for both sides. Between 60,000 
and 130,000 Salvadorans had been forcibly expelled or had fled 
from Honduras, producing serious economic disruption in some 



40 



Historical Setting 



areas. Trade between the two nations had been totally disrupted 
and the border closed, damaging the economies of both nations 
and threatening the future of the Central American Common Mar- 
ket (CACM — see Appendix B). Up to 2,000 people, the majority 
Honduran civilians, had been killed, and thousands of other Hon- 
durans in the border area had been made homeless. Airline ser- 
vice between the two nations was also disrupted for over a decade. 

After the war, public support for the military plummeted. 
Although the air force had performed well, the army had not. Criti- 
cism of the army was not limited to the public; junior officers were 
often vocal in their criticism of superiors, and a rift developed be- 
tween junior and senior officers. 

The war, however, led to a new sense of Honduran nationalism 
and national pride. Tens of thousands of Honduran workers and 
peasants had gone to the government to beg for arms to defend 
their nation. Local defense committees had sprung up, with thou- 
sands of ordinary citizens, often armed only with machetes, tak- 
ing over local security duties. This response to the fighting made 
a strong impression on a sector of the officer corps and contributed 
to an increased concern over national development and social wel- 
fare among the armed forces (see Consolidation and Organizational 
Maturity, ch. 5). 

The internal political struggle had been briefly suspended dur- 
ing the conflict with El Salvador, but by the start of 1970 it was 
again in full swing. The government was under pressure to initi- 
ate administrative and electoral reforms, allow open elections in 
1971 , reorganize the military, and adopt new economic programs, 
including a revision of Honduran relations with the CACM. Labor, 
peasant, and business organizations were meeting together in what 
were known as the fuerzas vivas (living forces). Their representatives 
met with Lopez Arellano and proposed a Plan of National Unity, 
calling for free elections, a coalition cabinet, and a division of govern- 
ment posts and congressional seats. These proposals failed to elicit 
immediate response, but discussions continued. Meanwhile, a gen- 
eral political amnesty was decreed, the creation of the Honduran 
Christian Democratic Party (Partido Democrata Cristiano de Hon- 
duras — PDCH) was announced, and a decree was issued calling for 
presidential and congressional elections on March 28, 1971. 

After considerable discussion and debate, the PHL and PNH par- 
ties responded to pressures from labor, business, and the military. 
On January 7, 1971, they signed a political pact agreeing to estab- 
lish a national-unity government after the March elections. The pur- 
poses of the pact were twofold. The first was to present a single slate 
of congressional candidates that would divide the Congress equally 



41 



Honduras: A Country Study 

between the PLH and PNH (each party would run its own candi- 
date for the presidency, however.) The second goal was to pro- 
mote the Minimum Government Plan (Plan Minimo de Gobierno), 
which included achieving agrarian reform, increasing technical edu- 
cation, passing a civil service law, attempting to resolve the con- 
flict with El Salvador, restructuring the CACM, and reforming 
government administration. A later agreement between the 
parties — the "little pact" ("pactito") — agreed to a division of 
government posts, including those in the Supreme Court of Justice. 

The 1971 elections were relatively free and honest. Both parties 
offered presidential candidates who were compromise choices of 
the major party factions. The PLH ran Jorge Bueso Arias, and 
the PNH nominated Ramon Ernesto Cruz. Most observers antic- 
ipated a PLH victory, but the PNH ran a more aggressive cam- 
paign, making use of the mass media and of modern campaign 
techniques for the first time in Honduran history. On election day, 
Cruz scored an impressive victory, gaining 299,807 votes to 269,989 
for Bueso Arias. However, a disturbing note for the PNH was that 
popular participation in the election had declined significantly from 
1965. Only slightly over two-thirds of those registered to vote had 
done so, although the constitution made voting obligatory. 

At first, Cruz appeared to be living up to the terms of the agree- 
ments between the parties. He appointed five PLH members, five 
PNH members, and one military officer to his cabinet. Lopez Are- 
llano remained as chief of the armed forces. As time passed, 
however, the split between PLH and PNH widened steadily. In 
order to deal with the budget crisis, Cruz pushed through a reluc- 
tant Congress a bill that cut tax benefits and import exemptions. 
This bill produced opposition from both business and labor sec- 
tors. In the area of agrarian reform, the president soon removed 
INA's dynamic director, Roberto Sandoval, and replaced him with 
a PNH member, Horacio Moya Posas, who slowed the pace of 
reform.' The PLH protested this action and also argued that the 
appointment of PNH supporters to the Supreme Court of Justice 
violated the agreement. Finally, in March 1972, the president dis- 
missed two of the PLH cabinet members. By mid- 1972, the govern- 
ment had lost most of its non-PNH support. 

Military Rule and Reform 

During the autumn of 1972, with the support of the military, the 
PLH and PNH attempted to revise the arrangements between the 
parties and the major labor and business groups. These efforts were 
not successful, and opposition to what was increasingly perceived 
as an ineffectual and divisive administration spread steadily. The 



42 



Historical Setting 



virtual halting of agrarian reform and the killing of several peasants 
by the military in the department of Olancho had angered peasant 
groups. Labor and business were alienated by the ineffective ef- 
forts to deal with the problems of the economy. The PLH felt that 
its position within the government was steadily eroding and that 
its agreement with the PNH was regularly violated. In December 
peasant and labor organizations announced a hunger march by 
20,000 individuals to Tegucigalpa to protest the government's 
agrarian policies. Supported by a prior agreement with the labor 
movement, the military on December 4, 1972, overthrew Cruz in 
a bloodless coup and once again installed Lopez Arellano as the 
president. 

Problems for the Lopez Arellano regime began to increase in 
1974. The economy was still growing at a slow pace, partly be- 
cause of the immense damage caused to the Caribbean coast by 
Hurricane Fifi in September 1974. The storm was the most 
devastating natural disaster in recent Honduran history, claiming 
10,000 or more lives and destroying a vast number of banana plants. 
The disaster also increased calls for agrarian reform. 

The government's greatest problem, however, centered on 
another aspect of the banana industry. Honduras had joined other 
banana-exporting nations in a joint agreement to levy an export 
tax on that fruit. The Honduran tax had taken effect in April 1974 
but was suddenly canceled four months later. Shortly thereafter, 
reports began to circulate that the United Fruit Company had paid 
more than US$ 1 million to Honduran officials to secure the repeal 
of the tax. Prominently implicated in these accusations were Lopez 
Arellano and his minister of economy and commerce. Reacting 
to these charges on March 31, 1975, the military relieved Lopez 
Arellano of his position as chief of the armed forces, replacing him 
with Colonel Juan Alberto Melgar Castro. Just over three weeks 
later, they completed the process by removing Lopez Arellano from 
the presidency and replacing him with Melgar Castro. These 
decisions had been made by the increasingly powerful Supreme 
Council of the Armed Forces (Consejo Superior de las Fuerzas 
Armadas — Consuffaa), a group of approximately twenty to twenty- 
five key colonels of the armed forces who provided the institution 
with a form of collective leadership (see Consolidation and Or- 
ganizational Maturity, ch. 5). 

In July 1976, the border with El Salvador was still disputed. In 
July a minor upsurge of conflict there brought prompt OAS inter- 
vention, which helped to keep the conflict from escalating. In Oc- 
tober both nations agreed to submit their dispute to arbitration. 
This development raised hopes for a rapid peace settlement. 



43 



Honduras: A Country Study 

Progress, however, proved slow; and tensions were raised again, 
briefly, in 1978, when the Honduran government abruptly can- 
celed all permits for travel to El Salvador. The rise of guerrilla con- 
flict in El Salvador, plus strong pressures from other nations, made 
a setdement increasingly urgent in subsequent months. In October 
1980, with Peruvian mediation, the bilateral General Peace Treaty 
was finally signed in Lima, Peru. Trade and travel were soon re- 
sumed, but numerous problems, including final adjudication of 
some small parcels of territory along the frontier, remained for later 
consideration (see Central America, ch. 4). 

Relations with Nicaragua had also become more difficult, espe- 
cially after civil conflict had increased in that nation in the late 1970s. 
In March 1978, Honduran soldiers captured German Pomares, 
a leader of the Sandinista National Liberation Front (Frente San- 
dinista de Liberacion Nacional — FSLN), the guerrilla force fight- 
ing against the regime of Anastasio Somoza Debayle in Nicaragua. 
Pomares was held until the end of June, but Nicaraguan requests 
for extradition were denied, and he was ultimately flown to Pana- 
ma. As fighting in Nicaragua escalated in 1978 and early 1979, 
Honduras found itself in a difficult position. Honduras did not want 
to support the unpopular Somoza regime but feared the Marxist 
leanings of the FSLN. In addition, beginning in September 1978, 
Honduras had become burdened with an ever-growing number of 
refugees from Nicaragua. 

The Return to Civilian Rule, 1978-82 

Melgar Castro's hold on power began to dissolve in 1978. 
Charges of government corruption and of military links with nar- 
cotics traffic had become increasingly widespread, leading to ac- 
cusations that the government had failed to adequately defend the 
country. Melgar Castro's hold on power had weakened because 
he lacked support among large landowners. In addition, the Mel- 
gar Castro government had seemed to be making litde progress 
toward promised elections, leading to suspicions that it hoped to 
prolong its time in office. Right-wing political forces criticized the 
Melgar Castro administration's handling of the Ferrari Case, which 
involved drug trafficking and murder of civilians and in which mem- 
bers of the military had been implicated. Unions and student or- 
ganizations correctly interpreted the right wing's criticism as a 
prelude to a coup. When demonstrators took to the streets to sup- 
port Melgar Castro, right-wing elements within the military charged 
Melgar Castro had lost control of public order and ousted him. 
On August 7, 1978, Melgar Castro and his cabinet were replaced 
by a three-member junta. Led by General Policarpo Paz Garcia, 



44 



Historical Setting 



chief of the armed forces, and including the air force commander 
and the chief of military security, the junta had close ties to the 
large landowners and moved to protect the military men involved 
in the Ferrari Case. 

From its inception, the government of Paz Garcia had promised 
to return Honduras to civilian rule. In April 1980, the Honduran 
citizenry was summoned to the polls to choose delegates for a new 
Congress. The Congress would select an interim government and 
would establish procedures for presidential and congressional elec- 
tions in 1981. 

Early indications for the 1980 elections pointed toward a victo- 
ry for the PNH, headed by Ricardo Zufiiga. The PNH appeared 
more unified and organized than the rival PLH, and most people 
assumed that the PNH would be favored by the ruling military. 
The PLH suffered from internal divisions and a lack of leadership. 
Former president Villeda Morales had died in 1971 , and the party's 
leader after his death, Modesto Rodas Alvarado, had died in 1979. 
A split had developed between the more conservative followers of 
Rodas and the party's left wing, which had formed the Popular 
Liberal Alliance (Alianza Liberal del Pueblo — Alipo). In addition, 
a third party, the Innovation and Unity Party (Partido de Inova- 
cion y Unidad — Pinu) had been registered and was expected to 
draw support away from the PLH. The PNH had succeeded in 
blocking the registration of the PDCH, leading the PDCH adher- 
ents to join with groups further to the left in denouncing the elec- 
tions as a farce and a fraud and urging popular abstention. 

The April 1980 election produced a record registration and voter 
turnout (see Political Parties, ch. 4). More than 1.2 million Hondur- 
ans registered, and over 1 million voted — over 81 percent of those eli- 
gible. The high number of voters evidentiy favored the PLH, which 
won 49.4 percent of the votes cast. Under a complex apportionment 
system, the PLH won thirty-five seats in the Congress; the PNH, 
thirty- three; and the Pinu, three. This result produced considera- 
ble debate over the composition of the next government. There was 
general agreement on naming Paz Garcia as interim president, and 
the disputes centered on the composition of the cabinet. Ultimately, 
a PLH leader, Roberto Suazo Cordova, was made president of the 
Congress, while the PLH also gained five of the seats on the new 
Supreme Court of Justice. The cabinet was divided among all three 
parties and the military; the armed forces received the Ministry of 
National Defense and Public Security, as well as the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, and the PNH acquired key economic positions. 

The Congress took more than a year to draft a new constitution 
and an electoral law for the 1981 presidential and congressional 



45 



Honduras: A Country Study 

elections. The work went slowly, and the elections originally sched- 
uled for August 1981 had to be postponed until November. In the 
interim, the National Elections Tribunal (Tribunal Nacional de 
Elecciones — TNE) unanimously granted the PDCH the legal sta- 
tus needed for a place on the 1981 ballot. 

Despite the presence of candidates for the Pinu and the PDCH 
on the November 1981 ballot, it was clear that the election would 
be essentially a two-party affair between the PLH and PNH. On 
November 29, 1981, a total of 1,214,735 Hondurans, 80.7 per- 
cent of those registered, voted, giving the PLH a sweeping victory. 
Suazo Cordova won 636,392 votes (52.4 percent), the PNH 491,089 
votes, and 48,582 votes were divided between the Pinu and the 
PDCH. The PLH also took control of Congress, winning forty- 
four seats; the PNH, thirty-four; the Pinu, three; and the PDCH, 
one. The PLH also won 61 percent of the municipal councils. Suazo 
Cordova was inaugurated as president of Honduras in January 
1982, ending nearly a decade of military presidents. 

Honduras in the Middle: United States Policy and the 
Central American Crisis 

President Suazo Cordova assumed office at a time of extreme 
political ferment in Central America. The United States govern- 
ment was seeking to halt or roll back the advances of what it consid- 
ered to be pro-Soviet forces on the isthmus. The leftist insurgency 
launched by the Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front 
(Frente Farabundo Marti de Liberation Nacional — FMLN) in El 
Salvador had been underway for some two years, and the outcome 
of the struggle in that country was in doubt. In Nicaragua, the 
FSLN — with close ties to Cuba, the Soviet Union, and other com- 
munist states — ruled repressively and continued a military build- 
up unprecedented for the region. Honduras — a country poor in 
resources, lacking in democratic traditions, and strategically located 
between these two unstable governments — almost inexorably drew 
the attention and involvement of Washington. 

The Suazo Cordova Administration: Caudillo Politics in the 
Shadow of the Military 

Suazo Cordova, a country doctor from La Paz, was a veteran 
of Honduran political infighting, but he lacked the kind of ex- 
perience that might have prepared him for the internationalist role 
he would play as president of the republic. His initial approach 
to the question of Honduras 's role in the growing regional crisis 
appeared to stress coexistence rather than confrontation. This ap- 
proach reflected Honduras 's historical passivity in regional and 



46 



President Roberto Suazo Cordova and General Gustavo 
Alvarez Martinez at inauguration, January 1982 
Courtesy Jorge Majin/YX Tiempo 
A demonstration celebrating the return to democracy, 

January 1982 
Courtesy Jorge Majin/YX Tiempo 



47 



Honduras: A Country Study 



international affairs and took into account the regional balance of 
power, which did not favor Honduras. As a result, Suazo Cordova's 
inaugural speech stressed the issues of self-determination and the 
administration's desire to remain neutral in the face of regional 
upheaval. 

In keeping with this conciliatory approach, on March 23, 1982, 
Minister of Foreign Affairs Edgardo Paz Barnica proposed a peace 
plan to the permanent council of the OAS. The plan was based on 
the following six points: general disarmament in Central America, 
the reduction of foreign military and other advisers (then a real point 
of contention with the Nicaraguan government), international su- 
pervision of any final agreement, an end to regional arms traffic, 
respect for delineated and demarcated borders, and the estab- 
lishment of a permanent multilateral dialogue. The proposal met 
with little support from other Central American states, particularly 
Nicaragua. 

Gradually, the Suazo Cordova administration began to perceive 
the FSLN (commonly referred to as Sandinista) administration as 
obstructionist in regional and international forums, as well as a 
subversive force that intended to undermine political stability in 
Honduras through intimidation, propaganda, and direct aid to in- 
cipient insurgent groups. The emergence of a consensus on this 
point within both the Honduran administration and the armed 
forces coincided with a significant expansion of the United States 
role in Honduras, both as policy adviser and as purveyor of mili- 
tary and economic aid. 

Brigadier General Gustavo Alvarez Martinez, who assumed the 
position of commander of the armed forces in January 1982, 
emerged as a hardliner against the Sandinistas (see Respect for Hu- 
man Rights, ch. 5). Alvarez publicly declared Honduras "in a war 
to the death" with Nicaragua; he believed such a war should be 
conducted under the auspices of a triple alliance among Guatema- 
la, El Salvador, and Honduras. Some observers also believed that 
Alvarez had another aspect to his anticommunist strategy, name- 
ly covert domestic surveillance and extralegal executions. Alvarez's 
training in Argentina, where such "dirty war" tactics were com- 
mon in the 1970s, lent some credence to the charges of increased 
disappearances and other less extreme forms of harassment against 
the Honduran left. Alvarez's main rival for the post of armed forces 
commander, Colonel Leonidas Torres Arias, the former head of 
military intelligence, had assumed an attache post in Buenos Aires, 
Argentina, after losing the struggle^ for command. From Argen- 
tina, Torres proceeded to castigate Alvarez in the media, charging 
that the general operated a personal death squad. The Honduran 



48 



Historical Setting 



Committee for the Defense of Human Rights appeared to confirm 
Torres 's charges to some degree by reporting an increase in the 
number of political disappearances nationwide. According to for- 
eign observers, the total numbers in no way rivaled those registered 
in El Salvador or Guatemala; the increase, however, was statisti- 
cally significant for previously tranquil Honduras. 

Alvarez's strong-arm tactics drew criticism from some observ- 
ers, particularly the foreign press and international human rights 
groups. At the same time, however, leftist subversive activity did 
expand in the early 1980s. Much of this increase was attributed 
directly or indirectly to Sandinista support for like-minded Hon- 
duran groups such as the PCH, the Lorenzo Zelaya Popular 
Revolutionary Forces (Fuerzas Populares Revolucionarias-Lorenzo 
Zelaya — FPR-LZ), and the Honduran Revolutionary Party of 
Central American Workers (Partido Revolucionario de los Trabaja- 
dores Centroamericanos de Honduras — PRTC-H). Beginning with 
minor bombings, these groups eventually progressed to kidnap- 
pings and hijackings (see Domestic Human Rights Organizations, 
ch. 5). The most ambitious effort was that launched by a platoon- 
sized unit of Nicaraguan-trained PRTC-H members who crossed 
the border from Nicaragua into Olancho department in Septem- 
ber 1983. A rapid response by Honduran troops isolated the 
PRTC-H column; twenty-three of the guerrillas surrendered, and 
another twenty- six died in the mountains, many of starvation and 
exposure. A similar incursion in 1984 also failed to strike a revolu- 
tionary spark among the conservative Honduran peasantry. 

The perception of a genuine leftist revolutionary threat to Hon- 
duran stability enhanced Brigadier General Alvarez's power and 
heightened his profile both in Honduras and the United States. 
The resultant appearance of an imbalance of power between the 
military and the nascent civilian government called into question 
the viability of Honduras 's democratic transition. Some observers 
saw in Alvarez a continuation in the long series of military caudi- 
llos who had ruled the nation since independence. A coup and reim- 
position of direct military rule appeared a virtual certainty to those 
who doubted Honduras' s affinity for any form of democratic 
government. Others, however, pictured Alvarez more in the mold 
of Argentina's Juan Peron — a military-based caudillo who success- 
fully made the transition to populist civilian politics. Like most 
officers, Alvarez had ties to the PNH. Alvarez served as president 
of the Association for the Progress of Honduras (Asociacion para 
el Progreso de Honduras — Aproh), a group made up mainly of 
conservative businesspeople and PNH leaders. The initial goals 
of Aproh were to attract foreign investment and to block the growth 



49 



Honduras: A Country Study 

of "popular organizations" (labor unions, campesino groups, and 
other activist groups) such as those that supported the FMLN in 
El Salvador. Aproh's acceptance of funding from the South Korea- 
based Unification Church proved controversial and generated nega- 
tive publicity for both the organization and for Alvarez. The gener- 
al's purportedly popular following, moreover, was suspect. He 
seemed much more comfortable and adept at high-level political 
maneuvering than at grassroots organization. Eventually, even his 
support within the armed forces proved to be inadequate to sus- 
tain his ambitions. 

Although Alvarez had appeared ascendant by 1982, some ob- 
servers described the political situation in Honduras as a trium- 
virate: Brigadier General Alvarez formulating national security 
policy and refraining from a direct military takeover of the govern- 
ment; President Suazo supporting Alvarez's policies in return for 
military tolerance of his rule and military support for his domestic 
policies; and the United States government providing the economic 
and military aid that helped sustain the arrangement. Some dis- 
puted the claim that Suazo was subservient to the military by point- 
ing out the fact that the president refused to increase the budget 
of the armed forces. That budget, however, failed to take foreign 
military aid into account. The increase in United States military 
aid from US$3.3 million in fiscal year (FY — see Glossary) 1980 
to US$31.3 million in FY 1982, therefore, represented a substan- 
tial expansion in the military's role in government. 

Alvarez strongly supported United States policy in Central 
America. He reportedly assisted in the initial formation of the 
Nicaraguan Resistance (more commonly known as the Contras, 
short for contrarevolucionarios — counterrevolutionaries in Spanish), 
arranged large-scale joint exercises with United States forces, and 
agreed to allow the training of Salvadoran troops by United States 
special forces at a facility near Puerto Castilla known as the Regional 
Center for Military Training (Centro Regional de Entrenamiento 
Militar — CREM) (see United States Military Assistance and Train- 
ing, ch. 5). The latter action eventually contributed greatly to 
Alvarez's ouster in early 1984. 

The other major factor in the Alvarez ouster was the general's 
attempt to streamline the command structure of the armed forces. 
Traditionally, a collegial board made up of field- grade officers 
consulted with the commander in the formulation of policy for the 
Honduran armed forces. Alvarez proposed to eliminate this organi- 
zation, the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (Consejo Superior 
de las Fuerzas Armadas — Consuffaa), and to replace it with a board 
of eight senior officers. The reorganization would have concentrated 



50 



Historical Setting 



and enhanced Alvarez's power over the military by allowing him 
to name his most trusted commanders to a leadership board that 
would rubber-stamp his policy proposals. At the same time, the 
reorganization had promised to make the armed forces function 
more efficiently, an important consideration if hostilities broke out 
between Honduras and Nicaragua. 

Alvarez's view on involvement in Nicaragua led directly to the 
1984 rebellion by his officers. Most observers had expected Hon- 
duras to serve as one staging area for a United States military in- 
tervention in Nicaragua if such an operation took place. The flawed 
but successful Operation Urgent Fury on the Caribbean island of 
Grenada in November 1983 had seemed to increase the likelihood 
of military action against the Sandinista regime in Nicaragua. 
Although Alvarez supported a military solution to the "Nicaraguan 
problem," a significant faction of the Honduran officer corps held 
divergent convictions. These more nationalistic, more isolationist 
officers saw Alvarez as subservient to the United States, giving up 
more in terms of sovereignty than he received in aid. These officers 
also resented Alvarez's posturing in the media and his apparent 
aspirations to national leadership. On a more mundane level, cer- 
tain officers also feared that Alvarez would force them out after 
he had solidified his power base within the officer corps. The 
prospect of early, involuntary retirement, with its attendant loss 
of licit and illicit income, prompted a clique of senior officers to 
move against Alvarez on March 31, 1984, seizing him and dis- 
patching him on a flight to Miami. 

The ouster of Alvarez produced a number of repercussions both 
in Honduran domestic politics and in Honduran-United States re- 
lations. The armed forces, which had appeared to be moving in 
a more activist and outward-looking direction under Alvarez, as- 
sumed a more isolationist stance toward regional relations and Unit- 
ed States policy initiatives. Air Force Brigadier General Walter 
Lopez Reyes, the new commander in chief, demanded further in- 
creases in military aid in return for Honduran cooperation in region- 
al affairs. After some equivocation, Lopez closed the CREM. He 
also scaled back Honduran-United States military exercises. On 
May 21, 1985, President Suazo Cordova and United States presi- 
dent Ronald W. Reagan signed a joint communique that amend- 
ed a 1982 annex to the 1954 Military Assistance Agreement between 
the two countries. Although the new accord allowed the United 
States to expand and improve its temporary facilities at Palmerola 
Air Base near Comayagua, it generally limited Honduran cooper- 
ation in comparison to the terms of the 1982 annex. 

By 1984 the armed forces under Lopez began to exert pressure 



51 



Honduras: A Country Study 

on the United States-backed Contra forces, the bulk of which oper- 
ated from bases in the southern departments of El Parafso and Olan- 
cho. Honduran foreign minister Edgardo Paz Barnica reflected the 
new attitude toward the Contras in January 1985, when he an- 
nounced that the government planned to expel them from Hon- 
duras. Although that statement reflected bravado and frustration 
more than reality, the Honduran military took more active steps 
to pressure both the Contras and, indirecdy, the United States 
government. In February 1985, the armed forces ordered the Con- 
tras to close a hospital that they had set up outside of Tegucigal- 
pa. The Hondurans also ordered the Contras to shut down an office 
that had been used to receive official visitors, mainly from the Unit- 
ed States. Around the same time, Honduran troops turned back 
two United States Department of State employees from a planned 
visit to a Contra training camp; the troops told the Americans that 
they lacked a newly required permit to enter the area. 

Honduras and the Nicaraguan Conflict 

President Suazo Cordova had foreshadowed the Honduran am- 
bivalence toward the Contras in a July 1983 letter to President Rea- 
gan, in which Suazo Cordova stated that "our people are beginning 
to ask with greater vigor if it is convenient to our own interests 
to be so intimately linked to the interests of the United States if 
we receive so little in exchange." Although 1983 and 1985 public 
opinion polls had shown that a majority of Hondurans supported 
United States policy in Central America, there was still a growing 
uneasiness over the country's role as reluctant host to Nicaraguan 
rebel forces. At the height of the conflict with the Sandinista Popular 
Army (Ejercito Popular Sandinista — EPS) in the mid-1980s, the 
Contra forces reportedly totaled between 12,000 and 17,000, de- 
pending on the source of the estimate. This force level rivaled that 
of the entire Honduran armed forces. This fact and the continued 
close ties between Honduras and the United States made it doubt- 
ful that the armed forces would expel the Nicaraguan rebels from 
Honduran territory by force. However, the prospect of an EPS 
victory over the Contras, which most observers considered inevita- 
ble, raised the disturbing prospect of a foreign armed force trapped 
on Honduran soil. Most Hondurans believed that, under such cir- 
cumstances, the Nicaraguans would fail to assimilate well into the 
Honduran population and would resort to banditry in order to sur- 
vive. Honduran politicians reflected little faith in the willingness 
of the United States to assist them should events take such a nega- 
tive turn. Most believed that, following a Contra defeat, Washing- 
ton would cut its losses and withdraw all support from the group. 



52 



Historical Setting 



Continued and sharply increased United States military aid to 
Honduras was the counterbalance to the prospect of United States 
withdrawal from the Nicaraguan conflict. For the years 1975-80, 
the total aid to Honduras had been US$16.3 million. From 
1981-85, the total reached US$169 million. Meanwhile, the per- 
centage of the military budget coming directly or indirectly from 
the United States increased from 7 percent in 1980 to 76 percent 
in 1985. 

As the Nicaraguan conflict spread, Hondurans were left to ponder 
the merits of the deal the armed forces had brokered. On March 
22, 1986, approximately 1,500 EPS ground troops crossed the Hon- 
duran border and engaged Contra forces near the hamlet of Las 
Vegas. The EPS withdrew into northern Nicaragua without mak- 
ing contact with Honduran forces. Honduran officials acknowledged 
the incursion publicly, but only after United States spokespersons 
had trumpeted the incident as proof of the Sandinistas' aggressive 
intentions toward their northern neighbor. Shortly thereafter, the 
United States Congress approved US$100 million in military aid 
to the Contra forces. Other EPS incursions into Honduran terri- 
tory followed, notably in December 1986 and June 1987. How much 
human suffering passed in the frontier region without public no- 
tice by any government remained unknown. As in decades past, 
the spillover of the Nicaraguan conflict into more peaceful Hon- 
duras demonstrated the interrelatedness of events in all of the states 
of Central America. 

The Struggle of Electoral Democracy: The Elections of 1985 

The forced departure of Brigadier General Alvarez on March 
31, 1984, and his succession by a group of officers who demon- 
strated less interest in political affairs than he had markedly changed 
the political situation prevailing in the country. President Suazo 
Cordova, previously restrained by his trepidations concerning Al- 
varez, began to show signs of becoming a caudillo. Although the 
constitution forbade his reelection, Suazo Cordova conspired to 
nominate for the 1985 presidential elections Oscar Mejia Arellano, 
a fellow Rodista (the PLH faction founded by Modesto Rodas Al- 
varado). Every politician in Honduras recognized the octogenari- 
an Mejia for what he was, namely someone who would perpetuate 
Suazo' s control of the Presidential Palace. Nevertheless, Suazo Cor- 
dova went about promoting Mejia' s candidacy with every power 
at his disposal. 

The potential key to a Mejia victory lay in the makeup of the 
Supreme Court of Justice, which could (under terms of the 1981 
constitution) decide an election in which each candidate failed to 



53 



Honduras: A Country Study 

receive a clear majority. As 1985 began, the Supreme Court con- 
tained a firm majority of Suazo Cordova supporters. The leadership 
of the Congress, both PLH and PNH, recognized the self-serving 
scenario that Suazo Cordova had set up. Moreover, they realized 
that the constitution granted power to the legislature to remove 
Supreme Court justices for cause. The Congress proceeded to do 
just that when fifty-three of its eighty-two deputies voted on March 
29, 1985, to replace five of nine justices because of their alleged 
corruption. Five new justices quickly took the oath of office. 

During the debate over the justices' corruption, Suazo Cordova 
had fulminated both publicly and privately, threatening to declare 
a state of emergency and close the Congress if the five lost their 
seats on the court. Although he stopped short of fulfilling that threat, 
troops did surround the Congress building temporarily after 
the deputies announced their action. Furthermore, military police 
took into custody Ramon Valladares Soto, the new president of 
the Supreme Court. Arrests of the four other new justices followed. 
A lower court judge charged the five with treason. On April 1, 
the judge filed treason charges against fifty-three legislative deputies 
who had voted to replace the five justices. The proceedings against 
the fifty- three, if pursued, threatened to result in the revocation 
of legislators' legal immunity from prosecution. 

The Congress rapidly reacted to Suazo 's counterattack. On April 
3, 1985, the assembly passed by a forty-nine to twenty-nine vote 
a motion censuring the president for his actions. In another action 
more calculated to curb the president's power, the legislature passed 
a bill establishing guidelines for primary elections within political 
parties. Had such guidelines been in place previously, the entire 
governmental crisis might have been avoided. Not surprisingly, 
Suazo Cordova vetoed the bill almost two weeks later, the day af- 
ter the Rodista faction had endorsed his choice, Mejfa, as the offi- 
cial presidential candidate of the PLH. 

The resolution of the crisis demonstrated how little Honduras 
had progressed from the days when the military had guided events 
either directly or indirectly. During the early April days of the dis- 
pute between Suazo Cordova and the Congress, Brigadier General 
Lopez had publicly declared himself and the armed forces neutral. 
As events began to degenerate, however, the officer corps moved 
to reconcile the antagonists. At first, the military sought to resolve 
the dispute through informal contacts. When that failed, the armed 
forces convened direct negotiations between presidential and legis- 
lative representatives, with military arbiters. By April 21, the talks 
produced an agreement. The leaders of Congress rescinded their 
dismissal of the five justices and dropped their demand for primary 



54 



Historical Setting 



elections. Supreme Court President Valladares received his freedom. 
In a complicated arrangement, it was agreed that candidates of all 
political factions could run for president. The winner of the elec- 
tion would be the faction that received the most votes within the 
party (PLH, PNH, or other) that received the most total votes. The 
arrangement conveniently ignored the provision of the constitu- 
tion stating that the president must be the candidate who receives 
a simple majority of the popular vote. Publicly, all parties expressed 
approval of the outcome. Although threatened union strike action 
had influenced the negotiations, the strongest factor in their out- 
come had been pressure from the armed forces leadership. 

The unorthodox nature of the agreed-upon electoral procedures 
delayed adoption of new regulations until late in November. By that 
time, four PLH candidates, three PNH candidates, and several other 
minor party candidates had filed. The campaign appeared to pit 
two PLH candidates — Mejia and San Pedro Sula engineer Jose Az- 
cona Hoyo — against the PNH's Rafael Leonardo Callejas Romero 
in a contest that saw the two PLH candidates criticize each other 
as much as, or more than, they did their opposition outside of their 
own party. The final vote count, announced on December 23, 
produced the result that the makeshift electoral regulations had made 
all but inevitable — a president who garnered less than a majority 
of the total popular vote. The declared winner, Azcona, boasted 
less than 30 percent of the vote, as opposed to Callejas's 44 per- 
cent. But because the combined total of PLH candidates equaled 
54 percent, Azcona claimed the presidential sash. Callejas lodged 
a protest, but it was short-lived and probably represented less than 
a sincere effort to challenge the agreement brokered by the military. 

Azcona faced multiple national and regional problems as his in- 
auguration took place on January 27, 1986. The new president's 
inaugural address noted the country's many social problems, but 
promised "no magic formulas" to solve them. He also noted the 
growing national debt and promised to adhere to foreign policies 
guided by the principle of nonintervention. Azcona' s prospects for 
a successful presidency appeared dim, partly because his party's bloc 
in the Congress was still splintered, unlike the more united PNH 
deputies on the other side of the aisle. Beyond such parochial con- 
cerns, the crisis in Central America still raged on, presenting a daunt- 
ing prospect for any Honduran leader. 

From Contadora to Esquipulas: The Crisis Abates 
The Contadora Process 

Although the crisis in Central America derived primarily from 



55 



Honduras: A Country Study 

domestic pressures, the region's growing instability during the 1980s 
had drawn the attention and intervention of numerous foreign ac- 
tors, chief among them the United States, the Soviet Union, and 
concerned nations of Latin America. The Contadora negotiating 
process (named for the Panamanian island where it was initiated 
in January 1983) sought to hammer out a solution among the five 
Central American nations through the mediation of the govern- 
ments of Mexico, Venezuela, Colombia, and Panama. The negoti- 
ations proved arduous and protracted. By mid- 1985, the talks had 
bogged down. The Nicaraguan delegates rejected discussion of 
democratization and internal reconciliation as an unwarranted in- 
tervention in their country's internal affairs. Honduras, El Sal- 
vador, Guatemala, and Costa Rica maintained that these provisions 
were necessary to ensure a lasting settlement. 

Another major point of contention was the cessation of aid to 
insurgent groups, particularly United States aid to the Contras. 
Although the United States government was not a party to the Con- 
tadora negotiations, it was understood that the United States would 
sign a separate protocol agreeing to the terms of a final treaty in 
such areas as aid to insurgents, military aid and assistance to Cen- 
tral American governments, and joint military exercises in the 
region. The Nicaraguans demanded that any Contadora treaty call 
for an immediate end to Contra aid, whereas all the other Central 
American states and the mediating countries, with the exception 
of Mexico, downplayed the importance of such a provision. In ad- 
dition, the Nicaraguan government raised objections to specific cuts 
in its military force levels, citing the imperatives of the counter- 
insurgency campaign and defense against a potential United States 
invasion. In an effort to break this impasse, the governments of 
Argentina, Brazil, Peru, and Uruguay announced in July 1985 that 
they would join the Contadora process as a "support group" in 
an effort to resolve the remaining points of contention and achieve 
a comprehensive agreement. 

Despite the combined efforts of the original "core four" nations 
and the "support group," the Contadora process unofficially came 
to a halt during June 1986 when the Central American countries 
still failed to resolve their differences sufficiently to permit the sign- 
ing of a final treaty draft. The United States Congress's approval 
of military aid to the Contras during the same month hampered 
the process, according to representatives of most of the mediating 
countries. Although the mediators vowed to continue their diplo- 
matic efforts and did convene negotiating sessions subsequent to 
the unsuccessful June 6 meeting in Panama City, the Contadora 
process was clearly moribund. 



56 



Historical Setting 



After the Contadora process stalled, the regional consensus of 
opinion seemed to be that a streamlined, strictly Central Ameri- 
can peace initiative stood a better chance of success than one that 
included countries outside the region. During the course of the Con- 
tadora negotiations, the Honduran government had sought to 
achieve an agreement that would settle the Nicaraguan conflict in 
such a way as to assure eventual reassimilation of the Contras into 
Nicaraguan society. At the same time, the Honduran military had 
sought to maintain its expanded relationship with the United States. 
Paradoxically, the Honduran government found itself espousing 
positions similar to those supported by its traditional adversary, 
El Salvador. As a new democracy, Honduras also enjoyed sup- 
port from the government of Costa Rica, a more established 
democracy. The government of Guatemalan president Marco Vini- 
cio Cerezo Arevalo established a more independent position, but 
still supported the concept of a diplomatic solution to Central Ameri- 
ca's troubles. 

The Arias Plan 

The five Central American presidents continued to seek a strictly 
Central American diplomatic solution. They held a meeting in May 
1986 in Esquipulas, Guatemala, in an effort to work out their differ- 
ences over the revised Contadora draft treaty. This meeting was 
a precursor of the process that in early 1987 superseded Contadora. 
The leading proponent and architect of this process was the presi- 
dent of Costa Rica, Oscar Arias Sanchez. After consultations with 
representatives of Honduras, El Salvador, Guatemala, and the 
United States, Arias announced on February 15, 1987, that he had 
presented a peace proposal to representatives of the other Central 
American states, with the exception of Nicaragua. The plan called 
for dialogue between governments and opposition groups, amnesty 
for political prisoners, cease-fires in ongoing insurgent conflicts, 
democratization, and free elections in all five regional states. The 
plan also called for renewed negotiations on arms reductions and 
an end to outside aid to insurgent forces. 

Including the Nicaraguan administration in the negotiations was 
a sensitive issue. The first formal negotiating session to include 
representatives of that government took place in Tegucigalpa on 
July 31, 1987. That meeting of foreign ministers paved the way 
for an August 6, 1987, gathering of the five Central American presi- 
dents in Esquipulas. The negotiations, reportedly marked by blunt 
exchanges among the leaders, produced an agreement that many 
had considered unachievable only months before. The agreement, 
signed on August 7, called for the cessation of outside aid and 



57 



Honduras: A Country Study 

support to insurgent forces but did allow the continuation of such 
aid to government forces. As a democratic government free from 
domestic insurgent problems, Honduras could easily comply with 
the terms of the Esquipulas accord. 

The Central American Peace Agreement, variously referred to 
as "Esquipulas II" or the "Arias Plan," initially required the im- 
plementation of certain conditions by November 5, 1987. The con- 
ditions included establishing decrees of amnesty in those countries 
involved in insurgent conflicts, initiating dialogue between govern- 
ments and unarmed political opposition groups or groups that had 
taken advantage of amnesty, undertaking efforts to negotiate cease- 
fires between governments and insurgent groups, ceasing to allow 
outside aid to insurgent forces, denying the use of each country's 
national territory to "groups trying to destabilize the governments 
of the countries of Central America, ' ' and ensuring conditions con- 
ducive to the development of a "pluralistic and participatory 
democratic process" in all of the signatory states. 

Nicaragua's compliance with the Arias Plan was uneven by late 
1988, and the process appeared to be losing momentum. The 
Nicaraguan government took a number of initial steps to comply 
with the treaty. These included allowing the independent daily La 
Prensa to reopen and the radio station of the Roman Catholic Church 
to resume broadcasting, establishing a national reconciliation com- 
mittee that incorporated representatives of the unarmed opposi- 
tion, and eventually undertaking cease-fire negotiations with 
representatives of the Contras. The optimism engendered by the 
signing of a provisional cease-fire accord on March 23, 1988, at 
Sapoa, Nicaragua, however, had largely dissipated by July. Dur- 
ing that month, the Nicaraguan government broke up a protest 
demonstration in the southern city of Nandaime, expelled the Unit- 
ed States ambassador and seven other diplomats for alleged col- 
laboration with the demonstrators, and again shut down La Prensa 
and the Roman Catholic radio station. 

Accord in Nicaragua 

Talks continued among the Central American presidents as they 
sought to resolve the insurgencies in El Salvador and Nicaragua. 
A series of summit meetings took place during 1989. The presi- 
dents agreed to a draft plan on February 14, 1989. The plan called 
for the demobilization and repatriation of Contra forces within nine- 
ty days, in return for elections. Nicaraguan president Daniel Jose 
Ortega Saavedra agreed to hold a February 1990 balloting. A for- 
eign ministers' meeting also produced agreement on foreign (but 
non-United States) observers to supervise the demobilization. 



58 



Historical Setting 



The Central American leaders crafted the agreement largely 
without advice or guidance from the United States. Although the 
United States remained Honduras 's leading supporter and ally, 
the United States administration gradually lost influence over events 
in Central America as the Esquipulas process played out. Having 
apparently neglected its relationship with President Azcona, the 
administration of George H.W. Bush (1989-93) turned to a more 
established connection, that between the United States government 
and the Honduran armed forces. Although Brigadier General Lopez 
had been purged and exiled in February 1986, the armed forces 
maintained a pro-United States stance. After discussions with Bush 
administration envoys, the Honduran officer corps agreed that non- 
military aid to the Contras should continue despite the February 
agreement. President Azcona, reportedly persuaded by the mili- 
tary, announced that humanitarian aid to the Contras would reduce 
the security threat to Honduras and would not violate the terms 
of the February 1989 agreement. 

The ninety-day timetable established by the February 1989 agree- 
ment proved unworkable. In order to avoid losing momentum, the 
five presidents reconvened in Tela, Honduras, beginning on Au- 
gust 5, 1989. Once again, the presidents negotiated without input 
from the United States government. They produced a new sched- 
ule for Contra demobilization, with a deadline of December 5, 1989. 
The OAS agreed to supervise the process. Although the Bush ad- 
ministration expressed disapproval of the new agreement, the White 
House and United States Congress agreed that the Contras' aid 
would be cut off if the Nicaraguan rebels failed to disband; the Unit- 
ed States Congress approved US$49.7 million in humanitarian aid 
to the Contras to be given through February 1990. 

The December 5 deadline also proved overly optimistic. As the 
date approached, the Central American leaders again scheduled 
a summit. The first site selected was Managua. That venue changed 
to San Jose, Costa Rica, however, after the discovery of arms in 
the wreckage of a Nicaraguan aircraft that had crashed in El Sal- 
vador. The Salvadoran government subsequently suspended rela- 
tions with Nicaragua, and an aura of conflict continued to hang 
over the summit. At one point, Azcona stormed out of a session 
after Nicaraguan president Ortega refused to drop Nicaragua's In- 
ternational Court of Justice suit against Honduras over the Con- 
tras' use of Honduran territory. The Nicaraguan government had 
previously agreed to drop the suit if the December 5 demobiliza- 
tion deadline were met. As the summit broke up without agree- 
ment, the Central American situation once again appeared 
dangerously unpredictable. 



59 



Honduras: A Country Study 

The unpredictability of events demonstrated itself once again in 
the Nicaraguan elections in February 1990. Contrary to most prog- 
nostications and opinion polls, opposition candidate Violeta Ba- 
rrios de Chamorro handily defeated Ortega and the FSLN. Having 
been forced to hold free elections, the FSLN discovered that many 
Nicaraguans deeply resented the authoritarian rule of their revolu- 
tionary government. The Contra insurgency, which had plagued 
both Nicaragua and Honduras for years, slowly drew to a close. 

Although Honduran president Azcona began the process that 
eventually culminated in the resolution of the Nicaraguan conflict, 
another president would occupy the presidential palace as the Con- 
tras abandoned their camps in Honduras and marched south. The 
elections of November 26, 1989, were free of the makeshift elec- 
toral procedures that had rendered the 1985 balloting questiona- 
ble. The PLH and PNH nominated one candidate each, rather 
than several. Carlos Flores Facusse, a Rodista and protege of ex- 
president Suazo Cordova, won the PLH nomination and the right 
to oppose Rafael Leonardo Callejas, who had also carried the ban- 
ner of the PNH when he lost in 1985. Callejas' s convincing victo- 
ry, by 50.2 to 44.5 percent, reflected public discontent with the 
PLH government's failure to translate increased foreign aid into 
improvements in the domestic economy. Callejas became the first 
opposition candidate to win an election in Honduras since 1932. 
All signs indicated that in the early 1990s, Honduras 's democratic 
transition remained on course. 

* * * 

No complete history of Honduras in English is available. Several 
volumes are available on the history of Central America, the best 
of which is Ralph Lee Woodward, Jr.'s Central America: A Nation 
Divided. Material on pre-Columbian Honduras can be found in John 
B. Glass's "Archaeological Survey of Western Honduras" in the 
Handbook of Middle American Indians, Vol. 4. The period of Spanish 
conquest is carefully detailed in Robert S. Chamberlin's The Con- 
quest and Colonization of Honduras, 1502-1550. Valuable material for 
the colonial period can be found in Murdo MacLeod's Spanish Cen- 
tral America: A Socioeconomic History, 1520-1720 and in Miles L. Wort- 
man's Government and Society in Central America, 1680-1840. Honduras 
at the time of independence is well covered in Louis Bumgartner's 
Jose Cecilo del Valle of Central America. 

Coverage of the nineteenth century is quite spotty. Mid-century 
conditions are surveyed in E. George Squier's Notes on Central 
America: Particularly the States of Honduras and El Salvador. There is 



60 



Historical Setting 



considerable valuable material in Thomas L. Karnes's The Failure 
of Union: Central America, 1824-1960. There are also numerous 
studies of the rise of the American fruit companies in the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, many of them polemi- 
cal. The best, by far, is Karnes's Tropical Enterprise: Standard Fruit 
and Steamship Company in Latin America. 

The pattern of United States-Honduran relations in the first third 
of the twentieth century is included in two volumes by Dana G. 
Munro, Intervention and Dollar Diplomacy in the Caribbean, 1900-1921 
and The United States and the Caribbean Republics, 1921-1933. The 
development of the Honduran political system, especially in the 
twentieth century, is covered in William S. Stokes's Honduras: An 
Area Study in Government. The rise of the military to political promi- 
nence is surveyed in Steve C. Ropp's "The Honduran Army in 
the Sociopolitical Evolution of the Honduran State." An excellent 
recent study is Robert MacCameron's Bananas, Labor, and Politics 
in Honduras, 1954-1963, which focuses on the 1954 banana work- 
ers' strike. The background to the 1969 conflict with El Salvador 
is covered in William H. Durham's Scarcity and Survival in Central 
America: Ecological Origins of the Soccer War; the causes, course, and 
results of the conflict are detailed in Thomas P. Anderson's The 
War of the Dispossessed: Honduras and El Salvador, 1969. Also useful 
is Mary Jeanne Reid Martz's The Central American Soccer War: Histor- 
ical Patterns and Internal Dynamics of OAS Settlement Procedures. The 
immediate postwar period is described in James A. Morris's The 
Honduran Plan, Politica de Unidad Nacional, 1971-1972: Its Origins 
and Demise. Morris also surveys the situation at the start of the 1980s 
in "Honduras: How Long an Oasis of Peace?" (For further in- 
formation and complete citations, see Bibliography.) 



61 



A typical village street in Honduras 



HONDURAN SOCIETY is, for the most part, rural and poor. 
The overall standard of living in the country is one of the lowest 
in the Western Hemisphere. Foreign as well as domestic assess- 
ments of the country have focused on its poverty to the point where 
this assessment dominates the outlook of the Honduran people. 

Almost all social indices show Honduras lagging in development. 
The annual per capita income is low, health services are extreme- 
ly deficient, infant mortality and child mortality rates are high, 
and literacy rates and other educational indicators are low. In 1993 
the majority of the population in Honduras remained poor, and 
a high rate of population increase made alleviation of that poverty 
in the near future unlikely. 

Honduras 's relatively low population density would seem to be 
a positive factor. An abundance of land, however, has not ensured 
the availability of land for cultivation. The terrain consists for the 
most part of mountains with only narrow coastal plains. Much of 
the arable land is used for export crops and is not available to small 
farmers. Banana (and some pineapple) agribusinesses predominate 
in the country's most fertile land in the Caribbean coastal plains. 
Land available for agriculture has actually decreased since the 1950s, 
as farmland has been converted to rangeland to support an expand- 
ing cattle export industry. 

The continued underdevelopment of the country produced a crisis 
of confidence in Honduran society in the 1980s. Indeed, during 
that decade, economic and social pressures produced an acute sense 
of disorientation in Honduran society. The combination of a world- 
wide economic crisis, a sharp rise in crime, and the absence of an 
independent police force and judicial system left the average citizen 
with a pronounced sense of vulnerability. 

Despite the depressing statistics, however, Honduran society has 
numerous strengths. Among some of the positive factors are a rela- 
tively high number of grassroots organizations, a peasant move- 
ment that has continued even during periods of repression, and 
a corporatist political system in which organizations and classes 
instead of political parties make their political demands. Positive, 
too, is the absence of civil war and the high level of terrorism ex- 
perienced by neighboring countries. 

The question for Honduras in the future is how, given the coun- 
try's limited resources, to deal with severe poverty and to avoid 
the repression and violence that poverty often engenders. 



65 



Honduras: A Country Study 

Geography 

Location and Boundaries 

Honduras, located at the widest part of the isthmus of Central 
America, is the second largest Central American republic (see fig. 
3). The triangular- shaped country has a total area of about 1 12,000 
square kilometers. The 735-kilometer northern boundary is the 
Caribbean coast extending from the mouth of the Rio Motagua 
on the west to the mouth of the Rio Coco on the east, at Cabo 
Gracias a Dios. The 922-kilometer southeastern side of the trian- 
gle is the land border with Nicaragua; it follows the Rio Coco near 
the Caribbean Sea and then extends southwestward through moun- 
tainous terrain to the Golfo de Fonseca on the Pacific Ocean. The 
southern apex of the triangle is a 153-kilometer coasdine at the Golfo 
de Fonseca, which opens onto the Pacific Ocean. The western land 
boundary consists of the 342 -kilometer border with El Salvador 
and the 256-kilometer border with Guatemala. 

Honduras controls a number of islands as part of its offshore 
territories. In the Caribbean Sea, the islands of Roatan (Isla de 
Roatan), Utila, and Guanaja together form Islas de la Bahia (Bay 
Islands), one of the eighteen departments into which Honduras is 
divided. Roatan, the largest of the three islands, is fifty kilometers 
long by five kilometers wide. The Islas de la Bahia archipelago also 
has a number of smaller islands, among them the islets of Barbareta 
(Isla Barbareta), Santa Elena (Isla Santa Elena), and Morat (Isla 
Morat). Farther out in the Caribbean are the Islas Santanillas, for- 
merly known as Swan Islands. A number of small islands and keys 
can be found nearby, among them Cayos Zapotillos and Cayos 
Cochinos. In the Golfo de Fonseca, the main islands under Hon- 
duran control are El Tigre, Zacate Grande (Isla Zacate Grande), 
and Exposicion (Isla Exposicion). 

Boundary Disputes 

A two-centuries-old border dispute between El Salvador and 
Honduras appears to have been resolved in 1993. At issue in this 
territorial dispute was ownership of six contested bolsones (pockets) 
of land encompassing a total area of 436.9 square kilometers as 
well as two islands (Meanguera and El Tigre) in the Golfo de 
Fonseca, and right of passage for Honduras to the Pacific Ocean 
from its southern coast. 

The origins of the boundary dispute date back to the eighteenth 
century when colonial boundaries were ill defined. In the late 
nineteenth century, numerous attempts at mediation failed to settle 
the dispute. The issue continued to fester in the twentieth century 



66 



84 



6 6 



can 



Sea 



Cordillera del Norte 


la 


Sierra del Espfritu Santo 


lb 


Sierra de Nombre de Dioe 


Cordillera Central 


XIa 


Sierra de Montecilloe 


lib 


Sierra de Comayagua 


He 


Sierra de Sulaco 


lid 


Sierra de Misoco 


lie 


Sierra La Esperanza 


Ilf 


Sierra de Agafta 


Ilg 


Sierra de Punta Piedra 


Cordillera del Sur 


Ilia 


Sierra del Merendon 


Illb 


Sierra de Ceiaque 


IIIc 


Sierra de Puca 


Hid 


Montafias de La Sierra 


Hie 


Sierra de Lapaterique 


Illf 


Sierra de Dipilto 




16- 



Cabo Gracias 
a Dios 



Note-Swan Islands, Honduran 
territory in the Caribbean Sea, 
are not pictured. 



14 



^presentation 
\rily authoritative 





International boundary 


® 


National capital 


• 


Populated place 


A 


Spot elevation in meters 





25 50 75 Miles 


1 1- 

25 


— 1 — 1 r 1 1 

50 75 Kilometers 



The Society and Its Environment 



and was a contributing factor in the outbreak of war between the 
two countries in 1969 (see War with El Salvador, ch. 1). The General 
Peace Treaty, signed by El Salvador and Honduras on October 
30, 1980, in Lima, Peru, represented the first real breakthrough 
on this border dispute. The peace treaty stated that the two par- 
ties agreed to submit the boundary dispute to the International 
Court of Justice (ICJ) in The Hague if they failed to reach a bor- 
der agreement after five years of negotiations. By 1985 the two coun- 
tries had not reached an agreement. In 1986 the case reached the 
ICJ, which handed down a ruling on September 11, 1992. Both 
countries accepted the ICJ decision, and a commission was estab- 
lished to decide the citizenship of residents of the bolsones. 

Of the 436.9 square kilometers in dispute, 300.6 square kilom- 
eters were granted to Honduras, and 136.3 were granted to El Sal- 
vador. Of the six bolsones, Honduras was awarded complete control 
of one and approximately 80 percent of another. The remaining 
four were split with El Salvador. El Salvador was awarded posses- 
sion of the island of Meanguera, and Honduras was awarded con- 
trol of the island of El Tigre. More importantly for Honduras, the 
ICJ ruling assured Honduras 's free passage to the Pacific Ocean. 
The ICJ also decided that the Golfo de Fonseca does not represent 
international waters because of the two countries' shared history 
as provinces of the same colonial power and subsequent member- 
ship in the United Provinces of Central America. The court ruled, 
rather, that the Golfo de Fonseca is a condominium, with control 
being shared by El Salvador, Honduras, and Nicaragua. The lat- 
ter country also has a coastline on the gulf. The decision allowed 
for the possibility that the three nations could divide the waters 
at a later date if they wished to do so. 

Topography 

Honduras has three distinct topographical regions: an extensive 
interior highland area and two narrow coastal lowlands. The in- 
terior, which constitutes approximately 80 percent of the country's 
terrain, is mountainous. The larger Caribbean lowlands in the north 
and the Pacific lowlands bordering the Golfo de Fonseca are charac- 
terized by alluvial plains. 

Interior Highlands 

The interior highlands are the most prominent feature of Hon- 
duran topography. Composing approximately 80 percent of the 
country's total area, these mountain areas are home to the majority 
of the population. Because the rugged terrain has made the land 



69 



The Society and Its Environment 



and was a contributing factor in the outbreak of war between the 
two countries in 1969 (see War with El Salvador, ch. 1). The General 
Peace Treaty, signed by El Salvador and Honduras on October 
30, 1980, in Lima, Peru, represented the first real breakthrough 
on this border dispute. The peace treaty stated that the two par- 
ties agreed to submit the boundary dispute to the International 
Court of Justice (ICJ) in The Hague if they failed to reach a bor- 
der agreement after five years of negotiations. By 1985 the two coun- 
tries had not reached an agreement. In 1986 the case reached the 
ICJ, which handed down a ruling on September 11, 1992. Both 
countries accepted the ICJ decision, and a commission was estab- 
lished to decide the citizenship of residents of the bolsones. 

Of the 436.9 square kilometers in dispute, 300.6 square kilom- 
eters were granted to Honduras, and 136.3 were granted to El Sal- 
vador. Of the six bolsones, Honduras was awarded complete control 
of one and approximately 80 percent of another. The remaining 
four were split with El Salvador. El Salvador was awarded posses- 
sion of the island of Meanguera, and Honduras was awarded con- 
trol of the island of El Tigre. More importantly for Honduras, the 
ICJ ruling assured Honduras 's free passage to the Pacific Ocean. 
The ICJ also decided that the Golfo de Fonseca does not represent 
international waters because of the two countries' shared history 
as provinces of the same colonial power and subsequent member- 
ship in the United Provinces of Central America. The court ruled, 
rather, that the Golfo de Fonseca is a condominium, with control 
being shared by El Salvador, Honduras, and Nicaragua. The lat- 
ter country also has a coastline on the gulf. The decision allowed 
for the possibility that the three nations could divide the waters 
at a later date if they wished to do so. 

Topography 

Honduras has three distinct topographical regions: an extensive 
interior highland area and two narrow coastal lowlands. The in- 
terior, which constitutes approximately 80 percent of the country's 
terrain, is mountainous. The larger Caribbean lowlands in the north 
and the Pacific lowlands bordering the Golfo de Fonseca are charac- 
terized by alluvial plains. 

Interior Highlands 

The interior highlands are the most prominent feature of Hon- 
duran topography. Composing approximately 80 percent of the 
country's total area, these mountain areas are home to the majority 
of the population. Because the rugged terrain has made the land 



69 



Honduras: A Country Study 

difficult to traverse and equally difficult to cultivate, this area has 
not been highly developed. The soil here is poor; Honduras lacks 
the rich volcanic ash found in other Central American countries. 
Until the early part of the twentieth century, the highlands economy 
consisted primarily of mining and livestock. 

In the west, Honduras 's mountains blend into the mountain 
ranges of Guatemala. The western mountains have the highest 
peaks, with the Pico Congolon at an elevation of 2,500 meters and 
the Cerro de Las Minas at 2,850 meters. These mountains are 
woodland covered with mainly pine forests. 

In the east, the mountains merge with those in Nicaragua. 
Although generally not as high as the mountains near the Guatema- 
lan border, the eastern ranges possess some high peaks, such as 
the Montana de la Flor at 2,300 meters, El Boqueron (Monte El 
Boqueron) at 2,485 meters, and Pico Bonito at 2,435 meters. 

One of the most prominent features of the interior highlands is 
a depression that runs from the Caribbean Sea to the Golfo de 
Fonseca. This depression splits the country's cordilleras into eastern 
and western parts and provides a relatively easy transportation route 
across the isthmus. Widest at its northern end near San Pedro Sula, 
the depression narrows as it follows the upper course of the Rio 
Humuya. Passing first through Comayagua and then through nar- 
row passes south of the city, the depression widens again as it runs 
along the border of El Salvador into the Golfo de Fonseca. 

Scattered throughout the interior highlands are numerous flat- 
floored valleys, 300 to 900 meters in elevation, which vary in size. 
The floors of the large valleys provide sufficient grass, shrubs, and 
dry woodland to support livestock and, in some cases, commercial 
agriculture. Subsistence agriculture has been relegated to the slopes 
of the valleys, with the limitations of small- sized holdings, primi- 
tive technology, and low productivity that traditionally accompany 
hillside cultivation. Villages and towns, including the capital, Tegu- 
cigalpa, are tucked in the larger valleys. 

Vegetation in the interior highlands is varied. Much of the 
western, southern, and central mountains are open woodland — 
supporting pine forest interspersed with some oak, scrub, and grassy 
clearings. The ranges toward the east are primarily continuous areas 
of dense, broad-leaf evergreen forest. Around the highest peaks, 
remnants of dense rain forest that formerly covered much of the 
area are still found. 

The Caribbean Lowlands 

This area of river valleys and coastal plains, which most Hon- 
duras call "the north coast," or simply "the coast," has traditionally 



70 



The Society and Its Environment 



been Honduras 's most exploited region. The central part of the 
Caribbean lowlands, east of La Ceiba, is a narrow coastal plain 
only a few kilometers wide. To the east and west of this section, 
however, the Caribbean lowlands widen and in places extend in- 
land a considerable distance along broad river valleys. The broadest 
river valley, along the Rio Ulua near the Guatemalan border, is 
Honduras's most developed area. Both Puerto Cortes, the coun- 
try's largest port, and San Pedro Sula, Honduras's industrial capi- 
tal, are located here. 

To the east, near the Nicaraguan border, the Caribbean lowlands 
broaden to an extensive area known as the Mosquitia. Unlike the 
western part of the Caribbean lowlands, the Mosquitia is Hon- 
duras's least-developed area. Underpopulated and culturally dis- 
tinct from the rest of the country, the area consists of inland 
savannah with swamps and mangrove near the coast. During times 
of heavy rainfall, much of the savannah area is covered by shallow 
water, making transportation by means other than a shallow-draft 
boat almost impossible. 

Pacific Lowlands 

The smallest physiographic region of Honduras, the Pacific 
lowlands, is a strip of land averaging twenty-five kilometers wide 
on the north shore of the Golfo de Fonseca. The land is flat, be- 
coming swampy near the shores of the gulf, and is composed mosdy 
of alluvial soils washed down from the mountains. The gulf is shal- 
low and the water rich in fish and mollusks. Mangroves along the 
shore make shrimp and shellfish particularly abundant by provid- 
ing safe and abundant breeding areas amid their extensive networks 
of underwater roots. 

Several islands in the gulf fall under Honduras's jurisdiction. 
The two largest, Zacate Grande and El Tigre, are eroded volca- 
noes, part of the chain of volcanoes that extends along the Pacific 
coast of Central America. Both islands have volcanic cones more 
than 700 meters in elevation that serve as markers for vessels en- 
tering Honduras's Pacific ports. 

Climate 

Although all of Honduras lies within the tropics, the climatic 
types of each of the three physiographic regions differ. The Carib- 
bean lowlands have a tropical wet climate with consistently high 
temperatures and humidity, and rainfall fairly evenly distributed 
throughout the year. The Pacific lowlands have a tropical wet and 
dry climate with high temperatures but a distinct dry season from 
November through April. The interior highlands also have a distinct 



71 



Honduras: A Country Study 

dry season, but, as is characteristic of a tropical highland climate, 
temperatures in this region decrease as elevation increases. 

Unlike in more northerly latitudes, temperatures in the tropics 
vary primarily with elevation instead of with the season. Land be- 
low 1,000 meters is commonly known as tierra caliente (hot land), 
between 1,000 and 2,000 meters tierra templada (temperate land), 
and above 2,000 meters tierra fria (cold land). Both the Caribbean 
and Pacific lowlands are tierra caliente, with daytime highs averag- 
ing between 28°C and 32 °C throughout the year. In the Pacific 
lowlands, April, the last month of the dry season, brings the war- 
mest temperatures; the rainy season is slightly cooler, although 
higher humidity during the rainy season makes these months feel 
more uncomfortable. In the Caribbean lowlands, the only relief 
from the year-round heat and humidity comes during December 
or January when an occasional strong cold front from the north 
(a norte) brings several days of strong northwest winds and slightly 
cooler temperatures. 

The interior highlands range from tierra templada to tierra fria. 
Tegucigalpa, in a sheltered valley and at an elevation of 1,000 
meters, has a pleasant climate, with an average high temperature 
ranging from 30°C in April, the warmest month, to 25 °C in Janu- 
ary, the coolest. Above 2,000 meters, temperatures can fall to near 
freezing at night, and frost sometimes occurs. 

Rain falls year round in the Caribbean lowlands but is seasonal 
throughout the rest of the country. Amounts are copious along the 
north coast, especially in the Mosquitia, where the average rainfall 
is 2,400 millimeters. Nearer San Pedro Sula, amounts are slightly 
less from November to April, but each month still has considera- 
ble precipitation. The interior highlands and Pacific lowlands have 
a dry season, known locally as "summer, ' ' from November to April. 
Almost all the rain in these regions falls during the ' 'winter, ' ' from 
May to September. Total yearly amounts depend on surrounding 
topography; Tegucigalpa, in a sheltered valley, averages only 1,000 
millimeters of precipitation. 

Honduras lies within the hurricane belt, and the Caribbean coast 
is particularly vulnerable to hurricanes or tropical storms that travel 
inland from the Caribbean. Hurricane Francelia in 1969 and Trop- 
ical Storm Alleta in 1982 affected thousands of people and caused 
extensive damage to crops. Hurricane Fifi in 1974 was the worst 
natural disaster in recent Honduran history; more than 8,000 people 
were killed, and nearly the entire banana crop was destroyed. Hur- 
ricanes occasionally form over the Pacific and move north to af- 
fect southern Honduras, but Pacific storms are generally less severe 
and their landfall rarer. 



72 



Rugged mountainous terrain in central Honduras 

Courtesy Bryan Fung 
Lago de Yojoa, largest lake in Honduras 
Courtesy Richard Haggerty 



73 



Honduras: A Country Study 
Hydrography 

Honduras is a water-rich country. The most important river in 
Honduras is the Ulua, which flows 400 kilometers to the Caribbean 
through the economically important Valle de Sula. Numerous other 
rivers drain the interior highlands and empty north into the Carib- 
bean. These other rivers are important, not as transportation routes, 
but because of the broad fertile valleys they have produced. 

Rivers also define about half of Honduras' s international bor- 
ders. The Rio Goascoran, flowing to the Golfo de Fonseca, and 
the Rio Lempa define part of the border between El Salvador and 
Honduras. The Rio Coco marks about half of the border between 
Nicaragua and Honduras. 

Despite an abundance of rivers, large bodies of water are rare. 
Lago de Yojoa, located in the west-central part of the country, is 
the sole natural lake in Honduras. This lake is twenty- two kilome- 
ters long and at its widest point measures fourteen kilometers. 
Several large, brackish lagoons open onto the Caribbean in north- 
east Honduras. These shallow bodies of water allow limited trans- 
portation to points along the coast. 

Demographic Trends 

In 1993 Honduras still had a low population density despite ex- 
plosive population growth during the second half of the twentieth 
century and significant immigration from neighboring countries. 
The population was also slightly more than 50 percent rural and 
unevenly distributed in the mountainous areas around the capital 
and near the Salvadoran border, and in the Rio Ulua valley. Rapid 
internal migration, however, was expected to change Honduras 
from a rural highlands nation in the twentieth century to an ur- 
ban one with large segments living in coastal lowlands in the twenty- 
first century (see fig. 4). 

Population Density and Distribution 

Although Honduras, with forty-six inhabitants per square kilo- 
meter, has a relatively low population density, especially when 
compared to its neighbors to the west, uneven distribution has con- 
tributed to overpopulation in certain areas (see table 2, Appendix 
A). The five mountainous departments bordering El Salvador 
(Ocotepeque, Lempira, Intibuca, La Paz, and Valle) have a much 
higher population density than the four sparsely populated depart- 
ments in the east (Colon, Olancho, Gracias a Dios, and El Parafso). 
The country's second-largest and least-populated department, 



74 



The Society and Its Environment 



Gracias a Dios, had a population density of only 2.5 inhabitants 
per square kilometer in 1989. Honduras' s only densely populated 
lowland area is the Rio Ulua valley. In 1989 the department of 
Cortes, on the west bank of the Rio Ulua, had a population densi- 
ty of 188 inhabitants per square kilometer. 

Honduras is the only country in Central America with an ur- 
ban population distributed between two large centers. Whereas 
other Central American capitals are home to more than 50 per- 
cent of their countries' urban populations, Tegucigalpa's percent- 
age of total urban population is considerably lower. The difference 
is accounted for by the growth of San Pedro Sula. By the begin- 
ning of the twenty-first century, Tegucigalpa and San Pedro Sula 
are projected to account for nearly 73 percent of the population 
living in urban areas. The two cities are also projected to account 
for 25 percent of the total population of Honduras by the end of 
the twentieth century. 

Rural-to-Urban Migration 

The vast majority of the rural-to-urban population shift has been 
the result of migration from the southwestern departments (Ocote- 
peque, Lempira, Intibuca, La Paz, and Valle) to cities in the depart- 
ments on or near the Caribbean coast (Cortes, Yoro, Atlantida, 
and Colon) and to Tegucigalpa (in Francisco Morazan department 
in the central highlands). During the earlier part of the twentieth 
century, employment opportunities in the newly established banana 
plantations attracted many people from southern and western Hon- 
duras to the Caribbean coast. Cities on the banks of the Rio Ulua, 
especially El Progreso, experienced impressive growth as a result 
of this migration from the south. Migration from the mountainous 
southwest sparked tremendous development in the city of San Pedro 
Sula. The search for employment also led many to Tegucigalpa, 
even though the capital has never been a center for industry or 
agriculture. 

Demographers have predicted that, unless significant social and 
economic reforms are instituted, the rural- to-urban migration trend 
so prevalent in the twentieth century not only will continue but 
also will probably increase. Although Honduras is still primarily 
an agrarian society, urban centers have grown considerably since 
the 1920s. Analysts speculate that urban centers will continue to 
expand as a result of internal migration and national population 
growth. 

In the second half of the twentieth century, Tegucigalpa in par- 
ticular experienced sharp increases in its population. During the 
1950s, Tegucigalpa's population increased nearly 75 percent. The 



75 



Honduras: A Country Study 



AGE-GROUP 

80 and over 
75-79 
70-74 
65-69 
60-64 
55-59 
50-54 
45-49 
40-44 
35-39 
30-34 
25-29 
20-24 
15-19 
10-14 
5-9 
0-4 



MA 



ES 



fxyyyy k 



r^yy^yy^xxs 





















FEMALES 


























































■ 













































10 8 



8 10 



POPULATION IN PERCENTAGES 



Source: Based on information from Federal Republic of Germany, Statistisches Bundesamt, 
Ldnderberichi Honduras, 1989, Wiesbaden, 1989, 18. 



Figure 4. Estimated Population by Age and Gender, 1985 

following decade brought a population rate increase of more than 80 
percent. In 1980 Tegucigalpa had a population of 400,000. By 1989 
the population had soared to 576,661 . This increase in population has 
practically crippled the already fragile infrastructure of the city. Hous- 
ing is woefully inadequate, and a large percentage of the residents ei- 
ther lack running water altogether or receive inadequate amounts. 

During the period between 1950 and 1980, San Pedro Sula had 
a population growth rate that exceeded that of Tegucigalpa. In the 
1980s, the annual growth rate dropped somewhat and was less than 
that of Tegucigalpa (3.7 percent and 4.4 percent, respectively). In 
1988 the population of San Pedro Sula stood at 287,350. Whereas 
San Pedro Sula has dealt more successfully with its population 



76 



The Society and Its Environment 

growth, it is nonetheless challenged to meet the housing, services, 
and employment needs of new inhabitants. 

Other urban centers experiencing a high population growth rate 
are La Ceiba, on the Caribbean, and El Progreso, in the agricul- 
tural valley of the Rio Ulua. La Ceiba is the third-largest city in 
Honduras. In 1988 it had a population of 68,764 and an annual 
population growth rate of 3.2 percent. El Progreso is the country's 
fourth-largest city. The 1988 population of this city was 60,058 and 
the annual growth rate 4.5 percent. The populations of both La 
Ceiba and El Progreso are expected to exceed 100,000 by the year 
2000. 

The majority of migrants in Honduras are very young, ranging 
from their teens to their early twenties. Most male migrants gravi- 
tate toward developing agricultural areas, especially the Caribbean 
coast. Because women traditionally have a more limited choice of 
employment, their occupational skills are similarly limited. Among 
the many incentives for their migration are escape from economic 
hardship, as well as escape from marriage and childbearing at a 
very young age. The majority of women migrants seek domestic 
employment or work as street vendors in urban areas. In the early 
1990s, an increasing number of women have been seeking employ- 
ment in the maquiladoras , or assembly factories. Many others be- 
come prostitutes. Male urban migrants seek jobs in artisan shops, 
with merchants, and as laborers. Employment opportunities for 
the new migrants remain spotty, however, as the industrial and 
commercial sectors in Honduras have not created enough jobs to 
absorb the population coming from the rural areas. 

Regional Emigration 

Since the early twentieth century, Honduras has had the challenge 
of absorbing thousands of immigrants from neighboring countries. 
Political tensions throughout Central America have been a key fac- 
tor behind much of the immigration. The number of immigrants 
from El Salvador looking for land or jobs was especially high be- 
tween the early twentieth century and the onset of the 1 969 Soccer 
War between El Salvador and Honduras. A significant number 
of Salvadoran immigrants worked in the banana plantations dur- 
ing the 1930s and 1940s. 

Armed conflict in Nicaragua, Guatemala, and El Salvador in the 
1980s resulted in the arrival of more than 60,000 refugees. Most of 
these refugees live near their respective borders, and the majority are 
women and children. Throughout the 1980s, Nicaraguan refugees 
continued to arrive in Honduras as the war between Nicaragua's 



77 



Honduras: A Country Study 

Sandinista government and the Nicaraguan Resistance forces 
(known as the Contras, short for contrarevolucionarios — counter- 
revolutionaries in Spanish) intensified. By the early 1990s, Hon- 
duras hosted an estimated 250,000 refugees or immigrants from 
Central America. 

Population Growth 

In the second half of the twentieth century, Honduras under- 
went explosive population growth. In the 1910 census, the annual 
rate of population growth barely exceeded 1.5 percent. By 1950 
it had reached 3 percent. From 1960 to 1990, the population growth 
rate climbed to 3.3 percent. By 1992 the annual population growth 
had slowed somewhat, but only to an estimated 2.8 percent. 

The country's high birth rate has led Honduras 's population to 
double about every twenty-five years. The 1950 census counted 
1,368,605 inhabitants, almost twice as many as the 1926 census 
recorded. By 1974 the population had almost doubled once again. 
As of July 1992, the population was estimated to be 5,092,776. 

Several factors have contributed to the rapid population rise. 
Honduras has consistently maintained high birth rates during the 
twentieth century. The crude birth rate (CBR — the annual num- 
ber of births per 1 ,000 inhabitants) from the beginning to the mid- 
point of the century fluctuated between 41.7 and 44.5 births per 
1,000 inhabitants. From around 1950 to 1975, Honduras had the 
highest CBR in Latin America. Since the mid-1970s, the CBR has 
dropped and steadied somewhat. In 1990 the CBR stood at 39 births 
per 1,000 inhabitants. 

The total fertility rate (TFR — the average number of children 
a woman would bear in her lifetime) had dropped to 7 . 5 children 
per woman by the early 1970s. Since the 1970s, the TFR in Hon- 
duras has declined. In 1990 it was 5.2, and the projected TFR for 
the year 2000 is 4.1. 

In 1993, however, the TFR varied considerably according to a 
woman's residence in rural or urban areas and according to in- 
come levels. Rural women had an average of 8.7 children while 
urban women had 5.3 children. The TFR for all upper- and middle- 
income women (rural and urban) was 5.8, while among lower- 
income women it was approximately 8.0. 

Regional differences in birth rates, coupled with internal migra- 
tion, are expected to change Honduras 's population distribution. 
The department of Cortes, with a high population growth rate, 
and the departments of Colon and Gracias a Dios, heretofore thinly 
populated areas in the northeast, are expected to become the coun- 
try's fastest growing areas. The emerging population pattern is one 



78 



View of Comayaguela 
Street scene in Tegucigalpa 
Courtesy Richard Haggerty 



79 



Honduras: A Country Study 

of significant growth in the central highlands near Tegucigalpa and 
along the entire Caribbean coast region from San Pedro Sula east 
to Gracias a Dios. The departments bordering El Salvador, in the 
southwest region of the country, are expected to have the slowest 
population growth rate. 

The absorption of this expanding population represents a seri- 
ous challenge to the Honduran government. Already inadequate 
health services, as well as poor educational, employment, and hous- 
ing opportunities, will be increasingly burdened by a rapidly grow- 
ing and young population. In 1989 slightly more than 2 million 
Hondurans, or 45 percent, were between one and fourteen years 
old. Frustrated expectations for a better standard of living among 
this youthful population raise the possibility of unrest in the future. 

Social Sectors 

Honduran society, for the most part, mirrors other Latin Ameri- 
can countries in terms of its social classes and sectors. Distribu- 
tion of wealth is uneven, with a small minority of the population 
(increasingly made up of members of the military) controlling 
national politics and wealth. Capital is largely obtained through 
ownership of large landed estates, collaboration with foreign en- 
trepreneurial enterprises, and privileges granted to the military. 

In sharp contrast to the small wealthy class, the vast majority of 
the population is made up of subsistence farmers and agricultural 
laborers who live in increasing poverty. Since the 1950s, a small 
middle class has emerged from the ranks of the poor and the artisan 
sectors. This new middle class had become moderately well off by 
the 1990s. However, the middle class and especially the poor were 
extremely hard hit during the economic crisis of the 1980s (see Hu- 
man Resources, ch. 3). Both classes saw many of the modest eco- 
nomic gains they had made in the previous three decades wiped out. 

Background 

Although the class structure in Honduras is similar to that in 
other Latin American countries, the manner in which these class-, 
es interact presents less conflict than is exhibited by Honduras' s 
immediate neighbors. The relative lack of tension in class relations 
raises the possibility that Honduras might avoid the social and po- 
litical violence that has plagued Guatemala, El Salvador, and 
Nicaragua. Political dynamics peculiar to Honduras tend to les- 
sen social pressures, although it is still possible that class tensions, 
growing poverty among the majority of the population, and in- 
creased concentration of wealth in a minority could result in vio- 
lence in the future. 



80 



Faces of Honduras 
Courtesy Bryan Fung 



Honduras: A Country Study 

The low level of social tension in Honduras has its origins in 
the country's colonial and early republican history. During the 
colonial period, the province that later became Honduras was a 
backwater in the territories held by Spain. Because much of the 
indigenous population either had been exterminated or had died 
of disease, the province was sparsely populated. Ethnically, this 
meant that Honduras had a more homogeneous mestizo culture 
than most other Spanish colonies. The area was isolated because 
the majority of Honduras 's population setded in the central and 
western highlands, far from the main transportation route that 
linked the southern and northern regions of the Spanish Empire. 
Furthermore, the area lacked any significant mineral deposits or 
other easily exploitable wealth. Consequently, the colonial elite in 
Honduras came to be defined by their control of the province's 
political system rather than by their accumulation of wealth. In 
later centuries, the absence of coffee exporting concerns in Hon- 
duras became another factor differentiating it from its neighbors. 
In most of Central America, large coffee plantations resulted in 
a wealthy elite. The accumulation of large fortunes by a land-owning 
minority took place much later in Honduras — during the twen- 
tieth century, when much of the wealth from the new banana busi- 
nesses went to foreign investors who owned the banana companies. 

Advocates for Social Change 

During the twentieth century, the corporatist system of politics 
that has emerged has eased the intensity of the demands placed 
on the state by the rural and urban poor. The relative openness 
of Honduran politics and the degree of legitimacy given to working- 
class demands have resulted in a system in which the organiza- 
tions representing lower sectors of society can be highly organized 
and even militant without calling for the overthrow of the system 
itself. This militancy has made organized labor a political force since 
the 1950s and has resulted in many labor reforms. Peasant militan- 
cy, for example, has made possible the agrarian reform movement. 
According to some analysts, Honduras has achieved a level of po- 
litical organization on the part of labor unions and peasant organi- 
zations that remains unparalleled in most of Central America (see 
Political Dynamics, ch. 4). Reform has been uneven, however, and 
political and social reform movements stagnated in the 1970s and 
1980s. In the early 1990s, the central problems of poverty and un- 
derdevelopment remained pervasive. 

The military's participation in Honduran politics has been, in 
one sense, the action of another interest group (see Historical Back- 
ground, ch. 5). The military in Honduras has not emerged as an 



82 



The Society and Its Environment 



organization for the sons of the elite, but rather as an organization 
that cuts across economic and class lines. This fact has meant a 
greater divergence of purpose and interests between the traditional 
Honduran elite and the armed forces. The decision-making struc- 
ture within the military also allows for a degree of dissent within 
the organization, resulting in less resistance to social reforms. 

The relatively open political discourse found in Honduras is aided 
by the ability of other social institutions to take advantage of the 
country's freedom of expression. Although in general the Hondu- 
ran press tends toward conservative positions, it is free of direct 
government control (see The Press, ch. 4). Control of the press 
is exercised more through cooptation than by censorship. Several 
independent radio stations are powerful forces in Honduras, a coun- 
try that has a high illiteracy rate. The independent position of the 
National Autonomous University of Honduras (Universidad Na- 
cional Autonoma de Honduras — UNAH), which as a rule holds 
liberal positions, also contributes to the variety of opinions that 
can be heard. 

The Honduran Roman Catholic Church also has been a force 
pressing for social change and reform, although its role has varied 
and, in many instances, has been contradictory throughout the 
years. The role of the church as advocate for change gained ground 
in the late 1960s after Vatican Council II. The church's role 
gathered momentum after the meeting of the Latin American Con- 
ference of Bishops in Medellm, Colombia, in 1968. The Roman 
Catholic Church in Honduras came to hold the view that its mem- 
bers should become active agents of social change. In Honduras, 
foreign clergy in particular played a major role in social activism. 
By the 1970s, the Roman Catholic Church in Honduras had come 
to be perceived as radical, and in 1971 various Roman Catholic 
Church organizations joined with those of the Christian Democratic 
Movement of Honduras (Movimiento Democrata Cristiano de 
Honduras — MDCH) to form the Coordinating Council for De- 
velopment (Consejo Coordinador de Desarrollo — Concorde). The 
impact of this activism was felt down to the parish level. 

Differences of opinion emerged within the Roman Catholic 
Church in the late 1970s, however, regarding its approach to so- 
cial change. Certain orders of clergy, particularly the Jesuits (So- 
ciety of Jesus) and various priests, advocated even greater activism 
than the church hierarchy supported. The hierarchy's opposition 
to further change was evident when it withdrew Roman Catholic 
organizations from the Concorde. As Central America took center 
stage in the Cold War in the 1970s and 1980s because of events 



83 



Honduras: A Country Study 

in Nicaragua and El Salvador, activist priests were accused of be- 
ing communists. Tensions between the church's hierarchy and ac- 
tivist priests eased in the 1990s, however, with the decline of 
insurgency in the area. 

Increased political conservatism and repression during the 1980s 
resulted in the emergence of a great number of grass-roots organi- 
zations. Along with labor unions and peasant organizations, the 
emerging groups advocated vigilance concerning human rights and 
exerted pressure on the authorities to reveal the whereabouts of 
disappeared citizens. 

These new grass-roots groups, as well as the press, the UN AH, 
and the Roman Catholic Church, all contributed to the preserva- 
tion of a political system with relative freedom of expression. The 
attempts at reform initiated by these groups, however, have not 
met with complete success. Although the government and military 
have at times opted for compromise in the face of reform demands, 
the organizations have also had to endure periods of threatened 
and real repression. 

The Upper Class 

Although the upper class has enjoyed privileges and wealth far 
greater than the general population, the Honduran elite has been 
both economically and politically the weakest oligarchy in Central 
America. This relative lack of power is partly the result of the 
dominant role of foreign investment in Honduras since the early 
twentieth century. Until about 1900, the Honduran elite was in- 
volved in rural landholding in the interior highlands and valleys. 
To this day, some hacendados (large hacienda owners) continue 
to live on their rural estates. Until the arrival of the banana com- 
panies, Hondurans had avoided the underpopulated, inhospitable 
Caribbean lowlands infamous for their heat and pestilence. Even 
after banana plantations were established in the Caribbean lowlands 
at the turn of the century, the interior highlands elite largely main- 
tained its status quo. 

With the development of cotton and livestock export businesses 
following World War II, the traditional Honduran elite became 
more economically active. In response to the beef markets that 
opened after the war, commercial production of cattle also became 
quite profitable. Between 1950 and 1980, cattle production more 
than tripled in Honduras. This period witnessed a marked acceler- 
ation in the concentration of land holdings and wealth. These 
changes took place mostly at the expense of lands formerly used 
for food production. As land title disputes and seizures proliferat- 
ed, social tensions in rural Honduras increased drastically. 



84 



Campaign posters on 
a main street in Tela 
Courtesy Ann Gardner 



Typical street scene in Copdn 
Courtesy Randall Baldwin 




85 



Honduras: A Country Study 

With wealth its only defining criterion, the upper class in Hon- 
duras is not particularly cohesive and has often split into diver- 
gent groups over political and economic issues. Competing business 
associations have served as vehicles for the disputing factions. Cer- 
tain factions of the elite are more conservative, whereas others ad- 
vocate a more liberal and open path to economic development. As 
a result of their differences, members of the upper class are willing 
to participate in an open dialogue and form alliances with other 
sectors and classes. In the 1950s, business interests supported strik- 
ing workers in foreign-owned corporations. At times, factions of 
the elite have supported social change while their conservative coun- 
terparts have fiercely opposed it. In the 1970s, the military, labor, 
and peasant organizations joined forces with the more progressive 
faction of the elite to support a military regime with a reform plat- 
form. Probably because all sectors keep a stake in the system, Hon- 
duras has avoided fundamental challenges to its social structure 
and overthrow of its political system. 

The twentieth century has seen the military become a part of 
Honduras 's elite. In the mid-1950s, the armed forces in Honduras 
underwent a transformation. With aid and training primarily from 
the United States, the military went from being what was, in 
effect, an array of provincial militias to a modern national insti- 
tution. Because the military in Honduras had never been an insti- 
tution favored by the traditional elite, the military has emerged 
as an independent member of the upper sector of society. 

The Middle Class 

In 1993 the middle class in Honduras was still a small, albeit 
growing, sector. Inclusion in this sector is best defined by economic 
factors and by occupation. Except for merchants, an equally im- 
portant factor in classifying a person as middle-class appears to be 
completion of a higher education. Included among middle-class 
ranks are professionals, students, farmers, merchants, business em- 
ployees, and civil servants. Although a well-paying occupation is 
crucial for movement up to the middle sector, incomes for this group 
are still relatively low. 

One factor limiting the size of the middle class is the slow growth 
of industry and commerce in Honduras (see Macroeconomic 
Trends, ch. 3). Employment opportunities are scarce. The growth 
of the middle class in the Caribbean coast region has been directly 
tied to that area's industries and foreign enterprises. The success 
of merchants in the north has resulted from the markets created 
by workers employed in the area's agribusinesses. The middle class 
in Honduras has not been politically active as a unified group, 



86 



The Society and Its Environment 



although many in its ranks are politically active through unions, 
church groups, or other organizations. 

The Lower Class 

Traditionally, the poor in Honduras have lived predominantly 
in rural areas. The lack of economic opportunity in rural areas and 
the subsequent migration to the cities have led to an increasing 
number of urban poor. 

During the colonial period, the low population density in the 
country made land readily available for small subsistence farm- 
ers. When the concentration of land for cotton and cattle export 
began in the 1950s, the situation in the rural areas changed. By 
the 1960s, poor rural families were struggling for survival on smaller 
parcels of land that had ever-decreasing fertility and productivity. 
By 1965 landlessness had become a problem. 

The increase in the number of landless peasants led to even great- 
er numbers migrating to cities in search of employment and in the 
emergence of a peasant movement in national politics. The majority 
of those unable to practice subsistence farming remained in rural 
areas, however, and sought work as farm workers; 62 percent of 
the labor force in 1993 was in agriculture. Other displaced peasants 
migrated to the cities in search of employment in the service sec- 
tor (20 percent of the total labor force in 1993), manufacturing (9 
percent of the total labor force), and construction (3 percent of the 
total labor force). Still others joined the peasant movement and 
migrated to areas where cooperative enterprises were being estab- 
lished or to areas where members of militant peasant groups were 
appropriating land. 

The poorest peasants still practice subsistence farming in plots 
of five hectares or less. Many others work as sharecroppers or rent 
land for cash. The majority of peasants are forced to seek work 
as full-time or part-time laborers, depending on the season and the 
size of the farms on which they are employed. At best, this work 
provides income to supplement the meager earnings from their own 
small parcels of land. At worst, this work represents their sole source 
of income. 

Although official unemployment figures are not very high, under- 
employment is widespread in the countryside and is increasingly 
a problem in urban centers as well. Underemployment (ranging 
between 15 and 75 percent) is usually a result of the seasonal na- 
ture of most of the available agricultural work. During the 1980s, 
the level of underemployment also rose in areas of the Caribbean 
coast where banana and sugarcane plantations are located. Although 
work in sugarcane fields is seasonal, banana plantations are a source 



87 



Honduras: A Country Study 

of long-term contracts or even permanent employment. The labor 
surplus in the interior highlands is evidence of the severe economic 
plight of most Hondurans. 

In the 1980s, land pressures, an increasing number of landless 
peasants, and the declining standard of living of the peasantry and 
working class galvanized the ranks of peasant organizations and 
labor unions. The first national peasant group to organize, in the 
1950s, was the National Federation of Honduran Peasants (Fe- 
deracion Nacional de Campesinos de Honduras — Fenach). The 
National Association of Honduran Peasants (Asociacion Nacional 
de Campesinos de Honduras — Anach) was established in 1962 as 
a competing association. By the time of the economic crisis of the 
1980s, both associations had become equally militant and confron- 
tational. The National Union of Peasants (Union Nacional de 
Campesinos — UNC) was formed in the 1960s. It began as a mili- 
tant organization with roots in the international Christian socialist 
movement, but by 1993 it was a less combative association. Many 
other politically active peasant organizations operated in Honduras. 
Their roles and strategies have varied from alienating the govern- 
ment and military with land takeovers and other militant tactics 
to a joint agricultural project with the military in 1989. 

Since the 1954 banana workers' strike, the labor movement in 
Honduras has been the strongest in Central America; in 1992, 40 
percent of urban labor and 20 percent of rural labor were unionized. 
Unions are strongest in the public sector, the agricultural sector, 
and the manufacturing sector. Strategies used by the labor move- 
ment range from providing crucial support to sympathetic adminis- 
trations to adopting more combative positions during general 
strikes. 

Although the labor and peasant movements represent interest 
groups that cannot be politically ignored, their influence has varied 
considerably since the 1950s. The two movements were weakened 
somewhat by repeated government attempts to divide the organi- 
zations. They were also weakened by internal divisions and the 
presence of opportunistic individuals in leadership positions. The 
economic crisis of the 1980s and the imposition of the economic 
adjustment policies during that decade have also taken a toll on 
these organizations. Confrontations between these groups and the 
government were frequent in the early 1990s. On more than one 
occasion, strikes in key sectors of the economy led to the govern- 
ment's calling in the army. 

Family and Kin 

The family is the fundamental social unit in Honduras, providing 



88 



Views of the capital, Tegucigalpa 
Courtesy Department of Defense, Still Media Records Center (top) 

and James M. Morris (bottom) 



89 



Honduras: A Country Study 

a bulwark in the midst of political upheavals and economic rever- 
sals. People emphasize the trust, the assistance, and the solidarity 
that kin owe to one another. Family loyalty is an ingrained and 
unquestioned virtue; from early childhood, individuals learn that 
relatives are to be trusted and relied on, whereas those outside the 
family are, implicitly at least, suspect. In all areas of life and at 
every level of society, a person looks to family and kin for both 
social identity and assistance. 

In general, the extent to which families interact and the people 
with whom they interact depend on their degree of prosperity. Fam- 
ilies with relatively equal resources share and cooperate. Where 
there is marked disparity in the wealth of various branches of a 
family, the more prosperous branches try to limit the demands made 
by the poorer ones. On the one hand, generosity is held in high 
esteem, and failure to care for kin in need is disparaged; but, on 
the other hand, families prefer to help their immediate relatives 
and to bestow favors on those who are able to reciprocate. A needy 
relative might receive the loan of a piece of land, some wage labor, 
or occasional gifts of food. Another type of assistance is a form of 
adoption by which poorer families give a child to more affluent 
relatives to raise. The adopting family is expected to care for the 
child and to see that he or she receives a proper upbringing. The 
children, however, are frequently little better than unpaid domes- 
tic help. Implicit in the arrangement is the understanding that the 
child's biological family, too, will receive assistance from the adopt- 
ing family. 

Kinship serves as metaphor for relations of trust in general. 
Where a kin tie is lacking, or where individuals wish to reinforce 
one, a relationship of compadrazgo is often established. Those so 
linked are compadres (co-parents or godparents). In common with 
much of Latin America, strong emotional bonds link compadres. Com- 
padres use the formal usted instead of til in addressing one another, 
even if they are kin. Sexual relations between compadres are regarded 
as incestuous. Compadres are commonly chosen at baptism and mar- 
riage, but the relationship extends to the two sets of parents. The 
tie between the two sets of parents is expected to be strong and 
enduring. Any breach of trust merits the strongest community 
censure. 

There are three accepted forms of marriage: civil, religious, and 
free unions. Both serial monogamy and polygamous unions are 
socially accepted. Annulment is difficult to obtain through the Ro- 
man Catholic Church; this fact, in addition to the expense involved, 
makes couples reluctant to undertake a religious marriage. Civil 
marriage is relatively common. Divorce in this case is relatively 



90 



The Society and Its Environment 



easy and uncomplicated. Marriage forms also reflect the individual's 
life cycle. Most opt for free unions when they are younger and then 
settie into more formal marriages as they grow older and enjoy more 
economic security. Class also plays a role. Religious marriage is 
favored by middle-class and upper-class groups, and thus it signi- 
fies higher socioeconomic status. The ideal marriage for most Hon- 
durans involves a formal engagement and religious wedding, 
followed by an elaborate fiesta. 

No shame accrues to the man who fathers many children and 
maintains several women as mistresses. Public disapproval follows 
only if the man fails to assume the role of "head of the family" 
and to support his children. When a free union dissolves, a woman 
typically receives only the house that she and her mate inhabited. 
The children receive support only if they have been legally recog- 
nized by their father. 

Families are usually more stable in the countryside. Since the 
partners are usually residing in the midst of their kin, a man can- 
not desert his wife without disrupting his work relationship with 
her family. A woman enjoys greater leverage when she can rely 
on her family to assist if a union fails or when she owns her own 
land and thus has a measure of financial independence. 

In keeping with the tradition of machismo, males usually play 
a dominant role within the family, and they receive the deference 
due to the head of the household. There is wide variation in prac- 
tice, however. Where a man is absent, has limited economic as- 
sets, or is simply unassertive, a woman assumes the role of head 
of the family. 

Sex role differentiation begins early: young boys are allowed to 
run about unclothed, while girls are much more carefully groomed 
and dressed. Bands of boys play unwatched; girls are carefully 
chaperoned. Girls are expected to be quiet and helpful; boys en- 
joy much greater freedom, and they are given considerable lati- 
tude in their behavior. Boys and men are expected to have 
premarital and extramarital sexual adventures. Men, however, ex- 
pect their brides to be virgins. Parents go to considerable lengths 
to shelter their daughters in order to protect their chances of mak- 
ing a favorable marriage. 

Parent-child relationships are markedly different depending on 
the sex of the parent. Mothers openly display affection for their 
children; the mother-child tie is virtually inviolate. Father-child 
relationships vary more depending on the family. Ideally, the father 
is an authority figure to be obeyed and respected; however, fathers 
are typically more removed from daily family affairs than mothers. 



91 




92 



I 




Honduras: A Country Study 

Living Conditions 
Rural Life 

Because Honduras has traditionally been an agrarian country 
and, in spite of rapid rates of urban growth, is still one of the least 
urbanized countries of Central America, conditions of life in the 
countryside are a major concern. Rural residents are farmers, 
although about 60 percent of Honduran land remains forested and 
only 25 percent of the total is available for agriculture or 
pastureland. A vast majority of rural dwellers are small farmers 
who till their own plots or landless laborers who work for wages 
on estates or smaller farms (see the Lower Class, this ch.). Many 
peasants with plots of their own also seek part-time wage labor to 
supplement their incomes. In a typical case, a man may work his 
father's land, rent additional land of his own, and do occasional 
day labor. 

The trend toward small farms in marginal areas increased rapidly 
after 1960 as the population increased explosively. Because land 
inheritance among the peasantry is divided among all the sons, 
a farmer with six manzanas (one manzana equals approximately 0.7 
hectare) of land and six sons would have only one manzana of land 
for each child to work as his own as an adult. In addition, escalat- 
ing land prices have increasingly forced small farmers to migrate 
to more and more marginal land because of population pressure 
and the rapid development of commercial agriculture and livestock 
estates since World War II . The steepness of the marginal moun- 
tain slopes, however, often makes agriculture impossible or at least 
extremely difficult. It is estimated that almost 90 percent of the 
mountainous area of Honduras has slopes with gradients that range 
from marginal for agriculture to those that do not permit agricul- 
ture or even decent pasturage. Obviously, small farmers attempt- 
ing to cultivate the mountainsides have a difficult task. 

Deterioration of the mountain environment, poor productivity, 
and crop losses result in poverty for small farmers. Soil erosion 
and the loss of soil fertility are caused by the marginality of the 
available slopes and the methods used in farming. Cultivation tech- 
niques are slash-and-mulch or slash- and-burn employing simple 
tools, such as machetes, hoes, axes, digging sticks, and possibly 
wooden plows, without the use of fertilizer. The rudimentary storage 
facilities of most farm households also contribute to the loss of a 
sizable percentage of crops to rodents and pests. 

Most of the rural population live in one- or two-room thatch- 
roofed huts (bahareques) built of adobe or sugarcane stalks and mud 
with dirt floors. As plantation agriculture and livestock raising have 



94 



The Society and Its Environment 



increased, many peasants have found it increasingly difficult to find 
a plot of land suitable for a house. Many who formerly lived on 
the edges of larger estates found themselves forced off the land by 
enclosure, or the fencing off of private property. Consequently, 
there is much "fence housing" in Honduras, in which a squatter 
and his family, squeezed off land by the development of planta- 
tion crops, live in a tiny hut in the narrow space between a public 
road and the landowner's fence. 

Poor food productivity and low incomes lead to a very low stan- 
dard of living in the countryside, where illness and poor diets are 
endemic. The typical diet of the rural population consists of corn — 
by far the primary staple and most widely planted crop — made into 
tortillas, beans — the main source of protein, cassava, plantains, 
rice, and coffee, with only occasional supplements of meat or fish. 
Although pigs and chickens are widely raised (each rural house- 
hold usually has a few), meat is infrequent in most rural diets, as 
are green vegetables. Given the nature of the typical diet and the 
fact that food production has been insufficient for the country's 
needs, widespread malnutrition complicates the population's fragile 
health. Population growth exacerbates the problem, creating a vi- 
cious cycle of more mouths to be fed, yet lower agricultural produc- 
tivity, as well as transportation and distribution difficulties. 

Indeed, a general attitude has evolved in which most of the af- 
fected population has related few of its health problems to their 
real causes, such as malnutrition and environmental hazards. In- 
stead, given a state of affairs where, for example, there is not a 
dramatic shortage of food but only a continuously inadequate diet, 
the population fails to relate infectious diseases, mental retarda- 
tion, and low productivity to conditions of poor diet and lack of 
sanitation. Because these problems have always existed for the af- 
fected population, they tend to be accepted as normal. 

Urban Life 

Urban life in Honduras, as in many developing countries, high- 
lights the contrasts between the life-styles of the rich and the poor. 
For the wealthy and powerful elite, Tegucigalpa and San Pedro 
Sula offer blocks of elegant apparel shops and jewelry stores. Tall 
office buildings provide headquarters for business and profession- 
al people. Comfortable homes shelter well-to-do families; a good 
education and family contacts secure promising future careers for 
their children. 

For the vast majority of Tegucigalpa's urban population, 
however, living conditions are dismal. Migrants to Tegucigalpa 
initially settled in the slums of the center city. When these became 



95 



Honduras: A Country Study 

inadequate to house the numbers arriving, the migrants began to 
invade land on the periphery of the city. A majority of these bar- 
rio residents live in cuarterias (rows) of connected rooms. Some 
cuarterias face the street, while others are arranged in double rows 
facing each other across a block-long alley, barely wide enough for 
a person to walk through. Usually windowless, the substandard 
rooms are generally constructed of wood, with dirt floors. The aver- 
age household contains about seven persons, who attend to all func- 
tions of daily living in the single room, although sometimes a small 
kitchen stands in the rear covered by the overhang of the tile roof. 
For those living in the rooms facing an alley, the narrow passage- 
way between buildings serves both as a sewage and waste disposal 
area and as a courtyard for as many as 150 persons. 

The major survival tactic for some of this population seems to 
lie in the large and extended families that deliberately cluster 
together into a single room, sharing a roof, a kitchen, and their 
incomes. Both relatives and unrelated individuals may be involved 
in such a network of social, psychological, and economic support. 
Others, however, have not been so fortunate. Given migratory 
labor, high unemployment, and income insecurity, male-female 
relationships often are unstable. Fathers frequently desert their fam- 
ilies, leaving the care and support of children entirely to mothers 
who struggle to earn enough for survival. Some children are aban- 
doned to live on the streets, particularly if the mother has become 
sick, has died, or has been unable to find work. 

The diet of lower- sector urban dwellers when they can afford 
to buy what they need is somewhat better than that of their rural 
counterparts. In times of economic hardship, however, urban fam- 
ilies, who must pay for all the food they consume, most likely reduce 
or alter their food consumption habits. Speaking of a potentially 
better diet in urban areas can, therefore, be misleading. When ur- 
ban families have the cash to purchase basic foods, their per capi- 
ta daily average consumption of calories, protein, and carbohydrates 
is likely to be higher than the average in rural settings. However, 
the consumption of calories, and carbohydrates in particular, still 
falls significantly below the minimum daily recommended allow- 
ance. Other foods sold mainly in city markets, especially meat such 
as poultry, are consumed primarily by the middle- and upper-class 
population and do not benefit the lower class. 

Ethnic Groups 

Around 90 percent of the population in Honduras is racially mes- 
tizo (people of mixed indigenous and European ancestry). The re- 
mainder of the population is composed of indigenous natives (7 



96 



Opening ceremonies in a rural elementary school 
Courtesy Bryan Fung 

percent); people of African descent, or blacks (2 percent); and 
those of European descent, or whites (1 percent). Mestizos, whites, 
and most blacks are culturally ladinos (those who practice Hispanic 
cultural patterns). Ladinos speak Spanish, and the majority are 
members of the Roman Catholic Church, although Protestant 
denominations made significant gains in membership among this 
group in the 1980s, especially in the larger cities. 

Indigenous Groups 

The Lenca, the largest indigenous group (numbering about 
50,000), live in the west and in the southwestern interior. Some 
anthropologists argue that the Lenca still practice some traditional 
customs and that they are the survivors of a once extensive in- 
digenous population that lived in the departments of Lempira, In- 
tibuca, La Paz, Valle, Comayagua, and Francisco Morazan. 
Controversy has arisen, however, regarding the identification of 
this community as indigenous because their native language is no 
longer spoken and their culture is to a large extent similar to the 
ladino majority. 

Other smaller indigenous groups are scattered throughout Hon- 
duras. Several hundred Chorti, a lowland Maya community, for- 
merly lived in the departments of Copan and Ocotepeque in western 



97 



Honduras: A Country Study 

Honduras. In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the Chorti 
migrated to the northeast coastal area, and by the early 1990s, they 
were practically extinct. The Chorotega migrated south from Mex- 
ico in pre-Columbian times and settled in the department of 
Choluteca. Like the Chorti, the Chorotega speak Spanish, but they 
retain distinct cultural and religious traits. A population of Maya 
live in the western departments of Copan and Ocotepeque and still 
speak a Mayan dialect. Several hundred Pipil live mainly in the 
isolated northeast coastal region in the departments of Gracias a 
Dios and parts of Yoro and Olancho. About 300 Tol or Jicaque 
are found in an isolated mountainous area of rain forests. 

Other Non-Ladino Groups 

The non-Hispanic (non-ladino) groups in Honduras consist of 
the Black Carib, the Miskito, the black population in the Islas de 
la Bahfa, and a sizeable number of Arab immigrants. The Black 
Carib (also known as Garifuna in Belize and Guatemala) settled 
in the early 1800s in coastal villages along the Caribbean. Origi- 
nally descendants of freed black slaves and native Carib from the 
island of Saint Vincent in the Caribbean, they arrived in Hon- 
duras when they were deported from Saint Vincent by the British 
in 1797 and resettled in the Islas de la Bahia off the coast of Hon- 
duras. From there, they moved to the mainland coast of northern 
Honduras. Their language, which they continue to speak, is a 
Carib-based Creole. Their cultural practices are similar to those 
of the Black Carib who live in Belize and Guatemala. 

The approximately 10,000 Miskito are a racially mixed popula- 
tion of indigenous, African, and European origin. Their language, 
still spoken by several thousand, is a Creole based on Bahwika (in 
the Misumalpan family of languages), with contributions from West 
African languages as well as Spanish, English, and German. Spain's 
failure to conquer and colonize the eastern Caribbean lowlands of 
Central America made this area attractive to English-speaking buc- 
caneers, traders, woodcutters, and planters during the seventeenth 
and eighteenth centuries. This remote area also became a refuge 
for black slaves and freed slaves. In the northern coasts of Hon- 
duras and Nicaragua, unions of indigenous people and the Afri- 
can and British immigrants produced a racially mixed group known 
as Miskito, who have a predominantly indigenous language and 
culture. Miskito setdements are situated near the Laguna de 
Caratasca and the banks of the Rio Patuca in northeasternmost 
Honduras and are an extension of the larger Miskito communi- 
ties in eastern Nicaragua. When the Nicaraguan Miskito population 
near the Rio Coco was uprooted by the Nicaraguan government 



98 




99 



Honduras: A Country Study 



for security reasons in the early 1980s, many Nicaraguan Miskito 
migrated to Honduras. 

Interestingly, although the Miskito and Black Carib peoples have 
similar racial origins, the Miskito are generally considered by Hon- 
durans to be indigenous people, whereas the Black Carib are gener- 
ally considered to be black. This difference in ethnic identification 
is probably a reflection of the different cultures of the two groups; 
Black Carib culture retains more African elements in its folklore, 
religion, and music than does the culture of the Miskito. 

The Miskito and Black Carib peoples have traditionally been 
economically self-sufficient through subsistence agriculture and fish- 
ing. In the early 1990s, the men, however, were often forced to 
seek supplementary income by working outside their own regions. 
Thus, Miskito and Black Carib men often spend long periods sepa- 
rated from their families. 

The population of the Islas de la Bahfa is a black or mixed white- 
black population. The inhabitants are descendants of English- 
speaking whites and of blacks who came from Belize and the 
Cayman Islands during the middle of the nineteenth century. This 
population speaks mostly Creole or Caribbean English, and its tra- 
ditions are distinctly West Indian. 

Another distinct ethnic group is the thriving Arab community. 
Arab immigrants from the Middle East (especially Palestine and 
Lebanon) began arriving in Honduras during the early part of the 
twentieth century. Because they held passports issued by the Ot- 
toman Empire, they came to be called turcos in Honduras. This 
community retains many of its traditions and continues to be per- 
ceived as culturally distinct, although this distinctiveness is becoming 
blurred through increased intermarriage with other groups. Eco- 
nomically, the Arab community prospered first as merchants in 
the area of the banana plantations on the Caribbean coast. Fol- 
lowing their success, many moved to the larger cities, where they 
became powerful economically, especially in manufacturing and 
commerce. 

Religion 

The constitution guarantees religious freedom and the separa- 
tion of church and state; however, the Roman Catholic Church 
has been a powerful institution in Honduras since colonial times. 
As a result of various tensions between the church and the state 
throughout the centuries, in the 1880s the Roman Catholic Church 
was stripped of some of its economic and political power. Neverthe- 
less, in the twentieth century the church has remained an impor- 
tant social actor, and the vast majority of Hondurans have remained 



100 



The Society and Its Environment 

Roman Catholic. Church schools receive government subsidies, 
and religious instruction is part of the public school curriculum. 

The Roman Catholic Church in Honduras launched an ambi- 
tious evangelical campaign in the 1950s. The program's aim was 
to invigorate church membership and encourage more active par- 
ticipation in church activities. By the 1960s and 1970s, this acti- 
vism had grown among certain sectors of the church into 
denunciations of the military's repression and the government's 
exploitation of the poor (see Advocates for Social Change, this ch.). 
This social activist phase in the Roman Catholic Church ended 
after large landowners in Olancho brutally murdered ten peasants, 
two students, and two priests in 1975. After this incident, the 
government took measures to dissuade the more activist factions 
in the church from continuing their actions. Expulsions and ar- 
rests of foreign priests took place, and some peasant centers with 
ties to the church were forced to close. The Roman Catholic Church 
retreated from its emphasis on social activism during the last half 
of the 1970s but resumed its criticism of government policies dur- 
ing the 1980s. 

Protestant, especially evangelical, churches have undergone a 
tremendous growth in membership during the 1980s. The largest 
numbers are found in Methodist, Church of God, Seventh Day 
Adventist, and Assemblies of God denominations. These churches 
sponsor social service programs in many communities, making them 
attractive to the lower classes. The evangelical leadership general- 
ly exerts a conservative influence on the political process. 

Although Protestant membership was estimated at only 100,000 
in 1990, growth of Protestant churches is apparently seen as a threat 
by Roman Catholic leaders. Instances of criticism leveled at evan- 
gelicals by Roman Catholic leaders have increased; however, such 
criticisms have generally been ineffective in stemming the rise of 
converts to Protestant denominations. 

Social Welfare 
Education 

Honduras lacked a national education system until the late 1950s. 
Before the reforms of 1957, education was the exclusive privilege 
of those who could afford to send their children to private institu- 
tions. The government of Ramon Villeda Morales (1957-63) in- 
troduced reforms that led to the establishment of a national public 
education system and began a school construction program. 

The Honduran constitution states that a free primary education 
is obligatory for every child between the ages of seven and fourteen. 



101 



Honduras: A Country Study 

The reality of the Honduran educational system is much more grim. 
Because of a lack of schools, understaffed schools, the high cost 
of materials needed for these schools, and the poor quality of pub- 
lic education, a good education is still largely the privilege of the 
few who can afford to send their children to private institutions. 

Statistical information shows that the state of the public educa- 
tion system remains poor (see table 3, Appendix A). Figures cited 
by the Ministry of Education suggest that Honduras suffers from 
widespread illiteracy (more than 40 percent of the total popula- 
tion and more than 80 percent in rural areas). A significant per- 
centage of children do not receive formal education. Especially in 
rural areas, schools are not readily accessible. When they are ac- 
cessible, they often consist of joint-grade instruction through only 
the third grade. Schools are so understaffed that some teachers have 
up to eighty children in one classroom. 

Only 43 percent of children enrolled in public schools complete 
the primary level. Of all children entering the first grade, only 50 
percent go on to secondary school, and only 8 percent continue 
to the university. 

The quality of instruction in Honduran public schools is greatly 
impaired by poor teacher training. The situation is worsened by 
the extremely low wages paid to teachers, lack of effective and up- 
to-date instruction materials, outdated teaching methods, poor ad- 
ministration, and lack of physical facilities. 

Because of the deficiencies of public education, the years since 
1970 have seen the proliferation of private schools. With few ex- 
ceptions, however, private education is popularly viewed as a profit- 
making enterprise. Great skepticism remains regarding the quality 
of the education that private schools offer. 

The National Autonomous University of Honduras (Universidad 
Nacional Autonoma de Honduras — UNAH) is the primary insti- 
tution of higher learning. Located in Tegucigalpa, the UNAH was 
founded in 1847 and became an autonomous institution in 1957. 
The university has approximately 30,000 students, with branches 
in San Pedro Sula and La Ceiba. 

Honduras counts three private universities, none of which is yet 
considered a credible educational alternative to the prestigious 
UNAH. One is the extremely small Jose Cecilio del Valle Univer- 
sity in Tegucigalpa. Another private university is the Central 
American Technological University, also in Tegucigalpa. The third 
private university is the University of San Pedro Sula. 

Health 

In Honduras the quality of and access to health care are directly 



102 



The Society and Its Environment 



tied to income levels. Adequate health care is available to those 
able to pay the high cost. Health care for the urban and rural poor 
is extremely limited. The lack of health care for the majority of 
the population is starkly apparent in its poor health. Widespread 
malnutrition is responsible for 34 percent of children experiencing 
stunting when they are between two and five years of age. In ad- 
dition, most of the population lacks access to running water and 
sanitation facilities — all key contributing factors to the country's 
high infant mortality rate (63 per 1,000 live births) and to a rela- 
tively low life expectancy rate (64.9 years) in 1992. 

Health services are not readily accessible to a majority of the 
population. An estimated 1 .3 million Hondurans were without ac- 
cess to health care in 1990. In the isolated regions of Honduras, 
there are almost no physicians. The ratio of doctor to population 
in 1984 was one to 1,510. Government clinics often are empty shells 
lacking adequate personnel, equipment, and medicines. 

Infectious and parasitic diseases are the leading causes of death. 
Gastroenteritis and tuberculosis are serious problems. Diseases such 
as influenza, malaria, typhoid, and pneumonia, once believed to 
be under control, have returned in force because of a lack of preven- 
tive measures. The foreign-exchange crisis of the 1980s has result- 
ed in periods when vaccines and other preventive medicines were 
not available. Alcoholism and drug addiction are other health con- 
cerns mentioned by the Ministry of Health. The rapid spread of 
acquired immune deficiency syndrome (AIDS) is also of great con- 
cern to Honduran health authorities. The incidence of AIDS ap- 
pears to be particularly high in San Pedro Sula. 

The cholera epidemic that originated in Peru hit Honduras in 
late 1991. Because of poor sanitation conditions, health officials 
were frightened that the disease would quickly spread throughout 
the country. The government launched an educational campaign 
months before the first case was reported, stressing personal hygiene 
as a prophylaxis against cholera. By the middle of 1992, however, 
more than 100 people had been diagnosed as having cholera. 

Although the country's national public health system was creat- 
ed in 1959, the date when the Honduran Social Security Institute 
(Instituto Hondureno del Seguro Social — IHSS) began to oper- 
ate, the proliferation of health services to all regions of the coun- 
try has been painfully slow. For years, people have had to travel 
to Tegucigalpa to avail themselves of public health service. Dur- 
ing the 1970s, when the government made an effort to expand health 
services, the INSS opened a medical center in San Pedro Sula. 
However, in El Progreso, only fifty kilometers away and the third 
largest city in the country, IHSS services were not available until 



103 



Honduras: A Country Study 

1992. Population growth, the implementation of economic austerity 
measures by the government in the 1990s, and the present lack 
of facilities seem to suggest that public health services in Honduras 
are likely to remain inadequate in the near future. 

The Environment 

The 1980s saw a heightened awareness and concern over eco- 
logical issues. Even though Honduras is not overpopulated, its land 
resources have been overexploited, and there are numerous rea- 
sons for concern regarding deforestation and the prevalence of 
unsustainable agricultural practices. Enforcement of the few regu- 
lations already in effect is uneven. 

Honduras has two major national parks. One is the Tigra Cloud 
Forest Park near Tegucigalpa. The other is the Copan National 
Park near the border with Guatemala, which houses the Mayan 
ruins. Honduras also has established the Rio Platano Reserve. Fur- 
thermore, the government has attempted to encourage ecotourism 
in the Islas de la Bahia, where biologically rich coral reefs are 
located. 

As a consequence of the expansion of environmental conscious- 
ness, the Honduran Association of Ecology (Asociacion Hondurefia 
de la Ecologfa — AHE) was founded in the 1980s. Following the 
example set in the foundation of the AHE, many other groups 
formed with the stated purpose of promoting ecologically sound 
policies. Unfortunately, in 1993 many sources of international fund- 
ing dried up following the discovery of corruption in a number of 
Honduran ecological groups. Despite the continued presence of 
many environmental problems, ecologists are encouraged by the 
increasing environmental consciousness among all sectors of the 
population. The fact that environmental concerns are part of the 
policies advocated by peasant organizations, labor unions, and other 
interest groups is a sign that the ecological movement has come 
to maturity. 

Honduran society provides examples of the most severe problems 
faced by developing nations. Yet within that same society, the 
unique relationship between social and political forces provides 
potential for progress in alleviating the country's problems. 

* * * 

The body of literature available on Honduran society and envi- 
ronment has never been comprehensive. Although somewhat dated, 
Richard N. Adams's Cultural Surveys of Panama, Nicaragua, Guatemala, 
El Salvador, and Honduras remains a good source. Population and Urban 



104 



The Society and Its Environment 



Trends in Central America and Panama, by Robert Fox and Jerrold 
Huguet, is also a basic text. More recent publications such as the 
report issued by the United States Agency for International De- 
velopment, Latin America and the Caribbean, are also helpful. The Hu- 
man Development Report published by the United Nations is an 
invaluable statistical look at all major indicators. 

Three texts providing solid information regarding economic 
trends, population pressures, and their effect on land tenure and 
use of resources are The War of the Dispossessed: Honduras and El Sal- 
vador, 1969, by Thomas P. Anderson; Land, Power, and Poverty: Agrar- 
ian Transformation and Political Conflict in Central America, by Charles 
Brockett; and Scarcity and Survival in Central America: Ecological Ori- 
gins of the Soccer War, by William H. Durham. Understanding Central 
America, by John Booth and Thomas Walker, also provides some 
interesting perspective and statistics. 

Little recent research has been done on non-Hispanic groups 
living in Honduras. Old standard sources remain, such as Mary 
W. Helm's Asang: Adaptations to Culture Contact in a Miskito Commu- 
nity. Studies on the Black Carib in Belize and Guatemala shed light 
on those groups living in Honduras. Of interest are Women and the 
Ancestors: Black Carib Kinship and Ritual, by Virginia Kerns, and Black 
Carib Household Structures: A Study of Migration and Modernization, by 
Nancie L. Solien Gonzalez. (For further information and complete 
citations, see Bibliography.) 



105 



Chapter 3. The Economy 




Headdress of a noblewoman atop a stela, Copdn 



HONDURAS IN 1993 remained one of the poorest nations in 
the Western Hemisphere. Since colonial times, the Honduran econ- 
omy has, for the most part, been based on one commodity — 
minerals before 1900 and bananas throughout the first half of the 
twentieth century. As is true for most underdeveloped countries 
whose livelihood depends on one export item, the Honduran econ- 
omy depends on world prices for its main export product. Despite 
attempts at agricultural diversification, bananas remained the coun- 
try's primary export in the early 1990s, leaving the country at the 
mercy of market fluctuations. The government has attempted to 
stimulate the manufacturing sector and expand assembly opera- 
tions, but these efforts have been only moderately successful. The 
country hence still lacks a dependable source of economic growth. 

Lack of resources, lack of arable land, and a small domestic mar- 
ket continue to impede economic progress in Honduras. Most sig- 
nificantly, Honduras lacks abundant natural resources; only land 
appears to be plentiful and readily exploitable. But the presence 
of apparendy extensive land is misleading because the nation's 
rugged, mountainous terrain restricts large-scale agricultural 
production to narrow strips on the coasts and to a few fertile val- 
leys. Honduras 's manufacturing sector has not yet developed 
beyond simple textile and agricultural processing industries and 
assembly operations. The small domestic market and competition 
from more industrially advanced countries in the region have in- 
hibited more complex industrialization. 

Growth and Structure of the Economy 

After Honduras achieved independence from Spain in the early 
nineteenth century, its economic growth became closely related to 
its ability to develop attractive export products. During much of 
the nineteenth century, the Honduran economy languished; tradi- 
tional cattle raising and subsistence agriculture produced no suitable 
major export. In the latter part of the century, economic activity 
quickened with the development of large-scale, precious-metal min- 
ing. The most important mines were located in the mountains near 
the capital of Tegucigalpa and were owned by the New York and 
Honduras Rosario Mining Company (NYHRMC). Silver was the 
principal metal extracted, accounting for about 55 percent of ex- 
ports in the 1880s. Mining income stimulated commercial and an- 
cillary enterprises, built some infrastructure, and reduced monetary 



109 



Honduras: A Country Study 

restraints on trade. Other beneficial economic effects were few, 
however, because the mining industry was never well integrated 
into the rest of the Honduran economy. The foreign mining com- 
panies employed a small work force, provided little or no govern- 
ment revenue, and relied mostly on imported mining equipment. 

Honduras' s international economic activity surged in the early 
twentieth century. Between 1913 and 1929, its agricultural exports 
rose from US$3 million (US$2 million from bananas) to US$25 
million (US$21 million from bananas). These "golden" exports 
were supported by more than US$40 million of specialized banana 
company investment in the Honduran infrastructure and were 
safeguarded by United States pressure on the national government 
when the companies felt threatened. 

The overall performance of the Honduran economy remained 
closely tied to banana prices and production from the 1920s until 
after mid-century because other forms of commercial export agricul- 
ture were slow to emerge. In addition, until drastically reduced 
in the mid-1950s, the work force associated with banana cultiva- 
tion represented a significant proportion of the wage earners in the 
country. Just before the banana industry's largest strike in 1954, 
approximately 35,000 workers held jobs on the banana plantations 
of the United Fruit Company (later United Brands Company, then 
Chiquita Brands International) or the Standard Fruit Company 
(later bought by Castle and Cook, then Dole Food Company). 

After 1950 Honduran governments encouraged agricultural 
modernization and export diversification by spending heavily on 
transportation and communications infrastructure, agricultural 
credit, and technical assistance. During the 1950s — as a result of 
these improvements and the strong international export prices — 
beef, cotton, and coffee became significant export products for the 
first time. Honduran sugar, timber, and tobacco also were exported, 
and by 1960 bananas had declined to a more modest share (45 per- 
cent) of total exports. During the 1960s, industrial growth was 
stimulated by the establishment of the Central American Common 
Market (CACM — see Appendix B). As a result of the reduction 
of regional trade barriers and the construction of a high common 
external tariff, some Honduran manufactured products, such as 
soaps, sold successfully in other Central American countries. Be- 
cause of the greater size and relative efficiency of the Salvadoran 
and Guatemalan industrial sectors, however, Honduras bought far 
more manufactured products from its neighbors than it sold to them. 
After the 1969 Soccer War with El Salvador, Honduras effectively 
withdrew from the CACM. Favorable bilateral trade arrangements 



110 



The Economy 



between Honduras and the other former CACM partners were sub- 
sequently negotiated, however. 

A political shift in the 1980s had strong and unexpected reper- 
cussions on the country's economic condition. Beginning in late 
1979, as insurgency spread in neighboring countries, Honduran 
military leaders enthusiastically came to support United States poli- 
cies in the region (see Honduras in the Middle: United States Policy 
and the Central America Crisis, ch. 1). This alignment resulted 
in financial support that benefited the civilian as well as the mili- 
tary ministries and agencies of Honduras. Honduran defense spend- 
ing rose throughout the 1980s until it consumed 20 to 30 percent 
of the national budget (see Defense Budget, ch. 5). Before the mili- 
tary buildup began in fiscal year (FY — see Glossary) 1980, United 
States military assistance to Honduras was less than US$4 million. 
Military aid more than doubled to reach just under US$9 million 
by FY 1981, surged to more than US$31 million by FY 1982, and 
stood at US$48.3 million in FY 1983. Tiny Honduras soon be- 
came the tenth largest recipient of United States assistance: total 
economic and military aid rose to more than US$200 million in 
1985 and remained at more than US$100 million for the rest of 
the 1980s. 

The increasing dependence of the Honduran economy on for- 
eign aid was aggravated by a severe, regionwide economic decline 
during the 1980s (see table 4, Appendix A). Private investment 
plummeted in 1980, and capital flight for that year was US$500 
million. To make matters worse, coffee prices plunged on the in- 
ternational market in the mid-1980s and remained low through- 
out the decade. In 1993 average annual per capita income remained 
depressingly low at about US$580, and 75 percent of the popula- 
tion was poor by internationally defined standards. 

Traditionally, Honduran economic hopes have been pinned on 
land and agricultural commodities. Despite those hopes, however, 
usable land has always been severely limited. Honduras' s mostly 
mountainous terrain confines agriculturally exploitable land to nar- 
row bands along the coasts and to some previously fertile but now 
largely depleted valleys. The country's once abundant forest 
resources have also been dramatically reduced, and Honduras has 
not derived economically significant income from mineral resources 
since the nineteenth century. Similarly, Honduras 's industrial sector 
never was fully developed. The heady days of the CACM (mid- 
to late 1960s), which produced an industrial boom for El Salvador 
and Guatemala, barely touched the Honduran economy except to 
increase its imports because of the comparative advantages enjoyed 



111 



Honduras: A Country Study 

by the Salvadoran and Guatemalan economies and Honduras 's in- 
ability to compete. 

Bananas and coffee have also proven unreliable sources of in- 
come. Although bananas are less subject to the vagaries of inter- 
national markets than coffee, natural disasters such as Hurricane 
Fifi in 1974, drought, and disease have appeared with a regular, 
albeit random, frequency to take their economic toll through se- 
verely diminished harvests. Moreover, bananas are grown and mar- 
keted mostly by international corporations, which keep the bulk 
of wealth generated. Coffee exports, equally unreliable as a major 
source of economic support, surpassed bananas in the mid-1970s 
as Honduras' s leading export income earner, but international price 
declines coupled with huge fiscal deficits underlined the vulnera- 
bility of coffee as an economic base. 

As Honduras entered the 1990s, it did have some factors work- 
ing in its favor — relative peace and a stronger civilian government 
with less military interference in the politics and economy of the 
country than in past years. The country was hobbled, however, 
by horrendous foreign debt, could claim only diminished natural 
resources, and had one of the fastest growing and urbanizing popu- 
lations in the world (see Population Growth, ch. 2). The govern- 
ment's daunting task then became how to create an economic base 
able to compensate for the withdrawal of much United States as- 
sistance without becoming solely dependent on traditional agricul- 
tural exports. 

In the 1990s, bananas were booming again, particularly as new 
European trade agreements increased market size. Small banana- 
producing cooperatives lined up in the 1990s to sell their land to 
the commercial giants, and the last banana-producing lands held 
by the government were privatized. Like most of Central Ameri- 
ca, Honduras in the 1990s began to woo foreign investors, mostly 
Asian clothing assembly firms, and it held high hopes for revenue 
to be generated by privatizing national industries. With one of the 
most strikeprone labor forces in Central America, debt-burdened 
and aging industrial assets, and a dramatically underdeveloped in- 
frastructure, Honduras, however, has distinct economic disadvan- 
tages relative to its Central American and Caribbean neighbors, 
who compete with Honduras in the same export markets. 

Macroeconomic Trends 

Recent Growth 

Honduran president Rafael Leonardo Callejas Romero, elected 
in November 1989, enjoyed little success in the early part of his 



112 



The Economy 



administration as he attempted to adhere to a standard economic 
austerity package prescribed by the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF— see Glossary) and the World Bank (see Glossary). As the 
November 1993 presidential elections drew closer, the political fall- 
out of austere economic measures made their implementation even 
less likely. Any hope for his party's winning the 1993 election was 
predicated on improving social programs, addressing employment 
needs, and appeasing a disgrunded, vocal public sector. However, 
reaching those goals required policies that moved away from balanc- 
ing the budget, lowering inflation, and reducing the deficit and 
external debt to attract investment and stimulate economic growth. 

Callejas inherited an economic mess. The economy had deteri- 
orated rapidly, starting in 1989, as the United States Agency for 
International Development (AID) pointedly interrupted disburse- 
ments of its grants to Honduras to signal displeasure with the eco- 
nomic policies of the old government and to push the new 
government to make economic reforms. Nondisbursal of those funds 
greatly exacerbated the country's economic problems. Funds from 
the multilateral lending institutions, which eventually would help 
fill the gap left by the reduction of United States aid, were still un- 
der negotiation in 1989 and would be conditioned first on payment 
of arrears on the country's enormous external debt. 

Between 1983 and 1985, the government of Honduras — pumped 
up by massive infusions of external borrowing — had introduced 
expensive, high-tech infrastructure projects. The construction of 
roads and dams, financed mostly by multilateral loans and grants, 
was intended to generate employment to compensate for the im- 
pact of the regionwide recession. In reality, the development projects 
served to swell the ranks of public- sector employment and line the 
pockets of a small elite. The projects never sparked private- sector 
investment or created substantial private employment. Instead, per 
capita income continued to fall as Honduras 's external debt dou- 
bled. Even greater injections of foreign assistance between 1985 
and 1988 kept the economy afloat, but it soon became clear that 
the successive governments had been borrowing time as well as 
money. 

Foreign aid between 1985 and 1989 represented about 4.6 per- 
cent of the gross domestic product (GDP — see Glossary). About 
44 percent of the government's fiscal shortfall was financed through 
cash from foreign sources. Side effects of the cash infusion were 
that the national currency, the lempira (L; for value of the 
lempira — see Glossary), became overvalued and the amount of ex- 
ports dropped. A booming public sector, with its enhanced ability 
to import, was enough to keep the economy showing growth, based 



113 



Honduras: A Country Study 



on private consumption and government spending. But the govern- 
ment did little to address the historical, underlying structural 
problems of the economy — its overdependence on too few tradi- 
tional commodities and lack of investment. Unemployment 
mushroomed, and private investment withered. 

By 1989 President Callejas's broad economic goal became to 
return Honduran economic growth to 1960-80 levels. During the 
decades of the 1960s and 1970s, the country's economy, spurred 
mostiy by erratically fluctuating traditional agricultural commodi- 
ties, nevertheless averaged real annual growth of between 4 and 
5 percent. At the end of the 1980s, however, Callejas had few re- 
maining vehicles with which to pull the country out of the deep 
regionwide recession of the 1980s. Real growth between 1989 and 
1993 translated to mostly negative or small positive per capita 
changes in the GDP for a population that was growing at close to 
4 percent annually (see fig. 5). 

President Callejas attempted to adhere to conditions of desper- 
ately needed new loans. Cutting the size of the public- sector work 
force, lowering the deficit, and enhancing revenues from taxes — 
as mandated by the multilateral lending institutions — were con- 
sistently his biggest stumbling blocks. Despite his all-out effort to 
reduce the public- sector deficit, the overall ratio of fiscal deficit to 
the GDP in 1990 showed little change from that in 1989. The total 
public- sector deficit actually grew to 8.6 percent of the GDP, or 
nearly LI billion, in 1991. The 1993 deficit expanded to 10.6 per- 
cent of the GDP. The Honduran government's medium- term eco- 
nomic objectives, as dictated by the IMF, were to have generated 
real GDP growth of 3.5 percent by 1992 and 4 percent by 1993. 
In fact, GDP growth was 3.3 percent in 1991, 5.6 percent in 1992, 
and an estimated 3.7 percent in 1993. The economy had operated 
so long on an ad hoc basis that it lacked the tools to implement 
coherent economic objectives. Solving the most immediate crisis 
frequently took precedence over long-term goals. 

Inflation 

By 1991 President Callejas had achieved modest success in con- 
trolling inflation. Overall inflation for 1990 had reached 36.4 
percent — not the hyperinflation experienced by some Latin Ameri- 
can counties — but still the highest annual rate for Honduras in forty 
years. The Honduran government and the IMF had set an infla- 
tion target of 12 percent for 1992 and 8 percent for 1993. The ac- 
tual figures were 8.8 percent in 1992 and an estimated 10.7 percent 
for 1993. Hondurans had been accustomed to low inflation (3.4 
percent in 1985, rising to 4.5 percent by the end of 1986), partly 



114 



The Economy 



because pegging the lempira to the dollar linked Honduras 's in- 
flation rate to inflation rates in developed countries. But the ex- 
pectation for low inflation made the reality of high inflation that 
much worse and created additional pressures on the government 
for action when inflation soared in 1990. 

Unemployment 

Between 1980 and 1983, 20 percent of the work force was 
unemployed — double the percentage of the late 1970s. Job crea- 
tion remained substantially behind the growth of the labor force 
throughout the 1980s. Unemployment grew to 25 percent by 1985, 
and combined unemployment and underemployment jumped to 
40 percent in 1989. By 1993, 50 to 60 percent of the Honduran 
labor force was estimated to be either underemployed or unem- 
ployed. 

The government's acceptance of foreign aid during the 1980s, 
in lieu of economic growth sparked by private investment, allowed 
it to ignore the necessity of creating new jobs. Honduras 's GDP 
showed reasonable growth throughout most of the 1980s, especially 
when compared to the rest of Latin America, but it was artificially 
buoyed by private consumption and public- sector spending. 

Mainstay agricultural jobs became scarcer in the late 1970s. 
Coffee harvests and plantings in border areas decreased because 
fighting in neighboring Nicaragua and El Salvador spilled over into 
Honduras. Other factors contributing to the job scarcity were limit- 
ed land, a reluctance on the part of coffee growers to invest while 
wars destabilized the region, and a lack of credit. Small farmers 
became increasingly unable to support themselves as their parcels 
of land diminished in size and productivity. 

Problems in the agricultural sector have fueled urbanization. The 
Honduran population was 77 percent rural in 1960. By 1992 only 
55 percent of the Honduran population continued to live in rural 
areas (see Rural to Urban Migration, ch. 2). Campesinos have 
flocked to the cities in search of work but found little there. Over- 
all unemployment has been exacerbated by an influx of refugees 
from the wars in neighboring countries, attracted to Honduras, 
ironically, by its relatively low population density and relative peace. 
In the agricultural sector (which in 1993 still accounted for approx- 
imately 60 percent of the labor force), unemployment has been es- 
timated to be far worse than the figures for the total labor force. 

Honduran urban employment in the early 1990s has been charac- 
terized by underemployment and marginal informal- sector jobs, 
as thousands of former agricultural workers and refugees have 
moved to the cities seeking better lives. Few new jobs have been 



115 



Honduras: A Country Study 



GDP 1992 = US $3.3 BILLION 



Other 7% 




Banking 
14% 



Source: Based on information from Economist Intelligence Unit, Country Report: Nicaragua, 
Honduras [London], No. 2, 1993, 5. 

Figure 5. Gross Domestic Product (GDP) by Sector, 1992 

generated in the formal sector, however, because domestic private- 
sector and foreign investment has dropped and coveted public-sector 
jobs have been reserved mosdy for the small Honduran middle class 
with political or military connections. Only one of ten Honduran 
workers was securely employed in the formal sector in 1991. 

In the mid-1980s, the World Bank reported that only 10,000 new 
jobs were created annually; the low rate of job creation resulted 
in 20,000 people being added to the ranks of the unemployed ev- 
ery year. The actual disparity between jobs needed for full em- 
ployment and new jobs created exceeded that projection, however. 
For those with jobs, the buying power of their wages tumbled 
throughout the 1980s while the cost of basic goods, especially food, 
climbed precipitously. 



116 



The Economy 



Role of Government 
Fiscal Policies 

Throughout the 1960s and most of the 1970s, the military-led 
governments of Honduras ran a state- sponsored and state-financed 
economy. The governments provided most guarantees for loans 
to a strong but patronage-dominated and somewhat corrupt pub- 
lic sector that included recipients of graft extracted from foreign 
and domestic investors, and to costly state-developed enterprises. 
By 1989 and the election of President Callejas, however, a heavy 
toll had been taken by regionwide economic recession, civil war 
in neighboring countries, the drying up of most external credit, 
and capital flight equaling more than US$1.5 billion. Callejas be- 
gan to shift economic policy toward privatizing government-owned 
enterprises, liberalizing trade and tariff regulations, and encourag- 
ing increased foreign investment through tax and other incentives. 
The Callejas administration did not seek less government control. 
Rather it changed the government's objectives by focusing on reduc- 
ing public-sector spending, the size of the public-sector work force, 
and the trade deficit. Overall economic planning became the respon- 
sibility of the National Superior Planning Council, directed by the 
minister of economy and commerce. President Callejas, a United 
States-trained economist, brought new professionalism and tech- 
nical skills to the central government as he began the arduous task 
of long-term economic reform. 

Monetary and Exchange-Rate Policies 

The official exchange rate of the lempira, pegged at US$1 = L2 
since 1918, was dramatically devalued in 1990. Exchange controls 
had been introduced in 1982, resulting in a parallel currency mar- 
ket (black market) and several confusing official exchange rates oper- 
ating simultaneously. Some of those rates were legally recognized 
in 1990 when President Callejas introduced a major series of eco- 
nomic policy reforms, which included reducing the maximum im- 
port tariff rate from 90 percent to 40 percent and getting rid of 
most surcharges and exemptions. The value of the lempira was ad- 
justed to US$1 = L4, with the exception of the rate for debt equity 
conversions, which remained at the old rate of US$1 = L2. The 
official conversion rate of the lempira fell to US$1 = L7.26 in De- 
cember 1993. The president also introduced temporary taxes on 
exports, which were intended to increase central government 
revenue. Additional price and trade liberalization measures and 
fewer government regulations became part of his ongoing reforms. 



117 



Honduras: A Country Study 
Budget 

Throughout the 1980s, the Honduran government was heavily 
financed by foreign assistance. External financing — mostiy bilateral 
credit from the United States — rose dramatically until it reached 
87 percent of the public deficit in 1^85, rising even further in sub- 
sequent years. By 1991 the public-sector deficit was entirely financed 
with net external credit. That financing permitted the government 
to reduce the demand for internal credit and, therefore, to main- 
tain its established exchange rate. 

In 1991 President Callejas managed to give the appearance of 
having reduced the overall fiscal deficit, a requirement for new 
credit. The deficit decrease, however, was mostly an accounting 
device because it resulted from the postponement of external pay- 
ments to the Paris Club (see Glossary) debtors and eventually would 
be offset by pressure to raise public investment. During 1991 , loan 
negotiations with multilateral and bilateral lending institutions 
brought Honduras US$39.5 million in United States development 
assistance, US$70 million in balance-of-payments assistance in the 
form of cash grants, and US$18.8 million in food aid. The coun- 
try also negotiated US$302.4 million in concessional loans from 
the multilateral lending institutions. Total outstanding external debt 
as a percentage of GDP fell from 119 percent in 1990 to 1 14 per- 
cent in 1991 and to 112 percent in 1993. This drop was largely 
the result of debt forgiveness of US$448.4 million by the United 
States, Switzerland, and the Netherlands. Scheduled amortization 
payments of an average US$223.2 million per year, however, 
guaranteed that Honduras 's gross funding requirements would re- 
main large indefinitely. 

In 1991 the government of Honduras projected that overall tax 
revenues would increase from 13.2 percent of GDP in 1989 to 15.7 
percent. Adjustments for low coffee prices and the continuation 
of lax collection methods, however, undermined those goals. Despite 
these tax increases, compared to developed countries, Honduras 
has low tax rates with particularly low property taxes. 

Human Resources 

Composition of Labor Force 

Honduras suffers from an overabundance of unskilled and un- 
educated laborers. Most Honduran workers in 1993 continued to 
be employed in agriculture, which accounted for about 60 percent 
of the labor force. More than half of the rural population, moreover, 
remains landless and heavily dependent on diminishing seasonal 



118 



The Economy 



labor and low wages. Fifty-five percent of the farming population 
subsists on less than two hectares and earns less than US$70 per 
capita per year from those plots, mostly by growing subsistence 
food crops. 

In 1 993 only about 9 to 1 3 percent of the Honduran labor force 
was engaged in the country's tiny manufacturing sector — one of 
the smallest in Central America. Skilled laborers are scarce. Only 
25,000 people per year, of which about 21 percent are industrial 
workers, graduate yearly from the National Institute of Professional 
Training (Instituto Nacional de Formation Profesional — Infop) es- 
tablished in 1972. 

Hundreds of small manufacturing firms, the traditional back- 
bone of Honduran enterprise, began to go out of business begin- 
ning in the early 1990s, as import costs rose and competition 
through increasing wages for skilled labor from the mostly Asian- 
owned assembly industries strengthened. The small Honduran 
shops, most of which had manufactured clothing or food products 
for the domestic market, traditionally received little support in the 
form of credit from the government or the private sector and were 
more like artisans than conventional manufacturers. Asian-owned 
export assembly firms (maquiladoras), operating mostly in free zones 
established by the government on the Caribbean coast, attract thou- 
sands of job seekers and swell the populations of new city centers 
such as San Pedro Sula, Tela, and La Ceiba. Those firms employed 
approximately 16,000 workers in 1991. 

About one-third of the Honduran labor force was estimated to 
be working in the services or "other" sector in 1993. That clas- 
sification usually means that a person ekes out a precarious liveli- 
hood in the urban informal sector or as a poorly paid domestic. 
As unemployment soared throughout Central America in the 1980s, 
more and more people were forced to rely on their own ingenuity 
in order to simply exist on the fringes of Honduran society. 

Employment Indicators and Benefits 

Honduran governments have set minimum wages since 1974, 
but enforcement has generally been lax. That laxity increased at 
the beginning of the 1980s. Traditionally, most Honduran workers 
have not been covered by social security, welfare, or minimum 
wages. Multinational companies usually paid more than the stan- 
dard minimum wage, but, overall, the Honduran wage earner has 
experienced a diminution of real wages and purchasing ability for 
more than a decade. When they occurred, minimum wage adjust- 
ments generally did not keep up with cost of living increases. After 
a major currency devaluation in 1990, average Honduran 



119 



Honduras: A Country Study 

workers were among the most poorly paid workers in the Western 
Hemisphere. By contrast, the banana companies paid relatively 
high wages as early as the 1970s. Banana workers continued at the 
top of the wage scale in the 1990s; however, in the 1980s, as banana 
production became less labor-intensive, the companies had 
decreased their investment and work force. Consequently, fewer 
workers were employed as relatively well-paid agricultural wage 
earners with related benefits. 

President Callejas responded to the severe poverty by implement- 
ing a specially financed Honduran Social Investment Fund (Fondo 
Hondureno de Inversion Social — FHIS) in 1990. The fund created 
public works programs such as road maintenance and provided 
United States surplus food to mothers and infants. Many Hondu- 
rans slipped through that fragile social safety net, however. As a 
continuing part of the social pact, and even more as the result of 
a fierce union- government battle, President Callejas announced 
in 1991 a 27.8 percent increase over a minimum wage that the 
government had earlier agreed upon. That increase was in addi- 
tion to raises of 50 and 22 percent set, respectively, in January and 
September 1990. Despite those concessions, the minimum daily 
rate in 1991 was only US$1.75 for workers employed by small 
agricultural enterprises and US$3 . 1 5 for workers in the big export- 
ing concerns; most workers did not earn the minimum wage. 

Labor Unions 

Honduras has long been heavily unionized. In 1993 approxi- 
mately 15 to 20 percent of the overall formal work force was 
represented by some type of union, and about 40 percent of urban 
workers were union members. There were forty-eight strikes in the 
public sector alone in 1990, protesting the government's econom- 
ic austerity program and layoffs of public-sector workers. More 
than 4,000 public- sector employees from the Ministry of Commu- 
nications, Public Works, and Transport were fired in 1990. About 
70,000 unionized workers remained in the faltering public sector 
in the beginning of 1991 . However, the government largely made 
good its pledge to trim that number by 8,000 to 10,000 through- 
out 1991 as part of its austerity program. 

In the private sector, 1990 saw ninety-four strikes in sixty-four 
firms as workers fought for wage increases to combat inflation. A 
forty-two-day strike at the Tela Railroad Company (owned by Chi- 
quita Brands International — formerly United Brands and United 
Fruit Company) was unsuccessful, however, and that defeat tem- 
porarily ended union efforts at direct confrontation. 



120 



Much of the labor force ekes out an existence in the informal sector. 
Courtesy Dennis W. Calkin (top) and Ann Gardner (bottom) 



121 



Honduras: A Country Study 

In 1993 Honduras had three major labor confederations: the Con- 
federation of Honduran Workers (Confederacion de Trabaj adores 
de Honduras — CTH), claiming a membership of about 160,000 
workers; the General Workers' Central (Central General de Tra- 
baj adores — CGT), claiming to represent 120,000 members; and 
the Unitary Confederation of Honduran Workers (Confederacion 
Unitaria de Trabajadores de Honduras — CUTH), a new confeder- 
ation formed in May 1992, with an estimated membership of about 
30,000. The three confederations included numerous trade union 
federations, individual unions, and peasant organizations. 

The CTH, the nation's largest trade confederation, was formed 
in 1964 by the nation's largest peasant organization, the National 
Association of Honduran Peasants (Asociacion Nacional de Cam- 
pesinos de Honduras — Anach), and by Honduran unions affiliat- 
ed with the Inter- American Regional Organization of Workers 
(Organization Regional Interamericana de Trabajadores — ORIT), 
a hemispheric labor organization with close ties to the American 
Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations 
(AFL-CIO). In the early 1990s, the confederation had three major 
components: the 45,000-member Federation of Unions of National 
Workers of Honduras (Federacion Sindical de Trabajadores Na- 
cionales de Honduras — Fesitranh); the 22,000-member Central 
Federation of Honduran Free Trade Unions (Federacion Central 
de Sindicatos Libres de Honduras); and the 2,200-member Fed- 
eration of National Maritime Unions of Honduras (Federacion de 
Sindicales Marftimas Nacionales de Honduras). In addition, Anach, 
claiming to represent between 60,000 and 80,000 members, was 
affiliated with Fesitranh. Fesitranh was by far the country's most 
powerful labor federation, with most of its unions located in San 
Pedro Sula and the Puerto Cortes Free Zone. The unions of the 
United States-owned banana companies and the United States- 
owned petroleum refinery also were affiliated with Fesitranh. The 
CTH received support from foreign labor organizations, includ- 
ing ORIT, the American Institute for Free Labor Development 
(AIFLD), and Germany's Friedreich Ebert Foundation and was 
an affiliate of the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions 
(ICFTU). 

Although it was not legally recognized until 1982, the CGT was 
originally formed in 1970 by the Christian Democrats and received 
external support from the World Confederation of Labor (WCL) 
and the Latin American Workers Central (Central Latinoamericana 
de Trabajadores — CLAT), a regional organization supported by 
Christian Democratic parties. In the late 1980s and early 1990s, 
however, the CGT leadership developed close ties to the National 



122 



The Economy 



Party of Honduras (Partido Nacional de Honduaras — PNH), and 
several leaders served in the Callejas government. Another national 
peasant organization, the National Union of Peasants (Union Na- 
cional de Campesinos — UNC), claiming a membership of 40,000, 
was affiliated with the CGT for many years and was a principal 
force within the confederation. 

The CUTH was formed in May 1992 by two principal labor 
federations, the Unitary Federation of Honduran Workers (Fe- 
deration Unitaria de Trabajadores de Honduras — FUTH) and the 
Independent Federation of Honduran Workers (Federation In- 
dependiente de Trabajadores de Honduras — FITH), as well as 
several smaller labor groups, all critical of the Callejas government's 
neoliberal economic reform program. 

The Marxist FUTH, with an estimated 16,000 members in the 
early 1990s, was first organized in 1980 by three communist- 
influenced unions, but did not receive legal status until 1988. The 
federation had external ties with the World Federation of Trade 
Unions (WFTU), the Permanent Congress for Latin American 
Workers Trade Union Unity (Congreso Permanente de Unidad 
Sindical de Trabajadores de America Latina — CPUSTAL), and 
the Central American Committee of Trade Union Unity (Comite 
de Unidad Sindical de Centroamerica — CUSCA). Its affiliations 
included water utility, university, electricity company, brewery, 
and teacher unions, as well as several peasant organizations, in- 
cluding the National Central of Farm Workers (Central Nacional 
de Trabajadores del Campo — CNTC), formed in 1985 and active 
in land occupations in the early 1980s. 

FUTH also became affiliated with a number of leftist popular 
organizations in a group known as the Coordinating Committee 
of Popular Organizations (Comite Coordinadora de las Organiza- 
tions Populares — CCOP) that was formed in 1984. Dissident 
FUTH members formed the FITH, which was granted legal sta- 
tus in 1988. The FITH consisted of fourteen unions claiming about 
13,000 members in the early 1990s. 

Agriculture 
Land Use 

The total land area of Honduras is 11.2 million hectares, of which 
a scant 1 . 7 million hectares (about 1 5 percent) are well suited for 
agriculture. Most land in Honduras is covered by mountains, giving 
rise to the country's nickname, "the Tibet of Central America." 
Nevertheless, the Honduran economy has always depended almost 
exclusively on agriculture, and in 1992 agriculture was still the 



123 



Honduras: A Country Study 




The Economy 



largest sector of the economy, contributing 28 percent to the GDP 
(see fig. 6; see table 5, Appendix A). Less than half of Honduras's 
cultivable land was planted with crops as recently as the mid-1980s. 
The rest was used for pastures or was forested and was owned by 
the government or the banana corporations. Potential for additional 
productivity from fallow land was questionable, however, because 
much of Honduras's soil lacks the thick volcanic ash found else- 
where in Central America. In addition, by 1987 about 750,000 hect- 
ares of Honduran land had been seriously eroded as a result of 
misuse by cattle ranchers and slash-and-burn squatters who planted 
unsuitable food crops. 

The Honduran government and two banana companies — 
Chiquita Brands International and Dole Food Company — owned 
approximately 60 percent of Honduras's cultivable land in 1993. 
The banana companies acquired most of their landholdings in the 
early twentieth century in return for building the railroads used 
to transport bananas from the interior to the coast. Much of their 
land remained unused because it lacked irrigation. Only about 14 
percent of cultivated land was irrigated in 1987. Most land under 
cultivation in 1992 was planted in bananas, coffee, and special- 
ized export crops such as melons and winter vegetables. 

Agricultural Policy 

The agricultural sector's output showed little or no growth be- 
tween 1970 and 1985. As a result of favorable weather and market 
conditions beginning in 1985, however, the agricultural sector grew 
at a rate of 2.6 percent annually, slightly above the average for 
Latin America during that period. Production of basic grains and 
coffee increased; the export price of bananas was high; and pork, 
poultry, and milk produced for the domestic market increased. Non- 
traditional fruits and vegetables also increased in value. 

Honduran agricultural production overall has tended to be low 
because the amount of crop yielded by a given amount of land has 
been low. For example, Honduran coffee yields historically have 
been only about half those of Costa Rica. Instead of using improved 
techniques to increase the productivity of the land, Honduran farm- 
ers have merely expanded the hectarage under cultivation to 
produce more crops — pushing their fields ever farther into the 
forests. Given the limited amount of good quality agricultural land 
to begin with, that policy has resulted in continual deforestation 
and subsequent erosion. This reluctance to improve techniques, 
coupled with generally poor soil, a lack of credit, and poor infra- 
structure, has contributed to low production figures. 



125 



Honduras: A Country Study 
Land Reform 

The Honduran government nominally began to address inequi- 
table land ownership in the early 1960s. Those efforts at reform 
focused on organizing rural cooperatives. About 1 ,500 hectares of 
government-owned land were distributed by the National Agrari- 
an Institute (Instituto Nacional Agrario — INA) beginning in 1960. 

A military coup in 1963 resulted in an end to the land reform 
program. Lacking even modest government-directed land reforms, 
illegal squatting became the primary means for poor people to gain 
land throughout the early 1970s. These actions spurred the govern- 
ment to institute new agrarian reforms in 1972 and 1975. Although 
all lands planted in export crops were exempted from reform, about 
120,000 hectares were, nevertheless, divided among 35,000 poor 
families. 

By 1975 the pendulum had swung back, and agrarian reform 
was all but halted. From 1975 through the 1980s, illegal occupa- 
tions of unused land increased once again. The need for land re- 
form was addressed mostly by laws directed at granting titles to 
squatters and other landholders, permitting them to sell their land 
or to use it as collateral for loans. 

Despite declarations by the Callejas government in 1989 of its 
intent to increasingly address social issues, including land tenure 
and other needs of small farmers, the early 1990s were jolted by 
increased conflicts between peasants and the Honduran security 
forces. Agricultural credit and government support increasingly 
favored export crop producers at the expense of producers of basic 
food crops. 

The Honduran land reform process under President Callejas be- 
tween 1989 and 1992 was directed primarily at large agricultural 
landowners. An agrarian pact, signed by landowners and peasant 
organizations in August 1990, remained underfunded and largely 
unimplemented. Furthermore, violence erupted as discharged mem- 
bers of the Honduran military forcibly tried to claim land that had 
already been awarded to the peasant organization Anach in 1976. 
In May 1991, violence initiated by members of the Honduran mili- 
tary resulted in the deaths of eight farmers. To keep similar sit- 
uations around the country from escalating into violence, the 
government promised to parcel out land belonging to the National 
Corporation for Investment (Corporacion Nacional de Inver- 
siones — Conadin). The government also pledged to return to 
peasants land that had been confiscated by the Honduran military 
in 1983. 



126 



The Economy 



An Agricultural Modernization Law, passed in 1992, acceler- 
ated land titling and altered the structure of land cooperatives 
formed in the 1960s. The law permitted cooperative members to 
break up their holdings into small personal plots that could be sold. 
As a result, some small banana producers suffering from econom- 
ic hard times chose to sell their land to the giant banana producers. 
After an agreement was reached with the European Union (EU) 
to increase Honduras' s banana quota to the EU, the large banana 
companies were avid for additional land for increased production 
to meet the anticipated new demand from Europe. 

Traditional Crops 

Throughout the twentieth century, Honduras 's agriculture has 
been dominated first by bananas and then to a lesser extent by coffee 
and sugar. Although their overall importance has declined some- 
what, bananas and coffee together still accounted for 50 percent 
of the value of Honduran exports in 1992. The combined value 
of the two crops also continued to make the biggest contribution 
to the economy in 1992. Total banana sales that year were US$287 
million, and total coffee sales amounted to US$148 million. These 
figures, which reflect a substantial decline from previous years' sales, 
reflect production losses suffered by banana producers and the with- 
holding of coffee exports from the market in a futile effort to force 
improvements in the face of record-breaking price declines. 

Two United States-based, multinational corporations — Chiquita 
Brands International and Dole Food Company — now account for 
most Honduran banana production and exports. Honduras 's tradi- 
tional system of independent banana producers, who, as late as 
the 1980s, sold their crops to the international banana companies, 
was eroded in the 1990s. In the absence of policies designed to pro- 
tect independent suppliers, economically strapped cooperatives be- 
gan to sell land to the two large corporations. 

Although Honduran banana production is dominated by mul- 
tinational giants, such is not the case with coffee, which is grown 
by about 55,000 mostly small producers. Coffee production in Hon- 
duras has been high despite relatively low yields because of the large 
numbers of producers. Honduras, in fact, consistently produced 
more than its international quota until growers began to withhold 
the crop in the 1980s in an attempt to stimulate higher prices. 
Despite the efforts of the growers, coffee prices plunged on the in- 
ternational market from a high of more than US$2.25 per kilo- 
gram in the mid-1970s to less than US$0.45 per kilogram in the 
early 1990s. As a result of the declining prices, coffee producers 
were becoming increasingly marginalized. 



127 



Honduras: A Country Study 

The outlook for the sugar industry, which had boomed during 
the 1980s when Honduran producers were allowed to fill 
Nicaragua's sugar quota to the United States, seemed bleak in 1993. 
Restoration of the sugar quota to Nicaraguan growers has been 
a major blow to Honduras 's small independent producers, who had 
added most of Nicaragua's quota to their own during the United 
States embargo of Nicaragua. Higher costs for imported fertiliz- 
ers because of the devaluation of the lempira add to the problem. 
Honduran producers seek relief from a relatively low official price 
of 25 lempiras per kilogram of sugar by smuggling sugar across 
the borders to Nicaragua and El Salvador, where the support prices 
are higher. Sugar growers who can afford it have begun to diver- 
sify by growing pineapples and rice. Many independent sugar grow- 
ers, like independent banana producers, have become indignant 
over the relatively high profits shown by refiners and exporters. 
Strikes by producers at harvest time in 1991 forced the closure of 
the Choluteca refinery for a short time but had little effect on the 
depressed long-term outlook for the industry. 

Nontraditional Crops 

While the total value of export merchandise fell in 1990 and 1991 
and had still not recovered in 1993 to its 1989 level, the overall 
agricultural sector output has grown somewhat because of growth 
in the sale of winter vegetables and shrimp. Nontraditional vegeta- 
bles and fruit produced US$23.8 million in export revenue in 1990, 
a figure that was almost double the 1983 figure. Nontraditional 
agricultural crops represented 4.8 percent of the value of total ex- 
ports in 1990, compared to 2.8 percent in 1983. Some develop- 
ment experts argue that government protection of corn, bean, and 
rice production by small farmers is a futile effort in the long-term 
goal of poverty reduction. On the other hand, they see significant 
economic potential for nontraditional crops, if they are handled 
properly. Analysts also note, however, that Honduras is at a dis- 
tinct disadvantage relative to its Central American neighbors be- 
cause of its poor transportation system (see Transportation, this 
ch.). Nontraditional exports require the ability to get fresh produce 
from the fields to distant markets rapidly. 

Livestock 

In the early 1980s, the catde industry appeared to have the poten- 
tial to be an important part of the Honduran economy. The Hon- 
duran catde sector, however, never developed to the extent that 
it did in much of the rest of Central America. Cattle production 
grew steadily until 1980-81 but then declined sharply when profits 



128 



Hanging banana stem 
on a conveyer belt 
Courtesy Dennis W. Calkin 



Women with coffee bushes 
Courtesy Dennis W. Calkin 



Honduras: A Country Study 

fell because of high production costs. The small Honduran meat 
packing industry declined at the same time, and several meat pack- 
ing plants closed. As late as 1987, livestock composed 16 percent 
of the value-added agricultural sector but the industry continued 
to decline. By 1991-92, beef exports accounted for only 2.9 per- 
cent of the value of total exports. 

Sales of refrigerated meat were the third or fourth highest source 
of export earnings in the mid-1980s, but like other Honduran agri- 
cultural products, beef yields were among the lowest in Central 
America. As world prices fell and production costs, exacerbated by 
drought, rose, there was less incentive to raise cattie. For a period 
of time, cattie farmers illegally smuggled beef cattie to Guatemala 
and other neighboring countries where prices were higher, but the 
Honduran cattie sector never became competitive internationally. 
The two large banana companies have also owned large cattie ran- 
ches where they raised prime beef, but these large companies had 
the flexibility to change crops as the market demanded. 

Honduran dairy herds fared about the same as beef cattie, and 
Honduran milk yields were also among the lowest in Central Ameri- 
ca. The dairy industry was further handicapped by the difficulties 
of trying to transport milk over poor roads in a tropical country, 
as well as by stiff competition in the domestic market from subsi- 
dized foreign imports, mostly from the United States. 

Fishing 

Honduras significantly developed its shrimp industry during the 
1980s and in the Latin American market was second only to Ecua- 
dor in shrimp exports by 1991 . In 1992 shrimp and lobster jumped 
to 12 percent of export earnings. Shrimp contributed US$97 mil- 
lion in export sales to the economy in 1992 — an increase of 33 per- 
cent over the previous year. The industry was dependent, however, 
on larvae imported from the United States to augment its unsta- 
ble natural supply. Technicians from Taiwan were contracted by 
large producers in 1991 to help develop laboratory larvae, but bit- 
ter feuds developed between independent shrimpers and the cor- 
porations. Local shrimpers charged that corporate methods were 
damaging the environment and destroying natural stock through 
destruction of the mangrove breeding swamps. Corporate shrimp 
farmers then began to move their operations farther inland, leav- 
ing local shrimpers to contend with diminished natural supplies 
on the mosquito-infested coast. 

Forestry 

As in much of Central America, Honduras's once abundant forest 



130 



The Economy 



resources have been badly squandered. In 1964 forests covered 6.8 
million hectares, but by 1988 forested areas had declined to 5 mil- 
lion hectares. Honduras continued to lose about 3.6 percent of its 
remaining forests annually during the 1980s and early 1990s. The 
loss is attributable to several factors. Squatters have consistently 
used land suitable only for forests to grow scant-yield food crops; 
large tracts have been cleared for cattle ranches; and the country 
has gravely mismanaged its timber resources, focusing far more 
effort on logging than on forestry management. 

The government began an intensive forestry development pro- 
gram in 1974, supposedly intended to increase management of the 
sector and to prevent exploitation by foreign-owned firms. The 
Honduran Corporation for Forestry Development (Corporacion 
Hondurena de Desarrollo Forestal — Cohdefor) was created in 1974, 
but it quickly developed into a corrupt monopoly for overseeing 
forest exports. Timber was mosdy produced by private sawmills 
under contracts selectively granted by Cohdefor officials. In fact, 
ongoing wasteful practices and an unsustainable debt, which was 
contracted to build infrastructure, appear to have undercut most 
conservation efforts. The military-dominated governments contract- 
ed huge debt with the multilateral development agencies, then ex- 
tracted timber to pay for it. Cohdefor generally granted licenses 
to private lumber companies with few demands for preservation, 
and it had little inclination or incentive to enforce the demands 
it did make. 

With encouragement from the United States Agency for Inter- 
national Development (AID), the Honduran government began 
to decentralize Cohdefor beginning in 1985. Under the decentrali- 
zation plan, regulatory responsibilities were transferred from the 
central government to mayors and other municipal officials on the 
assumption that local officials would provide better oversight. 
Despite decentralization and the sale of government assets, Coh- 
defor' s remaining debt was US$240 million in 1991 . The govern- 
ment also assumed continued financial responsibility for the 
construction of a new airstrip in the area of timber extraction, up- 
grading facilities at Puerto Castilla and Puerto Lempira, and provid- 
ing electricity at reduced prices to lumber concerns as part of the 
privatization package. 

Major legislation was passed in 1992 to promote Honduran 
reforestation by making large tracts of state-owned land more ac- 
cessible to private investors. The legislation also supplied subsi- 
dies for development of the sector. The same law provided for 
replanting mountainous regions of the country with pine to be used 
for fuel. 



131 



Honduras: A Country Study 

Natural Resources and Energy 

Mining and Minerals 

Mining, the mainstay of the Honduran economy in the late 
1800s, declined dramatically in importance in the 1900s. The New 
York and Honduras Rosario Mining Company (NYHRMC) 
produced US$60 million worth of gold and silver between 1882 
and 1954 before discontinuing most of its operations. Mining's con- 
tribution to the GDP steadily declined during the 1980s, to account 
for only a 2 percent contribution in 1992. El Mochito mine in 
western Honduras, the largest mine in Central America, accounted 
for most mineral production. Ores containing gold, silver, lead, 
zinc, and cadmium were mined and exported to the United States 
and Europe for refining. 

Energy Sources 

Honduras has for many years relied on fuelwood and biomass 
(mostly waste products from agricultural production) to supply its 
energy needs. The country has never been a producer of petroleum 
and depends on imported oil to fill much of its energy needs. In 
1991 Honduras consumed about 16,000 barrels of oil daily. Hon- 
duras spent approximately US$143 million, or 13 percent of its 
total export earnings, to purchase oil in 1991. The country's one 
small refinery at Puerto Cortes closed in 1993. Various Hondu- 
ran governments have done little to encourage oil exploration, 
although substantial oil deposits have long been suspected in the 
Rio Sula valley and offshore along the Caribbean coast. An oil 
exploration consortium consisting of the Venezuelan state oil 
company, Venezuelan Petroleum, Inc. (Petroleos de Venezuela, 
S.A. — PDVSA), Cambria Oil, and Texaco expressed interest in 
the construction of a refinery at Puerto Castilla in 1993, with 
production aimed at the local market. 

Fuelwood and biomass have traditionally met about 67 percent 
of the country's total energy demand; petroleum, 29 percent; and 
electricity, 4 percent. In 1987 Honduran households consumed ap- 
proximately 60 percent of total energy used, transportation and 
agriculture used about 26 percent, and industry used about 14 per- 
cent. Food processing consumed about 50 percent of industrial- 
sector energy, followed by petroleum and chemical manufacturing. 

Electric Power 

Honduran electrification is low and uneven relative to other coun- 
tries in Latin America. The World Bank estimates that only about 



132 



Rugged terrain has hampered 
Honduras 's development. 
Courtesy Department of Defense, 
Still Media Records Center (top) 
and Randall Baldwin (bottom) 



Honduras: A Country Study 

36 percent of the Honduran population had access to electricity 
(20 percent of the rural population) in 1987. The country's total 
capacity in 1992 was 575 megawatts (MW), with 2,000 megawatt- 
hours produced. A mammoth hydroelectric plant, the 292-MW 
project at El Cajon, began producing electricity in 1985 to help 
address the country's energy needs. The plant, however, soon be- 
came heavily indebted because of the government's electricity pric- 
ing policies (not charging public-sector institutions, for example) 
and because of the appointment of political cronies as top manage- 
ment officials. El Cajon also developed costly structural problems 
requiring extensive maintenance and repairs. Officials estimated 
that the government's decision to provide free service to public- 
sector institutions contributed to a 23 percent increase in public- 
sector consumption in 1990. Experts estimated that additional 
electrical generation capacity would likely be needed to keep pace 
with demand. The Honduran Congress assumed authority for set- 
ting electric prices beginning in 1986 but then became reluctant 
to increase rates. Under pressure from the World Bank, it did agree 
to a 60 percent increase in 1990, with additional increases in 1991 . 
To offset these increased rates for residential users, the National 
Congress initiated a system of direct subsidies that ran through 
1992. 

Industry 

Manufacturing 

The country's manufacturing sector is small, contributing only 
15 percent to the total GDP in 1992. Textile exports, primarily 
to the United States, lead the Honduran manufacturing sector. The 
maquiladora, or assembly industry, is a growth industry in the gener- 
ally bleak economy. Asian-owned firms dominate the sector, with 
twenty-one South Korean-owned companies in export processing 
zones located in the Rio Sula valley in 1991 . The maquiladoras em- 
ployed approximately 16,000 workers in 1991; another nine firms 
opened in 1992. Job creation, in fact, is considered to be the primary 
contribution of the assembly operations to the domestic economy. 
The export textile manufacturing industry has all but wiped out 
small, Honduran manufacturers, and food processors, whose goods 
were historically aimed at the domestic market, were also adversely 
affected. The small Honduran firms could not begin to compete 
with the assembly industry for labor because of the maquiladoras' 
relatively high wage scale of close to US$4 per day. Small firms 
also found it increasingly difficult to meet the high cost of mostly 
imported inputs. Membership in the Honduran Association of 



134 



The Economy 



Small and Medium Industry (Asociacion Hondurena de Peque- 
nas y Medianas Industrias) declined by 70 percent by 1991, com- 
pared to pre-maquiladora days, foreshadowing the likely demise of 
most of the small shops. 

Honduran domestic manufacturers have also suffered from in- 
creased Central American competition resulting from a trade liber- 
alization pact signed in May 1991 by Honduras, El Salvador, and 
Guatemala. Overall, the Honduran manufacturing sector has 
mimicked other sectors of the economy — it is mostly noncompeti- 
tive, even in a regional context, because of insufficient credit and 
the high cost of inputs. Relatively high interest rates and a com- 
plicated investment law have also inhibited the foreign-dominated 
manufacturing sector from taking off. 

The government- sponsored Puerto Cortes Free Zone was opened 
in 1976. By 1990 an additional five free zones were in operation 
in Omoa, Coloma, Tela, La Ceiba, and Amapala. A series of pri- 
vately run, export-processing zones were also established in com- 
petition with the government-sponsored free zones. These privately 
run zones offer the same standard import-export incentives as the 
government zones. Most of the government and privately run zones 
are located along the Caribbean coast in a newly developing in- 
dustrial belt. 

Firms operating outside of the special "enterprise zones" (either 
privately run, export-processing zones or government-sponsored free 
zones) enjoy many of the same benefits as those operating within 
the zones. The Honduran Temporary Import Law permits com- 
panies that export 100 percent of their production to countries out- 
side the CACM countries to hold ten-year exemptions on corporate 
income taxes and duty-free import of industrial inputs. 

Analysts continue to debate the actual benefits of the shift away 
from the import-substitution industrialization (ISI — see Glossary) 
policies of the 1960s and 1970s toward a new focus on free zones 
and assembly industries in the 1990s. Critics point to the apparent 
lack of commitment by foreign manufactures to any one country 
site or to the creation of permanent infrastructure and employment. 
They question whether new employment will be enough to offset 
the loss of jobs in the more traditional manufacturing sector. A 
value of US$195 million to the Honduran economy from assem- 
bly industries in 1991 — when the value of clothing exports was great- 
er than that of coffee — was a compelling argument in favor of the 
shift, however. 

Construction 

High interests rates, particularly for housing, continued to hurt 



135 



Honduras: A Country Study 

the Honduran construction industry in 1993, but danger from high 
rates was partially offset by some public- sector investment. Privati- 
zation of formerly state-owned industries through debt swaps also 
negatively affected construction as prices for basic materials such 
as cement increased and credit tightened. A major devaluation of 
the lempira added to the already high cost of construction imports. 
Construction contributed 6.0 percent to the GDP in 1992. 

Services 

Banking and Financial System 

The Honduran financial sector is small in comparison to the 
banking systems of its neighbors. After 1985, however, the sector 
began to grow rapidly. The average annual growth rate of value 
added to the economy from the financial sector for the 1980s was 
the second-highest in Latin America, averaging 4 percent. By 1985 
Honduras had twenty-five financial institutions with 300 branch 
offices. Honduran commercial banks held 60 percent of the finan- 
cial system's assets in 1985 and nearly 75 percent of all deposits. 
With the exception of the Armed Forces Social Security Institute, 
all commercial banks were privately owned, and most were owned 
by Honduran families. In 1985 there were two government-owned 
development banks in Honduras, one specializing in agricultural 
credit and the other providing financing to municipal governments. 

At the behest of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and 
World Bank, Honduras began a process of financial liberalization 
in 1990. The process began with the freeing of agricultural loan 
rates and was quickly followed by the freeing of loan rates in other 
sectors. Beginning in late 1991, Honduran banks were allowed to 
charge market rates for agricultural loans if they were using their 
own funds. By law, the banks had to report their rates to mone- 
tary authorities and could fix rates within two points of the an- 
nounced rate. 

In 1991 commercial banks pressured the government to reduce 
their 35 percent minimum reserve ratio. This rate remained stan- 
dard until June 1993 when the minimum requirement was tem- 
porarily lifted to 42 percent. The rate was dropped to 36 percent 
three months later. The banks had excess reserves, and lending 
rates were in the area of 26 to 29 percent, with few borrowers. Prior 
to liberalization measures, the Central Bank of Honduras (Banco 
Central de Honduras) maintained interest rate controls, setting a 
19 percent ceiling, with the market lending rate hovering around 26 
percent in late 1991 . With inflation hitting 33 percent in 1990, there 
was, in fact, a negative real interest rate, but this situation reversed 



136 



The government has begun to promote tourism on the Islas 
de la Bahia off Honduras 's Caribbean coast. 

Courtesy Randall Baldwin 

in 1991 when rates were high relative to inflation. Rates of 35 to 
43 percent in 1993 were well above the inflation rate of 13 to 14 
percent. Bankers argued for further liberalization, including eas- 
ing of controls in the housing and nonexport agricultural sectors. 

A Honduran stock exchange was established in August 1990 with 
transactions confined to trading debt. Nine companies were 
registered with the exchange in 1991; in 1993 this number had 
grown to eighteen. It appears doubtful, however, that the market 
will develop fully, given the reluctance of family-held firms to open 
their books to public scrutiny. 

Tourism 

Foreign tourists are attracted to Honduras by the Mayan ruins 
in Copan and coral reef skindiving off the Islas de la Bahfa (Bay 
Islands). Poor infrastructure, however, has discouraged the develop- 
ment of substantial international tourism. Despite these problems, 
the number of visitors arriving in Honduras rose from fewer than 
200,000 in 1987 to almost 250,000 in 1989. Small ecotourism 
projects in particular are considered to have significant potential. 

Telecommunications 

The telecommunications system in Honduras is poorly maintained, 



137 



Honduras: A Country Study 

largely outmoded, and inadequate to meet the needs of the popu- 
lation. The entire country had only 35,100 telephones, or fewer 
than seven telephones per 1 ,000 inhabitants in 1993. Service is limited 
primarily to government offices, businesses, and a few wealthy 
households. Half the telephones are in the capital, a fourth are in 
San Pedro Sula, and the remainder are scattered throughout the 
country in large towns. Many small towns and rural areas remain 
without telephone service of any kind. Outside of the capital, low- 
capacity, radio-relay systems or unreliable open- wire lines connect 
the national network with switching centers in towns. 

International service is of higher quality than are domestic tele- 
phone links. In the 1960s, the Central American Microwave Sys- 
tem (CAMS) was built between Mexico and Panama. The CAMS 
passed through Tegucigalpa and provided 960 channels of simul- 
taneous telephone or telex links to the outside world. In the 1980s, 
a satellite ground station named Lempira was inaugurated near 
Tegucigalpa. Operating with the International Telecommunica- 
tion Satellite Corporation's (Intelsat's) Adantic Ocean satellite, the 
ground station allowed for more than 100 simultaneous interna- 
tional telephone calls, as well as for live television broadcasts. In- 
creased demand for additional telephone and data links required 
the installation of another satellite ground station in the 1990s. 

Radiobroadcast is the primary mode of disseminating informa- 
tion to Hondurans. All parts of the country are in range of at least 
one amplitude modulation (AM) radio station, either mediumwave 
or shortwave in remote areas. In 1993 Honduras had a total of 
176 AM stations, twenty-eight frequency modulation (FM) stations 
(mostly in larger cities), and seven shortwave stations. Four of the 
shortwave stations are intended for domestic reception in remote 
areas. The three other shortwave stations, which have more power- 
ful transmitters, are owned by evangelical Christian groups and 
broadcast to an audience throughout the Western Hemisphere. Tele- 
vision in 1993 was limited to eleven stations in larger cities and 
seventeen low-power transmitters in smaller towns. 

Transportation 

Although sporadic attempts have been made to improve Hon- 
duras 's transportation system, most recentiy in the late 1980s, the 
country's transportation system fails to meet the needs of its popu- 
lation. Much of the system is old and in disrepair, and many of its 
elements, in particular the railroad system, were built for a special- 
ized purpose — such as transporting bananas to ports — instead of 
transporting goods and passengers nationwide. In 1993 Tegucigalpa 



138 




ARAGUA 



The Economy 



remained the only Spanish- speaking capital in the Americas with 
no rail service (see fig. 7). 

In 1993 Honduras had almost 9,000 kilometers of roads, of which 
only 1,700 kilometers were paved. Most paved roads connect the 
ports and industrial areas of north-central and northwestern Hon- 
duras. Only one paved highway joins the Caribbean and Pacific 
coasts, a branch of the Pan American Highway that extends south 
from Puerto Cortes through San Pedro Sula and Tegucigalpa to 
the main east- west section at Nacaome. Another paved road in poor 
condition stretches southwest from San Pedro Sula to the Guate- 
malan and Salvadoran borders, and a newly paved road links the 
capital with Dulce Nombre de Culmi in northeastern Honduras. 
Other areas are served only by gravel or earthen roads, often im- 
passable in rainy weather. 

Honduras' s 785 kilometers of railroad were originally built by 
the banana companies and consist of two separate systems with 
differing gauges. The larger system, with almost 600 kilometers 
of track, was built by Standard Fruit Company in the early 1900s. 
Half of this system is 1.067-meter narrow gauge; the other half 
consists of 0.914-meter, narrow-gauge lines. The government na- 
tionalized the Standard Fruit line in 1983, renaming it the Hon- 
duras National Railroad (Ferrocarril Nacional de Honduras — FNH). 
The other system, still owned by the Tela Railroad Company, a 
subsidiary of Chiquita Brands International, encompasses 190 kilo- 
meters of 1.067-meter narrow-gauge lines. Both systems are located 
in the north-central and northwestern coastal areas of Honduras and 
provide freight and passenger service. In 1992 Honduras announced 
that it and El Salvador would build a new transisthmian route to 
compete with the Panama Canal, with completion scheduled for 
1997. No construction had begun, however, by the end of 1993. 

Three ports handle almost all of Honduras 's seaborne trade. 
Puerto Cortes at the mouth of the Rio Sula is by far the country's 
largest port. Most of the country's agricultural exports — and im- 
ports of petroleum and finished products — pass through its wharves. 
A new deep-water port in Puerto Castilla in north-central Honduras 
was expanded in the mid-1980s, mostly with United States financ- 
ing and technical help, to allow for the influx of military personnel 
and materiel. With the end of the Contra war in Nicaragua and 
the reduction of United States military involvement in northern Hon- 
duras, however, efforts have been made to transform Puerto Castilla 
into an agricultural exporting center. Lack of land access, however, 
has impeded these attempts. San Lorenzo is a small port on the Golfo 
de Fonseca handling mostiy sugar and shrimp exports. 



141 




140 



The Economy 



remained the only Spanish-speaking capital in the Americas with 
no rail service (see fig. 7). 

In 1993 Honduras had almost 9,000 kilometers of roads, of which 
only 1,700 kilometers were paved. Most paved roads connect the 
ports and industrial areas of north-central and northwestern Hon- 
duras. Only one paved highway joins the Caribbean and Pacific 
coasts, a branch of the Pan American Highway that extends south 
from Puerto Cortes through San Pedro Sula and Tegucigalpa to 
the main east- west section at Nacaome. Another paved road in poor 
condition stretches southwest from San Pedro Sula to the Guate- 
malan and Salvadoran borders, and a newly paved road links the 
capital with Dulce Nombre de Culmi in northeastern Honduras. 
Other areas are served only by gravel or earthen roads, often im- 
passable in rainy weather. 

Honduras' s 785 kilometers of railroad were originally built by 
the banana companies and consist of two separate systems with 
differing gauges. The larger system, with almost 600 kilometers 
of track, was built by Standard Fruit Company in the early 1900s. 
Half of this system is 1.067-meter narrow gauge; the other half 
consists of 0.914-meter, narrow-gauge lines. The government na- 
tionalized the Standard Fruit line in 1983, renaming it the Hon- 
duras National Railroad (Ferrocarril Nacional de Honduras — FNH). 
The other system, still owned by the Tela Railroad Company, a 
subsidiary of Chiquita Brands International, encompasses 190 kilo- 
meters of 1 .067-meter narrow-gauge lines. Both systems are located 
in the north-central and northwestern coastal areas of Honduras and 
provide freight and passenger service. In 1992 Honduras announced 
that it and El Salvador would build a new transisthmian route to 
compete with the Panama Canal, with completion scheduled for 
1997. No construction had begun, however, by the end of 1993. 

Three ports handle almost all of Honduras 's seaborne trade. 
Puerto Cortes at the mouth of the Rio Sula is by far the country's 
largest port. Most of the country's agricultural exports — and im- 
ports of petroleum and finished products — pass through its wharves. 
A new deep-water port in Puerto Castilla in north-central Honduras 
was expanded in the mid-1980s, mosdy with United States financ- 
ing and technical help, to allow for the influx of military personnel 
and materiel. With the end of the Contra war in Nicaragua and 
the reduction of United States military involvement in northern Hon- 
duras, however, efforts have been made to transform Puerto Castilla 
into an agricultural exporting center. Lack of land access, however, 
has impeded these attempts. San Lorenzo is a small port on the Golfo 
de Fonseca handling mostly sugar and shrimp exports. 



141 



Honduras: A Country Study 

Honduras' s mountainous terrain and lack of alternative trans- 
portation modes make air travel one of the most important means 
of transportation. The country has two major international 
airports — Toncontm at Tegucigalpa and La Mesa near San Pedro 
Sula. Both cities have regularly scheduled nonstop service to Miami 
and major cities in Mexico and Central America. Regularly sched- 
uled domestic service also links La Ceiba with the country's two 
largest cities and carries tourists to Roatan on the largest island, 
Isla de Roatan, in the scenic Islas de la Bahia. Unscheduled ser- 
vice to small unpaved fields provides access from rural areas to the 
larger towns. 

External Sector 
Trade 

In the early 1990s, the United States was by far Honduras 's lead- 
ing trading partner, with Japan a distant second. United States 
exports to Honduras in 1992 were valued at US$533 million, about 
54 percent of the country's total imports of US$983 million. Most 
of the rest of Honduras' s imports come from its Central American 
neighbors (see table 6, Appendix A). Despite its status as beneficiary 
of both the Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI) and the Generalized 
System of Preferences (GSP) — both of which confer duty-free sta- 
tus on Honduran imports to the United States — Honduras has run 
a long-standing trade deficit with the United States. Total exports 
of goods and services by Honduras in 1992 were US$843 million, 
of which about 52 percent went to the United States (see table 7, 
Appendix A). The current account deficit, however, continues to 
rise, from US$264 million in 1992 to an estimated US$370 mil- 
lion deficit in 1993. 

Foreign Investment 

With the exception of relatively recent, Asian-dominated invest- 
ment in assembly firms along Honduras 's northern coast, the coun- 
try remains heavily dependent on United States-based multinational 
corporations for most of its investment needs in the early 1990s. 
Overall investment as a percentage of GDP declined dramatically 
during the 1980s, from about 25 percent in 1980 to a meager 15 
percent in 1990. Dole Food Company and Chiquita Brands Inter- 
national together have invested heavily in Honduran industries as 
diverse as breweries and plastics, cement, soap, cans, and shoes. 

As Honduras enters the 1990s, it faces challenging economic 
problems. The solutions relied on in the past — traditional export 
crops, the maquiladora assembly industry, and 1980s' development 



142 



The Economy 



schemes — appear unlikely to provide enough new jobs for a rapidly 
growing population. The major economic challenge for Honduras 
over the next decade will be to find dependable sources of sustainable 
economic growth. 

* * * 

In general, Honduras receives little scholarly analysis. Biblio- 
graphic sources for Honduras are mainly to be found in books about 
Central America, and, for the most past, Honduras is allocated 
less coverage than its neighbors. The annual Economic and Social 
Progress in Latin America report of the Inter- American Development 
Bank is one of the most thorough sources. Banana Diplomacy: The 
Making of American Policy in Nicaragua, 1981-87, by Roy Gutman, 
provides a good comprehensive background for understanding the 
evolution and complexities behind Honduras 's political and eco- 
nomic problems. Poverty, Natural Resources, and Public Policy in Cen- 
tral America, by Sheldon Annis and contributors, is a valuable 
analysis of possible solutions to the many problems confronting the 
region. Finally, specialized regional newsletters, particularly La- 
tin American Newsletters [London], Central America Report, and Busi- 
ness Latin America are important sources for specific economic 
information on all the countries of the region. (For further infor- 
mation and complete citations, see Bibliography.) 



143 



Chapter 4. Government and Politics 




The Mayan god Ik, Rio Ulua valley 



IN LATE 1993, HONDURAS was again in the midst of an elec- 
toral campaign to elect a president, deputies to the National Con- 
gress, and municipal officials nationwide. The November 1993 
elections were the third since the military turned the nation over 
to a democratically elected president in January 1982. Regular na- 
tional elections, which have come to be celebrated in an almost 
holiday-like atmosphere, appear to be institutionalized. For most 
of this century, the Honduran political system has had two dominant 
traditional parties, the Liberal Party of Honduras (Partido Liberal 
de Honduras — PLH) and the National Party of Honduras (Parti- 
do Nacional de Honduras— PNH). In the 1980s, the PLH captured 
the presidency in the 1981 and 1985 elections, choosing Roberto 
Suazo Cordova and Jose Azcona Hoyo, respectively; in 1989, the 
PNH was victorious, with Rafael Leonardo Callejas Romero as- 
suming the presidency. 

The Honduran military has been a powerful force in domestic 
politics since the 1950s. From 1963 until 1971, and again from 1972 
until 1982, the military essentially controlled the national govern- 
ment, often with support from the PNH. In the 1980s, after the 
country had returned to civilian rule, the military continued to be 
a potent political force, particularly during the Suazo Cordova 
government (1981-85). During that administration, the military 
allowed a United States military presence and hosted members of 
the Nicaraguan Resistance (more commonly known as the Contras, 
short for contrarevolucionarios — counterrevolutionaries in Spanish; see 
Glossary), a group attempting to overthrow the Nicaraguan govern- 
ment. In the early 1990s, the Honduran military continued to oper- 
ate as an autonomous institution with increasing involvement in 
economic activities. 

Within the civilian government, the executive branch of govern- 
ment has traditionally dominated the legislative and judicial 
branches. The Honduran judiciary has been widely criticized for 
politicization and for having unqualified judges among the lower 
court officials. The justice system for the most part has not held 
military or civilian elites accountable for their actions. A signifi- 
cant departure from this record was the July 1993 conviction of 
two military officers for the 1991 murder of an eighteen-year-old 
high-school student, Riccy Mabel Martinez. The case galvanized 
Honduran public opinion against the military's immunity from 
prosecution. The political system also suffers from the endemic 



147 



Honduras: A Country Study 

corruption found within its ranks; bribery is an almost institution- 
alized practice. 

In the early 1990s, a myriad of interest groups influenced the 
Honduran political process. Despite the nation's political tradition 
of a strong executive branch, an elaborate network of interest groups 
and political organizations has thrived and at times has helped settie 
conflicts. The Honduran labor movement has traditionally been 
one of the strongest in Central America. The nation's organized 
peasant movement helped bring about limited agrarian reform in 
the early 1960s and 1970s. Nevertheless, some critics maintain that 
in the early 1990s the government increasingly intervened in the 
affairs of labor unions and peasant organizations, including through 
the introduction of "parallel unions," government sponsored un- 
ions that had little worker support. In the 1980s and 1990s, a vari- 
ety of special interest organizations and associations were active 
in Honduras, including student and women's groups, human rights 
organizations, and environmental groups. 

In the foreign policy arena, Honduras in the early 1990s was 
just emerging from a decade of regional turbulence marked by civil 
conflicts in neighboring El Salvador and Nicaragua. Honduras had 
become a linchpin for United States policy toward Central America 
in the 1980s. It hosted the United States-supported anti-Sandinista 
Contra force as well as a 1,100-troop United States military force 
at Palmerola Air Base (renamed the Enrique Soto Cano Air Base 
in 1988). Military exercises involving thousands of United States 
troops and National Guardsmen were conducted in the country, 
many involving roadbuilding projects; and Honduras received 
almost US$1.6 billion in United States assistance during the de- 
cade. In the early 1990s, however, with the end to the Contra con- 
flict in Nicaragua and a peace accord in El Salvador, Honduras 's 
relations with the United States changed considerably. Aid levels 
fell dramatically, and military assistance slowed to a trickle. The 
United States became more willing to criticize Honduras for its 
human rights record and urged Honduras to cut back its military 
spending. As in the past, however, the United States remained Hon- 
duras 's most important trading partner and its most important 
source of foreign investment. 

Amidst the waning of civil conflict in the region in the early 1990s, 
Honduras and the other Central American states turned their ef- 
forts to regional integration, particularly economic integration. In 
1990 the Central American presidents signed a Central American 
Economic Action Plan (Plan de Action Economica de Centroameri- 
ca — Paeca), which included economic integration commitments and 
guidelines. In 1993 they established a regional integration governing 



148 



Government and Politics 



body, the Central American Integration System (Sistema de In- 
tegracion Centroamericana — Sica). As a first step toward political 
integration, the Central American Parliament (Parlamento Centro- 
americano — Parlacen) was inaugurated in 1991; however, as of 
1993 only Honduras, Guatemala, and El Salvador — the so-called 
northern triangle states — had elected representatives to that body. 
In September 1992, Honduras 's long-time border conflict with El 
Salvador was resolved when the International Court of Justice (ICJ) 
awarded Honduras approximately two-thirds of the disputed ter- 
ritory. Both nations agreed to accept the ruling, which was viewed 
by many as a victory for Honduras. 

Constitutional Background 

The Honduran constitution, the sixteenth since independence 
from Spain, entered into force on January 20, 1982. Just a week 
before, Honduras had ended ten years of military rule with the 
inauguration of civilian president Roberto Suazo Cordova. The 
constitution was completed on January 11, 1982, by a seventy-one- 
seat Constituent Assembly (see Glossary) that had been elected on 
April 20, 1980, under the military junta of Policarpo Paz Garcia. 
The Constituent Assembly was dominated by Honduras 's two 
major political parties, the PLH, which held thirty-five seats, and 
the PNH, which held thirty-three seats. The small Innovation and 
Unity Party (Partido de Inovacion y Unidad — Pinu) held the re- 
maining three seats. 

Honduran constitutions are generally held to have little bearing 
on Honduran political reality because they are considered aspira- 
tions or ideals rather than legal instruments of a working govern- 
ment. The constitution essentially provides for the separation of 
powers among the three branches of government, but in practice 
the executive branch generally dominates both the legislative and 
judicial branches of government. Moreover, according to the United 
States Department of State's human rights report for 1992, although 
basic human rights are protected in the constitution, in practice 
the government has been unable to assure that many violations 
are fully investigated, or that most of the perpetrators, either mili- 
tary or civilian, are brought to justice. 

Of the nation's fifteen previous constitutions, several have marked 
significant milestones in the nation's political development. The 
first constitution, in 1825, which reflected strong Spanish influence, 
established three branches of government. The 1839 constitution, 
which emphasized the protection of individual rights, was the na- 
tion's first outside the framework of the United Provinces of Cen- 
tral America; Honduras had just declared independence from the 



149 



Honduras: A Country Study 

federation in October 1838. In the 1865 constitution, the right of 
habeas corpus was constitutionally guaranteed for the first time. The 
1880 constitution introduced many new features to the Honduran 
political system, including the principle of municipal autonomy and 
the state's role in promoting economic development. Separation 
of church and state was also an important feature, as previous 
constitutions had proclaimed Roman Catholicism as the state's offi- 
cial religion. 

Promulgated under the presidency of Policarpo Bonilla Vasquez 
(1894-99), the 1894 constitution — the nation's ninth — was consid- 
ered the most progressive in its time. It abolished the death penalty 
and elevated the status of laws covering the press, elections, and 
amparo (see Glossary), laws that granted protection to claims in liti- 
gation. Although many provisions of the 1894 constitution were 
ignored, the document served as a model for future constitutions. 
The 1924 constitution introduced new social and labor provisions 
and attempted to make the legislature a stronger institution vis-a- 
vis the executive branch. With the 1936 constitution, which was 
promulgated under the dictatorship of Tiburcio C arias Andino 
(1933-49), the powers of the executive were again reinforced, and 
the presidential and legislative terms of office were extended from 
four to six years. Some observers maintain that the 1936 constitution 
was amended on numerous occasions to serve the needs of the Ca- 
riato, as the dictatorship came to be known. 

The 1957 constitution, promulgated under the presidency of Ra- 
mon Villeda Morales (1958-63), introduced a number of new fea- 
tures, including labor provisions (influenced by the growth of trade 
unionism after the banana strike of 1954) and the establishment 
of a body to regulate the electoral process. The 1965 constitution, 
the nation's fifteenth, was promulgated under the military rule of 
Colonel Osvaldo Lopez Arellano (1963-71 , 1972-73) and remained 
in force until 1982, through the brief civilian presidency of Ra- 
mon Ernesto Cruz (1971-72) and through ten more years of mili- 
tary rule. 

The 1982 constitution provides for many of the governmental 
institutions and processes inherited from previous decades. 
Throughout the constitution, however, new or changed provisions 
help distinguish it from previous constitutions, and some analysts 
consider it the most advanced constitution in Honduran history. 
The preamble expresses faith in the restoration of the Central 
American union and emphasizes the rule of law as a means of 
achieving a just society. 

The 1982 constitution consists of a preamble and 379 articles 
divided into eight titles that are further divided into forty-three 



150 



Government and Politics 



chapters. The first seven titles cover substantive provisions delineat- 
ing the rights of individuals and the organization and responsibilities 
of the Honduran state. The last tide provides for the constitution's 
implementation and amendment. As of mid- 1993, the National 
Congress had amended the 1982 constitution on seven occasions 
and interpreted specific provisions of the constitution on four oc- 
casions. 

The organization of the Honduran state, national territory, and 
international treaties are covered in Title I of the constitution. As 
stated in Article 4, 4 'The government is republican, democratic 
and representative" and ' 'composed of three branches: legislative, 
executive and judicial, which are complementary, independent, and 
not subordinate to each other." In practice, however, the execu- 
tive branch has dominated the other two branches of government. 
Article 2, which states that sovereignty originates in the people, 
also includes a provision new to the 1982 constitution that labels 
the supplanting of popular sovereignty and the usurping of power 
as "crimes of treason against the fatherland." This provision can 
be considered an added constitutional protection of representative 
democracy in a country in which the military has a history of usurp- 
ing power from elected civilian governments. 

Title II addresses nationality and citizenship, suffrage and po- 
litical parties, and provides for an independent and autonomous 
National Elections Tribunal (Tribunal Nacional de Elecciones — 
TNE) to handle all matters relating to electoral acts and procedures. 
Provisions regarding nationality and citizenship are essentially the 
same as in the 1965 constitution, with one significant exception. 
In the 1965 document, Central Americans by birth were considered 
"native-born Hondurans" after one year of residence in Honduras 
and after completing certain legal procedures, but in the 1982 con- 
stitution (Article 24), Central Americans by birth who have resided 
in the country for one year are Hondurans by naturalization. With 
regard to the electoral system, Article 46 provides for election 
through proportional or majority representation. 

Individual rights and guarantees for Honduran citizens are ad- 
dressed in Tide III. This section covers such matters as social, child, 
and labor rights; social security; and health, education, culture, 
and housing issues. Different from the 1965 constitution is the chap- 
ter devoted entirely to "rights of the child." 

The rights of habeas corpus and amparo are provided for in Ti- 
tle IV, which also addresses the constitutional review of laws by 
the Supreme Court of Justice and cases when constitutional guaran- 
tees may be restricted or suspended. 



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Honduras: A Country Study 

Title V outlines the branches and offices of the government and 
their responsibilities, and spells out the procedure for the enact- 
ment, sanction, and promulgation of laws. It covers the legisla- 
tive, executive, and judicial branches of government; the Office 
of the Comptroller General and the Directorate of Administrative 
Probity, both of which are auxiliary but independent agencies of 
the legislative branch; the Office of the Attorney General, the le- 
gal representative of the Honduran state; the offices of the ministers 
of the cabinet, with no fewer than twelve ministries; the civil ser- 
vice; the departmental and municipal system of local government; 
and guidelines for the establishment of decentralized institutions 
of the Honduran state. Different from the 1965 constitution, the 
terms of legislators and the president are four years, instead of six 
years. Another new feature focuses on the development of local 
government throughout the country. Article 299 states that "eco- 
nomic and social development of the municipalities must form part 
of the national development program," whereas Article 302, in 
order to ensure the improvement and development of the munici- 
palities, encourages citizens to form civic associations, federations, 
or confederations. 

The chapter on the judiciary also contains several changes from 
the 1965 constitution. The changes, according to one analysis, ap- 
pear to bring the administration of justice closer to the people. Ar- 
ticle 303 declares that "the power to dispense justice emanates from 
the people and is administered free of charge on behalf of the state 
by independent justices and judges." The Supreme Court of Justice 
has nine principal justices and seven alternates, increased from the 
seven principals and five alternates provided in the 1965 document. 

Title V also includes a chapter covering the armed forces, which 
consist of the "high command, army, air force, navy, public security 
force, and the agencies and units determined by the laws estab- 
lishing them. ' ' Most provisions of this chapter are largely the same 
as in the 1965 and 1957 constitutions. As set forth in Article 272, 
the armed forces are to be an "essentially professional, apoliti- 
cal, obedient, and nondeliberative national institution"; in practice, 
however, the Honduran military essentially has enjoyed autonomy 
vis-a-vis civilian authority since 1957. The president retains the 
title of general commander over the armed forces, as provided in 
Article 245 (16). Orders given by the president to the armed forces, 
through the commander in chief, must be obeyed and executed, 
as provided in Article 278. The armed forces, however, are under 
the direct command of the commander in chief of the armed forces 
(Article 277); and it is through him that the president performs 
his constitutional duty relating to the armed forces. According 



152 



Government and Politics 



to Article 285, the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (Conse- 
jo Superior de las Fuerzas Armadas — Consuffaa) is the armed forces 
consultative organ. The Supreme Council is chaired by the com- 
mander in chief of the armed forces, who is elected by the National 
Congress for a term of three years. He is chosen from a list of three 
officers proposed by Consuffaa. In practice, the National Congress 
always approves (some observers would say rubber stamps) Con- 
suffaa's first choice. 

The nation's economic regime, covered in Title VI, i ' is based 
on the principles of efficiency in production and social justice in 
the distribution of wealth and national income, as well as on the 
harmonious coexistence of the factors of production. " As provided 
in Article 329, the Honduran state is involved in the promotion 
of economic and social development, subject to appropriate plan- 
ning. The title also includes provisions on currency and banking, 
agrarian reform (which is declared to be of public need and in- 
terest), the tax system, public wealth, and the national budget. 

Title VII, with two chapters, outlines the process of amending 
the constitution and sets forth the principle of constitutional in- 
violability. The constitution may be amended by the National Con- 
gress after a two-thirds vote of all its members in two consecutive 
regular annual sessions. However, several constitutional provisions 
may not be amended. These consist of the amendment process it- 
self, as well as provisions covering the form of government and the 
national territory, and several articles covering the presidency, in- 
cluding term of office and prohibition from reelection. 

Governmental Institutions and Process 
Executive 

The executive branch in Honduras, headed by a president who 
is elected by a simple majority, has traditionally dominated the legis- 
lative and judicial branches of government (see fig. 8). According 
to political scientist Mark B. Rosenberg, the entire Honduran 
government apparatus is dependent on the president, who defines 
or structures policy (with the exception of security policy, which 
remains in the military's realm) through legislation or policy 
decrees. However, Rosenberg also notes that in an environment 
of intense rivalry and animosity between the two major parties, 
in which the president is under pressure to reward his party's sup- 
porters, public policy initiatives often do not fare well, as the ex- 
ecutive becomes bogged down with satisfying more pressing 
parochial needs. Political scientist James Morris points out that 
the executive-centered nature of the Honduran political system has 



153 



Honduras: A Country Study 




1 

so 



si 



.1) 



154 



Government and Politics 



endured whether the head of state has been an elected civilian poli- 
tician or a general, and that the Honduran state's formal and in- 
formal center of authority is the executive. 

According to the constitution, the president has responsibility 
for drawing up a national development plan, discussing it in the 
cabinet, submitting it to the National Congress for approval, direct- 
ing it, and executing it. He or she directs the economic and finan- 
cial policy of the state, including the supervision and control of 
banking institutions, insurance companies, and investment houses 
through the National Banking and Insurance Commission. The 
president has responsibility for prescribing feasible measures to pro- 
mote the rapid execution of agrarian reform and the development 
of production and productivity in rural areas. With regard to edu- 
cation policy, the president is responsible for organizing, direct- 
ing, and promoting education as well as for eradicating illiteracy 
and improving technical education. With regard to health policy, 
the president is charged with adopting measures for the promo- 
tion, recovery, and rehabilitation of the population's health, as well 
as for disease prevention. The president also has responsibility for 
directing and supporting economic and social integration, both na- 
tional and international, aimed at improving living conditions for 
Hondurans. In addition, the president directs foreign policy and 
relations, and may conclude treaties and agreements with foreign 
nations. He or she appoints the heads of diplomatic and consular 
missions. 

With regard to the legislative branch, the president participates 
in the enactment of laws by introducing bills in the National Con- 
gress through the cabinet ministers. The president has the power 
to sanction, veto, or promulgate and publish any laws approved 
by the National Congress. The president may convene the National 
Congress into special session, through a Permanent Committee of 
the National Congress, or may propose the continuation of the regu- 
lar annual session. The president may send messages to the Na- 
tional Congress at any time and must deliver an annual message 
to the National Congress in person at the beginning of each regu- 
lar legislative session. In addition, although the constitution gives 
the National Congress the power to elect numerous government 
officials (such as Supreme Court justices, the comptroller general, 
the attorney general, and the director of administrative probity), 
these selections are essentially made by the president and rubber- 
stamped by the National Congress. 

The constitution sets forth forty-five powers of the National Con- 
gress, the most important being the power to make, enact, inter- 
pret, and repeal laws. Legislative bills may be introduced in the 



155 



Honduras: A Country Study 

National Congress by any deputy or the president (through the 
cabinet ministers). The Supreme Court of Justice and the TNE 
may also introduce bills within their jurisdiction. In practice, most 
legislation and policy initiatives are introduced by the executive 
branch, although there are some instances where legislation and 
initiatives emanate from the National Congress. A bill must be de- 
bated on three different days before being voted upon, with the 
exception of urgent cases as determined by a simple majority of 
the deputies present. If approved, the measure is sent to the ex- 
ecutive branch for sanction and promulgation. In general, a law 
is considered compulsory after promulgation and after twenty days 
from being published in the official journal, the Gaceta Judicial. If 
the president does not veto the bill within ten days, it is considered 
sanctioned and is to be promulgated by the president. 

If the president vetoes a measure, he must return it to the Na- 
tional Congress within ten days explaining the grounds for disap- 
proval. To approve the bill again, the National Congress must again 
debate it and then ratify it by a two-thirds majority vote, where- 
upon it is sent to the executive branch for immediate publication. 
However, if the president originally vetoed the bill on the grounds 
that it was unconstitutional, the bill cannot be debated in the Na- 
tional Congress until the Supreme Court renders its opinion on 
the measure within a timeframe specified by the National Con- 
gress. If an executive veto is not overridden by the National Con- 
gress, the bill may not be debated again in the same session of the 
National Congress. 

If the National Congress approves a bill at the end of its ses- 
sion, and the president intends to veto it, the president must im- 
mediately notify the National Congress so that it can extend the 
session for ten days beyond when it receives the disapproved bill. 
If the president does not comply with this procedure, he must return 
the bill within the first eight days of the next session of the Nation- 
al Congress. 

Certain acts and resolutions of the National Congress may not 
be vetoed by the president. Most significantly these include the 
budget law, amendments to the constitution, declarations regard- 
ing grounds for impeachment for high-ranking government offi- 
cials, and decrees relating to the conduct of the executive branch. 

With regard to security, the president is charged with maintaining 
peace and internal security of the nation and with repelling every 
attack or external aggressor. During a recess of the National Con- 
gress, the president may declare war and make peace, although the 
National Congress must be convened immediately. The president 
may restrict or suspend certain individual rights and guarantees 



156 



Government and Politics 



with the concurrence of the cabinet for a period of forty-five days, 
a period that may be renewed. (Article 187 of the constitution spells 
out the procedure to be followed for the suspension of rights.) The 
president may deny or permit, after congressional authorization, 
the transit of foreign troops through Honduran territory. The presi- 
dent is also charged with monitoring the official behavior of public 
officials for the security and prestige of the Honduran government 
and state. 

In theory, the president exercises command over the armed forces 
as the general commander and adopts necessary measures for the 
defense of the nation. The president confers military ranks for se- 
cond lieutenant through captain based on the proposal of the com- 
mander in chief of the armed forces. Most importantly, the president 
is charged with ensuring that the army is apolitical, essentially 
professional, and obedient. In practice, however, the military oper- 
ates autonomously. According to the view of Honduran political 
scientist Ernesto Paz Aguilar, the military is the country's prin- 
cipal political force, exercising a tutelary role over the other insti- 
tutions of government and constituting a de facto power that is not 
subordinate to civilian political power. Other observers, although 
acknowledging the military is a politically powerful institution, 
maintain that the military essentially confines its spheres of influence 
to national security and internal stability, although in recent years, 
they concede that the military has had an increasing role in eco- 
nomic activities. 

Serving under the president are the ministers of the cabinet, who 
cooperate with the president in coordinating, directing, and su- 
pervising the organs and agencies of the executive branch under 
their jurisdiction. As required by Article 246 of the constitution, 
there are to be at least twelve departments of the cabinet covering 
the following portfolios: government and justice; the Office of the 
President; foreign affairs; economy and commerce; finance and 
public credit; national defense and public security; labor and so- 
cial welfare; public health and social aid; public education; com- 
munications, public works, and transport; culture and tourism; and 
natural resources. In addition to these ministries, in the early 1990s, 
there was also another cabinet-level department, the Ministry of 
Planning, Coordination, and Budget. The National Congress may 
summon the cabinet ministers to answer questions relating to their 
portfolios. Within the first days of the installation of the National 
Congress, ministers must submit annually a report on the work 
done in their respective ministries. The president convokes and 
presides over the cabinet ministers in a body known as the Coun- 
cil of Ministers, which, according to the constitution, meets at the 



157 



Honduras: A Country Study 

president's initiative to make decisions on any matters he or she 
considers of national importance and to consider such cases speci- 
fied by law. 

In addition to the various ministries, the president may create 
commissions, either permanent or temporary, made up of public 
officials or other representatives of Honduran sectors to undertake 
certain projects or programs mandated by the executive. The presi- 
dent may also name commissioners to coordinate the action of public 
entities and agencies of the state or to develop programs. 

The Callejas government (1990- ) created several presidential 
commissions for certain projects or programs. In 1990 Callejas es- 
tablished and headed the Modernization of the State Commission, 
which included thirty representatives of governmental institutions, 
the four legally recognized political parties, business, and labor. 
The objective of the commission was to study and design national 
policies for reforming the functioning of the Honduran state, in- 
cluding reform of the legislature and judiciary, decentralization of 
the power of the executive branch in favor of the municipalities, 
and modernizing public administration. 

In December 1992, the Callejas government appointed a head 
to the National Commission for the Protection of Human Rights 
(Comision Nacional para la Proteccion de Derechos Humanos — 
Conaprodeh), a new position established to protect the rights of 
persons who consider themselves victims of abuse or an unjust act 
by judicial or public administration. 

In 1993 the Callejas government established two additional com- 
missions, a Fiscal Intervention Commission to investigate govern- 
mental corruption that began with an inquiry into corruption at 
the Customs Directorate, and a high-level ad hoc Commission for 
Institutional Reform, headed by Roman Catholic Archbishop Oscar 
Andres Rodriguez. The ad hoc commission, created in early March 
1993, was established to formulate recommendations within thirty 
days for specific measures to improve the security forces, especially 
the National Directorate of Investigation (Directorio de Investiga- 
tion Nacional — DIN), and to strengthen the judiciary and public 
prosecutor's office. The commission was created because of grow- 
ing public criticism of the DIN and military impunity. It had 
representatives from each branch of government, from the mili- 
tary, from each of the four 1993 presidential candidates, and from 
the mass media. 

The Honduran civil service system regulates employment in the 
public sector, theoretically based on the principles of competence, 
efficiency, and honesty, according to the constitution. In practice, 
however, the system has been a source of political patronage, which 



158 



Government and Politics 



some observers claim has led to a bloated bureaucracy. In 1990 
there were an estimated 70,000 government employees, including 
employees of the decentralized institutions. Economic austerity 
measures introduced by the Callejas government reportedly led to 
the dismissal of thousands of employees, although some claim that 
thousands of other employees were hired because of political 
patronage. According to some observers, a fundamental problem 
of the Honduran civil service is its politicization, whereby much 
of the bureaucracy is replaced when the ruling party changes. Tradi- 
tionally, in Honduras, political patronage has been a key charac- 
teristic of the two dominant political parties. According to political 
scientist Mark B. Rosenberg, a president once in office is under 
tremendous pressure to provide jobs, recommendations, and other 
rewards to his followers in exchange for their continued loyalty and 
support. 

In addition to the various ministries, there are also numerous 
autonomous and semiautonomous state entities within the execu- 
tive branch, which have increased in number over the years as the 
government has become more involved in the economic develop- 
ment process and the provision of basic services. These decentral- 
ized institutions vary in their composition, structure, and function, 
but include three basic types: public institutes, which are largely 
government-funded and perform social or collective services that 
are not usually provided by the private sector; public enterprises, 
which often have their own resource bases and are autonomous 
organs of the state; and mixed enterprises, which bring together 
the government and private sector, with the state retaining at least 
a 51 percent share of the enterprise. Among the best known de- 
centralized agencies in Honduras are the National Autonomous 
University of Honduras (Universidad Nacional Autonoma de 
Honduras — UNAH); the Central Bank of Honduras (Banco Cen- 
tral de Honduras); the National Agrarian Institute (Instituto Na- 
cional Agrario — INA); the Honduran Banana Corporation 
(Corporacion Hondurena de Bananas); the Honduran Forestry De- 
velopment Corporation (Corporacion Hondurena de Desarrollo 
Forestal — Cohdefor); the Honduran Coffee Institute (Corporacion 
Hondurena de Cafe); the Honduran Social Security Institute (In- 
stituto Hondureno de Seguro Social — IHSS); the National Coun- 
cil of Social Welfare (Consejo Nacional de Bienestar Social); and 
the National Electric Energy Enterprise (Empresa Nacional de 
Energia Electrica). 

Legislative 

The legislative branch consists of the unicameral National 



159 



Honduras: A Country Study 

Congress elected for a four-year term of office at the same time 
as the president. When the country returned to civilian democratic 
rule in 1982, the National Congress had a membership of eighty- 
two deputies. This number was increased to 134 deputies for the 
1985 national elections and then reduced to 128 for the 1989 na- 
tional elections — it remained 128 for the 1993 national elections. 
The constitution, as amended in 1988, establishes a fixed number 
of 128 principal deputies and the same number of alternate deputies. 
If the principal deputy cannot complete his or her term, the Na- 
tional Congress may call the alternate deputy to serve the remainder 
of the term. 

The National Congress conducts regular annual sessions begin- 
ning on January 25 and adjourning on October 31 . These sessions, 
however, may be extended. In addition, special sessions may be 
called at the request of the executive branch through the Perma- 
nent Committee of Congress, provided that a simple majority of 
deputies agrees. A simple majority of the total number of prin- 
cipal deputies also constitutes a quorum for the installation of the 
National Congress and the holding of meetings. The Permanent 
Committee of Congress is a body of nine deputies and their alter- 
nates, appointed before the end of regular sessions, that remains 
on duty during the adjournment of the National Congress. The 
National Congress is headed by a directorate that is elected by a 
majority of deputies, which is headed by a president (who also pre- 
sides over the Permanent Committee of Congress when the Na- 
tional Congress is not in session) and includes at least two vice 
presidents and two ministers. 

In fulfilling its responsibilities, the National Congress has numer- 
ous commissions or committees for the study of issues that come 
before the legislature. In addition to committees that cover legis- 
lation (first, second, and third debate), protocol, and the budget, 
many other committees parallel the ministries of the executive 
branch, including government and justice, foreign affairs, economic 
affairs and trade, finance and public credit, national defense and 
security, public health, public education, communications and pub- 
lic works, labor and social welfare, natural resources, and culture 
and tourism. According to the internal regulations of the National 
Congress, between three and seven deputies sit on each commit- 
tee. In addition, nonstanding or extraordinary committees may 
cover other issues, and special committees may be established to 
investigate matters of national interest. Because of the executive- 
driven nature of the legislative process, the committees are somewhat 
underutilized and play only a minor role in the legislative process 
or congressional decision making. Aggravating this underutilization 



160 



Government and Politics 



is the fact that no staff members are assigned to the committees, 
so that necessary studies or reports for the committees must be 
solicited from outside of the National Congress. 

In addition to its legislative activities, the National Congress also 
has other extensive powers, particularly regarding other branches 
of the government and other institutions of the Honduran state. 
The National Congress is charged with electing numerous govern- 
ment officials: the nine principal justices and seven alternates of 
the Supreme Court of Justice, including its president; the com- 
mander in chief of the armed forces; the comptroller general; the 
attorney general; and the director of administrative probity. In prac- 
tice, however, the National Congress generally rubber stamps the 
choices of the president, or, in the case of the commander in chief 
of the armed forces, of the military. The National Congress may 
declare that there are grounds for impeachment of certain high- 
ranking government officials, including the president and presiden- 
tial designees, Supreme Court justices, cabinet ministers and deputy 
secretaries, and the commander in chief of the armed forces. 

In its oversight role, the National Congress may approve or dis- 
approve the administrative conduct of the other two branches of 
government, the TNE, the comptroller general, the attorney gener- 
al, and the decentralized institutions. The National Congress may 
also question the cabinet secretaries and other officials of the govern- 
ment, decentralized institutions, and other entities concerning mat- 
ters related to public administration. 

With regard to the military and national security, as noted above, 
the National Congress elects the commander in chief of the armed 
forces from a list of three proposed by the Consuffaa. The Nation- 
al Congress may fix the permanent number of members of the 
armed forces and confer all ranks from major to major general, 
at the joint proposal of the commander in chief of the armed forces 
and the president. It may authorize or refuse the president's re- 
quest for the crossing of foreign troops through national territory. 
It may also authorize the entrance of foreign military missions of 
technical assistance or cooperation in the country. The National 
Congress may declare an executive-branch restriction or suspen- 
sion of individual rights or guarantees in accordance with constitu- 
tional provisions, or it may modify or disapprove of the restriction 
or suspension enacted by the president. 

With regard to foreign policy, the National Congress has the 
power to declare war or make peace at the request of the presi- 
dent. The National Congress also may approve or disapprove in- 
ternational treaties signed by the executive branch. 



161 



Honduras: A Country Study 

Regarding government finances, the National Congress is 
charged with adopting annually (and modifying if desired) the 
general budget of revenue and expenditures based on the execu- 
tive branch's proposal. The National Congress has control over 
public revenues and has power to levy taxes, assessments, and other 
public charges. It approves or disapproves the formal accounts of 
public expenditures based on reports submitted by the comptroller 
general and loans and similar agreements related to public credit 
entered into by the executive branch. 

The legislative branch has two auxiliary agencies, the Office of 
the Comptroller General and the Directorate of Administrative 
Probity, both of which are functionally and administratively in- 
dependent. The Office of the Comptroller General is exclusively 
responsible for the post-auditing of the public treasury. It main- 
tains the administration of public funds and properties and audits 
the accounts of officials and employees who handle these funds and 
properties. It audits the financial operations of agencies, entities, 
and institutions of the government, including decentralized insti- 
tutions. It examines the books kept by the state and accounts ren- 
dered by the executive branch to the National Congress on the 
operations of the public treasury and reports to the National Con- 
gress on its findings. The Directorate of Administrative Probity 
audits the accounts of public officials or employees to prevent their 
unlawful enrichment. 

Some observers maintain that the National Congress gradually 
became a more effective and independent institution in the decade 
after the country returned to civilian rule in 1982. According to 
political scientist Mark Rosenberg, under the presidency of Suazo 
Cordova the institution appeared only to function as a rubber stamp 
for the executive branch, with little interest in promoting or creat- 
ing policy initiatives. Under the Azcona government (1986-90), 
however, the National Congress became more assertive in its re- 
lations with the executive branch — with a more vigorous use of its 
oversight powers and more active interest in developing legisla- 
tion. This trend continued under the Callejas presidency. In 1993 
a new legislative support body, the Data Processing and Legisla- 
tive Studies Center (Centro de Informatica y Estudios Legislativos — 
CIEL), was created with the assistance of the United States Agency 
for International Development (AID) to help provide computer and 
analytical support to the committees and deputies of the National 
Congress. 

Other observers stress the executive dominance over the legis- 
lative branch in almost all areas of public policy. They point out 
that the tradition of a strong executive is deeply embedded in the 



162 



National Palace, seat of the National Congress 
Courtesy James A. Morris 

national psyche, with the National Congress itself not willing or 
able to take responsibility for its congressional obligations. The 
general public view of the National Congress is that deputies use 
their offices for personal and political gain. As a result, most peo- 
ple contact executive-branch officials to promote causes, a prac- 
tice that reinforces executive dominance and makes it difficult for 
the congressional leadership to transform the National Congress 
into an equal partner in government. 

The nation's electoral law also limits the independence and ul- 
timately the effectiveness of the National Congress. Elections for 
the National Congress are held at the same time as presidential 
elections, and voters must use a unitary ballot that contains a party's 
presidential candidate, as well as its list of congressional candidates 
for each department. Voters are not allowed to split their tickets 
for national offices; however, in November 1993, voters for the 
first time could spilt their ticket for president and mayor. The per- 
centage of votes that a presidential candidate receives in each depart- 
ment determines the number of deputies from each party selected 
to represent that department. In effect, voters are not sure whom 
they are electing to the National Congress. There is no direct ac- 
countability to the electorate. Instead, deputies respond to party 
leadership, and party loyalty and bloc voting are the norm. The 



163 



Honduras: A Country Study 



two major parties dominate the National Congress, with smaller 
parties finding it difficult to gain representation. In the 1989 na- 
tional elections, the PNH won seventy-one seats in the National 
Congress, and the PLH captured fifty-five seats. The small Pinu 
won just two seats, and the Honduran Christian Democratic Party 
(Partido Democrata Cristiano de Honduras — PDCH) gained no 
seats. Efforts to change the unitary ballot for the presidential and 
legislative candidates for the November 1993 elections were un- 
successful, largely because the two dominant parties overcame pres- 
sure by the two smaller parties for separate ballots. 

Judiciary 

The judicial branch of government consists of a Supreme Court 
of Justice, courts of appeal, courts of first instance (Juzgados de 
Letras), and justices of the peace. The Supreme Court, which is 
the court of last resort, has nine principal justices and seven alter- 
nates. The Supreme Court has fourteen constitutional powers and 
duties. These include the appointment of judges and justices of the 
lower courts and public prosecutors; the power to declare laws to 
be unconstitutional; the power to try high-ranking government offi- 
cials when the National Congress has declared that there are 
grounds for impeachment; and publication of the court's official 
record, the Gaceta Judicial. The court has three chambers — civil, 
criminal, and labor — with three justices assigned to each chamber. 

Organizationally below the Supreme Court are the courts of ap- 
peal. These courts are three-judge panels that hear all appeals from 
the lower courts, including civil, commercial, criminal, and habeas 
corpus cases. To be eligible to sit on these courts, the judges must 
be attorneys and at least twenty-five years old. In the early 1990s, 
there were nine courts of appeal, four in Tegucigalpa, two in San 
Pedro Sula, and one each in La Ceiba, Comayagua, and Santa 
Barbara. Two of these courts of appeal, one in the capital and one 
in San Pedro Sula, specialized in labor cases. In addition, a 
contentious-administrative court, which dealt with public adminis- 
tration, was located in Tegucigalpa, but had jurisdiction through- 
out the country. 

The next level of courts are first instance courts, which serve 
as trial courts in serious civil and criminal cases. In the early 1990s, 
there were sixty-four such courts. Although half of the first instance 
courts were in Tegucigalpa and San Pedro Sula, each departmen- 
tal capital had at least one. Half of the sixty-four courts covered 
both civil and criminal cases, eight just covered criminal cases, and 
seven covered civil cases. There were also six labor courts, six 
family courts, two juvenile courts, two tenant courts, and one 



164 



Government and Politics 



contentious-administrative court. Most of the judges, who must 
be at least twenty-one years old, held degrees in juridical science. 
Although judges are required to be licensed attorneys, many in 
fact are not. 

The lowest level of the court system consists of justices of the 
peace distributed throughout the country. Each department capi- 
tal and municipalities with populations of more than 4,000 are sup- 
posed to have two justices, and municipalities with populations less 
than 4,000 are supposed to have one justice of the peace. Justices 
of the peace handling criminal cases act as investigating magistrates 
and are involved only in minor cases. More serious criminal cases 
are handled by the first instance courts. Justices of the peace must 
be more than twenty-one years of age, live in the municipality where 
they have jurisdiction, and have the ability to read and write. In 
1990 there were an estimated 320 justices of the peace, with thirty 
responsible for civil cases, thirty for criminal cases, and the remain- 
ing 260 justices covering both civil and criminal cases. Political 
patronage has traditionally been the most important factor in ap- 
pointing justices of the peace, and this practice has often led to less 
than qualified judicial personnel, some of whom have not completed 
primary education. 

The constitution requires that the judicial branch of government 
is to receive not less than 3 percent of the annual national bud- 
get, but in practice this requirement has never been met. For ex- 
ample, in 1989 the judiciary received 1.63 percent of the national 
budget, just slightly more than one-half of the amount constitu- 
tionally required. 

As in previous years, in the early 1990s the Honduran judicial 
system has been the subject of numerous criticisms, including 
widespread corruption and continuing ineffectiveness with regard 
to holding military members or civilian elites accountable for their 
crimes. According to the United States Department of State's hu- 
man rights report for 1992, the civilian judiciary in Honduras ' ' is 
weak, underfunded, politicized, inefficient, and corrupt." The 
report further charged that the judiciary remains vulnerable to out- 
side influence and suffers from woefully inadequate funding, and 
that the Callejas government is unable to ensure that many hu- 
man rights violations are fully investigated, or that most of the per- 
petrators, either military or civilian, are brought to justice. Justice 
is reported to be applied inequitably, with the poor punished ac- 
cording to the law, but the rich or politically influential almost never 
brought to trial, much less convicted or jailed. 

One frequent criticism has focused on the executive branch's 
dominance over the judiciary. Because a new Supreme Court is 



165 



Honduras: A Country Study 

appointed every four years with the change in the presidency and 
because the executive essentially controls the selection of the justices, 
the judiciary is largely beholden to the president. This loyalty to 
the executive permeates the judicial branch because the Supreme 
Court appoints all lower-court justices. To eliminate this partisan- 
ship in the courts, the Modernization of the State Commission, 
established by President Callejas, proposed that the constitution 
be amended to change the way Supreme Court justices are appoint- 
ed. According to the proposal, justices would hold seven-year ap- 
pointments and would be selected from a list of candidates developed 
by a special committee composed of those who work in the justice 
sector. 

Another criticism notes that judicial personnel are often unquali- 
fied for their positions. Although a Judicial Career Law (which re- 
quires that all hiring and promotions be based on merit and that 
all firings be based on cause) was approved in 1980, the govern- 
ment did not begin implementing the law until 1991 because of 
the overall lack of political will. The United States Department of 
State's human rights report for 1992 maintained that results have 
been few, but AID states that the law could be fully implemented 
by 1995. AID has lent support to the Honduran courts since 1985 
and in 1989 began an experimental program designed to improve 
the selection process for justices of the peace so that the appointed 
justices would hold law degrees. By 1991 the AID program account- 
ed for the qualifications of eighty-one justices of the peace, and 
AID estimated that by 1995 about half of all justices of the peace 
would have law degrees. 

Closely associated with the judicial system and the administra- 
tion of justice in Honduras is the Office of the Attorney General, 
which, as provided in the constitution, is the legal representative 
of the state, representing the state's interests. Both the attorney 
general and the deputy attorney general are elected by the National 
Congress for a period of four years, coinciding with the presiden- 
tial and legislative terms of office. The attorney general is expect- 
ed to initiate civil and criminal actions based on the results of the 
audits of the Office of the Comptroller General. The law creating 
the Office of the Attorney General was first enacted in 1961. 

Although some public prosecutors operate out of the Office of 
the Attorney General, most operate out of the Office of the Public 
Prosecutor of the Supreme Court. The public prosecutor of the 
Supreme Court also serves as chief of the Prosecutor General's 
Office (Ministerio Publico) as provided under the 1906 Law of the 
Organization and Attributions of the Courts. In April 1993, the 
Ad Hoc Commission for Institutional Reform created by President 



166 



Government and Politics 



Callejas recommended the creation of a Prosecutor General's Office 
as an independent, autonomous, and apolitical organization, not 
under either the Supreme Court or the Office of the Attorney 
General. The prosecutor general would be appointed by the Na- 
tional Congress by a two- thirds vote for a seven-year appointment. 
The ad hoc commission also recommended that this new Prosecu- 
tor General's Office have under it a newly created Department of 
Criminal Investigation (Departamento de Investigation Criminal — 
DIC), a police and investigatory corps that would replace the cur- 
rent DIN, a department of the Public Security Force (Fuerza de 
Seguridad Publica — Fusep) that has often been associated with hu- 
man rights abuses. 

Local Government 

Honduras is administratively divided into eighteen departments 
(Atlantida, Choluteca, Colon, Comayagua, Copan, Cortes, El 
Paraiso, Francisco Morazan, Gracias a Dios, Intibuca, Islas de la 
Bahia (Bay Islands), La Paz, Lempira, Ocotepeque, Olancho, Santa 
Barbara, Valle, and Yoro), each with a designated department capi- 
tal (cabecerd). The president of the republic freely appoints, and may 
freely remove, governors for each department. Departmental gover- 
nors represent the executive branch in official acts in their depart- 
ment and serve as the tie between the executive branch and other 
national agencies and institutions that might have delegations work- 
ing in the department. Each governor may freely appoint and re- 
move a secretary to assist him or her. If a governor is absent more 
than five days, the mayor of the departmental capital substitutes 
for the governor. The costs of running the departmental govern- 
ments fall under the budget of the Ministry of Government and 
Justice. 

The departments are further divided into 291 municipalities 
(municipios) nationwide, including a Central District consisting of 
the cities of Tegucigalpa and Comayaguela. A municipality in Hon- 
duras may include more than one city within its boundaries, and 
is therefore similar to the jurisdiction of county in the United States. 
In addition to cities, municipalities may also include aldeas (villages) 
and caserios (hamlets), which are scattered concentrations of popu- 
lations outside urban areas. The urbanized cities may be divided 
into smaller divisions known as colonias (colonies) and barrios (neigh- 
borhoods). 

The municipalities are administered by elected corporations, 
deliberative organs that are accountable to the courts of justice for 
abuses, and are supposed to be autonomous or independent of the 
central government's powers. The municipal corporations consist 



167 



Honduras: A Country Study 

of a mayor {alcalde), who is the paramount executive authority in 
a municipality, and a municipal council that varies in size depending 
on the population of the municipality. Those municipalities with 
a population of less than 5,000 have four council members, those 
with a population of between 5,000 and 10,000 have six, and those 
with a population between 10,000 and 80,000 have eight. All the 
department capitals, regardless of their population, and munici- 
palities with a population of more than 80,000 have ten council 
members. 

The municipal corporations meet at least two times per month 
in ordinary sessions, but special sessions may be called by the mayor 
or by at least two council members. Each municipal corporation 
has a secretary, freely appointed and removed by a majority of the 
members of the corporation, and a treasurer, named by the cor- 
poration at the request of the mayor. Municipalities with annual 
revenue of more than one million lempiras (L; for value of the 
lempira — see Glossary) are to have an auditor named by the 
municipal corporation; however, in the early 1990s, the majority 
of Honduran municipalities had an annual revenue of less than 
one million lempiras. 

The constitution sets forth several provisions regarding the 
municipalities. According to Article 299, the economic and social 
development of the municipalities must form part of the nation's 
development plans. Each municipality is also to have sufficient com- 
munal land in order to ensure its existence and development. 
Citizens of municipalities are entitled to form civic associations, 
federations, or confederations in order to ensure the improvement 
and development of the municipalities. In general, income and in- 
vestment taxes in a municipality are paid into the municipal 
treasury. 

In 1990 a new Law of Municipalities covering both departmen- 
tal and municipal administration superseded the previous municipal 
law issued in 1927. The new law set forth the numerous rights and 
responsibilities of the municipalities and public administration at 
the municipal level. It also outlined the concept of municipal au- 
tonomy, characterized by free elections; free public administration 
and decisions; the collection and investment of resources with spe- 
cial attention on the preservation of the environment; the develop- 
ment, approval, and administration of a municipal budget; the 
organization and management of public services; the right of the 
municipality to create its own administrative structure; and 
municipal control over natural resources. The law also outlines 
twenty-one functions of the municipal corporations, which include 
the following responsibilities: organizing public administration and 



168 



Government and Politics 



services, developing and implementing a municipal budget, ap- 
pointing public employees and naming needed public commissions, 
planning urban development, and consulting the public through 
plebiscites on important municipal issues and through open pub- 
lic meetings with representatives of the various social sectors of the 
municipality. 

Under the law, each municipality has a Municipal Development 
Council named by the corporation and consisting of representa- 
tives of the various economic and social sectors of the municipality. 
The Municipal Development Council functions in an advisory ca- 
pacity by providing the corporations with information and input 
for making decisions. The law also calls for a special law to be 
enacted to regulate the organization and functioning of a national 
Institute of Municipal Development to promote the integrated de- 
velopment of municipalities in Honduras. 

Traditionally, the central government in Honduras, whether civil- 
ian or military, has dominated local government, and some ob- 
servers maintain that local mayors and municipal corporations have 
served largely as administrative arms of the central government. 
With the return to democratic rule in 1982, however, there has 
been a shift, at least in theory, to promote the economic develop- 
ment and political independence of the municipalities. New pro- 
visions in the 1982 constitution call for economic and social 
development in the municipalities to form parts of national de- 
velopment programs and outline the right of citizens to form or- 
ganizations to ensure the improvement and development of the 
municipalities. 

The Callejas government emphasized support for political and 
administrative decentralization from the executive branch to the 
municipalities. In fact, one of the objectives in establishing the 
Modernization of the State Commission in 1990 was to reduce the 
centralism of the executive branch through the effective and or- 
derly transfer of functions and resources to the municipalities in 
order to fortify their autonomy. The promulgation of the new Law 
of Municipalities in 1990 was further evidence of the Callejas 
government's emphasis on municipal development. Observers not- 
ed, however, that the executive branch, particularly through the 
decentralized agencies and institutions, still wielded significant pow- 
er at the local level in the early 1990s. 

One significant measure approved in 1992 was reform of the na- 
tion's electoral law for the 1993 national elections. For the first time, 
the law would allow voters to cast their ballots separately for mayoral 
candidates. In previous elections, the practice of split-party vot- 
ing was not allowed, and the mayors were elected based on the 



169 



Honduras: A Country Study 

percentage of the vote received by the presidential candidates. The 
reform of the electoral law is significant in that it makes elected 
mayors directly accountable to the electorate and strengthens the 
democratic process at the local level. The reform could also strength- 
en the chances for the nation's two smaller parties to gain represen- 
tation in the municipalities. 

The Electoral Process 

The president is elected along with three presidential designees 
(who essentially function as vice presidents) for four-year terms of 
office beginning on January 27. The president and the presiden- 
tial designees must be Honduran by birth, more than thirty years 
old, and enjoy the rights of Honduran citizenship. Additional re- 
strictions prohibit public servants and members of the military from 
serving as president. Commanders and general officers of the armed 
forces and senior officers of the police or state security forces are 
ineligible. Active-duty members of any armed body are not eligi- 
ble if they have performed their functions during the previous twelve 
months before the election. The relatives (fourth degree by blood 
and second degree by marriage) and spouse of each military officer 
serving on Consuffaa are also ineligible, as are the relatives of the 
president and the presidential designees. Numerous high-level pub- 
lic servants, including the presidential designees, cabinet secretar- 
ies and deputy secretaries, members of the TNE, and justices and 
judges of the judicial branch, are prohibited from serving as presi- 
dent if they have held their positions six months prior to the election. 

If the president dies or vacates office, the order of succession is 
spelled out in Article 242 of the 1982 constitution. The presiden- 
tial designees are the first three potential successors; the National 
Congress elects one to exercise executive power for the remainder 
of the presidential term. The president of the National Congress and 
the president of the Supreme Court of Justice are the fourth and 
fifth successors, respectively. During a temporary absence, the pres- 
ident may call upon one of the presidential designees to replace him. 

The president, who is the representative of the Honduran state, 
has a vast array of powers as head of the executive branch. The 
constitution delineates forty-five presidential powers and respon- 
sibilities. The president has the responsibility to comply with and 
enforce the constitution, treaties and conventions, laws, and other 
provisions of Honduran law. He or she directs the policies of the 
state and fully appoints and dismisses secretaries and deputy secre- 
taries of the cabinet and other high-ranking officials and employees 
(including governors of the eighteen departments) whose appoint- 
ment is not assigned to other authorities. 



170 



Government and Politics 



To be elected to the National Congress, one must be a Hondu- 
ran by birth who enjoys the rights of citizenship and is at least 
twenty-one years old. There are a number of restrictions regard- 
ing eligibility for election to the National Congress. Certain govern- 
ment officials and relatives of officials are not eligible if the position 
was held six months prior to the election. All officials or employees 
of the executive and judicial branches, except teachers and health- 
care workers, are prohibited from being elected, as are active-duty 
members of any armed force, high-ranking officials of the decen- 
tralized institutions, members of the TNE, the attorney general 
and deputy attorney general, the comptroller general, and the direc- 
tor and deputy director of administrative probity. Spouses and rela- 
tives (fourth degree by blood and second degree by marriage) of 
certain high-ranking civilian officials and certain military officials 
are also prohibited from serving in the National Congress, as are 
delinquent debtors of the National Treasury. 

The nine principal justices and seven alternates on the Supreme 
Court of Justice are elected by the National Congress for a term 
of four years concomitant with the presidential and legislative terms 
of office. The National Congress also selects a president for the 
Supreme Court, and justices may be reelected. To be eligible, a 
justice must be Honduran by birth, a lawyer, a member of the bar 
association, more than thirty-five years of age, enjoy the rights of 
citizenship, and have held the post of trial judge or a judge on a 
court of appeals for at least five years. 

Since the country returned to civilian democratic rule in 1982, 
national elections in Honduras have been held every four years 
for the presidency, the National Congress, and municipal officials. 
As provided for in the constitution and in the country's Electoral 
and Political Organizations Law, the National Elections Tribunal 
(Tribunal Nacional de Elecciones — TNE) is an autonomous and 
independent body, with jurisdiction throughout the country and 
with responsibility for the organization and conduct of elections. 
The composition of the TNE consists of one principal member and 
an alternate proposed by the Supreme Court, and one principal 
member and an alternate proposed by each of the four registered 
political parties, the PLH, the PNH, Pinu, and the PDCH. The 
presidency of the tribunal rotates among the members, with a 
term lasting one year. The TNE also names members of Depart- 
mental Elections Tribunals and Local Elections Tribunals, each 
with representatives from the four legally registered parties. The 
TNE has numerous rights and responsibilities, including register- 
ing political parties and candidates, registering voters, resolving 



171 



Honduras: A Country Study 

electoral complaints, establishing the time and places for voting, 
training poll workers, and counting and reporting votes. 

The National Registry of Persons, a dependency of the TNE, 
is responsible for issuing to all Hondurans exclusive identity cards, 
which also serve as voter registration cards, and for preparing the 
National Electoral Census at least five months before an election. 
All Hondurans are required by law to register with the National 
Registry of Persons. 

According to some observers, a fundamental problem with the 
TNE is its politicization. Observers charge that the staffs of both 
the TNE and the National Registry of Persons are predominantly 
composed of political appointees with little competence or commit- 
ment. Representation is skewed toward the party in power because 
of the representative proposed by the Supreme Court, which es- 
sentially is a representative of the government in power. In 1985 
President Suazo Cordova brazenly used the TNE to attempt to sup- 
port unrepresentative factions of the two major parties. Military 
leader General Walter Lopez Reyes impeded Suazo Cordova's at- 
tempt by modifying the electoral system so that party primaries 
and the general elections were held at the same time. The winner 
would be the leading candidate of the party receiving the most votes. 
As a result, PLH candidate Jose Azcona Hoyo was elected presi- 
dent by receiving just 25 percent of the vote, compared with the 
PNH candidate, Rafael Leonardo Callejas Romero, who received 
45 percent. Subsequendy, however, for the 1989 elections, separate 
party primaries were required to elect the candidates, resulting in 
just one candidate from each party. 

As the 1993 electoral campaign got underway, the PLH made 
numerous charges that the National Electoral Census did not in- 
clude the names of many of its party members. Despite the charges, 
observers maintained that the elections would probably be as legiti- 
mate as the past four elections (Constituent Assembly elections in 
1980 and national elections in 1981, 1985, and 1989), which were 
conducted without serious irregularities. 

Political Dynamics 
Political Parties 

Two Traditionally Dominant Parties 

Honduras essentially has had two dominant political parties, the 
PNH and the PLH, for most of this century, with the military ally- 
ing itself with the PNH for an extended period beginning in 1963. 
The PLH was established in 1891 under the leadership of Policarpo 
Bonilla Vasquez and had origins in the liberal reform efforts of 



172 



Presidential Palace 
Courtesy Dennis W. Calkin 



173 



Honduras: A Country Study 

the late nineteenth century. The PNH was formed in 1902 by 
Manuel Bonilla as a splinter group of the PLH. Between 1902 and 
1948, these two parties were the only officially recognized parties, 
a factor that laid the foundation for the currently entrenched PNH 
(red) and PLH (blue) two-party system. In the early 1990s, the 
internal workings of the two traditional political parties appeared 
to be largely free of military influence. Since the country returned 
to civilian rule in 1982, the military has not disrupted the constitu- 
tional order by usurping power as it did in 1956, 1963, and 1972, 
and it no longer appears to favor one party over the other as it 
did with the PNH for many years. 

There appear to be few ideological differences between the two 
traditional parties. The PLH, or at least factions of the PLH, for- 
merly espoused an antimilitarist stance, particularly because of the 
PNH's extended alliance with the military. The two PLH presiden- 
cies of the 1980s, however, appeared to end the PLH's antipathy 
toward the military. According to political scientists Ronald H. 
McDonald and J. Mark Ruhl, both parties are patron-client net- 
works more interested in amassing political patronage than in offer- 
ing effective programs. As observed by political scientist Mark 
Rosenberg, Honduran politicians emphasize competition and pow- 
er, not national problem- solving, and governing in Honduras is 
determined by personal authority and power instead of institutions. 
The objective of political competition between the two parties has 
not been a competition for policies or programs, but rather a com- 
petition for personal gain in which the public sector is turned into 
private benefit. Nepotism is widespread and is an almost institu- 
tionalized characteristic of the political system, whereby public jobs 
are considered rewards for party and personal loyalty rather than 
having anything to do with the public trust. The practice of using 
political power for personal gain also helps explain how corrup- 
tion appears to have become a permanent characteristic not only 
of the political system, but also of private enterprise. 

Despite these characteristics, the two traditional parties have re- 
tained the support of the majority of the population. Popular sup- 
port for the two traditional parties has been largely based on family 
identification, with, according to political scientist Donald Schulz, 
voting patterns passed on from generation to generation. Accord- 
ing to McDonald and Ruhl, about 60 percent of voters are identi- 
fied with the traditional parties, with the PLH having a 5 percent 
advantage over the PNH. 

Traditionally, the PNH has had a stronger constituency in rural 
areas and in the less developed and southern agricultural depart- 
ments, whereas the PLH traditionally has been stronger in the urban 



174 



Government and Politics 



areas and in the more developed northern departments, although 
the party has had some rural strongholds. In a study of five Hon- 
duran elections from 1957 to 1981, James Morris observes that 
the PLH had a strong base of support in the five departments that 
made up the so-called central zone of the country — Atlantida, 
Cortes, Francisco Morazan, El Paraiso, and Yoro. The PNH had 
strong support in the more rural and isolated departments of Copan, 
Lempira, Intibuca, and Gracias a Dios, and the southern agricul- 
tural departments of Valle and Choluteca. 

Looking more closely at the four national elections since 1980, 
one notices two facts: the PLH dominated the elections of 1980, 
1981, and 1985, at times capturing departments considered PNH 
bulwarks (Choluteca and Valle), whereas the PNH crushed the 
PLH in the 1989 elections, winning all but two departments, one 
the traditional PLH stronghold of El Paraiso. Honduran scholar 
Julio Navarro has examined electoral results since 1980 and ob- 
serves that in the 1989 elections the PNH won significantly not 
only at the department level but also at the municipal level. Of 
the 289 municipalities in 1989, the PNH captured 217, or about 
75 percent of the country's municipalities. 

According to political analysts, two significant factors helped 
bring about the success of the PNH in the 1989 elections: the co- 
hesiveness and unity of the PNH and the disorder and internal fac- 
tionalism of the PLH. The PLH has had a tradition of factionalism 
and internal party disputes. In the early 1980s, there were two for- 
mal factions: the conservative Rodista Liberal Movement (Movi- 
miento Liberal Rodista — MLR), named for deceased party leader 
Modesto Rodas Alvarado and controlled by Roberto Suazo Cor- 
dova; and the center-left Popular Liberal Alliance (Alianza Liberal 
del Pueblo — Alipo), founded by brothers Carlos Roberto Reina 
Idiaques and Jorge Arturo Reina Idiaques. By 1985, however, there 
were five different factions of the PLH. Alipo had split with the 
Reina brothers to form the Revolutionary Liberal Democratic 
Movement (Movimiento Liberal Democratico Revolucionario — M- 
Lider), which represented a more strongly antimilitary platform, 
and another faction led by newspaper publisher Jaime Rosenthal 
retained the Alipo banner. The MLR split into three factions: one 
led by President Suazo Cordova, which supported Oscar Mejfa 
Arellano as a 1985 presidential candidate; a second faction head- 
ed by Efrain Bu Giron, who also became a presidential candidate; 
and a third faction led by Jose Azcona Hoyo, who ultimately was 
elected president with the support of Alipo, which did not run a 
candidate. Only the complicated electoral process utilized in the 
1985 elections, which combined party primaries and the general 



175 



Honduras: A Country Study 

election, allowed the PLH to maintain control of the government (see 
The Struggle of Electoral Democracy: The Elections of 1985, ch. 1). 

Three PNH factions also vied for the presidency in the 1985 elec- 
tions, but the National Movement of Rafael Callejas (Movimiento 
Nacionalista Rafael Callejas — Monarca) easily triumphed over fac- 
tions led by Juan Pablo Urrutia and Fernando Lardizabel, with 
Callejas winning 45 percent of the total national vote and almost 
94 percent of the PNH vote. PNH unity around the leadership 
of Callejas endured through the 1989 elections. Callejas was respon- 
sible for modernizing the organization of the PNH and incorporat- 
ing diverse social and economic sectors into the party. As a result, 
in the 1 989 elections he was able to break the myth of PLH inviol- 
ability that had been established in the three previous elections of 
the 1980s. In the 1989 contest, the PNH broke PLH strongholds 
throughout the country. 

The PLH was not as successful as the PNH in achieving party 
unity for the 1989 elections. The PLH candidate, Carlos Flores 
Facusse, had survived a bruising four-candidate party primary in 
December 1988 in which he received 35.5 percent of the total vote. 
As noted by Julio Navarro, Flores was an extremely vulnerable 
candidate because in the primary he did not win major urban areas 
or departments considered PLH strongholds. 

The electoral campaign for the November 1993 national elec- 
tions was well underway by mid- 1993. The PLH nominated Carlos 
Roberto Reina Idiaquez, a founder of M-Lider and former presi- 
dent of the Inter- American Court of Human Rights (IACHR), 
the leftist PLH faction. The PNH nominated conservative and con- 
troversial Osvaldo Ramos Soto, former Supreme Court president 
and former rector of the UNAH in the 1980s. As of mid- 1993, pub- 
lic opinion polls showed the two candidates about even. 

Reina won his party's nomination in elections on December 6, 
1992, by capturing 47.5 percent of the vote in a six-candidate 
primary; second place was taken by newspaper publisher Rosen- 
thal, who received 26. 1 percent of the vote. Unlike the PLH primary 
of December 1988, the 1992 PLH nomination process demonstrated 
the party's strong support for Reina, who won in fourteen out of 
eighteen departments. Reina, who represented Honduras before 
the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in the border conflict with 
El Salvador, advocated a "moral revolution" in the country and 
vowed to punish those who enriched themselves through corruption. 

The nomination process for the PNH was not an open process 
like that of the PLH, and a vote scheduled for November 29, 1993, 
served only to legalize the candidacy of Ramos Soto. The actual 
process of choosing the PNH candidate had occurred several months 



176 



Government and Politics 



earlier, in July 1992, when the Monarca faction and the Ramos 
Soto faction struck a deal in which Ramos Soto was to be the can- 
didate. Monarca' s presidential precandidate, Nora Gunera de Mel- 
gar (the widow of General Juan Alberto Mel gar Castro, former 
head of state), was eliminated from consideration despite her ob- 
jections. Other minor factions were not allowed to present their 
candidates. 

In his campaign, Ramos Soto described himself as a "success- 
ful peasant" ("campesino superado"), alluding to his humble origins 
in order to gain popular support. Despite capturing the nomina- 
tion, Ramos Soto encountered some resistance to his PNH can- 
didacy, with some party members believing that his election would 
be a setback for the modernization program begun by President 
Callejas. Other Honduran sectors remembered Ramos Soto's reign 
as UNAH rector when he led a campaign to oust leftist student 
groups. Some human rights activists even claimed that Ramos Soto 
had collaborated with the military to assassinate leftists at the 
university. 

Smaller Political Parties and Movements 

Since Honduras 's return to civilian democratic rule in the 1980s, 
two small centrist political parties, Pinu and the PDCH, have par- 
ticipated in regular national presidential and legislative elections. 
Neither party, however, has challenged the political domination 
of the two traditional parties. Both parties have received most of 
their support from urban centers of Tegucigalpa and San Pedro 
Sula, Choluteca, and La Ceiba. In the presidential elections of 1981 , 
1985, and 1989, Pinu received 2.5 percent, 1.4 percent, and 1.8 
percent, respectively, and the PDCH received 1.6 percent, 1.9 per- 
cent, and 1.4 percent. Both parties have presented presidential can- 
didates for the 1993 national elections. 

Pinu was first organized in 1970 by businessman Miguel An- 
donie Fernandez as an effort to reform and reinvigorate the na- 
tion's political life. This urban-based group, which draws support 
from middle-class professionals, first attempted to gain legal recog- 
nition (personeria juridica) in 1970, but the PNH blocked Pinu's at- 
tempts until the 1980 Constituent Assembly elections. Pinu won 
three seats in those elections, important because only two votes sepa- 
rated the two traditional parties in the National Congress. Pinu 
also held a cabinet position in the provisional government headed 
by General Policarpo Paz Garcia (1980-82) in 1980. In the 1981 
elections, Pinu acquired three legislative seats, whereas in the 1985 
and 1989 elections it won only two seats. Pinu became affiliated 
with the Social Democratic International in 1988. In 1985 and 1989, 



177 



Honduras: A Country Study 

Enrique Aguilar Cerrato was the Pinu presidential candidate, and 
in 1993 businessperson Olban Valladares was the party's candidate. 

The origins of the Honduras Christian Democratic Party (Par- 
tido Democrata Cristiano de Honduras — PDCH) date back to the 
1960s, when, in the wake of Vatican Council II, the Roman Catho- 
lic Church became involved in the development of community or- 
ganizations, including unions, and student and peasant groups. 
In 1968 lay persons associated with the Roman Catholic Church 
founded the Christian Democratic Movement of Honduras (Movi- 
miento Democrata Cristiano de Honduras — MDCH), which in 
1975 became the PDCH. According to Mark Rosenberg, the party 
became more progressive than the Roman Catholic Church and 
maintained solid ties with peasant organizations. Although the party 
applied for legal recognition, the PNH blocked the process, and 
the party did not receive recognition until late 1980, too late to 
be part of the Constituent Assembly drafting a new constitution, 
but just in time to compete in the 1981 national elections. In those 
elections, the PDCH earned just one seat in the National Con- 
gress. In the 1985 elections, the party won two seats in the Na- 
tional Congress, but in 1989 it did not win any representation. 
Efrain Diaz Arrivillaga, who reportedly gave the party the repu- 
tation for being the "conscience" of the Honduran National Con- 
gress in the 1980s, was the PDCH's 1989 presidential candidate; 
the 1993 candidate was businessperson Marcos Orlando Iriarte 
Arita. 

In the early 1980s, amidst the Sandinista (see Glossary) revolu- 
tion in Nicaragua and the civil conflict in El Salvador, several radical 
leftist guerrilla groups that advocated some type of armed action 
against the Honduran government were formed in Honduras. The 
Honduran Revolutionary Party of Central American Workers (Par- 
tido Revolucionario de los Trabaj adores Centroamericanos de 
Honduras — PRTCH) was formed in 1976 as part of a regional 
party. The Morazanist Front for the Liberation of Honduras 
(Frente Morazanista para la Liberacion de Honduras — FMLH), 
first active in 1980, was named for Honduran national hero Fran- 
cisco Morazan, who had tried to keep the Central American states 
unified in the early nineteenth century. The Lorenzo Zelaya Popular 
Revolutionary Forces (Fuerzas Populares Revolucionarias- Lorenzo 
Zelaya — FPR-LZ), founded in 1980 and named for a communist 
peasant leader who was murdered in 1965, traced its roots to a 
pro-Chinese faction of the PCH. The Cinchoneros Popular Liber- 
ation Movement (Movimiento Popular de Liberacion Cinchoneros — 
MPLC), founded in 1981, was named for a nineteenth-century 
peasant leader. With the exception of the MPLC, which had about 



178 



Government and Politics 



300 members, the groups had memberships of fewer than 100 par- 
ticipants each. 

In 1982 these new radical groups joined the Communist Party 
of Honduras (Partido Comunista de Honduras — PCH), under the 
loose umbrella of the National Unified Directorate-Movement of 
Revolutionary Unity (Directorio Nacional Uniflcado-Movimiento 
de Unidad Revolucionario — DNU-MUR) . The PCH, which was 
formed in 1927, had been the country's major leftist opposition 
group through the 1970s, but had rarely resorted to violence be- 
fore its affiliation with the DNU-MUR. An offshoot of the PCH 
that was not part of the DNU-MUR was the Marxist-Leninist 
Communist Party of Honduras (Partido Comunista Marxista- 
Leninista de Honduras — PCMLH), formed in 1967 by PCH dis- 
sidents. 

Guerrilla groups in Honduras were responsible for numerous 
terrorist incidents throughout the 1980s. These included a successful 
plane hijacking in exchange for the freeing of political prisoners, 
the holding of hostages, bombings, and attacks against United States 
military personnel and advisers. Political assassinations included 
the January 1989 murder of General Gustavo Alvarez Martinez 
by members of the MPLC. Nevertheless, compared with neigh- 
boring El Salvador and Nicaragua, these groups were small and 
did not attract much popular support. According to analysts, one 
fundamental reason is the conservative nature of Honduran socie- 
ty, which is not conducive to a revolutionary uprising. Moreover, 
according to political scientist Donald Schulz, Honduran society 
is characterized by a network of interlocking interest groups and 
political organizations that have reconciled conflicts that could have 
turned violent. Schulz also observes that important escape valves 
like agrarian reform, a strong union movement, an entrenched two- 
party system, and the restoration of elected democracy in the 1980s 
also enabled Honduras to escape the revolution of its neighbors. 

Some analysts maintain that another important factor explain- 
ing why revolutionary groups did not gain much ground in Hon- 
duras was the government's swift use of repression. In the early 
1980s, when General Alvarez was military chief, the military waged 
a campaign against leftist groups that included political assassina- 
tions, disappearances, and illegal detentions. Those leftist politi- 
cal leaders who escaped the military's campaign did so by going 
into exile. In the summer of 1983, the military struck against the 
PRTCH, which reportedly was moving a contingent of almost 100 
guerrillas into the Honduran province of Olancho from Nicaragua. 
The Honduran military claimed that most of the rebels were killed 
in combat or died from exhaustion while hiding out from the 



179 



Honduras: A Country Study 



military, but human rights organizations maintain that most of the 
rebels, including a United States-born Jesuit priest, James Car- 
ney, were detained and executed. 

With the end of the Contra war in Nicaragua in 1990 and a peace 
accord in El Salvador in 1991 , Honduran guerrilla groups lost im- 
portant sources of support. By 1992 most guerrilla groups, including 
the six groups of the DNU-MUR, had largely ceased operating, 
and many political exiles had returned to the country in order to 
take advantage of an amnesty offered by the Callejas government. 
Some former exiles worked to establish new political parties. For 
example, the PCMLH formed the Party for the Transformation 
of Honduras (Partido para la Transformacion de Honduras — 
PTH), and the FMLH established the Morazanist Liberation Party 
(Partido Morazanista de Liberation — PML). Other leftist groups 
operating openly in the early 1990s included the Honduran Revolu- 
tionary Party (Partido Revolucionario Hondureno — PRH), the 
Workers' Party (Partido de los Trabaj adores — PT), the Patriotic 
Renovation Party (Partido de Renovation Patriotica — PRP), and 
the People's Democratic Movement (Movimiento Democratico del 
Pueblo— MDP). 

These six parties, which reportedly planned to run under a united 
front in the 1998 elections, presented a plan to President Callejas 
in 1992 to reform the country's electoral law in order to facilitate 
the participation of smaller parties in national elections; the plan 
included a reduction of signatures required for a party to be legal- 
ly registered. In order to be legally registered, a political party must 
complete a complex process that can be made even more complex 
by the politicization of the electoral tribunal. A party seeking legal 
recognition, according to the nation's Electoral and Political Or- 
ganizations Law, must have local organizations in at least half of 
the nation's departments and municipalities, and must present valid 
nominations of at least 20,000 registered voters affiliated with the 
party asking to be registered. 

Despite the incorporation of most leftist leaders and groups into 
the political system, there were still sporadic terrorist actions in 
Honduras in the early 1990s instigated by remnants or factions of 
the armed guerrilla groups of the 1980s. For example, although 
four top leaders of the Cinchoneros renounced armed struggle in 
May 1991, a faction of the group still wanted to fight and was 
responsible for the burning of an electric company building in 1992. 
Moreover, a small fringe group known as the Morazanist Patriot- 
ic Front, which appeared to be unrelated to the FMLH, vowed 
to continue armed struggle and claimed responsibility for terrorist 
attacks and several political killings in the early 1990s. 



180 



Government and Politics 



At various times during the 1980s, there were also reports of 
the presence of right-wing extremist groups, which were associat- 
ed with the Honduran military. Most observers judged that the 
military and police were largely responsible for right-wing extrem- 
ism throughout the 1980s. In the early 1980s, when the military 
was under the command of General Alvarez, reportedly more than 
140 disappearances of government opponents were carried out, 
largely by a secret army unit, or death squad apparatus, known 
as Battalion 3-16. For the balance of the 1980s, the military and 
police were reportedly involved in extrajudicial killings of oppo- 
nents and torture, but not at the high level of the first part of the 
decade. In 1988 and 1989, a paramilitary group known as the Al- 
liance for Anticommunist Action (Alianza de Accion Anticomu- 
nista — AAA), which human rights organizations contend was tied 
to the military, was involved in a campaign to intimidate leftist 
leaders and human rights activists. The AAA took credit for several 
activities aimed at intimidating the left and human rights groups, 
including making death threats, circulating threatening posters with 
the AAA logo, and defacing property. 

Interest Groups 

In the early 1990s, Honduras had a variety of interest groups 
that influenced the political process, some more successfully than 
others. Although Honduran political tradition is characterized by 
a strong executive, political scientist Donald Schulz maintains that 
the society is characterized by an elaborate network of interest 
groups and political organizations that help resolve conflicts. Ac- 
cording to Schulz, the essence of Honduran politics is the struggle 
within and among competing groups, with public decisions arrived 
at through the long process of consensus-building. 

Business Organizations 

According to Mark Rosenberg, the private sector in Honduras 
has historically been one of the weakest in Central America be- 
cause of the economy's domination by foreign-owned banana com- 
panies. The private sector, however, got a boost in the 1960s with 
the creation of the Central American Common Market (CACM — 
see Appendix B). In 1967 the Honduran Private Enterprise Council 
(Consejo Hondurefio de la Empresa Privada — Cohep) was estab- 
lished to serve as an umbrella organization for most private- sector 
business organizations. 

In the early 1980s, a short-lived business organization, the As- 
sociation for the Progress of Honduras (Asociacion para el Progreso 
de Honduras — Aproh), was formed during the presidency of Suazo 



181 



Honduras: A Country Study 

Cordova; it was headed by armed forces commander General Al- 
varez. Aproh, which was made up of conservative business lead- 
ers, had an anticommunist bent, and appeared to be a means for 
General Alvarez to establish a power base outside the military. It 
received a US$50,000 contribution from a front group for the Unifi- 
cation Church, led by the Reverend Sun Myung Moon, which had 
begun to proselytize in Honduras. The existence of Aproh appeared 
to be directly tied to the fate of General Alvarez, and as a result, 
when he was ousted in 1984, Aproh lost its source of support and 
fell into disarray. Moreover, the Roman Catholic Church in Hon- 
duras denounced the dangers posed by the Unification Church 
(whose members were referred to as Moonies), a measure that was 
a further setback to the fate of Aproh. In the 1993 presidential elec- 
tions, Aproh received media attention because PNH presidential 
candidate Osvaldo Ramos Soto had been a prominent member of 
Aproh, coordinating its Committee for the Defense and Support 
of Democratic Institutions. Human rights groups in Honduras 
claimed that Aproh was associated with the political killings and 
disappearances of leftist activists during the early 1980s. 

In the early 1990s, Cohep was the most important business- sector 
interest group, representing about thirty private- sector organiza- 
tions. Essentially an organization of the business elite that tries to 
influence government policy, the group has often been used as a 
business sounding board when the government is considering new 
policy initiatives. Within Cohep, several organizations stand out 
as the most powerful; they often issue their own statements or po- 
sitions on the government's economic policy. Among these, the 
Cortes Chamber of Commerce and Industry (Camara de Comer- 
cio e Industrias de Cortes — CCIC), which represents the private 
sector of San Pedro Sula, was originally formed in 1931, but was 
restructured in 1951 and since then has served as a strong develop- 
ment proponent and vocal advocate for the northern coastal region 
of the country. Another body, the National Association of Indus- 
trialists (Asociacion Nacional de Industrials — ANDI), was a vo- 
cal critic of the Callejas administration's liberalization program 
designed to open the Honduran market to outside competition. 
Another group, the Tegucigalpa Chamber of Commerce and In- 
dustry (Camara de Comercio de Industrias de Tegucigalpa — 
CCIT), supported the government's trade liberalization efforts. 

Overlapping with Cohep membership is the National Federa- 
tion of Agriculturists and Stockraisers of Honduras (Federacion 
Nacional de Agricultores y Ganaderos de Honduras — Fenagh). 
Founded in the 1960s, it has been an active opponent of land re- 
form, and in 1975 was responsible for the killing of several people, 



182 



Government and Politics 



including two priests, in a peasant training center in Olancho 
department. Fenagh strongly supported a new agricultural modern- 
ization law approved by the Honduran National Congress in 1992 
that was opposed by most peasant organizations. Another organi- 
zation that overlaps with Cohep's membership is the Honduran 
Federation of Chambers of Commerce and Industry (Federacion 
de Camaras de Comercio e Industrias de Honduras), founded in 
1988, which functions largely as a service organization for its mem- 
bers throughout the country. 

The private sector in Honduras is divided by a variety of rival- 
ries. These rivalries include the traditional competition between 
Tegucigalpa and San Pedro Sula and the animosity between turco 
(Arab immigrants who arrived early in this century carrying Ot- 
toman Empire — Turkish — travel documents) entrepreneurs and 
native-born Honduran entrepreneurs. Divisions were also appar- 
ent in the early 1990s, in conjunction with the trade liberalization 
efforts initiated by the Callejas government. Those business sec- 
tors able to compete with imported goods and services supported 
liberalization measures, whereas those producers more dependent 
on government protection or subsidies opposed the trade liberali- 
zation program. 

Labor and Peasant Organizations 

The organized labor movement of Honduras, traditionally the 
strongest in Central America, first began organizing in the early 
years of the twentieth century (see Labor Unions, ch. 3). The move- 
ment, however, gained momentum only with the great banana 
strike of 1954, at which point organized labor unions became a 
political force in the country, at times having an important impact 
on government policy. In that year, labor won the right to form 
unions legally and to engage in collective bargaining. In addition, 
the country's first national peasant organizations were formed in 
the mid-1950s, and later picked up momentum when an Agrarian 
Reform Law was enacted in 1962. 

In the early 1990s, trade unions represented about 20 percent 
of the Honduran labor force and exerted considerable economic 
and political influence. According to the United States Department 
of State's 1992 human rights report, unions frequently participated 
in public rallies against government policies and made use of the 
media. Unions also gained wage and other concessions from em- 
ployers through collective bargaining and the use of the right to 
strike. For example, in May 1992, direct negotiations between or- 
ganized labor and the private sector led to a 1 3 . 7 percent increase 
in the minimum wage, the third consecutive annual increase. 



183 



Honduras: A Country Study 

Nevertheless, organized unions and peasant organizations still 
experienced significant difficulties in the early 1990s. Retribution 
against workers for trade union activity was not uncommon and 
the right to bargain collectively was not always guaranteed. Union 
activists at times were the target of political violence, including as- 
sassination, and workers were at times harassed or fired for their 
trade union activities. Several peasant leaders were killed for po- 
litical reasons; and in a highly publicized May 1991 massacre, five 
members of a peasant organization were killed, reportedly by mili- 
tary members, because of a land dispute. The government also at 
times supported pro- government parallel unions over elected unions 
in an attempt to quiet labor unrest. 

In 1993 Honduras had three major labor confederations: the Con- 
federation of Honduran Workers (Confederacion de Trabajadores 
de Honduras — CTH), claiming a membership of about 160,000 
workers; the General Workers' Central (Central General de 
Trabajadores — CGT), claiming to represent 120,000 members; and 
the Unitary Confederation of Honduran Workers (Confederacion 
Unitaria de Trabajadores de Honduras — CUTH), a new confeder- 
ation formed in May 1992, with an estimated membership of about 
30,000. The three confederations included numerous trade union 
federations, individual unions, and peasant organizations. 

The CTH, the nation's largest trade confederation, was formed 
in 1964 by the nation's largest peasant organization, the National 
Association of Honduran Peasants (Asociacion Nacional de Cam- 
pesinos de Honduras — Anach), and by Honduran unions affili- 
ated with the Inter- American Regional Organization of Workers 
(Organization Regional Interamericana de Trabajadores — ORIT), 
a hemispheric labor organization with close ties to the American 
Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations 
(AFL-CIO). In the early 1990s, the confederation had three ma- 
jor components, the 45,000-member Federation of Unions of 
National Workers of Honduras (Federacion Sindical de Trabaja- 
dores Nacionales de Honduras — Fesitranh), the 22,000-member 
Central Federation of Honduran Free Trade Unions (Federacion 
Central de Sindicatos Libres de Honduras), and the 2,200-member 
Federation of National Maritime Unions of Honduras (Federacion 
de Sindicales Maritimas Nacionales de Honduras). In addition, 
Anach, claiming to represent 60,000-80,000 members, was affi- 
liated with Fesitranh. Fesitranh was by far the country's most 
powerful labor federation, with most of its unions located in San 
Pedro Sula and the Puerto Cortes Free Zone. The unions of the 
United States-owned banana companies and the United States- 
owned petroleum refinery also were affiliated with Fesitranh. The 



184 



Government and Politics 



CTH received support from foreign labor organizations, includ- 
ing ORIT; the American Institute for Free Labor Development 
(AIFLD); and Germany's Friedreich Ebert Foundation. The CTH 
was an affiliate of the International Confederation of Free Trade 
Unions (ICFTU). 

The CGT, first formed in 1970, but not legally recognized until 
1982, was originally formed by the Christian Democrats and 
received external support from the World Confederation of Labor 
(WCL) and the Latin American Workers Central (Central 
Latinoamericana de Trabaj adores — CLAT), a regional organiza- 
tion supported by Christian Democratic parties. In the late 1980s 
and early 1990s, however, the CGT leadership developed close ties 
to the PNH, and several leaders served in the Callejas government. 
Another national peasant organization, the National Union of 
Peasants (Union Nacional de Campesinos — UNC), claiming a 
membership of 40,000, has been affiliated with the CGT for many 
years and is a principal force within the confederation. 

The CUTH was formed in May 1992 by two principal labor 
federations, the Unitary Federation of Honduran Workers (Fed- 
eracion Unitaria de Trabaj adores de Honduras — FUTH) and the 
Independent Federation of Honduran Workers (Federacion In- 
dependiente de Trabajadores de Honduras — FITH), as well as 
several smaller labor groups, all critical of the Callejas government's 
strong neoliberal economic reform program. The Marxist FUTH, 
with an estimated 16,000 members in the early 1990s, was first 
organized in 1980 by three communist-influenced unions, but did 
not receive legal status until 1988. The federation had external ties 
with the World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU), the Per- 
manent Congress for Latin American Workers Trade Union Unity 
(Congreso Permanente de Unidad Sindical de Trabajadores de 
America Latina — CPUSTAL), and the Central American Com- 
mittee of Trade Union Unity (Comite de Unidad Sindical de Centro- 
america — CUSCA). Its affiliations included water utility, university, 
electricity company, brewery, and teacher unions, as well as several 
peasant organizations, including the National Central of Farm 
Workers (Central Nacional de Trabajadores del Campo — CNTC), 
formed in 1985 and active in land occupations in the early 1980s. 

FUTH also became affiliated with a number of leftist popular 
organizations in a group known as the Coordinating Committee 
of Popular Organizations (Comite Coordinadora de las Organiza- 
ciones Populares— CCOP) that was formed in 1984. The FITH, 
claiming about 13,000 members in the early 1990s, was granted 
legal status in 1988. Originally formed by dissident FUTH mem- 
bers, the federation consisted of fourteen unions. 



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Honduras: A Country Study 

Many Honduran peasant organizations were affiliated with the 
three labor confederations in the early 1990s. Anach was created 
and received legal recognition in 1962 in order to counter the 
communist-influenced peasant movement of the National Federa- 
tion of Honduran Peasants (Federacion Nacional de Campesinos 
de Honduras — Fenach). In contrast, Fenach never received legal 
recognition. Its offices were destroyed following the 1963 military 
coup by Colonel Oswaldo Lopez Arellano, and, in 1965, seven of 
Fenach' s leaders who had taken up armed struggle against the 
government, including founder Lorenzo Zelaya, were killed by the 
military. Anach became the primary peasant organization and in 
1967 became affiliated with the CTH. 

The UNC, traditionally a principal rival of Anach and tradi- 
tionally more radical than Anach, was established in 1970 but did 
not receive legal recognition until 1984. The UNC traces its roots 
to the community development organizations and peasant leagues 
established by the Roman Catholic Church in the 1960s. The UNC 
was a founding member of the CGT and had ideological ties to 
the MDCH. 

In addition to Anach and the UNC , another large peasant or- 
ganization in the 1990s was the Honduran Federation of Agrarian 
Reform Cooperatives (Federacion de Cooperativas de la Reforma 
Agraria de Honduras — Fecorah). The federation was formed in 
1970 and received legal recognition in 1974. In the early 1990s, 
Fecorah had about 22,000 members. 

There were numerous attempts to unify the nation's peasant or- 
ganizations in the 1970s and 1980s, but the sector was character- 
ized by numerous divisions, including ideological divisions. For 
some peasant organizations, political affiliation changed with 
changes in the government. Disillusionment with the neglect of 
unions and peasant organizations under the PLH administrations 
of the 1980s caused some groups to move toward the PNH. In 1988 
the three major peasant organizations, Anach, the UNC, and 
Fecorah, along with smaller leftist peasant groupings, united under 
the banner of the Coordinating Council of Honduran Peasant Or- 
ganizations (Consejo Coordinador de Organizaciones Campesinas 
de Honduras — Cocoh) to lobby for agrarian reform. Just four years 
later, however, in May 1992, the peasant movement was split by 
disagreement over the Callejas government's proposed agricultural 
modernization law. The three major peasant organizations all left 
Cocoh to form the National Peasants Council (Consejo Nacional 
de Campesinos — CNC), while leftist peasant organizations re- 
mained in Cocoh and actively demonstrated against the proposed 
agricultural modernization law. 



186 



Government and Politics 



From 1989 until 1992, the nation's major peasant organizations 
and labor federations, a confederation of cooperatives, and several 
professional organizations supported the "Platform of Struggle for 
the Democratization of Honduras." The objective of the campaign 
was to present far-reaching economic, social, and political reform 
proposals to the national government, which included issuing several 
documents and a manifesto. By 1993 however, this initiative had 
disappeared because of divisions among the disparate groups and, 
according to some observers, because of the Callejas government's 
success in coopting several organizations. 

The organized peasant movement in Honduras was an impor- 
tant, if not determinant, factor in implementing an agrarian re- 
form program. In the early 1960s, because of increasing pressure 
on the government from landless peasants and external pressure 
from the United States through the Alliance for Progress, the PLH 
government of Ramon Villeda Morales took significant steps toward 
implementing a land reform program. He established the National 
Agrarian Institute (Instituto Nacional Agrario — INA) in 1961 and 
the following year approved an agrarian reform law that especially 
was aimed at the uncultivated lands of the United States-owned 
fruit companies (see Aborted Reform, ch. 1). The 1963 military 
coup and subsequent repressive rule of General Lopez Arellano 
brought an abrupt halt to land redistribution. By the late 1960s, 
however, peasant organizations were again increasing pressure on 
the government, and under a director who was sympathetic to the 
peasant movement, the INA began to adjudicate land claims in 
favor of peasants. 

The election of conservative Ramon Ernesto Cruz as president 
in 1971 once again shifted the government's agrarian policy to one 
favoring the large landholders, but with the 1972 coup, again led 
by General Lopez Arellano, the government instituted a far- 
reaching agrarian reform program (see Military Rule and Reform, 
ch. 1). The program was all the more significant because it was 
driven by Lopez Arellano, who had crushed land reform efforts 
in the 1960s. This time around, however, the general allied him- 
self with peasant organizations. He issued an emergency land re- 
form decree in 1972 and in 1975 issued another agrarian reform 
measure that promised to distribute 600,000 hectares to 120,000 
families over a period of approximately five years. 

In 1975, however, a conservative countercoup by General Juan 
Mel gar Castro ended these high expectations for land redistribu- 
tion. After 1977 land redistribution continued, but at lower levels. 
According to a study by Charles Brockett, from 1962 through 1984, 
a little more than 293,000 hectares were distributed, benefiting 



187 



Honduras: A Country Study 



about 52,000 families countrywide. Brockett observed, however, 
that most of the land distributed was public land rather than idle 
or underutilized private land. In the 1980s, land redistribution 
slowed while peasant land takeovers of underused land continued 
unabated. The government's reaction to the takeovers was mixed. 
At times, the military reversed them by force, and, on other occa- 
sions, the government did nothing to stop the occupations. 

In 1992 the Callejas government enacted a new agricultural 
modernization law that some observers claim essentially ended 
prospects for additional land distribution. The law, approved by 
the National Congress in March 1992, limited expropriations and 
augmented guarantees for private ownership of land. The United 
States Department of State observed that the law improved the en- 
vironment for increases in investment, production, and agricul- 
tural exports. The law was actively opposed by some peasant 
organizations, who waged a campaign of land occupations and 
claimed that those peasant organizations that supported the law 
were linked to PNH or were bought by the government. 

In the early 1990s, the government increasingly intervened in 
the affairs of labor unions and peasant organizations through parallel 
unions. For example, in July 1992, the Callejas government gave 
legal recognition to two parallel telecommunications workers 
unions and to a second union representing road, airport, and ter- 
minal maintenance employees. In October 1992, the government 
recognized a faction of Anach that favored the Callejas govern- 
ment's proposed agricultural modernization law even though 
another faction had won a union election. 

Unions in Honduras have strongly opposed the growth of solidar- 
ity {solidarismo) associations, which emphasize labor-management 
harmony. These associations, which consist of representatives of 
both labor and management, provide a variety of services by utiliz- 
ing a joint worker/employer capital fund. Solidarity associations 
began in the late 1940s in Costa Rica and have thrived there, ac- 
counting for almost 16 percent of the work force. In Honduras 
solidarity associations first appeared in 1985 and, although the 
government had not granted the associations legal status, by the 
early 1990s they accounted for about 10,000 workers in a variety 
of companies. Organized labor, including Honduran unions and 
international labor affiliations, strongly opposes solidarity associ- 
ations on the grounds that they do not permit the right to strike 
and that they do not include appropriate grievance procedures. 
Unions contend that the associations are management-controlled 
mechanisms that undermine unionism. In 1991 a bitter strike at 



188 



Government and Politics 



El Mochito mine was reportedly begun by unions who opposed 
management's attempt to impose a solidarity association there. 

Popular Organizations 

A plethora of special interest organizations and associations were 
active during the 1980s and early 1990s. Some of these organiza- 
tions, like student groups and women's groups, had been active 
long before the 1980s, but others, such as human rights organiza- 
tions and environmental groups, only formed in the 1980s. Still 
other groups were just beginning to organize. In 1993, for exam- 
ple, a newly formed homosexual rights association petitioned the 
government for legal recognition. Beginning in 1984, a number 
of leftist popular organizations were linked with the FUTH in the 
CCOP. Some observers maintain that the number and power of 
popular organizations grew in the 1980s because of the inertia and 
manipulation associated with the traditional political process. Others 
contend that the proliferation of popular organizations demonstrates 
the free and open nature of Honduran society and the belief of the 
citizens that they can influence the political process by organizing. 

The student movement in Honduras, which dates back to 1910, 
is concentrated at the country's largest institution of higher-learn- 
ing, UNAH, which had an enrollment of around 30,000 students 
in the early 1990s. Ideological divisions among the student popu- 
lation and student organizations have often led to violence, including 
the assassination of student leaders. Leftist students, organized into 
the Reformist University Front (Frente de Reforma Universitaria — 
FRU), largely dominated student organizations until the early 
1980s, but ideological schisms within the group and an antileftist 
campaign orchestrated by General Gustavo Alvarez broke leftist 
control of official university student bodies. Since the early 1980s, 
the right-wing Democratic University United Front (Frente Uni- 
do Universitario Democratico — FUUD), which reportedly has ties 
to the PNH and to the military, has become the more powerful 
student organization, with close ties to the conservative university 
administration. Osvaldo Ramos Soto, the PNH 1993 presidential 
candidate, served as FUUD coordinator while he was UNAH's 
rector in the mid-1980s. In the early 1990s, political violence in 
the student sector escalated. FRU leader Ramon Antonio Bricero 
was brutally tortured and murdered in 1990, and four FUUD ac- 
tivists were assassinated in the 1990-92 period. 

Organized women's groups in Honduras date back to the 1920s 
with the formation of the Women's Cultural Society, which strug- 
gled for women's economic and political rights. Visitacion Padilla, 
who also actively opposed the intervention of the United States 



189 



Honduras: A Country Study 

Marines in Honduras in 1924, and Graciela Garcia were major 
figures in the women's movement. Women were also active in the 
formation of the Honduran labor movement and took part in the 
great banana strike of 1954. In the early 1950s, women's associa- 
tions fought for women's suffrage, which finally was achieved in 
1954, making Honduras the last Latin American country to ex- 
tend voting rights to women. In the late 1970s, a national peasant 
organization, the Honduran Federation of Peasant Women (Federa- 
tion Hondurefla de Mujeres Campesinas — Fehmuca), was formed; 
by the 1980s, it represented almost 300 organizations nationwide. 
As a more leftist-oriented women's peasant organization, the Coun- 
cil for Integrated Development of Peasant Women (Consejo de 
Desarrollo Integrado de Mujeres Campesinas — Codeimuca) was 
established in the late 1980s and represented more than 100 wom- 
en's groups. Another leftist women's organization, the Visitation 
Padilla Committee, was active in the 1980s, opposing the presence 
of the United States military and the Contras in Honduras. 

Numerous other women's groups were active in the late 1980s 
and early 1990s, including a research organization known as the 
Honduran Center for Women's Studies (Centro de Estudios de 
la Mujer-Honduras — CEM-H). Another organization, the Hon- 
duran Federation of Women's Associations (Federation Hondurena 
de Asociaciones Femininas — Fehaf), represented about twenty-five 
women's groups and was involved in such activities as providing 
legal assistance to women and lobbying the government on wom- 
en's issues. 

Although women were represented at all levels of government 
in the late 1980s and early 1990s, their numbers were few. Accord- 
ing to CEM-H, following the 1989 national elections, women held 
9.4 percent of congressional seats and 6.2 percent of mayorships 
nationwide, including the mayorship of Tegucigalpa. In the Callejas 
government, women held several positions, including one seat on 
the Supreme Court, three out of thirty- two ambassadorships, and 
two out of fifty-four high-level executive-branch positions. For the 
1993 presidential elections, the Monarca faction of the PNH origi- 
nally supported the nomination of a woman as the PNH candidate, 
and the PLH nominated a woman as one of its three presidential 
designate candidates. 

Domestic Human Rights Organizations 

Human rights groups in Honduras first became active in the 
early 1980s when revolution and counterrevolution brought vio- 
lence and instability to Central America. In Honduras, these groups 
organized in response to the mounting level of violence targeted 



190 



Government and Politics 



at leftist organizations, particularly from 1982-84, when General 
Gustavo Alvarez commanded the military. Human rights organi- 
zations were at times targeted by the Honduran military with 
harassment and political violence. According to some observers, 
the United States embassy in Honduras also became involved in 
a campaign to discredit Honduran human rights organizations at 
a time when Honduras was serving as a key component of United 
States policy toward Central America by hosting the Contras and 
a United States military presence. 

In the early 1990s, there were three major nongovernmental hu- 
man rights organizations in Honduras: the Committee for the 
Defense of Human Rights in Honduras (Comite para la Defensa 
de Derechos Humanos de Honduras — Codeh); the Committee of 
the Families of the Detained and Disappeared in Honduras (Co- 
mite de las Familias de los Detenidos y Desaparecidos Hondurenos — 
Cofadeh); and the Center of the Investigation and Promotion 
of Human Rights (Centro de Investigation y Promotion de los 
Derechos Humanos — Ciprodeh). 

Established in 1981 by Ramon Custodio, Codeh became the 
country's foremost human rights organization in the 1980s, with 
a network throughout the country. The organization withstood 
harassment and intimidation by Honduran security forces. In Janu- 
ary 1988, Codeh' s regional director in northern Honduras, Miguel 
Angel Pavon, was assassinated before he was about to testify in 
a case brought before the Inter- American Court of Human Rights 
(IACHR). In 1981 and 1982, Codeh and Cofadeh had brought 
three cases before the IACHR involving the disappearances of two 
Hondurans, Angel Manfredo Velasquez and Saul Godinez, and 
two Costa Ricans traveling in Honduras, Fairen Garbi and Yolanda 
Solis Corrales. The court ultimately found Honduras responsible 
for the disappearances of the two Hondurans, but not for the two 
Costa Ricans. 

In the 1990s, Codeh remained the country's most important and 
most internationally known human rights organization. Codeh con- 
tinued to issue annual reports and to speak out frequently, not only 
on human rights violations, but also on economic, social, and po- 
litical issues. Some observers, however, have criticized Codeh for 
going beyond a human rights focus, as well as for exaggerating 
charges against the government and military. In the 1980s and as 
late as 1990, the United States Department of State in its annual 
human rights reports on Honduras charged that Codeh' s charges 
were ill-documented, exaggerated, and in some cases false. 

Cofadeh was founded in 1982 by Zenaida Velasquez, sister of 
Angel Manfredo Velasquez, the missing student and labor activist 



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Honduras: A Country Study 

whose case Codeh and Cofadeh brought before the IACHR. As its 
name suggests, Cofadeh's membership consisted of relatives of the 
disappeared and detained, and in the 1980s its members often dem- 
onstrated near the Presidential Palace in the center of Tegucigalpa. 

Ciprodeh, founded in 1991 by Leo Valladares, provides human 
rights educational and legal services. The group offers human rights 
courses and monthly seminars and has a special program for the 
protection of the rights of children and women. 

The Honduran government did not establish an effective hu- 
man rights monitor until late 1992, and Codeh and Cofadeh often 
served this purpose. In 1987 the Azcona government established 
the Inter-Institutional Commission on Human Rights (Comision 
Inter-Institucional de Derechos Humanos — CIDH), made up of 
representatives from the three branches of government and the mili- 
tary, to investigate human rights violations. The CIDH proved 
ineffective and did not receive cooperation from either civilian ju- 
dicial or military authorities. 

In December 1992, the Callejas government inaugurated a new 
governmental human rights body headed by Valladares. In 1993 
this new office of the National Commission for the Protection of 
Human Rights (Comision Nacional para la Protection de Derechos 
Humanos — Conaprodeh) received complaints of human rights vio- 
lations and, in some instances, provided "protection" to those 
citizens issuing complaints. 

In the early 1990s, Honduras also had a number of ethnic-based 
organizations representing Hondurans of African origin and the 
nation's indigenous population. Six ethnic-based organizations were 
loosely grouped together under the Honduran Advisory Council 
for Autonomous Ethnic Development (Consejo Asesor Hondu- 
reno para el Desarrollo de las Etnicas Autoctonas — CAHDEA). 
Representing the nation's black population, including the Garifuna 
(see Glossary), and English-speaking Creoles (see Glossary) was the 
Honduran Black Fraternal Organization (Organization Fraternal 
Negra Hondurena — Ofraneh), a group established in 1977 for the 
betterment of social, political, economic, and cultural conditions 
of black Hondurans. The indigenous peoples of Honduras first 
began forming national organizations in the 1950s, and in the 1990s, 
five indigenous organizations were represented in CAHDEA. These 
consisted of organizations representing the Miskito, Pech, Lenca, 
Towaka, and Jicaque peoples. According to the United States 
Department of State in its human rights report for 1992, Hondu- 
ran indigenous peoples had "little or no participation in decisions 
affecting their lands, cultures, traditions, or the allocation of na- 
tural resources." The report further asserted that legal recourse 



192 



Government and Politics 



is commonly denied to indigenous groups and that the seizing of 
indigenous lands by nonindigenous farmers and cattle growers is 
common. 

The Press 

Freedom of speech and the press are guaranteed by the Hondu- 
ran constitution, and in practice these rights are generally respected. 
Nevertheless, as noted in the United States Department of State's 
1992 human rights report, the media are subject to both corrup- 
tion and politicization, and there have been instances of self- 
censorship, allegations of intimidation by military authorities, and 
payoffs to journalists. In a scandal that came to light in January 
1993, a Honduran newspaper published an internal document from 
the National Elections Tribunal (Tribunal Nacional de Elecciones — 
TNE) that listed authorized payments to thirteen journalists. Ob- 
servers maintain that numerous governmental institutions, includ- 
ing municipalities, the National Congress, the various ministries, 
and the military, have been involved in paying journalists for sto- 
ries; some estimate that more than 50 percent of journalists receive 
payoffs. Another significant problem in the media has been self- 
censorship in reporting on sensitive issues, especially the military. 
Intimidation in the form of threats, blacklisting, and violence also 
occurred at various times in the 1980s and early 1990s. 

According to some analysts, however, despite instances of mili- 
tary intimidation of the press in early 1993, the media, including 
the press, radio, and television, have played an important role in 
creating an environment conducive to the public's open question- 
ing and criticism of authorities. Honduran sociologist Leticia Salo- 
mon has observed that in early 1993 the media, including newspaper 
caricatures, played an instrumental role in mitigating the fear of 
criticizing the military, and he asserts that this diminishment of 
fear was an important step in the building of a democratic culture 
in Honduras. 

Honduras has five daily national newspapers, three based in 
Tegucigalpa — El Periodico, La Tribuna and El Heraldo — and two 
based in San Pedro Sula — El Tiempo and La Prensa. Quite conser- 
vative in its outlook, El Periodico has former president Callejas as 
its principal stockholder. Owned by PLH leader and business- 
person Jaime Rosenthal (who placed second in the PLH presiden- 
tial primary for the 1993 national election), the left-of-center El 
Tiempo has been the newspaper most prone to criticize the police 
and military, for which its editor, Manuel Gamero, has at times 
been jailed. In February 1993, a bomb exploded at the home of 
the newspaper's business manager after the paper gave refuge to a 



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Honduras: A Country Study 

reporter, Eduardo Coto, who had witnessed the assassination of 
a San Pedro Sula businessperson, Eduardo Pina, in late January 
1993. Coto alleged that Pina had been killed by two former mem- 
bers of the notorious Battalion 3-16, a military unit reportedly 
responsible for numerous disappearances in the early 1980s. After 
alleged death threats from military members, Coto fled to Spain, 
where he received asylum. 

La Tribuna and La Prensa are considered centrist papers by some 
observers, although some might put La Prensa into the more con- 
servative center- right category. La Tribuna, which is owned by 
Carlos Flores Facusse (the unsuccessful 1989 presidential candi- 
date), has close ties to the PLH and to the new industrial sector 
of Tegucigalpa. La Prensa has close ties with the business section 
of San Pedro Sula. Its president and editor is Jorge Canahuati 
Larach, whose family also publishes El Heraldo, a conservative paper 
that has been more favorable to the military in its reporting than 
other dailies and often reflects the positions of the PNH. 

In addition to the five dailies, Honduras also has numerous 
smaller publications. Most significantly, the Honduran Documen- 
tation Center (Centro de Documentacion de Honduras — Cedoh), 
run by the widely respected political analyst Victor Meza, pub- 
lishes a monthly Boletin Informativo; and Cedoh and the sociology 
department of UNAH publish Puntos de Vista, a magazine dedicat- 
ed to social and political analysis. In addition, an English-language 
weekly paper, Honduras This Week, covers events in Honduras and 
in Central America. 

Civilian Democratic Rule 

In the decade since Honduras returned to civilian democratic 
rule in 1982, the political system has undergone notable changes. 
Hondurans successfully elected three civilian presidents in the 1980s, 
and elections came to be celebrated in an almost holiday-like at- 
mosphere, similar to the electoral process in Costa Rica. In 1993 
the nation was again gearing up for national elections in Novem- 
ber, with conservative Osvaldo Ramos Soto of the PNH squaring 
off against Carlos Roberto Reina, leader of a leftist faction of the 
PLH. Although remaining a powerful factor in the political sys- 
tem, the military is increasingly facing challenges from civilians 
who are beginning to hold it responsible for involvement in hu- 
man rights violations. 

Nevertheless, many observers have noted that although Hon- 
duras has held regular elections and has begun to hold the mili- 
tary accountable, the nation still faces numerous political challenges, 
most notably reforming the administration of justice so that both 



194 



Government and Politics 



military and civilian elites can be held accountable for their ac- 
tions, realizing civilian control over the military, and rooting out 
corruption from government. 

The human rights situation deteriorated significantly in the first 
few years of civilian rule, when the military, under the command 
of General Gustavo Alvarez Martinez, initiated a campaign against 
leftists that led to the disappearance of more than 100 people. Small 
insurgent groups also began operating during this period, but the 
overwhelming majority of political killings were carried out by the 
military. Although this violence paled in comparison to the vio- 
lence in neighboring El Salvador and Guatemala, it marked a depar- 
ture from the relatively tranquil Honduran political environment. 
Beginning in 1985, political violence declined significantly but did 
not completely disappear; a small number of extrajudicial killings 
continued to be reported annually for the balance of the 1980s and 
early 1990s. In July 1988 and January 1989, when the Honduran 
government was held responsible by the Inter- American Court of 
Human Rights (IACHR) for the 1982 disappearances of Angel 
Manfredo Velasquez and Saul Godmez, Honduran authorities were 
also held responsible by the court for a deliberate kidnapping cam- 
paign of between 100 and 150 individuals believed to be tied to 
subversive activities between 1981 and 1984. 

In the early 1990s, as the political conflicts in El Salvador and 
Nicaragua were abating, the Honduran public increasingly began 
to criticize the military for human rights violations, including a 
number of political and other types of extrajudicial killings. One 
case that ignited a public outcry against the military was the July 
1991 rape, torture, and murder of an eighteen-year old student, 
Riccy Mabel Martinez, by military members. Initially, the mili- 
tary would not allow the civilian courts to try the three suspects, 
but ultimately the military discharged the suspects from the mili- 
tary so as not to set the precedent of military members being tried 
in civilian courts. After a long drawn-out process, two of the sus- 
pects, including a former colonel, were convicted of the crime in 
July 1993, marking the first time that a high-ranking officer, even 
though no longer in the military, was prosecuted in the civilian 
courts. 

Observers credit former United States Ambassador Cresencio 
Arcos with speaking out promptly on the case and urging the Hon- 
duran government to prosecute it through an open judicial process. 
In fact, the United States embassy increasingly has been viewed 
as a champion for human rights in Honduras, and its human rights 
reports in the early 1990s were considerably more critical than those 
prepared in the 1980s. 



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Honduras: A Country Study 

Although Honduras has experienced more than a decade of 
civilian democratic rule, some observers maintain that the mili- 
tary is still the most powerful political player in the country. Its 
disregard for civilian authority is demonstrated by the military's 
immunity from prosecution for human rights violations. In early 
1993, after the military received considerable public criticism for 
alleged involvement in the killing of a businessperson in San Pedro 
Sula in January 1993, military forces were deployed in both San 
Pedro Sula and in the capital. Rumors abounded about the true 
intention of the deployment, reportedly made without the knowledge 
of President Callejas. Some observers speculated that the armed 
forces chief, General Luis Alonso Discua Elvir, took the action to 
intimidate his opponents and stem a barrage of recent criticism 
against the military. President Callejas later announced that he had 
ordered the deployment as one of a series of actions to deter crimi- 
nal violence. 

Some critics maintain that President Callejas should have been 
more forceful with the military and attempted to assert more civilian 
control during his presidency, particularly when the military tried 
to impede the prosecution of the Riccy Martinez case. Some main- 
tain that Callejas himself had close ties with General Discua, thus 
explaining why no strong civilian action was taken against the mili- 
tary. Others, however, maintain that Callejas substantially im- 
proved civilian control over the military with the establishment of 
such commissions as the Ad Hoc Commission for Institutional 
Reform, which recommended the breakup of the National Direc- 
torate of Investigation and the creation of a new Department of 
Criminal Investigation (Departamento de Investigation Criminal — 
DIC) within the civilian government. 

A growing concern of the business sector in the early 1990s was 
the military's increasing involvement in private enterprise. Through 
its Military Pension Institute (Instituto de Pension Militar — IPM), 
the military acquired numerous enterprises, including the nation's 
largest cement factory, a bank, a real estate agency, cattie ranches, 
a radio station, and a funeral home. Critics maintain that the mili- 
tary has a competitive advantage in a number of areas because of 
certain benefits derived from its status, such as the ability to im- 
port items duty free. 

According to some observers, a fundamental problem associat- 
ed with the Honduran political system is the almost institutional- 
ized corruption found within its ranks. Analysts maintain that the 
primary motivation of politicians in Honduras is personal interest; 
bribery {la mordidd) is a common or institutionalized practice. Pub- 
licized instances of corruption are found throughout the political 



196 



Government and Politics 



system, in all branches of government, and some observers main- 
tain that Hondurans have come to expect this of their politicians. 
As noted by Mark B. Rosenberg, political power in Honduras is 
defined by one's ability to convert public authority into private ad- 
vantage. Some analysts contend that corruption is literally a neces- 
sity to govern effectively in Honduras. Former United States 
ambassador Cresencio Arcos notes that "there is more than a ker- 
nel of truth in the Latin American cliche, a deal for my friend, 
the law for my enemies." 

Some observers maintain that the Callejas government mod- 
erated corrupt practices, as demonstrated by the creation of the 
Fiscal Intervention Commission, which turned its attention to inves- 
tigating extensive corruption in the Customs Directorate. Others 
maintain that the commission was a smokescreen to give the ap- 
pearance that the government was doing something to root out cor- 
ruption, when in fact the Callejas government was saturated with 
corruption, and personal enrichment was the norm. The issue of 
corruption was a theme in the 1 993 presidential campaign of PLH 
candidate Carlos Roberto Reina, who has pledged a moral revo- 
lution to punish those public officials enriching themselves through 
corruption. 

Foreign Relations 

The conduct of foreign policy in Honduras has traditionally been 
dominated by the presidency, with the minister of foreign affairs 
essentially executing that policy. After Honduras returned to civilian 
rule in 1982, however, the military continued to exercise power 
over aspects of foreign policy associated with national security. 
General Gustavo Alvarez reportedly direcdy negotiated the presence 
of the anti-Sandinista Contras in Honduras with the United States, 
as well as the establishment of a United States military presence 
at Palmerola Air Base and the training of Salvadoran troops at 
a Regional Center for Military Training in Honduras (Centro 
Regional de Entrenamiento Militar — CREM). Military influence 
over these aspects of foreign policy continued through the end of 
the decade, when regional hostilities subsided and reduced Hon- 
duras 's geostrategic importance for United States policy toward 
the region. 

In the second half of the 1980s, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
under the dynamic leadership of Carlos Lopez Contreras, report- 
edly became a professional and well-respected cadre of diplomats. 
Key positions in the ministry were reportedly chosen on the basis 
of competence rather than political affiliation. With the change in 
government in 1990, however, politicization once again became 



197 



Honduras: A Country Study 



the norm, with preference given to PNH loyalists. President 
Callejas's active involvement in the regional integration process 
in Central America has tended to eclipse the prominence of the 
role of the minister of foreign affairs in the process of formulating 
foreign policy. 

The United States 

In the twentieth century, the United States has had more in- 
fluence on Honduras than any other nation, leading some analysts 
to assert that the United States has been a major source of politi- 
cal power in Honduras. United States involvement in Honduras 
dates back to the turn of the century, when United States-owned 
banana companies began expanding their presence on the north 
coast. The United States government periodically dispatched war- 
ships to quell revolutionary activity and to protect United States 
business interests. Not long after the United States entered World 
War II, the United States signed a lend-lease agreement with Hon- 
duras. Also, the United States operated a small naval base at Trujillo 
on the Caribbean Sea. In 1954 the two countries signed a bilateral 
military assistance agreement whereby the United States helped 
support the development and training of the Honduran military. 
In the 1950s, the United States provided about US$27 million, 
largely in development assistance, to Honduras for projects in the 
agriculture, education, and health sectors. In the 1960s, under the 
Alliance for Progress program, the United States provided larger 
amounts of assistance to Honduras — almost US$94 million for the 
decade, the majority again in development assistance, with funds 
increasingly focused on rural development. In the 1970s, United 
States assistance expanded significantly, amounting to almost 
US$193 million, largely in development and food assistance, but 
also including about US$19 million in military assistance. Aid dur- 
ing the 1970s again emphasized rural development, particularly 
in support of the Honduran government's agrarian reform efforts 
in the first part of the decade. 

It was in the 1980s, however, that United States attention be- 
came fixated on Honduras as a linchpin for United States policy 
toward Central America. In the early 1980s, southern Honduras 
became a staging area for Contra excursions into Nicaragua. The 
conservative Honduran government and military shared United 
States concerns over the Sandinistas' military buildup, and both 
the United States and Honduran governments viewed United States 
assistance as important in deterring Nicaragua, in both the build- 
up of the Honduran armed forces and the introduction of a Unit- 
ed States military presence in Honduras. 



198 



Government and Politics 



In 1982 Honduras signed an annex to its 1954 bilateral military 
assistance agreement with the United States that provided for the 
stationing of a temporary United States military presence in the 
country. Beginning in 1983, the Palmerola Air Base (renamed the 
Enrique Soto Cano Air Base in 1988) housed a United States mili- 
tary force of about 1 ,100 troops known as Joint Task Force Bravo 
(JTFB) about 80 kilometers from Tegucigalpa near the city of 
Comayagua. The primary mission of the task force was to sup- 
port United States military exercises and other military activities 
and to demonstrate the resolve of the United States to support Hon- 
duras against the threat from Nicaragua. In its military exercises, 
which involved thousands of United States troops and United States 
National Guardsmen, the United States spent millions of dollars 
in building or upgrading several air facilities — some of which were 
used to help support the Contras — and undertaking roadbuilding 
projects around the country. The United States military in Hon- 
duras also provided medical teams to visit remote rural areas. In 
addition, a military intelligence battalion performed reconnaissance 
missions in support of the Salvadoran military in its war against 
leftist guerrillas of the Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front 
(Frente Farabundo Marti de Liberation Nacional — FMLN). In 
1987 the United States approved a sale of twelve advanced F-5 
fighter aircraft to Honduras, a measure that reinforced Hondu- 
ran air superiority in Central America. 

During the early 1980s, the United States also established an 
economic strategy designed to boost economic development in the 
Caribbean Basin region. Dubbed the Caribbean Basin Initiative 
(CBI), the centerpiece of the program was a one-way preferential 
trade program providing duty-free access to the United States mar- 
ket for a large number of products from Caribbean and Central 
American nations. Honduras became a beneficiary of the program 
when it first went into effect in 1984. Although the value of Hon- 
duran exports had increased by 16 percent by 1989, this growth 
paled in comparison to the growth of United States-destined ex- 
ports from other CBI countries such as Costa Rica and the Domini- 
can Republic. 

During the 1980s, the United States provided Honduras with 
a substantial amount of foreign assistance. Total United States as- 
sistance to Honduras in the 1980s amounted to almost US$1 .6 bil- 
lion, making the country the largest United States aid recipient 
in Latin America after El Salvador; about 37 percent of the aid 
was in Economic Support Funds (ESF), 25 percent in military as- 
sistance, 24 percent in development assistance, and 10 percent in 
food aid. The remaining 4 percent supported one of the largest 



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Honduras: A Country Study 

Peace Corps programs worldwide, disaster assistance, and small 
development projects sponsored by the Inter- American Foundation. 

By the end of the decade, however, critics were questioning how 
so much money could have produced so little. The country was 
still one of the poorest in the hemisphere, with an estimated per 
capita income of US$590 in 1991, according to the World Bank 
(see Glossary). The government had not implemented any signifi- 
cant economic reform program to put its house in order. Many 
high-level Hondurans acknowledged that the money was ill- spent 
on a military build-up and on easy money for the government. Ac- 
cording to former United States ambassador to Honduras Cresencio 
Arcos, "If there was a significant flaw in our assistance, it was that 
we did not sufficiendy condition aid to macroeconomic reforms and 
the strengthening of democratic institutions such as the adminis- 
tration of justice." Moreover, as noted by the United States General 
Accounting Office in a 1989 report, the Honduran government 
in the 1980s became dependent upon external assistance and tended 
to view United States assistance as a substitute for undertaking eco- 
nomic reform. The report further asserted that the Honduran 
government was able to resist implementing economic reforms be- 
cause it supported United States regional security programs. 

Many observers maintain that United States support was in- 
strumental in the early 1980s in bringing about a transition to 
elected civilian democracy and in holding free and fair elections 
during the rest of the decade. Nevertheless, critics charge that 
United States support for the Honduran military, including direct 
negotiations over support for the Contras, actually worked to under- 
mine the authority of the elected civilian government. They also 
blame the United States for tolerating the Honduran military's hu- 
man rights violations, particularly in the early 1980s. They claim 
that the United States obsession with defeating the Sandinistas in 
Nicaragua and the FMLN in El Salvador resulted in Honduras 's 
becoming the regional intermediary for United States policy — 
without regard for the consequences for Honduras. Indeed, some 
maintain that the United States embassy in Tegucigalpa often ap- 
peared to be more involved with the Contra war effort against 
Nicaragua than with the political and economic situation in Hon- 
duras. United States-based human rights organizations assert that 
the United States became involved in a campaign to defame hu- 
man rights activists in Honduras who called attention to the abuses 
of the Honduran military. United States embassy publications dur- 
ing the 1980s regularly attempted to discredit the two major hu- 
man rights groups in Honduras, Codeh and Cofadeh, because of 



200 



Government and Politics 



their "leftist bias," while also calling into question the large num- 
ber of disappearances that occurred in the early 1980s. 

Hondurans' frustration over the overwhelming United States 
presence and power in their country appeared to grow in the late 
1980s. For example, in April 1988 a mob of anti-United States 
rioters attacked and burned the United States embassy annex in 
Tegucigalpa because of United States involvement in the abduc- 
tion and arrest of alleged drug trafficker Juan Ramon Mata 
Ballesteros, a prime suspect in the 1985 torture and murder of Unit- 
ed States Drug Enforcement Administration agent Enrique 
Camarena in Mexico. Nationalist sentiments escalated as some 
Hondurans viewed the action as a violation of a constitutional pro- 
hibition on the extradition of Honduran citizens. The mob of stu- 
dents was reportedly fueled by then UNAH rector Osvaldo Ramos 
Soto, who later became Supreme Court president and the PNH 
candidate for president in 1993. 

By the early 1990s, with the end to the Contra war and a peace 
accord in El Salvador, United States policy toward Honduras had 
changed in numerous respects. Annual foreign aid levels had be- 
gun to fall considerably. Although the United States provided about 
US$213 million in fiscal year (FY— see Glossary) 1990 and US$150 
million in FY 1991, the amount declined to about US$98 million 
for FY 1992 and an estimated US$60 million for FY 1993. Most 
significant in these declines is that military assistance slowed to a 
trickle, with only an estimated US$2.6 million to be provided in 
FY 1993. 

Although aid levels were falling, considerable United States sup- 
port was provided through debt forgiveness. In September 1991, 
the United States forgave US$434 million in official bilateral debt 
that Honduras owed the United States government for food as- 
sistance and United States AID loans. This forgiveness accounted 
for about 96 percent of Honduras' s total bilateral debt to the United 
States and about 12 percent of Honduras's total external debt of 
about US$3.5 billion. Observers viewed the debt forgiveness as 
partially a reward for Honduras's reliability as a United States ally, 
particularly through the turbulent 1980s, as well as a sign of sup- 
port for the modest economic reforms undertaken by the Callejas 
government in one of the hemisphere's poorest nations. 

In the 1990s, the United States remained Honduras's most im- 
portant trading partner and the most important source of foreign 
investment. According to the United States Department of State, 
in the early 1990s Honduras was a relatively open market for United 
States exports and investments. In 1992 the Callejas government 



201 



Honduras: A Country Study 

took important steps toward improving the trade and investment 
climate in the nation with the approval of a new investment law. 

Under the rubric of the Enterprise for the Americas Initiative 
(EAI — see Glossary), a United States foreign policy initiative was 
introduced by the George H. W. Bush administration (1989-93) 
in June 1990, with the long-term goal of free trade throughout the 
Americas. The United States and Honduras signed a trade and 
investment framework agreement in 1991 , which theoretically was 
a first step on the road to eventual free trade with the United States. 
Some Hondurans in the early 1990s expressed concern about the 
potential North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) among 
Canada, Mexico, and the United States, which could possibly un- 
dermine Honduras 's benefits under the CBI and also divert por- 
tions of United States trade and investment to Mexico. 

A point of controversy between Honduras and the United States 
in the early 1990s was the issue of intellectual property rights. In 
1992, because of a complaint by the Motion Picture Exporters As- 
sociation of America, the Office of the United States Trade 
Representative (USTR) initiated an investigation into the protec- 
tion of private satellite television signals. Local cable companies 
in Honduras routinely pirated United States satellite signals, but 
as a result of the investigation, the Honduran government pledged 
to submit comprehensive intellectual property rights legislation to 
the National Congress in 1993. If the USTR investigation rules 
against Honduras, the country's participation in the CBI and the 
Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) would be jeopardized. 

A significant change in United States- Honduran relations dur- 
ing the early 1990s was reflected in United States criticism over 
the human rights situation and over the impunity of the Hondu- 
ran military, as well as recommendations to the Honduran govern- 
ment to cut back military spending. In one public statement in 1992 
that was severely criticized by the Honduran military, Cresencio 
Arcos, who was then United States ambassador, stated that "soci- 
ety should not allow justice to be turned into a viper that only bites 
the barefoot and leaves immune those who wear boots." 

Despite the winding down of regional conflicts in the early 1990s, 
the United States military maintains a 1,100-member force presence 
at the Enrique Soto Cano Air Base. Joint Task Force Bravo is still 
involved in conducting training exercises for thousands of United 
States troops annually, including road-building exercises, and in 
providing medical assistance to remote rural areas. A new mission 
for the United States military in Honduras, and perhaps its number- 
one priority, is the use of surveillance planes to track drug flights 
from South America headed for the United States. Although 



202 



Government and Politics 



Honduras is not a major drug producer, it is a transit route for 
cocaine destined for both the United States and Europe. A radar 
station in Trujillo on the north Honduran coast forms part of a 
Caribbean- wide radar network designed for the interdiction of drug 
traffickers. The United States military in Honduras maintains a 
relatively low profile, with soldiers confined to the base, and the 
sporadic anti- Americanism targeted at the United States military 
in the past appears largely to have dissipated, most probably be- 
cause of the end to regional hostilities and the new supportive role 
of the United States as an advocate for the protection of human 
rights. 

Central America 

Honduran national hero Francisco Morazan was a prominent 
leader of the United Provinces of Central America in the 1820s 
and 1830s, but his vision of a united Central America was never 
fully realized because of divisiveness among the five original mem- 
ber nations — Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and 
Nicaragua — each of which went its separate way in 1838 with the 
official breakup of the federation. Subsequent hopes of restoring 
some type of political union were unsuccessful until the 1960s, when 
economic integration efforts led to the formation of the Central 
American Common Market (CACM — see Appendix B). In De- 
cember 1960, the General Treaty of Central American Integra- 
tion was signed by El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and 
Nicaragua, and the CACM became effective in June 1961. One 
year later, Costa Rica acceded to the treaty. 

The objectives of the CACM are to eliminate trade barriers 
among the five countries and institute a common external tariff 
(CET). Two important institutions were established as a result of 
CACM economic integration efforts in the 1960s. One was the 
Secretariat of the General Treaty on Central American Economic 
Integration (Secretaria Permanente del Tratado General de Integra- 
cion Economica Centroamericana — SIECA), based in Guatema- 
la City, which serves as the CACM's executive organ. The other 
was the Central American Bank for Economic Integration (Banco 
Centroamericano de Integracion Economica — BCIE) headquar- 
tered in Tegucigalpa, which is the CACM's financial institution 
that lends funds to its member nations, particularly for infrastruc- 
ture projects. The CACM integration process was somewhat suc- 
cessful in the 1960s, but by the end of the decade essentially fell 
into disarray because of the 1969 border war between Honduras 
and El Salvador, the so-called ' ' Soccer War" (see War with El Sal- 
vador, ch. 1). Honduras officially suspended its participation in 



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Honduras: A Country Study 

the CACM in December 1970, and relations with El Salvador re- 
mained tense in the 1970s, with border hostilities flaring up in 1976. 

A peace treaty between Honduras and El Salvador was finally 
signed in 1980, reportedly under significant pressure from the Unit- 
ed States. According to political scientist Ernesto Paz Aguilar, the 
treaty allied the Honduran and Salvadoran governments in a cam- 
paign against the leftist Salvadoran insurgents, as evidenced by 
the Honduran military's participation in the Rio Sumpul massacre 
of Salvadoran peasants in April 1980, when hundreds of Salvado- 
ran peasants were reportedly killed as they attempted to cross the 
river into Honduras. 

Given the historical animosity between the two nations, this mili- 
tary alliance was indeed surprising. As noted by Victor Meza, Unit- 
ed States policy demanded "ideological and operational solidarity 
with a country [El Salvador]" with which there existed "a territorial 
dispute and an historic antagonism." For Honduras, United States 
military assistance would benefit Honduras not only in case of con- 
flict with Nicaragua, but also, perhaps most importantly, in case 
of conflict with El Salvador. One example of United States dis- 
regard for Honduran sensitivities was the establishment of a Region- 
al Center for Military Training at Puerto Castilla in 1983, primarily 
to train Salvadoran soldiers. The center was eventually closed in 
1985 after General Alvarez Martinez, who had agreed to the es- 
tablishment of the center, was ousted by General Lopez Reyes. 
The official Salvadoran-Honduran bilateral relationship gradual- 
ly improved in the 1980s. 

In the early 1990s, there was considerable movement toward in- 
tegration in Central America, in part because of the good personal 
relations among the Central American presidents. The semiannual 
Central American presidential summits became institutionalized 
and were complemented by numerous other meetings among two 
or more of the region's nations. The so-called northern triangle 
of Central America, consisting of Guatemala, El Salvador, and 
Honduras, made consistently stronger efforts toward integration 
than did Costa Rica or Nicaragua. At the tenth Central American 
summit held in San Salvador in July 1991, the presidents decided 
to incorporate Panama into the integration process, although the 
method by which this would occur had not been spelled out as of 
mid- 1993. Belize has also attended the semiannual summits as an 
observer. Although Honduras has actively participated in Central 
American summits since 1986, it officially rejoined the integration 
process in February 1992, when the Transitional Multilateral Free 
Trade Agreement between Honduras and the other Central Ameri- 
can states came into force. 



204 



Government and Politics 



The rejuvenation of economic integration began in June 1990 
at the eighth presidential summit held in Antigua, Guatemala, when 
the presidents pledged to restructure, strengthen, and reactivate 
the integration process. The presidents signed a Central Ameri- 
can Economic Action Plan (Plan de Accion Economica de Centro- 
america — Paeca) that included a number of commitments and 
guidelines for integration. These included such varied measures 
as elimination of intraregional tariff barriers; support for commercial 
integration; tightening of regional coordination for external trade, 
foreign investment, and tourism; promotion of industrial restruc- 
turing; formulation and application of coordinated agricultural and 
science and technology policies; and promotion of coordinated mac- 
roeconomic adjustment processes. 

At the eleventh presidential summit held in December 1991 in 
Tegucigalpa, the presidents signed a protocol for the establishment 
of the Central American Integration System (Sistema de Integra- 
cion Centroamericana — Sica) to serve as a governing body for the 
integration process. The protocol was ratified by the Central Ameri- 
can states, and Sica began operating in February 1993. The main 
objective of Sica is to coordinate the region's integration institu- 
tions, including SIECA and the BCIE, which were established in 
the 1960s. 

Further progress toward economic integration was achieved in 
January 1993, when the five Central American states agreed to 
reduce the maximum external tariff for third countries from 40 to 
20 percent. In April 1993, a new Central American Free Trade 
Zone went into effect among the three northern triangle states and 
Nicaragua. The new grouping reduced tariffs for intraregional trade 
to the 5-20 percent range for some 5,000 products, with the inten- 
tion of lowering the tariff levels and expanding the scope of product 
coverage. The northern triangle states agreed to create a free trade 
area and customs union by April 1994. 

As regards political integration, the Central American presidents 
in 1987 signed a Constituent Treaty to set up a Central American 
Parliament (Parlamento Centroamericano — Parlacen) to serve as 
a deliberative body that would support integration and democra- 
cy through consultations and recommendations. With the excep- 
tion of Costa Rica, the other four Central American countries 
approved the treaty, and Parlacen was approved in September 1988. 
Each country was to have twenty elected deputies in the parlia- 
ment, but by the date of its inauguration in October 1991, only 
three nations — Honduras, El Salvador, and Guatemala — had elect- 
ed representatives. Nicaragua planned to elect deputies by early 
1994. Costa Rica's participation in Parlacen was impeded by 



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Honduras: A Country Study 



domestic opposition. Since February 1993, Parlacen has formed 
part of Sica. Other political organizations under Sica are the Cen- 
tral American Court of Justice and the Consultative Committee, 
consisting of representatives from different social sectors. 

As illustrated by the integration process, Honduras' s relations 
with El Salvador and Nicaragua were close in the early 1990s. In 
September 1992, after six years of consideration, the ICJ ruled on 
the border dispute with El Salvador and awarded Honduras ap- 
proximately two- thirds of the disputed area. Both countries agreed 
to abide by the decision. The ruling was viewed as a victory for 
Honduras, but also one that provided Honduras with significant 
challenges in dealing with the nearly 15,000 residents of the dis- 
puted bolsones who identified themselves as Salvadorans. Residents 
of the bolsones petitioned both governments in 1992 for land rights, 
freedom of movement between both nations, and the preservation 
of community organizations. A Honduran-Salvadoran Binational 
Commission was set up to work out any disputes. The ICJ also 
determined that El Salvador, Honduras, and Nicaragua were to 
share control of the Golfo de Fonseca on the Pacific coast. El Sal- 
vador was awarded the islands of Meanguera and Meanguerita, 
and Honduras was awarded the island of El Tigre. 

In 1993 political conflict in Nicaragua was again on the rise, with 
the government of President Chamorro struggling to achieve na- 
tional reconciliation between conservatives of her former ruling coa- 
lition and the leftist Sandinistas. Conservative critics of Chamorro 
charged her with caving in to Sandinista demands and complained 
that the Sandinistas still controlled the military and policy. Rearmed 
former Contras were forming in northern Nicaragua, with reported 
support from Nicaraguan and Cuban communities in the United 
States. Memories of the early 1980s led some observers to fear a 
flare-up of hostilities in the Honduran- Nicaraguan border area, 
as well as the prospect of another flood of Nicaraguan refugees into 
Honduras. Political observers and most Hondurans were hopeful, 
however, that even should turmoil break out in neighboring coun- 
tries, Honduras would be able to follow the course laid out in the 
1980s and continue to strengthen its democratic traditions. 

* * * 

In the 1980s, Honduras was the subject of several good political 
analyses in English. Most prominent among these works is James 
A. Morris's 1984 study, Honduras: Caudillo Politics and Military Rulers. 
Other important studies in the 1980s were Honduras Confronts Its 
Future: Contending Perspectives on Critical Issues, edited by Mark B. 



206 



Government and Politics 



Rosenberg and Philip Shepherd; Honduras: The Making of a Banana 
Republic, by Alison Acker; and Politics in Central America: Guatemala, 
El Salvador, Honduras, and Nicaragua, by Thomas P. Anderson, which 
includes several insightful chapters on Honduras 's historical po- 
litical development and dynamics. 

In the 1990s, two notable studies in English on Honduras are 
Donald E. Schulz's How Honduras Escaped Revolutionary Violence, a 
report published in 1992 by the United States Army War College; 
and Inside Honduras, authored by Kent Norsworthy with Tom Barry, 
which presents comprehensive analyses of politics, the economy, 
the multiplicity of Honduran social forces and institutions, and 
United States-Honduran relations. 

Several other studies on Central or Latin America contain notable 
chapters on Honduran politics. Mark B. Rosenberg has written 
an important chapter on the nation's historical political develop- 
ment in Howard J. Wiarda and Harvey F. Kline's Latin American 
Politics and Development, and Ronald H. McDonald and J. Mark 
Ruhl's 1989 study, Party Politics and Elections in Latin America, has 
an insightful article on Honduran elections. In addition, Charles 
Brockett's Land, Power, and Poverty: Agrarian Transformation and Po- 
litical Conflict in Central America covers the politics of agrarian re- 
form in Honduras. The 1992 study, Political Parties and Democracy 
in Central America, edited by Louis W. Goodman, William M. 
Leogrande, and Johanna Mendelson Forman, has several chap- 
ters touching on various aspects of Honduran politics. 

Two human rights organizations, Americas Watch and Amnesty 
International, have periodically published reports on the human 
rights situation in Honduras. In 1991 Americas Watch published 
Honduras: Torture and Murder by Government Forces Persist Despite End 
of Hostilities, and Amnesty International published Honduras: Per- 
sistence of Human Rights Violations. 

Valuable up-to-date information on Honduras is provided by 
several United States government agencies that publish annual or 
biannual reports on Honduras, covering such issues as human rights 
practices, economic trends, the investment climate, labor practices 
and trends, and cooperation with the United States on antidrug 
matters. 

Several studies in Spanish are valuable sources of information 
on Honduran politics. Leticia Salomon's Politicay militares en Hon- 
duras, published by Victor Meza's Centro de Documentacion de 
Honduras (Cedoh), provides a wealth of information on the Hon- 
duran military and its role in the political system. Also published 
by Cedoh in 1992 was Mario Posas's Puntos de vista: temas politicos, 
which examines a broad range of political issues since the country's 



207 



Honduras: A Country Study 

return to civilian democratic rule in 1982. Cedoh also publishes 
the valuable monthly, Boletin Informativo, which provides details and 
analysis of political and economic events in Honduras, and a maga- 
zine of political and social analysis, Puntos de Vista, in cooperation 
with the Sociology Department of UN AH. (For further informa- 
tion and complete citations, see Bibliography.) 



208 



Chapter 5. National Security 



The fort of San Fernando de Omoa on the Caribbean coast was built by the 
Spanish in the eighteenth century. 



THE 1982 CONSTITUTION of Honduras gives the armed forces 
a broad mandate to defend the national territory, maintain inter- 
nal order, and guarantee the principles of free elections and regu- 
lar presidential succession. This constitutional mandate ensures that 
the armed forces play a central role not only in national defense 
but also in politics. Although the government changed from mili- 
tary to civilian rule in 1982, the military remains a powerful insti- 
tution in Honduran society, formally and informally providing 
guidance to civilian political leaders. 

Honduras 's location on the borders of El Salvador and Nicara- 
gua, which were the scenes of hard-fought civil strife during the 
1970s and 1980s, has made Honduras geostrategically important 
to the United States. In the 1980s, Honduras became a buffer area 
to help contain leftist guerrilla activity in El Salvador as well as 
a home base for United States-supported Contras (short for 
contrarevolucionarios — see Glossary) seeking to destabilize the San- 
dinista (see Glossary) government of Nicaragua. In addition, the 
United States poured millions of dollars into the country during 
the 1980s and early 1990s in order to increase the size and strengthen 
the capabilities of the Honduran armed forces and massively ex- 
pand Honduras' s military infrastructure, which also supported a 
United States military presence. Between 1983 and 1993, the United 
States, in conjunction with the Honduran armed forces, carried 
out almost continuous military maneuvers on Honduran soil. Hon- 
duras 's geostrategic role in the Central American (see Glossary) 
crisis of the 1980s had a significant impact on the military, re- 
inforcing the historical processes that had strengthened the insti- 
tution and its key role in Honduran society. 

The ending of the Cold War and the return of relative peace 
to Nicaragua and El Salvador have brought new pressures to bear 
on the Honduran armed forces. The armed forces have been forced 
to adjust to steep cutbacks in military assistance from abroad and rec- 
oncile themselves to the prospect of having to deactivate combat units 
and personnel as part of the government's military reduction ef- 
fort. Additionally, they have had to face growing public demands 
for justice and an end to the military's role in human rights abuses. 
Although Honduran military leaders claim that a strong army is 
needed to protect the national territory and maintain internal order, 
in 1993 there were no perceivable external threats to Honduras, 



211 



Honduras: A Country Study 

and signs of internal threats to the government were weak, sporad- 
ic, and isolated (see Political Dynamics, ch. 4). 

In mid- 1993 Honduras had 22,500 armed forces personnel or- 
ganized into three services (army, air force, and navy) and the na- 
tional police force. Unlike its counterparts in many other Latin 
American countries, the Honduran national police, called the Public 
Security Force (Fuerza de Seguridad Publica — Fusep), remains an 
integral part of the armed forces. The army, having 14,000 troops, 
is the largest service, followed by the police, with 5,500 personnel. 
Although the air force has only 1,800 members, it wields much 
influence because of its historical importance and battle success dur- 
ing the 1969 border war with El Salvador. The navy, which grew 
rapidly during the 1970s and 1980s in response to an increased 
perception of threat to Honduran coastal waters, remains relatively 
small, with 1,200 members, 600 of whom are marine infantry. 

Historical Background 

One of the most important aspects of the Armed Forces of Hon- 
duras (Fuerzas Armadas de Honduras — FAH) is their political and 
economic influence. In some Central American countries, such as 
Guatemala and El Salvador, the armed forces emerged during the 
late nineteenth century as an appendage of powerful new coffee 
oligarchies. The military's primary function was to maintain peace 
or to restore it in rural areas suffering from the major dislocations 
that coffee cultivation produced. In Honduras, however, it was the 
lack of government continuity and the desire of caudillos (political 
strongmen) to control the central government that eventually led to 
the creation of the Honduran military. This difference in origins is 
important because it explains differences in contemporary military 
behavior. The Honduran military never developed a strong and over- 
riding allegiance to a landed oligarchy or to any other single economic 
interest group; it could thus play a mediating role when the interests 
of the oligarchy clashed with those of the less privileged classes. 

Although the political role that the armed forces have histori- 
cally performed has remained largely the same, major changes in 
military organization and structure have occurred since national 
independence was achieved in 1838. The evolution of the armed 
forces took place in three stages. From 1838 until 1922, the mili- 
tary was a tool of the political faction or party in power. Between 
1922 and 1963, the military forged an independent institutional 
identity (with guidance and aid from the United States). After 1963 
a number of national and international developments occurred that 
moved the armed forces further along the road toward institutional 
consolidation and organizational sophistication. 



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National Security 



The Army as Political Instrument, 1838-1922 

For the better part of a century, the army operated within a chaotic 
political context dominated by warring factions that sought control 
of the government largely for personal gain and wealth. The coun- 
try lacked strong church and governmental institutions, and the strug- 
gle for control of the central government was conducted largely by 
factions of various ideological hues, which formed loyalties to in- 
dividual caudillos. By the late nineteenth century, these factions had 
coalesced loosely around the two newly formed political parties, the 
Liberal Party of Honduras (Partido Liberal de Honduras — PLH) 
and the National Party of Honduras (Partido Nacional de Hon- 
duras— PNH). 

During this period, although men in uniform performed largely 
political functions, the military lacked institutional authority and 
identity. Caudillos who sought political power would form guer- 
rilla bands composed of relatives and friends and establish alliances 
with other ambitious politicians. If the caudillo succeeded in seiz- 
ing the capital city of Tegucigalpa, his new government would for- 
malize his military appointments. The newly appointed generals 
and colonels could then return to the provinces where they would 
assume high-level political positions, such as governorships. Be- 
cause they retained their military titles, the distinction between po- 
litical and military "command structure" at the regional level 
became blurred. 

During the early nineteenth century, the Honduran military per- 
formed both security and political functions in the countryside. Each 
of the seventeen departments into which the nation was divided 
contained a comandancia (command headquarters). A large num- 
ber of military detachments also existed at the subdepartmental 
level. In 1914, for example, Honduras had eighty local comandan- 
cias but 1 83 subcomandancias de pueblo (town subcommand headquar- 
ters) or subcomandancias de aldea (village subcommand headquarters). 
Whereas the instability of the central government no doubt con- 
tributed to considerable turnover at the local level, a continuing 
local military presence was necessary to keep the peace. 

Just as important, local military units performed critical politi- 
cal functions, which are best demonstrated by the historical role 
of the militia during national elections. As election time approached, 
governors and their subordinates, the officer-politicians, would be 
called back to active duty, and they in turn would call up the 
militia — made up of able-bodied males between the ages of twenty- 
one and thirty, who were given instructions on how to vote. Failure 
to comply with these instructions constituted a serious breach of 



213 



Honduras: A Country Study 

military discipline. Such practices by the military persisted well 
into the twentieth century. 

Development of an Independent Military Identity, 1922-63 

During the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, rapid turn- 
over in governments prevented a weak professional officer corps 
from consolidating its position and professionalizing military service. 
The country had few military schools; and the lack of resources, 
including the poor caliber of students, meant that a professional 
cadre of officers never solidified. A severe inequality in the con- 
scription system also handicapped professionalization. All able- 
bodied males between the ages of twenty-one and thirty were 
legally required to serve, but numerous exemptions existed for 
members of the middle class. The result was that militia service 
came to be viewed as a form of lower-class servitude rather than 
as a patriotic duty. 

During the 1930s, the political climate stabilized under the PNH 
and its strongman, Tiburcio C arias Andino (president, 1932-49), 
who took advantage of foreign aid to create a military apparatus 
that developed long-term support for his government. The air corps, 
which had been established in 1922, was the first of the armed ser- 
vices to benefit from such aid. A United States Air Force colonel 
became the first commandant of the Military Aviation School found- 
ed in 1934, and United States personnel ran the school until the 
end of World War II. By 1942 United States-trained pilots were 
flying a fleet of twenty- two aircraft. The army's capabilities also 
improved with training in counterinsurgency, which proved help- 
ful to C arias in defending his government from his political enemies. 

During World War II, the United States military's mission ex- 
panded to include support for the professionalization of the army. 
In 1946 Honduran military officers began to receive advanced mili- 
tary training at the United States Army School of the Americas 
in the Panama Canal Zone, which nearly 3,000 of them attended 
until the school's closing in 1986. In 1946 the Basic Arms School 
was established, and separate schools for enlisted personnel and 
officers were formed shortly thereafter. In 1952 the Francisco 
Morazan Military Academy was established with aid from the Unit- 
ed States; it graduated its first class of officers in 1956 (see Re- 
cruitment and Training, this ch.). As academic standards and 
entrance requirements steadily improved during the late 1950s and 
early 1960s, the academy attracted a greater number of intelligent 
and ambitious young Hondurans to a military career. In 1947 the 
United States Military Assistance Program (MAP) made it possi- 
ble for the Hondurans to create the First Infantry Battalion. Shortly 



214 



National Security 



thereafter an additional infantry battalion was formed. What hither- 
to had been a conglomerate of local militia units began to take on 
the appearance of a modern national army. 

These internal changes led to the emergence of an independent, 
politically conscious, and professionally trained cadre of Hondu- 
ran military officers. In 1956, for the first time in Honduran his- 
tory, the military, as an autonomous institution, intervened direcdy 
in civilian politics by overthrowing president Julio Lozano Diaz 
and establishing a government headed by a military junta (see 
Aborted Reform, 1954-63, ch. 1). Seeking to preserve its new-found 
autonomy and status, the military introduced provisions in the 1957 
constitution to ensure that the armed services would not have to 
submit to the authority of civilian politicians. Among these provi- 
sions was a requirement that presidential orders to the military be 
transmitted through the commander in chief of the armed forces, 
who, moreover, was granted the right to disobey the president if 
his commands were perceived to violate the constitution. The new 
constitution also stripped the civilian government of its control over 
military promotions and assignments. 

By the early 1960s, the Honduran military leadership was con- 
fident in its position, determined to protect its institutional auton- 
omy, and willing to play a greater role in the national political arena. 
This they did in 1963 when air force general Oswaldo Lopez Are- 
llano seized power from civilian president Ramon Villeda Morales 
and governed until 1971. Lopez Arellano seized power again in 
1972 after a short civilian interlude, and the armed forces domi- 
nated the political scene for the remainder of the 1970s. From 1954 
until 1981, each chief of the armed forces also served as president 
of the country before taking his retirement (see Military Rule and 
International Conflict, 1963-78, ch. 1). 

Consolidation and Organizational Maturity, 1963-80 

During the 1960s and 1970s, the armed forces underwent fur- 
ther important changes that had significant political repercussions. 
The military expanded rapidly in size from approximately 8,000 
personnel in 1970 to 16,000 a decade later. Growth was accompa- 
nied by improved professional training and an expanded officer 
corps of academy graduates. With enlargement and organization- 
al complexity came new and bigger general staffs and support units. 
Change and growth were accelerated by the defeat by El Salvador 
in the 1969 4 'Soccer War," a defeat that drove military leaders to 
improve their conventional warfare capabilities and modernize the 
air force (see War with El Salvador, ch. 1). Shortly after the war, 
for example, Honduras purchased sophisticated military hardware 



215 



Honduras: A Country Study 



from Israel, including armored vehicles mounted with recoilless 
rifles and a dozen modified Super Mystere B2 fighter-bombers. 
The purchase made Honduras the first country in the region with 
supersonic aircraft. Furthermore, in 1970 military leaders took ac- 
tion to prevent the formation of a separate and independent 
uniformed force under civilian control. They incorporated the senior 
leadership of the national police, or Civil Guard (Guardia Civil) 
as it was called then, into the rapidly growing national defense sys- 
tem (see Public Security Force, this ch.). 

Increased numbers of troop commands and service units led to 
an expanded professional officer corps, the members of which 
demanded a greater role in decision making. An expanding or- 
ganizational complexity also challenged the military hierarchy to 
deal with factionalism within the officer corps, as well as interser- 
vice rivalry. Officers, for example, began to identify with and ally 
themselves with members of their own military academy graduat- 
ing class, known as a promotion. Each promotion competed against 
other academy classes for privileges and promotions — a phenome- 
non that developed also in other Central American countries. To 
deal with some of these organizational problems, the Supreme 
Council of the Armed Forces (Consejo Superior de las Fuerzas 
Armadas — Consuffaa) was created in 1975. Consuffaa became the 
main consultative body in all matters of concern to the military. 

Constitutional and Other Legal Provisions 

The 1982 constitution and the Constituent Law of the Armed 
Forces, issued in 1975, form the legal framework within which the 
military operates. According to Article 272 of the constitution, the 
armed forces are "a national institution that is permanent, essen- 
tially professional, nonpolitical, obedient, and nondeliberative." 
Their mission is to " defend the territorial integrity and sovereignty 
of the Republic, to maintain peace, public order and the integrity 
of the Constitution, the principle of free elections and regular 
presidential succession." Furthermore, the armed forces are di- 
rected to cooperate with the executive branch in developmental 
activities, including education, agrarian reform, extension of the 
transportation and communications infrastructure, health, and 
preservation of natural resources. 

At the top of the military command hierarchy is the president 
of the republic, who is the titular head of the armed forces and 
is given the title of general commander (comandante general). Accord- 
ing to Article 19 of the constituent law, the president is empowered 
to maintain the territorial integrity and inviolability of Honduras 
and to preserve internal and external security. However, these and 



216 



Members of the Honduran army's 7th battalion train in joint United 

States -Honduran exercises. 
Courtesy Department of Defense, Still Media Records Center 



217 



Honduras: A Country Study 

other presidential powers are circumscribed by Article 278 of the 
constitution, which specifies that presidential orders given through 
the chief (jefe) of the armed forces (who is the top active-duty mili- 
tary officer) are to be obeyed by the military. Unlike earlier con- 
stitutions, the 1982 document contains no article explicitiy reserving 
for the armed forces the right to disobey presidential orders. Lack 
of such a provision reflects growth in the number of "checks and 
balances" between military and civilian authorities that have been 
incorporated into existing legislation. 

The president can declare war while the National Congress is 
not in session, but the National Congress must immediately be con- 
vened to confirm the action. The president can also permit for- 
eign troops, ships, and aircraft to move through national territory, 
if congress has authorized such action in advance. The president 
has the power to send troops abroad in support of existing treaty 
commitments or other international agreements, but only with prior 
congressional authorization. Further provisions allow the president 
to call up the reserves in time of war or internal unrest and to or- 
ganize and deploy military units on national territory when these 
actions are taken through the chief of the armed forces. 

Honduran presidents have occasionally attempted to construct 
an independent base of power around control of the Presidential 
Honor Guard and to politically manipulate the promotion system. 
To curb the power of the president, the military has carefully cir- 
cumscribed presidential power in both areas by law. The presi- 
dent names personnel to the honor guard, but only with the 
approval of the Secretary of State for National Defense and Public 
Security (as the Honduran minister of defense is formally known). 
Honor Guard officers are selected from among active-duty mili- 
tary personnel, who thus remain under the direct control of the 
chief of the armed forces. Article 21 of the constituent law states 
that the Honor Guard "will consist of the number of officers and 
enlisted men strictly necessary for the accomplishment of its mis- 
sion." Because this mission is largely ceremonial, the president is 
effectively prevented from expanding the unit. The Presidential 
Honor Guard was disbanded when the country returned to civilian 
rule in the early 1980s. 

Article 279 of the constitution states that the chief of the armed 
forces must be a senior officer holding at least the rank of colonel 
or its equivalent, on active duty, and a native Honduran. The chief 
of the armed forces is chosen by congress from a list of three names 
proposed by Consuffaa, serves a five-year term, and can be re- 
moved from office by a two-thirds vote of congress for reasons 
such as permanent physical or mental incapacity. To prevent the 



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National Security 



concentration of political power in the hands of the president, the 
constitution specifies that no relative of the president to the fourth 
level of consanguinity can be chosen as chief of the armed forces. 

Powers of the chief of the armed forces encompass the full range 
of organizational and administrative activities. The armed forces 
chief is empowered to "release the directives, instructions and orders 
that regulate the organization, functioning, and administration of 
the armed forces," prepare military plans, inspect military installa- 
tions and troop units, and assign personnel to the various branches. 
Additionally, it is the armed forces chief who most direcdy con- 
trols, regulates, and manages institutional military relations with 
foreign governments. The chief decides which countries should sup- 
ply military aid and training and to which countries officers and 
enlisted personnel will be sent for schooling. The armed forces chief 
also holds ultimate control over officer promotions, but rarely over- 
turns a decision of the promotions board. 

Although the powers of the chief of the armed forces are sub- 
stantial, before April 1982 members of Consuffaa also wielded con- 
siderable power over the military. Its members include the armed 
forces chief (who serves as chairman), the minister of national 
defense and public security, the chief of the General Staff of the 
Armed Forces, the inspector general, commanders of the various 
service branches, and commanders of airbases and naval fleets. Con- 
suffaa also includes commanders of combat and support units 
organized at the brigade level, or at the battalion level when in- 
dependent; the directors of the various service schools; and the 
armed forces' auditor and paymaster general. Depending on the 
specific period of time and organizational structure of the armed 
forces, Consuffaa has had from twenty-five to forty members. 

The chief of the armed forces convokes regular sessions of Con- 
suffaa at least four times a year. In addition, extraordinary ses- 
sions are held if called for by the president of the republic, the armed 
forces chief, or by one-third of Consuffaa's members. Consuffaa 
establishes its own internal rules, which include the following pro- 
visions: that two-thirds of the members be present before a meet- 
ing be held, that decisions be reached by majority vote, that ties 
be broken by the armed forces chief, and that all decisions be 
binding. 

Consuffaa evolved from a predecessor body called the Superior 
Defense Council, which was established in 1970 to give legitimacy 
to the position of General Lopez Arellano and to deal with mat- 
ters of military succession. Under rules in effect in the early 1980s, 
Consuffaa could propose a slate of three candidates to congress to 
fill the unexpired term of the chief of the armed forces should the 



219 



Honduras: A Country Study 

position fall vacant. If congress is in recess, it is called into special 
session. However, Consuffaa is more than just a body with nar- 
row, if important, procedural powers. Under both military and 
civilian governments, it has become the ultimate authority, deter- 
mining broad matters of national policy. Consuffaa has the power 
to review and approve the national security budget in advance, 
to form commissions consisting of civilians and soldiers to study 
any national problem of interest to the armed forces, and to famil- 
iarize itself with national development plans. 

Although not technically subordinate to the chief of the armed 
forces and Consuffaa, the Secretary of State for National Defense 
and Public Security occupies a position that responds to their ac- 
tions. Appointed to office by the president, the Secretary of State 
for National Defense and Public Security countersigns all mea- 
sures dealing with armed forces organization and personnel matters. 
He or she also serves as the channel through which are conveyed 
measures submitted by the military high command for discussion 
and approval by the executive branch and congress. Each year this 
secretary reports to congress on the current activities of the armed 
forces. The secretary of state heads the Ministry of National Defense 
and Public Security, which formally controls the Public Security 
Force (Fuerza de Seguridad Publica — Fusep). Actual control of 
Fusep, however, is held by the chief and the General Staff of the 
Armed Forces. 

The General Staff of the Armed Forces is the body through which 
the chief of the armed forces plans, coordinates, and supervises or- 
ganizational activities. Planning functions include the development 
of the strategic doctrine and tactics that the military will use in pur- 
suit of national objectives. The general staff is also charged with 
incorporating these ideas into the programs of study of all military 
schools and with planning and supervising military exercises that 
reflect their character. Just as important as the general staffs plan- 
ning function are the supervisory and coordinating functions that 
allow the chief of the armed forces to coordinate and control the 
activities of the various service branches. The General Staff of the 
Armed Forces is charged with seeing that the operational orders 
of the service branch chiefs are carried out and with compiling in- 
formation concerning the activities and requirements of subordinate 
commands. The importance of the position held by the chief of 
the general staff is indicated by Article 281 of the constitution, which 
stipulates that the chief of the general staff will perform the duties 
of chief of the armed forces when the latter is temporarily absent 
from duty. 



220 



National Security 



The Armed Forces 

The armed force include the army, the air force, the navy, and 
the public security force (Fusep). Most internal security functions 
and some police activities fall under Fusep control. Each of the four 
branches has its own distinct organizational structure and equip- 
ment (see fig. 9). The capabilities of the Honduran armed forces 
are hindered by a lack of armored personnel carriers (APCs) and 
the logistical problems posed by servicing a variety of small arms. 
The country has no weapons manufacturing capability and must 
import all of its equipment and supplies. The army is top-heavy 
with officers. By comparison, the Salvadoran army is double the 
size of the Honduran, yet both armies have about 250 senior 
officers. The average United States infantry division has 18,000 
soldiers — about 4,000 more than the entire Honduran army — but 
only twenty to twenty-five senior officers. On the other hand, Hon- 
duras has the most balanced ground, air, and naval forces in Cen- 
tral America. The army is equipped with a small number of modern 
light tanks and anti-aircraft and artillery pieces; the air force has 
the only supersonic aircraft in the region; and the navy has the 
fastest and best-equipped boats in Central America. 

Army 

The Army of Honduras (Ejercito de Honduras — EH) came into 
its modern form when changes were made in the previous militia 
system during the 1940s and 1950s. With assistance from the United 
States, the First Infantry Battalion was created in 1947 as a tradi- 
tional infantry unit, and the Second Infantry Battalion was formed 
during the 1950s as a counterinsurgency unit. These two battal- 
ions remain important military commands and were headquartered 
near the capital city, Tegucigalpa, in the early 1990s. 

During the 1960s and 1970s, the number of army combat units 
expanded dramatically, and major changes occurred in the organi- 
zation of the ground forces. Some of these changes were political- 
ly rather than militarily motivated, as, for example, when General 
Lopez Arellano created the First Infantry Brigade in 1971 to serve 
as his own private guard. In 1970 the army had grown to three 
infantry battalions complemented by an engineering battalion and 
an artillery battalion, which had been created immediately after 
the 1969 conflict with El Salvador. By the end of the 1970s, the 
number of infantry battalions had increased to ten, and a signal 
battalion had been added. 

By 1983 troop strength had grown to 13,500. The army had three 
brigades, each composed of two infantry battalions and one artillery 



221 



Honduras: A Country Study 



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222 



National Security 



battalion. In addition, there were six independent infantry battal- 
ions varying in size from 400 to 1,000 men. Two of the infantry 
battalions formed the Presidential Honor Guard, which was based 
in Tegucigalpa and under the personal command of the president. 
There was also an engineering battalion, an armored car regiment, 
and a special forces unit of battalion size. 

The army continued to grow in size, strength, and complexity 
during the 1980s, reaching a peak of 15,400 in 1989. Beginning 
in 1990, because of severe reductions in the government's mili- 
tary budget, the army began to cut its troop strength, dropping 
to 14,500 in 1991 and then to 14,000 in 1993 (see Defense Bud- 
get, this ch.). The downward trend is expected to continue. Cur- 
rently, the army is composed of three infantry brigades totaling 
ten regular infantry battalions, a special jungle group, one artillery 
battalion, one engineer battalion, and a signal battalion. A single 
armored calvary regiment is made up of four armored car squad- 
rons, one reconnaissance squadron, a tank squadron, and one ar- 
tillery battalion. General Army Headquarters has direct control 
of a territorial force composed of one special forces (airborne quali- 
fied) battalion, one infantry battalion, one regular airborne bat- 
talion, the Honduran Military Training Academy, the Francisco 
Morazan Military Academy, the Commando School, and the 
Officer Candidate School. 

The principal infantry weapons are Belgian FAL automatic ri- 
fles and United States-manufactured M-16s. The tank squadron 
is equipped with twelve British-made Scorpion light tanks, which 
have a 400-kilometer range and travel seventy-two kilometers per 
hour. These tanks give the army some rapid armored mobility be- 
cause of their air transportability and high speed on the ground. 
The army is also equipped with towed artillery pieces, including 
twenty-four 105mm howitzers and four 155mm guns. Air defense 
capabilities are provided by thirty highly effective Ml 67 Vulcan 
guns (see table 8, Appendix A). 

Air Force 

Unlike most other Central American countries, Honduras formed 
its first modern military structures around the air arm (see Historical 
Background, this ch.). Traditionally, the air force has functioned 
as Honduras' s strongest military deterrent. Personnel from the Air 
Force of Honduras (Fuerzas Aereas de Honduras) played key roles 
in the military coup that overthrew President Lozano in 1956; and 
General Lopez Arellano, an air force officer, played an important 
role in Honduran politics during the 1960s and early 1970s. The 
air force enhanced its public reputation and prestige during the 



223 



Honduras: A Country Study 

1969 conflict with El Salvador. Although the Salvadoran air force 
launched a surprise attack on Honduran airfields, the Honduran 
pilots were able to counterattack and to damage oil storage tanks 
at the Salvadoran ports of La Union and Acajutla. The war 
produced a number of air force heroes, the best known of whom 
is Major Fernando Soto, who shot down three Salvadoran fighter 
aircraft. 

The air force had a total troop strength in 1993 of 1,800. This 
figure did not include civilian maintenance personnel. The air 
force's offensive capability consists of three combat squadrons: one 
fighter/ground attack with ten F-5Es and two F-5Fs, one coun- 
terinsurgency with thirteen A-37Bs and some aging F-86F/Ks, and 
one reconnaissance with three RT-33As. The United States- 
manufactured A-37B Dragonfly ground-attack bombers have a 
maximum range of 740 kilometers while carrying a full payload, 
and they can be used in counterinsurgency missions from short, 
unimproved airstrips. The F-5 Tiger II fighters, which also are 
of United States manufacture, are supersonic aircraft, easily main- 
tained and capable of using rough airfields. Each F-5 can be armed 
with two 20mm cannon, two Sidewinder air-to-air missiles, and 
up to 3,000 kilograms of bombs, rockets, and air-to-ground mis- 
siles, and can be used for both ground attack and air interception. 
Twelve Super Mystere B2 fighter-bombers that Honduras acquired 
from Israel in the 1970s are no longer operational. Honduras's small 
fighter fleet is the most sophisticated in Central America and costs 
about US$3 million a year to fly and maintain. The air force is 
also supplied with seventeen transport planes, forty-two trainers 
and liaison aircraft, and forty- two helicopters. 

Air force headquarters is located at Toncontin International Air- 
port near Tegucigalpa, with major bases at San Pedro Sula, La 
Ceiba, and San Lorenzo. Beginning in 1983, the air force, with 
the assistance of the United States, undertook a significant upgrad- 
ing of Honduran air facilities. Work was done at the Enrique Soto 
Cano Air Base (formerly Palmerola Air Base) to extend the run- 
ways and to build additional access ramps, fuel storage facilities, 
and revetments. The base is located near Comayagua. These im- 
provements were done according to United States Air Force specifi- 
cations, making the facilities suitable for use by United States 
military aircraft under terms of a 1982 annex to a 1954 military 
assistance agreement (see United States Military Assistance and 
Training, this ch.). With technical assistance from the United 
States, the Honduran air force also took on the task of providing 
critical logistical, training, and tactical support for the army and 
Fusep. 



224 



National Security 



Because of Honduras 's rugged topography and the limited ac- 
cess by road to vast areas of the country, the air force plays an 
important role in tying the nation together. Numerous small air- 
ports are located in isolated areas; they are used to provide trans- 
port services and to facilitate civic action work by the military. 
Military influence extends into the area of civil aviation, with former 
president and air force general Lopez Arellano controlling the two 
major Honduran national airlines, Air Service of Honduras (Ser- 
vicios Aereos de Honduras, Sociedad Anonima — SAHSA) and Na- 
tional Air Transport (Transportes Aereos Nacionales, Sociedad 
Anonima — TAN) . 

Navy 

Before the early 1970s, Honduras did not have an independent 
navy. The country had only one utility boat twelve meters in length, 
which allowed personnel from the army to patrol coastal waters 
intermittently. In 1972 the Navy of Honduras (Marina de Hon- 
duras) became a separate service with its own mission and general 
staff. 

The navy had a personnel strength of 1 ,200, including 600 ma- 
rines, in 1993. The navy had doubled in size since 1983 because 
of changing military perspectives concerning the importance of 
naval forces in Central America and because of an increase of Unit- 
ed States aid. The navy is headquartered at three bases: Amapala 
on Isla del Tigre in the Golfo de Fonseca on the Pacific coast, Puerto 
Cortes on the western Caribbean coast, and Puerto Castilla on the 
central Caribbean coast. In 1993 the fleet consisted of five fast- 
attack craft, eight river- and seven coastal-patrol craft, nine land- 
ing craft, and six auxiliary craft. In addition, the navy controls 
the First Naval Infantry Battalion, based at Puerto Cortes. 

Public Security Force 

The Public Security Force (Fuerza de Seguridad Publica — 
Fusep), the fourth major component of the armed forces, is respon- 
sible for maintaining public order and protecting private property. 
Police units were first created in Honduras in 1882, and a traffic 
division was established in 1933. When the PLH, led by President 
Ramon Villeda Morales, came to power in 1957, a Civil Guard 
was created to assume police functions. The Civil Guard, however, 
appeared to military leaders to pose a direct threat to their politi- 
cal influence and interests. After the 1963 coup that brought Lopez 
Arellano to power, the Civil Guard was disbanded and replaced 
by an army-dominated Special Security Corps, which took over 
all major police functions. The Special Security Corps was organized 



225 



Honduras: A Country Study 

into small detachments throughout the country with responsibility 
for regulating transit, patrolling the border, and investigating crimi- 
nal activities. 

Once they had gained control of police functions by absorbing 
the Civil Guard, the armed forces attempted to restore to police 
units a certain measure of independence. Although army officers 
controlled the Special Security Corps and later Fusep, which 
replaced the Special Security Corps in 1973, political reasons led 
the armed forces to distance themselves from the police. During 
the 1970s, military leaders such as Lopez Arellano benefited from 
the perception among peasants that the armed forces were progres- 
sive and bent on implementing land reform. 

Although Fusep continued to be controlled by army officers and 
was formally subordinate to the Ministry of National Defense and 
Public Security, by the early 1980s it had its own general staff and 
separate organizational structure. Fusep had regular-line police units 
and an investigative unit that is now called the National Direc- 
torate of Investigation (Directorio de Investigation Nacional — 
DIN). DIN was formed in 1976 and became heavily involved in 
the campaign to quell internal subversion and unrest. Fusep came 
to be viewed by the armed forces as the primary instrument for 
dealing with internal security problems. However, some military 
officers felt that Fusep was staffed with unsophisticated and some- 
times brutal personnel, and they worried about the effect on their 
national image of too-close an association with Fusep. 

In 1993 Fusep was made up of 5,500 active-duty personnel, 
making it the second largest service branch after the army. It is 
organized under a director general with commands for counter- 
narcotics, traffic police, treasury, logistics, and the DIN. The DIN 
is made up of departments for criminal identification, intelligence 
and immigration, and a police laboratory. The traffic command 
is responsible for vehicle registration and inspection, licenses, traffic 
control, and investigation of accidents. A directorate of operations 
controls two special services squadrons (El Machen and Casama- 
ta); the Morazan signal squadron; police stations; and a technical 
and tactical police department, which includes an elite counterin- 
surgency battalion, the Cobras. In addition to their antiguerrilla 
activities, the Cobras have also been used against labor unions, 
populist organizations, and student activists. The infamous Bat- 
talion 3-16, which was created in the early 1980s to function as 
a clandestine countersubversive force and which has been linked 
to the disappearance and extrajudicial execution of hundreds of 
Honduran civilians, is believed to be under Fusep authority (see 
fig. 10). 



226 



National Security 



Other Military Units 

A number of additional units and dependencies complement the 
major services. One consists of the centers of military instruction, 
which train both officers and enlisted personnel (see Recruitment 
and Training, this ch.). The Logistical Support Center is respon- 
sible for meeting the military needs for transport, maintenance, 
production, warehousing, supply, and distribution of materials and 
equipment. Dependencies include the Auditor's Office, the Office 
of the Paymaster General, and the Military Pension Institute (In- 
stituto de Pension Militar — IPM). The IPM, a semiautonomous 
government agency charged with providing for the economic well- 
being and security of members of the armed forces upon retire- 
ment, manages many of the growing number of military- owned 
businesses (see Involvement in the Nation's Economy, this ch.). 

Finally, there are the reserves, which complement the active- 
duty armed forces and consist of standby and general reserve 
groups. The standby reserve consists of citizens who have com- 
pleted active military service. The general reserve, which is poorly 
administered and offers very little military capability, is made up 
of all physically and mentally fit Honduran men who have not 
served in the military. The size of the standby reserve stood at 
60,000 in 1990. 

Recruitment and Training 

Historically, the ranks of the Honduran army have been filled 
not through regular recruitment procedures, but through force and 
intimidation. According to Article 276 of the 1982 constitution, 
all able-bodied men between the ages of eighteen and thirty are 
liable for up to eighteen months of compulsory service. In reality, 
however, exemptions are common for members of the upper and 
middle classes, and young men from the lower classes, usually be- 
tween the ages of fourteen and eighteen, are pressed into service 
against their will. 

The absence of a respected and institutionalized draft, coupled 
with low salaries for enlisted personnel, provides little incentive 
to enlist in the armed forces. The problem is compounded by the 
unfavorable view that urban youths have of enlisted armed forces 
personnel, who are mostly illiterate, poor, and rural. Recruitment 
in urban areas is accomplished through the recogida (harvest), which 
consists of military sweeps through the major cities. Army patrols 
pick up young men at the plazas and entertainment centers, such 
as movie theaters, ask for their military identification cards, and 
abduct anyone without one. Military personnel are often posted 



227 



Honduras: A Country Study 




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228 



National Security 



at bus stops and seize youths who are classified as "vagrants." 
Sometimes it is possible for the youth to prove student status or 
have his family pay for his release. Those who cannot do either 
are taken direcdy to training barracks. Forced conscription became 
increasingly common after 1980 because of the escalation of con- 
flict within the region and the growth in the size of the ground forces. 

Peasants appear to have a somewhat more favorable view of life 
in the armed forces because it often represents their first opportu- 
nity to receive the benefits of modern society. In addition to receiv- 
ing new clothes, a balanced diet, and medical treatment, they have 
the opportunity to learn to read. The Francisco Morazan Military 
Academy teaches aspiring officers how to instruct their troops in 
a variety of subjects, including hygiene and occupational trade skills, 
that sometimes prove useful later in civilian life. 

Despite the benefits enjoyed by recruits, military service among 
the enlisted ranks is widely perceived as a burden of the rural poor. 
The life of an enlisted soldier is harsh and sometimes brutal. The 
practice of forced conscription is hated and feared by most Hon- 
durans, and it has contributed to the growth of antimilitary senti- 
ment in the country. Such sentiment became a political factor in 
the 1990s. During the 1993 presidential campaign, Carlos Rober- 
to Reina Idiaquez, one of the leading candidates, made conscrip- 
tion a campaign issue. He promised to replace forced recruitment 
with an all- volunteer system. He also promised to improve condi- 
tions in the military for the average recruit. The military leader- 
ship, headed by General Luis Alonso Discua Elvir, the chief of the 
armed forces, opposed his plan, claiming that the country could 
not afford an all-volunteer system and that it would result in the 
crippling of the armed forces. 

The process of recruitment and training of officers has been a 
different matter. Before the 1950s, it was difficult to attract high- 
caliber personnel into the academies, and the desertion rate among 
cadets was high. As the salaries and status of military officers im- 
proved during the 1960s, however, the academies began to attract 
cadets much more motivated to succeed as military officers and 
more willing to pursue careers in the armed forces. 

The Francisco Morazan Military Academy was established in 
1952. Partly to raise academic standards within the armed forces 
and, thus, attract cadets of higher caliber, a program of civil edu- 
cation was incorporated into the curriculum to supplement the 
military- related courses. These changes allowed cadets to earn a 
bachelor's degree in arts and sciences, which appealed to those from 
the urban, lower middle class. 



229 



Honduras: A Country Study 



A prospective cadet, who has to be at least eighteen years of age, 
qualifies for admission by taking a competitive entrance examina- 
tion that tests knowledge of primary- school subjects. For many 
cadets, the academy's three-year program of studies is capped by 
an additional one-year stint at the United States Army School of 
the Americas in Fort Benning, Georgia, where a cadet receives ad- 
vanced training in infantry tactics, weapons skills, and the martial 
arts. 

In 1981 the Armed Forces Command and General Staff School 
was established in Tegucigalpa. The design of its curriculum was 
influenced by two visiting Argentine military officers, who were 
sponsored by the Argentine General Staff College. The school is 
attached to the Francisco Morazan Military Academy. 

Fusep has its own training school in Tegucigalpa, where both 
recruits and officers receive training in police communications, 
criminal investigation, crowd control, interrogation, drug inter- 
diction, civil procedure, and the criminal code. Some Fusep officers 
also receive training at the International Police Academy in 
Washington. Beginning in 1986, Fusep officers began receiving 
tactical training from the regular army as part of a stepped-up ef- 
fort to combat rising crime rates in Tegucigalpa and San Pedro Sula. 

Ranks, Insignia, and Uniforms 

The rank structure of Honduran military officers generally con- 
forms to that used in the United States. Fusep also has a rank struc- 
ture; it is similar to the army's structure (see fig. 11). Enlisted grades 
also generally parallel those used in the United States (see fig. 12). 

The Armed Forces of Honduras uses insignia developed by 
the Central American Defense Council (Consejo de Defensa 
Centroamericana — Condeca) except at the general officer level. 
Company grade officers of the army, air force, and Fusep wear 
one gold bar to indicate the rank of second lieutenant, lieutenants 
wear two bars, and captains, three. The field grades are represented 
by gold stars — one for major, two for lieutenant colonel, and three 
for colonel. Honduran brigadier generals wear four silver stars, 
and major generals wear five. Air force personnel are distinguished 
from army personnel only by unit insignia and by wings worn on 
the jacket or shirt pocket. Navy officer insignia are distinct and 
consist of a gold star combined with yellow bars on black shoulder 
boards. 

The army field uniforms, which are similar to United States 
Army field dress, are olive green in color and include cap and black 
boots. Honduran soldiers sometimes also wear camouflage olive 
green and khaki-colored field uniforms. The army service uniform 



230 



National Security 



consists of beige shirt, beige trousers with a black stripe along the 
sides, black belt, and black shoes. Officers wear their rank insig- 
nia on the collar. Enlisted personnel wear rank insignia on the uni- 
form's upper arm. 

The 1982 constitution states that military rank and promotion 
are to be awarded only through strict application of promotion poli- 
cies in accordance with the law. Armed forces personnel cannot 
be stripped of their rank or military honors except according to 
similarly rigorous application of legal procedures. Promotion of 
officers through the company grades is conferred by the president 
of the republic on the recommendation of the chief of the armed 
forces. Both field and general grades are conferred by congress as 
jointly recommended by the president and chief of the armed forces. 
Promotions of enlisted personnel are given through unit com- 
manders and approved by the service branch general staff. Promo- 
tions are based on criteria such as minimum time in grade, abili- 
ty, and existing vacancies. 

Promotion is conferred by a promotions board, with the approval 
of the chief of the armed forces. Officer promotion through captain 
is generally automatic after a required period of time in each rank; 
promotion to major and above involves merit, as well as completion 
of scheduled training. Promotion to lieutenant colonel requires at- 
tendance at the Armed Forces Command and General Staff School. 

Military Finances 
Defense Budget 

The Honduran National Congress has little say in determining 
how the armed forces spend the defense budget. Congress approves 
a single lump-sum amount, with little debate or itemization and 
no oversight. The chief of the armed forces has the authority to 
make all final spending decisions for the military. 

During the 1980s, increases in the defense budget were fueled 
by military assistance from the United States in the form of For- 
eign Military Sales (FMS), the Military Assistance Program 
(MAP), and the International Military Education Training (IMET) 
program (see United States Military Assistance and Training, this 
ch.). Between 1983 and 1989, these programs provided Honduras 
with a yearly average of US$47.59 million in military assistance. 
The advent of peace in Central America led to a sharp drop in mili- 
tary assistance after 1991 — down from US$33.5 million in 1991 to 
US$16.3 million in 1992, and to only US$2.7 million in 1993. The 
rise in foreign assistance and subsequent dramatic reductions had 
a corresponding effect on Honduran miitary expenditures. 



231 



Honduras: A Country Study 



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232 



National Security 




233 



Honduras: A Country Study 

Honduran military spending averaged US$72.4 million a year 
between 1982 and 1988, reaching a peak of US$126 million in 1989. 
Later, during 1992 and 1993, the official defense budgets averaged 
only US$44.2 million. At the beginning of the 1994 government 
budget process, it appeared likely that military expenditures would 
drop further. The sharp decline in spending has led to significant 
reductions in the size and capabilities of the armed forces (see The 
Armed Forces, this ch.). 

Involvement in the Nation's Economy 

In addition to the legislated budget, the military also receives 
an income of about US$40 million annually from its own network 
of businesses, as well as from revenue generated through its con- 
trol of the merchant marine, immigration services, police, automo- 
bile registrations, border check points, customs, seaports, and 
airports. In the early 1990s, new corporate investments made by 
the military averaged US$20 million annually. In the face of steep 
cutbacks in foreign military aid, these investments have taken on 
a new significance for the long-term survival of the armed forces. 
Most military investments are administered by the IPM, which 
is headed by the chief of the armed forces and managed by 100 
retired military officers, who control a team of 3,000 civilian tech- 
nicians and executives, and 10,000 other employees. 

The IPM's profits, which never come under the control of 
civilians and the normal budgetary process, go directly to the mili- 
tary and its retirement funds. These funds provide pension income 
to 7,000 retired civilian personnel and officers, some of whom, de- 
pending on rank and length of service, receive incomes of more than 
US$100,000 per year. This income is considerable in a country where 
in 1992 the average per capita income was only about US$650. 

Military-owned businesses include the nation's most modern 
funeral home called San Miguel Archangel; the eighth largest bank 
in the country, Bank of the Armed Forces (Banco de las Fuerzas 
Armadas — Banffaa), which offers credit cards and loans to the pub- 
lic; plus a real estate agency, a stock brokerage firm, an insurance 
company, cattle ranches, radio stations, and scores of other enter- 
prises. The IPM also makes available Previcard, a credit card for 
the exclusive use of the military, with backing from MasterCard. 
The IPM is diversifying its holdings at a rapid rate. In 1991 the 
IPM acquired the country's largest cement factory, the Hondu- 
ran Cement Industry (Industria Cementera de Honduras, Sociedad 
Anonima — Incehsa), which it purchased from the government for 
US$20 million. 



234 



National Security 



In 1993 the IPM was well on its way to controlling the distribu- 
tion of cement in Honduras. The IPM provided financial backing 
for the army's plan to buy the state-owned Honduran Telecom- 
munications Enterprise (Empresa Hondurena de Telecomunica- 
ciones — Hondutel), valued at US$160 million and one of the 
government's most profitable businesses. Military businesses do 
not pay the normal import duties on goods or business taxes on 
their profits, allowing military enterprises to operate at much lower 
costs than their civilian competitors. Individual officers also are 
allowed to own and operate their own firms, and these too are grow- 
ing in number. Civilian businesspeople have complained that the 
military's growing intrusion into the private sector constitutes un- 
fair competition and that it erodes the spirit of free enterprise in 
the country. So far, docile civilian leaders, long-accustomed to see- 
ing top military officers use their posts to gain wealth, have done 
little to curb the expansion of the military's business empire. 

United States Military Assistance and Training 

Since the 1930s, the United States has been the armed forces' 
major source of military assistance. Initially, such assistance aid- 
ed in the formation of a fledgling air force, and emphasis on this 
service branch continued through the 1940s. United States lend- 
lease funds granted to Honduras during World War II were used 
primarily for aircraft, engine parts, and support equipment. Fol- 
lowing the signing of a military assistance agreement in 1954, the 
focus of United States aid shifted toward the army. New combat 
battalions were created, and increasing numbers of Honduran mili- 
tary personnel were trained at the United States Army School of 
the Americas. Military assistance funding increased dramatically 
during the 1960s, from US$1.1 million for the years 1953 to 1961 
to US$5.9 million for the years 1962 to 1969. 

During the early 1980s, conflict in Central America increased 
Honduras 's strategic importance and led the United States govern- 
ment to maintain a significant military presence in Central America 
as a counterforce against the Sandinista government of Nicaragua. 
Sharp increases in military assistance to Honduras followed the 
buildup of United States troops and equipment in Honduras. In 
1983 United States forces began a series of large-scale maneuvers 
in Honduras that not only provided joint training for United States 
and Honduran forces but also allowed the administration of Ronald 
W. Reagan to skirt congressional limits on military aid to that coun- 
try and the Contras. Throughout the 1980s, the United States also 
built or improved military- related installations such as airfields, 
barracks, and radar stations. 



235 



Honduras: A Country Study 

In February 1983, the United States and Honduras conducted 
a joint military exercise called Big Pine, which was the largest of 
its kind ever held in Honduras. A total of 1 ,600 United States mili- 
tary personnel and 4,000 Honduran soldiers participated in exer- 
cises designed to help Honduras improve its deployment techniques 
and logistical support in the field. United States Army elements 
provided mobility for Honduran forces and logistics and commu- 
nications assistance. United States Navy elements included two 
landing ships and two landing craft. United States Air Force per- 
sonnel participated in the coordination of landing and air supply 
operations. A number of training personnel, mosdy from the United 
States Army, remained in the country to train the Honduran army 
in infantry tactics. Also during the exercises, a sizable radar in- 
stallation staffed by over fifty United States Air Force technicians 
was placed south of Tegucigalpa. 

The number of United States advisers increased further in 
mid- 1 983 when the United States and Honduras approved a new 
training agreement as an amendment to the 1954 military assistance 
agreement. The two countries constructed a military training fa- 
cility, near Puerto Castilla on the Caribbean coast, at a cost of some 
US$250,000. The primary purpose of this facility, called the 
Regional Center for Military Training (Centro Regional de En- 
trenamiento Militar — CREM), was to train Salvadoran ground 
forces, although Hondurans also received training. The center 
initially had about 125 United States Army Special Forces per- 
sonnel, raising the total number of trainers in the country to ap- 
proximately 270 in July 1983. 

Although CREM closed in 1985, United States military advisers 
remained. Between 1983 and 1993, the United States and Hon- 
duras carried out an almost continuous string of joint military 
maneuvers on Honduran soil. To facilitate the maneuvers and 
strengthen Honduras 's military infrastructure, the Honduran 
government built a network of roads, improved ports, and con- 
structed additional airfields. 

Between August 1983 and February 1984, United States forces 
carried out Big Pine II, a considerably more extensive military ex- 
ercise than the earlier Big Pine maneuvers, involving up to 5,000 
United States military personnel. Extensive naval maneuvers in- 
volved two United States Navy aircraft carrier task forces, another 
task force led by the battleship U.S.S. New Jersey, and a landing 
by the United States Marines on the Caribbean coast during por- 
tions of the exercises. The purpose, according to a senior United 
States official, was to demonstrate the ability of United States mili- 
tary forces to operate in Central America and to persuade the 



236 



Members of the Honduran 
army's 2d Airborne Battalion 
prepare for parachute 
jump operations. 
Courtesy Department of Defense, 
Still Media Records Center 



Honduras: A Country Study 

Sandinista government of Nicaragua to desist from fomenting in- 
surrection in the region. 

A simulated defense of Honduras from a mock Nicaraguan in- 
vasion was staged between February and May 1985. Called Big 
Pine III and Universal Trek, the military exercises involved thirty- 
nine United States warships, as well as 7,000 United States troops 
and 5,000 Honduran troops. The exercises, which featured a mas- 
sive amphibious landing on the northeastern coast of Honduras, 
were the most intricate peacetime military maneuvers the United 
States ever carried out in Central America. The war games prompt- 
ed concern among some Hondurans that their country's national 
sovereignty was being compromised and that the Honduran peo- 
ple might be pushed unwillingly into a regional war. Honduran 
trade unions organized demonstrations that called for the withdraw- 
al of United States troops. 

An even bigger show of force occurred in Honduras during Oper- 
ation Solid Shield in May 1987. This exercise simulated a United 
States response to a request from Honduras to help fight a 
Nicaraguan invasion, and it coincided with larger United States 
military exercises carried out on the Puerto Rican island of Vie- 
ques and at Camp Lejeune, North Carolina. The Honduran phase 
of this operation involved more than 7,000 United States military 
personnel as well as 3,000 Honduran soldiers. As part of the exer- 
cises, a combined air and sea landing in Honduras was undertaken 
by a brigade of 3,000 helicopter assault troops from the 101st Air- 
borne Division at Fort Campbell, Kentucky, and a marine am- 
phibious unit of 1 ,800 from Camp Lejeune. These maneuvers tested 
the ability of the army, navy, marine corps, air force, and coast 
guard to mobilize and operate together in a large-scale operation, 
which was also meant to help train and build a logistical infra- 
structure for the Contras based in Honduras. Daniel Jose Ortega 
Saavedra, who was then the president of Nicaragua, accused the 
United States of planning an invasion of his country. 

During the early 1990s, Honduras continued to serve as a mili- 
tary outpost for the United States. The Enrique Soto Cano Air 
Base, located about ninety kilometers northwest of Tegucigalpa near 
Comayaguela, is operated by the Honduran air force but functions 
as the nerve center of intelligence gathering, communications, and 
logistical support for United States military operations in Honduras. 
While billing it as a temporary site, the Pentagon, beginning in 
1983, began spending hundreds of millions of dollars in order to 
transform the once- sleepy facility into the most advanced base in 
Central America. The United States extended the airstrip to han- 
dle any military aircraft belonging to the United States and installed 



238 



Super Mystere B-2 (top), F-5 Tiger II (center), 
and C-101 Aviojet aircraft of the Honduran air force 
Courtesy Department of Defense, Still Media Records Center 



239 



Honduras: A Country Study 

sophisticated listening devices and radar to track the communi- 
cations and movements of El Salvador's leftist guerrillas and to 
coordinate air strikes against them. The base also handled com- 
munication with the Contra rebels who were attempting to over- 
throw Nicaragua's Sandinista government. 

As of 1993, the huge base was home for Joint Task Force Bravo 
(JTFB), a contingent of 1,100 United States troops that rotate 
through on a temporary basis, and about 600 Honduran soldiers. 
JTFB, which is a joint command of the United States Army and 
the United States Air Force, coordinates military operations, as 
well as the joint operations with Honduran forces. The United States 
has never paid base rights because the facility is officially on tem- 
porary loan from the Honduran government. Upkeep of the En- 
rique Soto Cano Air Base costs the United States about US$50 
million a year. 

The three elements of the United States military assistance pro- 
gram for Honduras come under IMET, MAP, and the FMS. Un- 
der the IMET program, Honduras received US$14.2 million 
between 1962 and 1986; it received an additional US$5.8 million 
between 1987 and 1991. During the 1980s, the IMET program 
provided military education to 9,500 Honduran military officers 
at bases in the United States and other locations. During the same 
period, El Salvador was the only Latin American country to receive 
more military training than Honduras under the IMET program. 
In addition to the IMET training at the United States Army School 
of the Americas (in Panama before 1985, thereafter at Fort Ben- 
ning, Georgia), Mobile Training Teams (MTTs) of the United 
States Special Forces entered the country for short periods to train 
Honduran soldiers in counterinsurgency tactics and other military 
skills. 

MAP grants to Honduras totaled US$257.2 million between 1962 
and 1986; additional MAP grants totaling US$140 million were 
made available from 1987 to 1989. FMS credits totaled US$44.4 
million from 1978 to 1983, and although Honduras did not receive 
FMS credits between 1983 and 1990, it did receive US$51 million 
in credits during 1991 and 1992. 

Other United States military-related programs also aided Hon- 
durans during the 1980s. Under the Overseas Security Assistance 
Management Program, the United States stationed military 
managerial personnel in Honduras and authorized nearly US$2 
million each year for this program. Honduras also benefited from 
United States Department of Defense military construction grants, 
which financed the construction and maintenance of military air- 
fields, radar stations, ammunition storage warehouses, training 



240 



National Security 



facilities, and a strategic road network. The United States mili- 
tary retains access and usage rights to many of these facilities. In 
just a two-year period — 1987 and 1988 — about US$8.2 million was 
spent for United States military construction in Honduras. 

In 1985 Honduras and El Salvador were exempted by the Unit- 
ed States Congress from the prohibition of using United States aid 
for foreign police forces. As a result, Fusep has been the beneficiary 
of US$2.8 million in training, riot-control gear, vehicles, commu- 
nications equipment, and weapons. Aid to the Honduran police 
has also been provided under the Anti-Terrorism Assistance pro- 
gram, which is managed by the United States Department of State's 
Bureau of Diplomatic Security. Other police training has been spon- 
sored by the International Criminal Investigative Training As- 
sistance Program (ICITAP), which is managed by the United States 
Department of Justice. 

Between 1983 and 1990, forty-seven United States military per- 
sonnel died in Honduras as a result of accidents and shootings. 
During the same period, several bombings, some claimed by leftist 
guerrillas, wounded about a dozen American soldiers stationed in 
Honduras. 

As recently as August 1993, United States and Honduran troops 
and naval elements carried out joint exercises in various parts of 
Honduras under the code name Cabanas 93. The operation test- 
ed the coastal patrolling, drug interdiction, parachuting, and psy- 
chological warfare capabilities of the two armies. 

Military Ties with Other Countries 

Although not nearly as important to Honduras as is the United 
States — which alone supplied 73 percent of the arms that Honduras 
imported from 1984 to 1988 — Israel has also been a noteworthy 
provider of training and sophisticated weaponry to the Armed 
Forces of Honduras. A 1982 visit by a high-level Israeli delega- 
tion headed by (then) Defense Minister Ariel Sharon and Air Force 
General David Ivry was followed by an increase in arms deliveries 
and training for Honduras. A dozen Israelis trained the Cobras 
(the elite counterinsurgency unit) and the personal security guards 
of former Honduran presidents Roberto Suazo Cordova and Jose 
Azcona Hoyo (see Public Security Force, this ch.). In mid- 1983 
the New York Times reported that significant quantities of weapons 
captured from the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) by Is- 
rael in their 1982 invasion of Lebanon were passing through the 
Honduran armed forces to the Contras. 

Brazil, France, Britain, and the former West Germany supplied 
about US$70 million worth of arms to Honduras between 1984 



241 



Honduras: A Country Study 

and 1988. The total in weapons sales deliveries from both foreign 
government and commercial sources was US$331.7 million dur- 
ing the years 1981 to 1990. 

The Penal System and Human Rights 
Penal System 

Honduras has two penal systems — one for females and another 
for males. The female system is connected administratively to the 
National Board of Social Welfare (Junta Nacional de Bienestar So- 
cial), which has authority over the Female Center of Social Adap- 
tation (Centro Femenino de Adaptation Social — Cefas), all of which 
form part of the Ministry of Work (Ministerio de Trabajo). The 
National Directorate of Penal Establishments (Direction Nacional 
de Establecimientos Penales), which is under the authority of the 
Ministry of Government and Justice (Ministerio de Gobernacion 
y Justicia), is responsible for the national penitentiary and depart- 
ment and local jails that house male inmates. Both systems are regu- 
lated in accordance with the Law of Criminal Rehabilitation (Decree 
Law Number 173-84), in effect since March 1985; the constitu- 
tion of 1982; and the penal code adopted in 1983, which replaced 
the outdated 1906 code. 

Generally, inmates serving prison sentences of three years or 
more are assigned to the national penitentiary in Tegucigalpa; in- 
mates with prison sentences of less than three years but more than 
ninety days are assigned to a department jail; sentences of ninety 
days or less are carried out in local jails. In 1986 the penal system 
housed a total of 3,635 inmates; of these, only fifty-seven were fe- 
male. Most female inmates — regardless of the length of their prison 
sentences — are incarcerated in the Cefas penitentiary near Tegu- 
cigalpa. One department jail is located in each of the eighteen 
departments, except for El Paraiso, which has two, and Francisco 
Morazan, which has none. 

Prison facilities in Honduras are overcrowded, and services are 
inadequate to meet the needs of all inmates. Lighting, ventilation, 
and sanitary conditions in most cases are poor. Medical and psy- 
chiatric care is poor to nonexistent. Inmates can order medicine 
from outside the institution but must find their own means to pay 
for it. Inmates also must supply their own clothing, towels, soap, 
and other toiletries. Television, sport, and other recreation facili- 
ties are not provided, except at Cefas. Conjugal privileges are al- 
lowed, however, and some inmates receive basic literacy instruction. 
The daily diet for inmates is rice, beans, tortillas, and coffee. 



242 




Honduran fighter pilots 
during joint United States- 
Honduran military maneuvers 
Courtesy Department of Defense, 
Still Media Records Center 



Honduran air force 
security policeman 
with Uzi machine gun 
Courtesy Department of Defense, 
Still Media Records Center 



Honduras: A Country Study 

Individual inmates commonly bribe guards and prison adminis- 
trators for better food and other amenities. 

Respect for Human Rights 

The human rights situation deteriorated significantly after the 
return to civilian rule in 1982. Under the new civilian president, 
the military, under the command of General Gustavo Alvarez 
Martinez, initiated a campaign against leftists. This campaign al- 
legedly led to the disappearance of more than 100 people. Small 
insurgent groups also began operating during this period, but the 
overwhelming majority of political killings were carried out by the 
military, according to human rights observers. Although this vio- 
lence paled in comparison to that in neighboring El Salvador and 
Guatemala, it marked a departure from the relatively tranquil Hon- 
duran political environment. 

Beginning in 1985, political violence declined significantly, but 
did not completely disappear; a small number of extrajudicial kill- 
ings continued to be reported annually for the balance of the 1980s 
and early 1990s. In July 1988 and January 1989, the Inter- 
American Court of Human Rights (IACHR) held the Honduran 
government responsible for the 1982 disappearances of a student 
activist, Angel Manfredo Velasquez, and a secondary school teacher 
and union activist, Saul Godmez. The IACHR also determined 
that Honduran authorities were responsible for a deliberate kid- 
napping campaign of between 100 and 150 individuals believed 
to be tied to subversive activities between 1981 and 1984. 

In the early 1990s, as the political conflicts in El Salvador and 
Nicaragua abated, the Honduran public increasingly began to criti- 
cize the military for human rights violations. These violations al- 
legedly included a number of political and other types of 
extrajudicial killings. One case in particular that ignited a public 
outcry against the military was the July 1991 rape, torture, and 
murder of an eighteen- year-old student, Riccy Mabel Martinez, 
by military personnel. Initially, the military did not allow the civilian 
courts to try the three suspects, but ultimately the military dis- 
charged the suspects from the military so as to avoid the precedent 
of military members being tried in civilian courts. After a long, 
drawn-out process, two of the suspects, including a former colonel, 
were convicted of the crime in July 1993, marking the first time 
that a high-ranking officer, even though no longer in the military, 
was prosecuted in the civilian courts. 

Observers credit former United States Ambassador Cresencio 
Arcos with speaking out promptly on the case and urging the Hon- 
duran government to prosecute it through an open judicial process. 



244 



National Security 



In fact, the United States embassy increasingly has been viewed 
as a champion for human rights in Honduras, and its annual hu- 
man rights reports are considerably more critical than those pre- 
pared in the 1980s. 

Nevertheless, the military's disregard for civilian authority is 
demonstrated by the military's immunity from prosecution for hu- 
man rights violations. In early 1993, after considerable public criti- 
cism of alleged military involvement in the January 1993 killing 
of a San Pedro Sula businessperson, the military deployed forces 
in both San Pedro Sula and in the capital. Rumors abounded about 
the true intention of the deployment, reportedly made without the 
knowledge of President Rafael Leonardo Callejas Romero. Some 
observers speculated that the armed forces chief, General Luis Alon- 
so Discua, took the action to intimidate his opponents and stem 
a barrage of recent criticism against the military. President Calle- 
jas later announced that he had ordered the deployment as one 
of a series of actions to deter criminal violence. 

Some critics maintain that President Callejas should have been 
more forceful with the military and attempted to assert more civilian 
control during his presidency, particularly when the military tried 
to impede the prosecution of the Riccy Martinez case. Some main- 
tain that Callejas himself had close ties with General Discua, thus 
explaining why no strong civilian action was taken against the mili- 
tary. Other analysts, however, maintain that Callejas substantial- 
ly improved civilian control over the military with the establishment 
of such commissions as the Ad Hoc Commission for Institutional 
Reform, which recommended the breakup of the DIN and the cre- 
ation of a new Department of Criminal Investigation (Departamen- 
to de Investigation Criminal — DIC) within the civilian government. 

Domestic Human Rights Organizations 

Human rights groups in Honduras first became active in the 
early 1980s when revolution and counterrevolution brought vio- 
lence and instability to Central America. In Honduras, these groups 
organized in response to the mounting level of domestic violence 
targeted at leftist organizations, particularly from 1982 to 1984, 
when General Alvarez commanded the military. Human rights or- 
ganizations were at times targeted by the Honduran military with 
harassment and political violence. According to some observers, 
the United States embassy in Honduras also participated in a cam- 
paign to discredit Honduran human rights organizations at a time 
when Honduras was serving as a key component of United States 
policy toward Central America. 



245 



Honduras: A Country Study 

In the early 1990s, there have been three major nongovernmental 
human rights organizations in Honduras: the Committee for the 
Defense of Human Rights in Honduras (Comite para la Defensa 
de Derechos Humanos de Honduras — Codeh); the Committee of 
the Families of the Detained and Disappeared in Honduras (Comite 
de las Familias de los Detenidos y Desaparecidos Hondurenos — 
Cofadeh); and the Center of the Investigation and Promotion of 
Human Rights (Centro de Investigation y Promotion de los Dere- 
chos Humanos — Ciprodeh). 

Established in 1981 by Ramon Custodio, Codeh became the 
country's foremost human rights organization in the 1980s with 
a network throughout the country. The organization has withstood 
harassment and intimidation by Honduran security forces. In Janu- 
ary 1988, Codeh' s regional director in northern Honduras, Miguel 
Angel Pavon, was assassinated before he was about to testify in 
a case brought before the IACHR. 

In the early 1990s, Codeh remained the country's most impor- 
tant and most internationally known human rights organization. 
Codeh continues to issue annual reports and to speak out frequendy, 
not only on human rights violations, but also on economic, social, 
and political issues. Some observers have criticized Codeh for go- 
ing beyond a human rights focus, as well as for exaggerating charges 
against the government and military. In the 1980s and as late as 
1990, the United States Department of State in its annual human 
rights reports on Honduras often charged that Codeh 's charges were 
ill-documented, exaggerated, and in some cases false. 

Cofadeh was founded in 1982 by Zenaida Velasquez, sister of 
Angel Manfredo Velasquez, the disappeared student and labor ac- 
tivist whose case Codeh and Cofadeh brought before the IACHR. 
As its name suggests, Cofadeh's membership consists of relatives 
of the disappeared and detained, and in the 1980s, its members 
often demonstrated near the Presidential Palace in the center of 
Tegucigalpa. 

Ciprodeh, founded in 1991 by Leo Valladares, provides human 
rights educational and legal services. The group offers human rights 
courses and monthly seminars, as well as a special program for 
the protection of the rights of children and women. 

Until late 1992, the Honduran government had not established 
an effective human rights monitor, and Codeh and Cofadeh often 
served this purpose. In 1987 the Azcona government had estab- 
lished the Inter-Institutional Commission on Human Rights (Co- 
mision Inter-Institucional de Derechos Humanos — CIDH), made 
up of representatives from the three branches of government and 
the military, to investigate human rights violations. The CIDH 



246 



National Security 



proved ineffective and did not receive cooperation from either 
civilian judicial or military authorities. 

In December 1992, the Callejas government inaugurated a new 
governmental human rights body, a human rights commission, 
headed by Valladares of Ciprodeh. This new office — the National 
Commission for the Protection of Human Rights (Comision Na- 
tional para la Protection de Derechos Humanos — Conaprodeh) — 
was active in 1993 in receiving complaints of human rights viola- 
tions and in certain instances provided "protection" to those citizens 
issuing complaints. 

Although Honduras has experienced more than a decade of 
civilian rule, many observers maintain that the military is still the 
most powerful political actor in the country. Since the mid- twentieth 
century, the military has become a cohesive national institution 
and has made strides in improving its professionalism. The Hon- 
duran armed forces handled themselves well in the 1969 war with 
El Salvador and the sometimes-not-too-cold war with Nicaragua 
in the 1980s. The question for the Honduran armed forces in the 
1990s, however, is how they will deal with regional peace, down- 
sizing, and a populace growing disenchanted with the military's 
role in national politics. 

* * * 

Book length treatments of the armed forces and police are scarce. 
Leticia Salomon's Politica y militares en Honduras provides a short 
overview of political-military relations. The recendy published "The 
United States, Honduras, and the Crisis in Central America" by 
Donald E. Schulz and Deborah Loff covers United States relations 
with the government and armed forces of Honduras and explores 
the role that important Honduran military leaders have played in 
the politics of the country. Several works by Tom Barry and Kent 
Norsworthy, such as Inside Honduras and Central America Inside Out: 
The Essential Guide to Its Societies, Politics, and Economics, include chap- 
ters on the armed forces, police, and foreign military assistance. 
James A. Morris's Honduras: Caudillo Politics and Military Rulers 
(1984) is dated but contains useful background information. 

Also useful are annual or semi-annual publications, including 
World Defence Almanac, The Military Balance, and Foreign Military Mar- 
kets: Latin America and Australasia, which contain information on the 
order of battle, weapons inventories, and defense expenditures. 

Journal and newspaper articles were highly useful in the prepara- 
tion of this chapter, especially Julio Montes's "The Honduran 
Army — The Last 20 Years, ' ' in Jane's Intelligence Review (February 



247 



Honduras: A Country Study 

1993). The Los Angeles Times, New York Times, Washington Post, and 
Miami Herald provide regular reporting on political and military 
developments in Honduras. The Latin American Weekly Report and 
the Foreign Broadcast Information Service's Daily Report — Latin 
America also provide regular reporting on military activities in 
Honduras. 

The penal and judicial systems of Honduras are adequately treat- 
ed in La administracion dejusticia en Honduras: descripciony andlisis del 
sector, by the Instituto Latinoamericano de las Naciones Unidas 
para la Prevention del Delito y Tratamiento del Delicuente. (For 
further information and complete citations, see Bibliography.) 



248 



Appendix A 



Table 

1 Metric Conversion Coefficients and Factors 

2 Total Population and Population Density by Department, 1988 

3 Enrollment by Education Level, Selected Years, 1975-89 

4 Selected Economic Indicators, 1989-92 

5 Production of Selected Commodities, 1988, 1989, and 1990 

6 Major Trading Partners, 1992 

7 Principal Exports, 1991 and 1992 

8 Major Military Equipment, 1993 



249 



Appendix A 



Table 1. 


Metric Conversion Coefficients and Factors 


When you know 


Multiply by 


To find 




04. 


inches 




0.39 


inches 




3.3 


feet 




0.62 


miles 


Hectares (10,000 m 2 ) 


2 47 


acres 




0.39 


square miles 




35.3 


cubic feet 






gallons 




2.2 


pounds 




0.98 


long tons 




1.1 


short tons 




2,204 


pounds 




1.8 


degrees Fahrenheit 


(Centigrade) 


and add 32 





Table 2. Total Population and Population Density by Department, 1988 



Inhabitants 
per Square 



Department 


Population 


Kilometer 




238,741 


56.2 




295,484 


70.2 




149,677 


16.9 




239,859 


46.2 




219,455 


68.5 




662,772 


167.6 




254,295 


35.2 




828,274 


104.2 




34,970 


2.1 




124,681 


40.6 




22,062 


84.7 




105,927 


45.5 




177,055 


41.3 




74,276 


44.2 




283,852 


11.7 




278,868 


54.5 


Valle 


119,965 


76.7 


Yoro 


333,508 


42.0 


HONDURAS 


4,443,721 


39.6 



Source: Based on information from Honduras, Direction General de Estadistica y Cen- 
sos, Anuario estadistico, 1989, Tegucigalpa, 1991, 36. 



251 



Honduras: A Country Study 



Table 3. Enrollment by Education Level, Selected Years, 1975-89 



Education Level 


1975 


1980 


1985 


1989 




460,700 


601,300 


765,800 


880,000 


Middle schools and high schools . . . 


37,000 


93,800 


n.a. 




Vocational high schools 


17,700 


28,300 


n.a. 


160,000 1 


Teachers' high schools 


2,000 


5,200 


n.a. 






10,600 


24,000 


36,600 


32,572 



n.a. — not available. 

1 Middle, high, vocational high, and teachers' high schools combined. 



Source: Based on information from Federal Republic of Germany, Statistisches Bundesamt, 
Ldnderbericht Honduras, 1989, Wiesbaden, 1989, 28; and Honduras, Direction General 
de Estadistica y Censos, Anuario estadistico, 1989, Tegucigalpa, 1991, 175, 184, 191. 



Table 4. Selected Economic Indicators, 1989-92 
(in millions of United States dollars unless otherwise indicated) 



Indicator 


1989 


1990 


1991 


1992 


1993 1 


Change in real gross domestic 












product (GDP) 2 


4.3 


0.1 


3.3 


5.6 


3.7 


Real GDP per capita growth 2 .... 


1.5 


-3.1 


-0.1 


2.2 


0.4 




9.9 


23.3 


34.0 


8.8 


10.7 


Trade balance 


-53 


-20 


-76 


- 140 


-230 




-177 


39 


-59 


88 


n.a. 




3,385 


3,698 


3,360 


3,597 


3,700 



n.a. — not available. 

1 Estimated. 

2 In percentages. 



Source: Based on information from United States, Agency for International Development, 
Latin America and the Caribbean: Selected Economic Data, Washington, April 1992; and 
Economist Intelligence Unit, Country Report: Nicaragua, Honduras [London], 4, 1994, 6. 



Table 5. Production of Selected Commodities, 1988, 1989, and 1990 
(in thousands of tons) 



Commodity 1988 1989 1990 



Bananas 1,180 1,092 1,100 

Beef 80 46 46 

Coffee 91 90 118 

Corn 500 510 539 

Pineapples 120 129 130 

Plantains 162 175 170 

Shrimp and lobster 4.7 5.6 5.7 

Sugarcane 2,442 2,694 2,700 



Source: Based on information from South America, Central America, and the Caribbean, 1993 
[London], 1993, 379. 



252 



Appendix A 

Table 6. Major Trading Partners, 1992 
(in percentages) 



Country 1992 



Exports 

United States 52.4 

Germany 14.3 

Italy 5.1 

Belgium 4.8 

Japan 2.5 

Imports 

United States 54.2 

Mexico 6.6 

Guatemala 4.7 

Panama 3.0 

The Netherlands 2.7 



Source: Based on information from Economist Intelligence Unit, Country Report: Nicaragua, 
Honduras [London], No. 4, 1994, 6. 



Table 7. Principal Exports, 1991 and 1992 
(in millions of United States dollars) 



Commodity 


1991 


1992 




342 


287 


Coffee 


155 


148 




104 


97 




35 


37 







Source: Based on information from Economist Intelligence Unit, Country Report: Nicaragua, 
Honduras [London], No. 1, 1994, 6; and Economist Intelligence Unit, Country Report: 
Nicaragua, Honduras [London], No. 2, 1993, 5. 



253 



Honduras: A Country Study 



Table 8. Major Military Equipment, 1993 



Type and Description 



Country of 
Origin 



In 

Inventory 



Army 

Tanks 

Scorpion 

Armored reconnaissance 

Scimitar 

Sultan 

Saladin 

RBY MK 1 



Britain 



-do- 
-do- 
-do- 
Israel 



12 



3 
1 

50 
12 



Towed artillery 
M-102, 105mm 
M-198, 155mm 



United States 
-do- 



Mortars 

60mm/81mm Various 

Brandt, 120mm France 

Soltam, 160mm Israel 

Rocket launchers 

Carl Gustav, 84mm Sweden 

M40A1, 106mm United States 

Navy 

Patrol craft (various) -do- 
Inshore craft (various) -do- 
Amphibious 

Punta Caxinas LCT -do- 

LCM -do- 
Air force 

Fighter-ground attack -do- 

A-37B -do- 

F-5E -do- 

F-5F -do- 
Fighter 

Super Mystere B2 Belgium 

Transport 

C-47 United States 

C-123 -do- 

C-130A -do- 

DHC-5 Canada 

L-188 United States 



24 
4 



400 
60 
30 



120 



254 



Appendix A 



Table 8. — Continued 



Country of In 
Type of Description Origin Inventory 



Liaison 

Baron -do- 1 

Cessna 172 -do- 3 

180 -do- 2 

185 -do- 2 

Commander -do- 4 

PA-31 -do- 1 

PA-34 -do- 1 

Helicopters 

Bell 412 -do- 9 

Hughes 500 -do- 4 

TH-55 -do- 5 

UH-1B -do- 8 

UH-1H -do- 7 

S-76 -do- 1 

Training 

C-101B -do- 4 

U-17A -do- 6 

EMB-312 Brazil 11 

T-41A United States 5 



n.a. — not available. 

Source: Based on information from The Military Balance, 1993-1994, London, 1993, 180; 
and Jane's Fighting Ships, 1993-94, Alexandria, Virginia, 1993, 442. 



255 



Appendix B 



CENTRAL AMERICAN COMMON MARKET 

THE CENTRAL AMERICAN COMMON MARKET (CACM) 
was one of four regional economic integration organizations created 
during the Latin American export boom of the 1960s. The CACM 
was established by Guatemala, Honduras, El Salvador, and Nica- 
ragua (and later joined by Costa Rica) with the signing of the Gen- 
eral Treaty of Central American Economic Integration (Tratado 
General de Integracion Economica Centroamericana) in Managua 
on December 15, 1960. The CACM and the three other Latin 
American trading blocs — the Latin American Free Trade Area, 
the Caribbean Free Trade Association (Carifta), and the Andean 
Group — were generally alike in their initial endorsement of regional 
integration behind temporary protectionist barriers as a way to con- 
tinue import- substitution industrialization (ISI — see Glossary). 

The basic strategy for development in Latin America was pi- 
oneered in the 1950s by Raul Prebisch and the Economic Com- 
mission for Latin America and the Caribbean (EC LAC). The 
"EC LAC approach" applied a structuralist model of development 
that emphasized increasing private and public investment in 
manufacturing and infrastructure in order to overcome dependence 
on exports of primary commodities. Prebisch argued that continued 
overreliance on primary commodity exports as a source of foreign 
exchange would eventually lead to economic stagnation and even 
economic contraction because population growth and falling com- 
modity prices would exert downward pressure on per capita gross 
domestic product (GDP — see Glossary). Concurrently, Prebisch and 
EC LAC recognized the inherent limitations for single-country 
domestic markets of ISI based solely on manufacturing. Particularly 
for the smaller countries of the Western Hemisphere, strictly domestic 
production of manufactured goods would quickly saturate local de- 
mand and would prematurely reduce returns on capital investment. 

In order to overcome the limitations of single-country ISI, 
EC LAC proposed to expand the "local" market by means of com- 
mon markets among like groups of countries. A common external 
tariff (CET) would allow nascent industries to develop by protect- 
ing local manufacturers from extraregional competition. 

The EC LAC approach was advanced and widely accepted 
throughout the Western Hemisphere as an alternative to both the 



257 



Honduras: A Country Study 

liberal export-led growth model and the previous single-country 
I SI approach. In practice, however, elements of all three models 
coexisted uneasily in most Latin American economies until the 
mid-1980s. 

Despite their common adherence to the EC LAC model of intra- 
regional free trade within a protectionist framework, the various 
Latin American trading blocs differed from each other in the size 
and economic structure of their member states, their intermediate 
goals, their institutions, their cohesiveness, and their relationships 
to the global economy. In the case of the CACM, economic dis- 
equilibria among member states, incomplete and unbalanced im- 
plementation of the ECLAC-inspired integration scheme, and the 
inherent limitations of a development model based on protection 
from global competition eventually undermined the CACM as origi- 
nally conceived by ECLAC. The CACM's effectiveness waned fol- 
lowing Honduras 's withdrawal in the wake of the 1969 Soccer War 
with El Salvador. The CACM stagnated throughout the 1970s and 
virtually collapsed during the prolonged Central American (see 
Glossary) political and debt crises of the 1980s, revitalizing only 
after its overhaul and the partial inclusion of Panama in the early 
1990s. 

Institutions 

The post-World War II movement toward Central American 
economic integration began with a wave of bilateral free-trade 
treaties signed among Guatemala, Honduras, El Salvador, Nica- 
ragua, and Costa Rica between 1950 and 1956. By the end of this 
period of bilateral negotiations, each country had become party 
to at least one of the treaties, which involved free trade in a limit- 
ed range of products. The trend toward economic integration was 
further bolstered by the formation of the Organization of Central 
American States (Organizacion de Estados Centroamericanos — 
Odeca) in 1951 . Although primarily a political entity, Odeca repre- 
sented a significant step toward the creation of other regional 
multilateral organizations. 

Economic cooperation at the multilateral level began to take shape 
under the auspices of ECLAC, which in August 1952 began spon- 
soring regular meetings of the Committee of Economic Coopera- 
tion, comprising the ministers of economy and commerce of the 
five Central American republics. It was through the committee that 
ECLAC advanced the Prebisch model of coordinated industriali- 
zation within regional trading blocs. EC LAC 's active consultancy 
efforts facilitated the signing in 1958-59 of three important integra- 
tion agreements: the Multilateral Treaty on Free Trade and Central 



258 



Appendix B 



American Economic Integration (Tratado Multilateral de Libre 
Comercio e Integracion Economica Centroamericana), the Integra- 
tion Industries Convention (Regimen de Industrias de Integracion — 
RII), and the Central American Tariff Equalization Convention 
(Convenio Centroamericano sobre Equiparacion de Gravamenes 
a la Importacion). 

The Multilateral Treaty on Free Trade and Central American 
Economic Integration provided for intraregional free trade in 239 
groups of Central American products and a ten-year phase-in of 
intraregional free trade in all Central American goods. The Cen- 
tral American Tariff Equalization Convention was a complemen- 
tary agreement to the multilateral treaty, establishing a CET on 
270 products, including all those listed under the treaty, and propos- 
ing a harmonization of tariffs on an additional 200 products within 
five years. The tariff equalization convention would thereby pro- 
vide the common barrier to extraregional imports under which Cen- 
tral American producers would conduct a liberalized trade. 

The RII was the most controversial component of the EC LAC 
program and would be the most difficult to implement. As origi- 
nally conceived, the RII was to direct the flow of capital invest- 
ment into the region by granting special incentives and privileges 
to firms given "integration industries" status. In order to prevent 
costly duplication of capital investment, firms whose products had 
small consumer markets in the region would be given a virtual mo- 
nopoly within the CACM. The Central American countries were 
supposed to distribute integration industry plants among themselves 
in an equitable and efficient manner. 

The integration regime envisioned by the ECLAC-sponsored 
agreements never entered fully into force, but was instead supersed- 
ed by the General Treaty of Central American Economic Integra- 
tion, which became the basis for the CACM. The general treaty 
represented a compromise between the EC LAC -inspired approach 
and the policy preferences of the United States. The latter pro- 
posed several significant changes to the EC LAC integration scheme, 
the main difference being the establishment from the outset of in- 
traregional free trade as the norm, rather than as the exception, 
as provided for in the multilateral treaty. Under the United States 
plan, all products would be subject to intraregional free trade un- 
less exempted. The United States was also opposed to the grant- 
ing of monopoly status to integration industries within the region. 
In exchange for adoption of its plan, the United States would pro- 
vide funding for the various institutions of the CACM and increase 
its economic aid to Central America. 



259 



Honduras: A Country Study 

In February 1960, Guatemala, El Salvador, and Honduras ac- 
cepted the United States-sponsored integration scheme and signed 
the Tripartite Treaty (Tratado Tripartito) in Esquipulas, Guate- 
mala, establishing intraregional free trade as the norm and exclud- 
ing an RII mechanism. The Tripartite Treaty evoked strong 
objections from ECLAC, which saw its guiding role in Central 
American integration undermined by United States involvement 
in the process. In response to protests from ECLAC and the govern- 
ment of Nicaragua, the United States and the parties to the Tripar- 
tite Treaty agreed to negotiate a compromise integration treaty to 
supersede all prior free-trade agreements. The General Treaty of 
Central American Economic Integration was signed in Managua, 
Nicaragua, by four of the five republics (Costa Rica delayed sign- 
ing by two years) on December 13, 1960, with ECLAC conceding 
on the free-trade issue and the United States conceding on the in- 
clusion of the RII. The general treaty went into effect for Guatemala, 
El Salvador, and Nicaragua in June 1961 and for Honduras and 
Costa Rica in April and July 1962, respectively. 

In addition to the RII, the general treaty established a perma- 
nent Secretariat, the Secretariat of the General Treaty on Central 
American Economic Integration (Secretara Permanente del Tratado 
General de Integracion Economica Centroamericana — SIECA), 
and a development bank, the Central American Bank for Economic 
Integration (Banco Centroamericano de Integracion Economica — 
BCIE). A Central American Clearing House (Camara Centroameri- 
cana de Compensacion de Monedas) was established in 1963 to 
promote the use of local currencies in the settlement of short-term 
trade deficits between pairs of CACM member states. A Central 
American Monetary Council (Consejo Monetario Centroameri- 
cano) was set up the following year to promote monetary union. 

The CACM Experiment 

During the 1960s and 1970s, the CACM had a significant posi- 
tive impact on trade flows in Central America. Intraregional ex- 
ports as a percentage of total exports grew dramatically — from 7 
percent of total exports in 1960 to 26 percent in 1970 — before declin- 
ing to 23.4 percent in 1975 and to 14.7 percent in 1985. The total 
value of trade within the region grew from US$33 million in 1960 
to US$1.1 billion in 1980, dropping to US$421 million in 1986. 
Of all goods traded within the region, 95 percent had attained duty- 
free status by 1967, and 90 percent of traded goods were covered 
by the CET. The goods exempted from intraregional free trade 
were mainly traditional agricultural exports destined for global 
markets. 



260 



Appendix B 



Most of the new intraregional trade was in consumer goods, a 
large share of which consisted of processed foods. By 1970 food 
processing was the single most prominent industrial activity within 
the CACM, accounting for approximately 50 percent of gross in- 
dustrial output. The preference for consumer goods production was 
built into the CACM tariff structure, which imposed a high CET 
on extraregional consumer goods but did not impede the import 
of intermediate or capital goods. 

In addition to the protection afforded to consumer goods produc- 
tion by the CET on consumer imports, CACM member states also 
promoted investment in industry by introducing generous tax in- 
centives and exemptions for new and existing industrial firms. To 
help promote balanced development, the Convention of Fiscal In- 
centives for Industrial Development (Convenio Centroamericano 
de Incentivos Fiscales al Desarollo Industrial) was signed among 
the then four CACM member states in 1962 to equalize the grant- 
ing of tax incentives to industrial firms. The convention allowed 
Honduras and Nicaragua to offer temporarily broader tax breaks 
to industrial firms than the other two more industrialized repub- 
lics. Honduras became the main beneficiary of this differentiated 
treatment, gaining in 1969 an extension of its preferential taxa- 
tion status. 

Another important incentive to industrial development within 
the CACM was the implementation of regional infrastructure de- 
velopment projects. Several infrastructure development organiza- 
tions were established during the 1960s to improve intraregional 
transport and communications: the Technical Commission of Cen- 
tral American Telecommunications (Comision Tecnica de las 
Telecomunicaciones de Centroamerica — Comtelca), the Central 
American Corporation of Air Navigation Services (Corporacion 
Centroamericana de Servicios de Navegacion Aerea — Cocesna), 
the Central American Maritime Commission (Comision Cen- 
troamericana de Transporte Mantimo — Cocatram), and the Cen- 
tral American Railways Commission (Comision Centroamericana 
de Ferrocarriles — Cocafer). These organizations were financed 
mainly by the Regional Office for Central America and Panama 
(ROCAP) of the United States Agency for International Develop- 
ment (AID) as part of the Alliance for Progress initiative. 
AID/ROCAP also financed a Regional Highway Program to im- 
prove highway routes considered vital to intraregional trade. 

Stagnation of the CACM 

Despite the considerable expansion of intraregional trade and 
investment in Central America during the 1960s, by the end of 



261 



Honduras: A Country Study 



the decade, the region had not yet achieved the balanced industrial 
growth nor the diversification of extraregional exports that was 
needed to maintain the momentum of the CACM. 

This failure resulted in part from the inability of Central Ameri- 
can governments to implement fiscal modernization or to overcome 
persistent structural trade deficits by the less developed economies 
of the region. Moreover, the gradual abandonment by regional eco- 
nomic planners of key components of the ECLAC model, particu- 
larly the goal of monetary union and the Integration Industries 
Convention, reduced the potential for joint action on a broad range 
of common challenges. Lack of progress on structural reforms of 
the Central American economies meant that the CACM would exist 
primarily as a customs union, rather than become an economic 
community. By the early 1980s, Central America's profound eco- 
nomic problems and political upheavals had undermined most 
CACM activities and institutions. During the 1960s, Central 
American policymakers charged with implementing the ECLAC 
model were faced with a series of deeply ingrained social and po- 
litical obstacles to economic modernization. Foremost among these 
were the structural biases in favor of traditional export agriculture 
that diverted capital from industrial investment and discouraged 
export diversification. Among the most pervasive structural biases 
were the antiquated tax systems that relied primarily on import 
tariffs as a source of revenue while undertaxing property and per- 
sonal income. As free trade entered into force within the CACM, 
governments found themselves forfeiting a large share of their tradi- 
tional revenues. In all of the republics except Costa Rica, political 
opposition to fiscal reform from the powerful landowning sector 
prevented governments from recovering the lost funds through 
property and income taxes. Pressure for fiscal reform was offset 
by a surplus of commercial bank credit during the 1970s, which 
allowed Central American governments to run consecutive fiscal 
deficits. When the flow of capital to Latin America ended abruptly 
in 1982, the burden of servicing Central American public and pri- 
vate debts caused a severe regional economic depression. The "lost 
decade" of the 1980s was characterized by macroeconomic insta- 
bility, massive capital flight, and severe cutbacks in public services. 

Monetary and credit policies were also strongly biased in favor 
of the traditional export sector, which enjoyed a sharp increase in 
commercial bank lending throughout the 1960s. In 1970 a large 
share of domestic credit was still being channeled to traditional ex- 
port agriculture, which received three times as much credit as did 
industry. Moreover, interest rates for traditional agriculture were 



262 



Appendix B 



in some cases kept artificially much lower than the rates paid by 
industry and by nontraditional agriculture. 

Despite these inconsistencies in public policy toward industri- 
alization, manufacturing's contribution to GDP grew modestly in 
all of the region except Honduras during the 1960s. Industrial 
growth associated with the CACM was generally more capital in- 
tensive than manufacturing for domestic markets, where small, 
labor-intensive firms employing ten to twenty workers were the 
norm. Rather than producing the desired diversification of extra- 
regional exports, however, Central America's industrial develop- 
ment stagnated at the stage of consumer goods production and 
became heavily dependent on capital- goods imports paid for with 
foreign exchange from traditional agricultural exports. The for- 
eign exchange constraint that had existed before formation of the 
CACM remained essentially unchanged, as competitive export in- 
dustries oriented toward global markets failed to develop under the 
CACM's protective CET. 

Another major drawback of the CACM was its inability to com- 
pensate for disequilibria in capital endowments, in net export 
volume, and in productivity among more- and less-developed mem- 
ber states. As a result, intraregional trade imbalances became 
pronounced, and the CACM became polarized between the net 
creditors, Guatemala and El Salvador, and the net debtors, Hon- 
duras and Nicaragua. Costa Rica evolved from a net debtor to a 
net creditor. 

The institutions created by the general treaty to alleviate struc- 
tural imbalances among member states failed to operate as planned. 
One of the first CACM institutions to be deactivated was the In- 
tegration Industries Convention, which had been negotiated to help 
allocate capital investment rationally and fairly among member 
states. The convention had been a source of controversy from the 
beginning, having been opposed by the United States and exclud- 
ed from the earlier Tripartite Treaty. When rivalries arose over 
the proposed location of plants, CACM institutions were unable 
to mediate the conflicts or to impose solutions. As a result, only 
two firms ever attained integration industries status, and the con- 
vention was effectively scrapped in the mid-1960s when a tire plant 
was established in Costa Rica to compete with an integration in- 
dustries plant in Guatemala. 

Another CACM institution that abandoned its original purpose 
was the Central American Clearing House. The clearing house had 
originally been designed to promote the use of local currencies in 
the settlement of intraregional trade deficits. The clearing house 
and the Central American Monetary Council were supposed to 



263 



Honduras: A Country Study 

represent initial steps toward monetary union. By 1963, however, 
the CACM member states had allowed the monetary cooperation 
effort to lapse and were settling their trade deficits in United States 
dollars twice yearly. Littie impetus remained to maintain exchange 
rate stability or currency convertibility within the CACM. 

Rupture of the CACM 

As the 1960s progressed, unbalanced growth and development 
among CACM member states began to take a serious toll on cooper- 
ative efforts in trade, monetary policy, and investment promotion. 
By the end of the decade, the CACM had reverted to an amor- 
phous grouping of economies at different stages of development 
pursuing uncoordinated and sometimes antagonistic macroeconom- 
ic policies. The most acute conflict arose between Honduras and 
El Salvador over the issues of unbalanced trade, investment, and 
migration. 

By the mid-1960s, chronic Honduran trade deficits with El Sal- 
vador and highly visible Salvadoran investment in Honduras had 
led to widespread Honduran indignation and a virtual Honduran 
boycott of Salvadoran products. Meanwhile, 300,000 Salvadoran 
migrants displaced by the expansion of export agriculture in their 
country had settled across the border in Honduras. Capitalizing 
on the widespread sentiment against Salvadoran "encirclement," 
the government of Honduran President Oswaldo Lopez Arellano 
(1963-71) attempted to expel Salvadoran squatters under the pretext 
of land reform. Increasing tensions throughout the summer of 1969 
erupted into hostilities on July 14, when Salvadoran air and land 
units made an incursion into Honduran territory. The ensuing four- 
day war claimed 2,000 lives and led to the forced repatriation of 
about 150,000 Salvadorans. 

Diplomatic and commercial relations between El Salvador and 
Honduras were suspended for a decade thereafter, as was air trans- 
port between the two countries. In December 1970, Honduras with- 
drew from the CACM after it failed to persuade the other member 
states to enact further reforms in its favor. Honduras subsequently 
conducted trade with CACM countries on a bilateral basis until 
1986. Honduras 's withdrawal from the CACM, although not sig- 
nificant in terms of lost trade volume, represented a symbolic col- 
lapse of the organization as a vehicle for promoting coordinated 
regional growth. The prospects for integration had already dimmed 
considerably prior to the Soccer War, as evidenced by the piecemeal 
abandonment of major components of the original EC LAC inte- 
gration plan. 



264 



Appendix B 



Reactivation of Integration 

Despite Honduras' s withdrawal from the CACM and its sus- 
pension of commercial relations with El Salvador, Central American 
intraregional trade rose steadily throughout the 1970s, exceeding 
US$1 billion by 1980, before halving in the mid-1980s as a result 
of accumulated intraregional debts, the overall debt crisis, and the 
disruption caused by civil wars in El Salvador and Nicaragua. Most 
efforts to coordinate industrial and macroeconomic policies had been 
abandoned, however, well before the general treaty expired in 1982. 

A reactivation of Central American economic integration was 
made possible with the signing of the Central American Peace 
Agreement (Esquipulas II) in August 1987. Esquipulas II laid the 
political groundwork for concerted action to renew the integration 
system following restoration of peace and democracy in the region. 
Formal action to restart the integration process was taken at the 
eighth summit of Central American presidents, held in Antigua, 
Guatemala, in June 1990. The participants at the Antigua sum- 
mit approved the Economic Action Plan for Central America (Plan 
de Accion Economico de Centroamerica — Paeca), which foresaw 
a new conceptual and legal basis for a Central American economic 
community. 

The new integration initiative emphasized insertion of the 
region's economy into the global economy based on export-led 
growth. The industrial base established under the CACM was to 
be retrofitted and modernized to compete in the international mar- 
ketplace, and nontraditional exports were to be promoted more 
vigorously. Concurrently, the maximum CET for the region was 
to be reduced from 40 percent to 20 percent and was expected to 
average between 10 percent and 15 percent for most products. With 
assistance from the European Economic Community (EEC), a new 
Central American Payments System was established to settle in- 
traregional debts. The main components of this new payments sys- 
tem were a revised Central American Clearing House and a Special 
Foreign Currencies Fund. The new payments system, backed by 
an initial 120 million European Currency Unit (ECU — see Glos- 
sary) support fund, was designed to manage intraregional creditor- 
debtor relations multilaterally, rather than bilaterally as under the 
previous regime, so that trade deficits would be incurred against 
the system rather than against individual countries. In addition, 
the Special Foreign Currencies Fund, which was backed by an in- 
itial EEC support fund of 30 million ECUs, was to help the less 
developed countries in the region finance the building and improve- 
ment of export-related infrastructure. 



265 



Honduras: A Country Study 

Further progress toward integration was made at the tenth Cen- 
tral American presidential summit, held in San Salvador, El Sal- 
vador, in July 1991, when the five original participants agreed to 
include Panama in certain aspects of the new economic community. 
The eleventh summit, held in Tegucigalpa, Honduras, modified 
several CACM institutions and incorporated them into the Sys- 
tem of Central American Integration (Sistema de Integracion 
Centroamericana — SIC A), an umbrella organization encompass- 
ing both political and economic integration efforts. Honduras ful- 
ly rejoined the integration process in February 1992, upon the 
signing of the Transitional Multilateral Free Trade Agreement with 
the other Central American republics. 

Central American integration was given a further boost with the 
signing of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) 
among Canada, Mexico, and the United States. In August 1992, 
a Framework Free Trade Agreement was signed among the five 
Central American republics and Mexico, establishing the proce- 
dures for the formation of a free-trade area projected to enter into 
force in December 1996. Inclusion of Central America in a free- 
trade area with Colombia and Venezuela was also foreseen in the 
Caracas Commitment adopted at a regional summit in February 
1993. Guatemala's recognition of Belize in September 1991 made 
it possible to begin free- trade agreement talks with the Caribbean 
Community (Caricom), the successor to Carifta. In late 1993, the 
Central American countries were actively lobbying for incorpora- 
tion into NAFTA and were expanding ties with the G-3 (Mexico, 
Colombia, and Venezuela) and Caricom. 

* * * 

Several detailed studies of the institutional development of the 
CACM through the 1980s are available; however, no comprehen- 
sive treatment of Central American economic integration efforts 
since Esquipulas II has yet been published. The earlier works in- 
clude Economic Integration in Central America, an extensive 1978 study 
edited by William R. Cline and Enrique Delgado; and Victor 
Bulmer-Thomas's The Political Economy of Central America since 1920, 
which places the CACM within the context of historical patterns 
of development in the region. More recent information on economic 
and political integration efforts in Central America can best be ob- 
tained from biannual issues of Revista de la Integracion y el Desarollo 
de Centroamerica, published by the BCIE, and various numbers of 
Panorama Centroamericano, published by the Instituto Centro- 
americano de Estudios Polfticos. Statistical data on CACM member 



266 



Appendix B 



states are available from various SIECA publications, including 
Cuadernos de la SIECA, Estadisticas Analiticas del Comercio Intracen- 
troamericano, and Series Estadisticas Seleccionadas de Centroamerica. Cur- 
rent reporting of Central American economic developments is 
available from Latin American Weekly Report, Latin America Monitor, 
and the Economist Intelligence Unit's Country Reports and Country 
Profiles on Central American countries. (For further information 
and complete citations, see Bibliography.) 



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Chapter 4 

Acker, Alison. Honduras: The Making of a Banana Republic. Boston: 
South End Press, 1988. 



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Americas Watch. Honduras: Torture and Murder by Government Forces 
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Honduras: Without the Will. New York: July 1989. 

Amnesty International. Honduras. Civil Authority-Military Power: Hu- 
man Rights Violations in the 1980s. London: February 1988. 

Honduras: Persistence of Human Rights Violations. New York: 

June 1991. 

Anderson, Thomas P. Politics in Central America: Guatemala, El Sal- 
vador, Honduras, and Nicaragua. (2d ed.) New York: Praeger, 1988. 

Blaustein, Albert P., and Gisbert H. Flanz. Constitutions of the Coun- 
tries of the World. Dobbs Ferry, New York: Oceana, 1983. 

Brockett, Charles. Land, Power, and Poverty: Agrarian Transformation 
and Political Conflict in Central America. Boulder, Colorado: West- 
view Press, 1991. 

Crahan, Margaret E. "Religion and Democratization in Central 
America." Pages 331-54 in Louis W. Goodman, William M. 
Leogrande, and Johanna Mendelson Forman (eds.), Political Par- 
ties and Democracy in Central America. Boulder, Colorado: West- 
view Press, 1992. 

Encyclopedia of the Third World. (4th ed.) (Ed., George Thomas Ku- 
rian.) New York: Facts on File, 1992. 

Espindal Irias, Rigoberto. El sistema de justicia en Honduras. 
Tegucigalpa: Editorial Valle, 1990. 

The Europa Yearbook, 1993. London: Europa, 1993. 

Goodman, Louis W., William M. Leogrande, and Johanna Men- 
delson Forman (eds.). Political Parties and Democracy in Central Ameri- 
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Honduras. Constitution de la Republica. Tegucigalpa: 1992. 

Tribunal Nacional de Elecciones. Ley electoral y de las or- 
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Levitsky, Steve. "Taming the Honduran Military," Hemisphere, 
4, Summer 1992, 36-38. 

Loser, Eva. The 1989 Honduran Elections: Pre- Election Report. 
Washington: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 
November 17, 1989. 

McDonald, Ronald H., and J. Mark Ruhl. Party Politics and Elec- 
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Millet, Richard L. "Politicized Warriors: The Military and Cen- 
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William M. Leogrande, and Johanna Mendelson Forman (eds.), 
Political Parties and Democracy in Central America. Boulder, Colora- 
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Morris, James A. Honduras: Caudillo Politics and Military Rulers. Boul- 
der, Colorado: Westview Press, 1984. 



279 



Honduras: A Country Study 

Navarro, Julio. "Apuntes sobre los intentos de modernizacion del 
estado hondureno," Puntos de vista [Tegucigalpa], 6, October 
1992, 49-52. 

4 'La pecada electoral: de la tradition a la ruptura. ' ' Pages 

39-62 in Mario Posas (ed.), Puntos de vista: temas politicos. 
Tegucigalpa: Centro de Documentacion de Honduras, 1992. 

Norsworthy, Kent, with Tom Barry. Inside Honduras. Albuquerque, 
New Mexico: Inter-Hemispheric Education Resource Center, 1993. 

Paz Aguilar, Ernesto. "The Origin and Development of Political 
Parties in Honduras." Pages 161-74 in Louis W. Goodman, 
William M. Leogrande, and Johanna Mendelson Forman (eds.), 
Political Parties and Democracy in Central America. Boulder, Colora- 
do: Westview Press, 1992. 

Posas, Mario. "El proceso de democratization en Honduras." 
Pages 1-37 in Mario Posas (ed.), Puntos de vista: Temas politicos. 
Tegucigalpa: Centro de Documentacion de Honduras, 1992. 

"Los sindicatos y la construccion de la democracia. ' ' Pages 

63-80 in Mario Posas (ed.), Puntos de vista: Temas politicos. 
Tegucigalpa: Centro de Documentacion de Honduras, 1992. 

Posas, Mario (ed.). Puntos de vista: Temas politicos. Tegucigalpa: Cen- 
tro de Documentacion de Honduras, 1992. 

Ronfeldt, David, with Konrad Kellen and Richard Millet. U.S. 
Involvement in Central America: Three Views from Honduras. (R-3662- 
USDA series.) Santa Monica, California: Rand, July 1989. 

Rosenberg, Mark B. "Honduras." Pages 519-34 in Howard J. 
Wiarda and Harvey F. Kline (eds.), Latin American Politics and 
Development. (3d ed.) Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1990. 

Rosenberg, Mark B., and Philip Shepherd. Honduras Confronts Its 
Future: Contending Perspectives on Critical Issues. Boulder, Colora- 
do: Lynne Rienner, 1986. 

Salas, Luis, and Jose M. Rico. Lajusticia penal en Honduras. San 
Jose, Costa Rica: Editorial Universitaria Centroamericana, 1989. 

Salomon, Leticia. "La perdida del miedo en la construccion cul- 
tural de la democracia," Puntos de vista [Tegucigalpa], No. 7, 
May 1993, 53-71. 

Politica y militares en Honduras. Tegucigalpa: Centro de 

Documentacion de Honduras, 1992. 

"De la seguridad a la inseguridad: La tragedia de las fuer- 

zas armadas," Puntos de vista [Tegucigalpa], No. 6, October 1992, 
34-48. 

Schulz, Donald E. How Honduras Escaped Revolutionary Violence. 

Washington: United States Army War College, 1992. 
Sek, Lenore M., and Mark P. Sullivan. Caribbean Basin Countries: 

Implications of a North American Free Trade Agreement. (Library of 



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Washington: May 27, 1993. 

United States. Department of Commerce. Investment Climate State- 
ment: Honduras. Washington: GPO, October 1992. 

Department of Justice. International Criminal Investiga- 
tive Training Assistance Program. Honduras: Criminal Justice Anal- 
ysis and Law Enforcement Assessment. Washington: GPO, 1990. 

. Department of Labor. Foreign Labor Trends: Honduras, 

1991-1992. (FLT 92-39 series.) Washington: GPO, 1992. 

Department of State. Background Notes: Honduras. Washing- 
ton: GPO, 1992. 

Department of State. Country Reports on Human Rights Prac- 
tices for 1990. (Report submitted to United States Congress, 102d, 
1st Session, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, and House 
of Representatives, Committee on Foreign Affairs.) Washing- 
ton: GPO, 1991. 

Department of State. Country Reports on Human Rights Prac- 
tices for 1991. (Report submitted to United States Congress, 102d, 
2d Session, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, and House 
of Representatives, Committee on Foreign Affairs.) Washing- 
ton: GPO, 1992. 

Department of State. Country Reports on Human Rights Prac- 
tices for 1992. (Report submitted to United States Congress, 103d, 
2d Session, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, and House 
of Representatives, Committee on Foreign Affairs.) Washing- 
ton: GPO, 1993. 

Embassy in Tegucicalpa. Handbook on Honduras: Democra- 
cy, Defense, Development, and Drug Control. Tegucigalpa: 1989. 

General Accounting Office. Central America: Conditions of 

Refugees and Displaced Persons. (GAO/NSIAD-89-54 series.) 
Washington: GPO, 1989. 

General Accounting Office . Central America: Impact of U. S. 

Assistance in the 1980s. (GAO/NSIAD-9-170 series.) Washing- 
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General Accounting Office. Honduras: U.S. Military Presence 

at Soto Cano Air Base. (GAO/NSIAD-89-107BR series.) Washing- 
ton: GPO, 1989. 

West, Robert C, and John P. Augelli. Middle America: Its Lands 
and Peoples. Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice- Hall, 1966. 

Wiarda, Howard J., and Harvey F. Kline (eds.). Latin American 
Politics and Development. (3d ed.) Boulder, Colorado: Westview 
Press, 1990. 

Yearbook on International Communist Affairs, 1991. Stanford, Califor- 
nia: Hoover Institution Press, 1991. 



281 



Honduras: A Country Study 



Chapter 5 

''Army to Train FUSEP," La Tribuna [Tegucigalpa], December 
31, 1986, 3. 

Barry, Tom. Central America Inside Out: The Essential Guide to Its So- 
cieties, Politics, and Economics. New York: Grove Weidenfeld, 1991. 

The Central America Fact Book. Albuquerque, New Mexi- 
co: Inter-Hemispheric Education Resource Center, 1986. 

Blachman, Morris J., William M. LeoGrande, and Kenneth E. 
Sharpe. Confronting Revolution: Security Through Diplomacy in Cen- 
tral America. New York: Pantheon Books, 1986. 

Center for Defense Information. "The Global Network of United 
States Military Bases," The Defense Monitor, 18, No. 2, 1989. 

Countries of the World and Their Leaders Yearbook, 1993. Detroit: Gale 
Research, 1993. 

Farah, Douglas. "Honduras Assesses Role of Its Military, " 
Washington Post. April 24, 1993, A23. 

"Pentagon's Temporary Base in Honduras Searches for 

New Roles," Washington Post, June 12, 1993, A24. 

"Wars Over, Region's Armies Remain: Generals Retain 

Dominance in March of Central America, ' ' Washington Post, June 
2, 1993, Al and A24. 

Foreign Military Markets: Latin America and Australasia. Newton, Con- 
necticut: Forcast International/DMS, 1993. 

Gugliota, Guy. "War Games Praised: Gringos Are with US," Mi- 
ami Herald, May 14, 1987, A5. 

Halloran, Richard. "New U.S. Exercises Set For Honduras," New 
York Times, New York: March 22, 1987, A3. 

Jane's Fighting Ships, 1993-94. Alexandria, Virginia: Jane's, 1993. 

Hockstader, Lee. "Honduras Embattled after Decade of Aid: U.S. 
Effort Benefited Officer Corps," Washington Post, July 13, 1992. 

Keegan, John. World Armies. Detroit, Michigan: Gale Research, 
1983. 

Klepak, Harold. "Central America — A Strategic Review, "Jane's 
Intelligence Review [London], 4, No. 7, July 1992, 325-27. 

La administracion de justicia en Honduras. Tegucigalpa: Instituto 
Latinoamericano de las Naciones Unidas para la Prevention del 
Delito y Tratamiento de Delicuente, 1987. 

Lapper, Richard, and James Painter. Honduras: State for Sale. Lon- 
don: Latin American Bureau, 1985. 

Montes, Julio A. "Central American Navies," Jane's Intelligence 
Review, 4, November 1992, 525-27. 

"The Honduran Army — The Last 20 Years ," Jane's In- 
telligence Review [London], February 1993, 90-93. 



282 



Bibliography 



Morris, James A. Honduras: Caudillo Politics and Military Rulers. Boul- 
der, Colorado: Westview Press, 1984. 

Norsworthy, Kent, with Tom Barry. Inside Honduras. Albuquer- 
que, New Mexico: Inter-Hemisphere Education Resource 
Center, 1993. 

Polmar, Norman (ed.). World Combat Aircraft Directory. Garden City, 
New York: Doubleday, 1976. 

Salomon, Leticia. Politicay militares en Honduras. Tegucigalpa: Centro 
de Documentacion de Honduras, 1992. 

Schulz, Donald E. "The United States, Honduras, and the Crisis 
in Central America," Scandinavian Journal of Development Alterna- 
tives, 6, December 1987, 5-61. 

SIPRI Yearbook, 1992: World Armaments and Disarmament. Stockholm: 
Oxford University Press, 1992. 

World Defence Almanac: The Balance of Military Power. McLean, Vir- 
ginia: Monch Publishing, 1993. 

World Encyclopedia of Police Forces and Penal Systems. (Ed., George 
Thomas Kurian.) New York: Facts on File, 1989. 

(Various issues of the following publications were also used in 
the preparation of this chapter: Los Angeles Times, The Military Balance 
[London], New York Times, and Washington Post.) 



Appendix B 

Bulmer-Thomas, Victor. The Political Economy of Central America since 
1920. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987. 

Studies in the Economics of Central America. New York: St. 

Martin's Press, 1988. 

Cline, William R., and Enrique Delgado (eds.). Economic Integra- 
tion in Central America. Washington: Brookings Institution, 1978. 

Edwards, Sebastian. "Latin American Economic Integration: A 
New Perspective on an Old Dream," The World Economy, 16, 
No. 3, May 1993, 317-37. 

Salazar, Jose Manuel. "Present and Future Integration in Cen- 
tral America," Cepal Review, No. 42, December 1990, 157-80. 

Secretaria Permanente del Tratado General de Integracion Econo- 
mica Centroamericana. Cuadernos de la SIECA, No. 17: 25 ahos 
de integracion (en cifras). Guatemala City: 1986. 

Series estadisticas seleccionadas de centroamerica. Guatemala City, 

No. 24, May 1991. 

(Various issues of the following publications were also used in 
the preparation of this appendix: Estadisticas analiticas del comercio 



283 



Honduras: A Country Study 



Intracentroamericano [Guatemala City]; Economist Intelligence Unit, 
Country Report: Guatemala, El Salvador [London]; Economist Intelli- 
gence Unit, Country Report: Nicaragua, Honduras [London]; Economist 
Intelligence Unit, Country Report: Panama, Costa Rica [London]; Latin 
American Weekly Report [London]; Panorama Centroamericano [Guatema- 
la City]; and Revista de la integracion y el desarollo de Centroamerica 
[Tegucigalpa]). 



284 



Glossary 



amparo — Law that gives protection to a legal claim while the claim 
is under litigation. Under Spanish civil law, a person could ob- 
tain a temporary title to a tract of land, protecting his or her 
claim until a survey could be made and full title granted. This 
concept of protection of a land claim while under litigation, 
the amparo, has since been codified and extended to any type 
of legal claim. 

audiencia — Literally audience or court; a subdivision of a viceroy alty 
under Spanish colonial administration. As well as being the 
name of the administrative unit, the audiencia, composed of five 
men, was the highest governmental authority in the territory. 
During most of the colonial period, the president of the audien- 
cia held the additional titles of governor and captain general; 
hence the alternative name for the audiencia was captaincy gener- 
al. Although technically subordinate to the viceroy alty, the 
governor, or captain general, was appointed by the Spanish 
monarch and was responsible only to him or her. In practice, 
the governor frequendy ignored orders from Spain and acted 
independentiy. For this reason, the Audiencia of Guatemala 
was frequendy referred to in colonial times as the Kingdom 
of Guatemala. 

Central America — Here used in a geographic sense. Central Ameri- 
ca is considered to be the entire isthmus between Mexico and 
Colombia, including present-day Belize, Guatemala, Hon- 
duras, El Salvador, Nicaragua, Costa Rica, and Panama. A 
more traditional political view of the term, most often used in 
the region itself, is that Central America encompasses only the 
five successor states to the United Provinces of Central America 
(1821-38): Guatemala, Honduras, El Salvador, Nicaragua, and 
Costa Rica. 

compadrazgo — Literally, "copaternity. " A system of ritual 
"coparenthood" that links parents, children, and godparents 
in a close social or economic relationship. 

Constituent Assembly — A deliberative body made up of elected 
delegates who are charged with the responsibility of drafting 
a new constitution and, in some instances, electing a new presi- 
dent. Traditionally, after it completed its work, a Constituent 
Assembly reverted to a National Congress, which then served 
as the country's legislative body until the next scheduled 
elections. 



285 



Honduras: A Country Study 

Contadora — A diplomatic initiative launched by a January 1983 
meeting on Contadora Island off the Pacific coast of Panama, 
by which the "Core Four" mediator countries of Mexico, 
Venezuela, Colombia, and Panama sought to prevent through 
negotiations a regional conflagration among the Central Ameri- 
can states of Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua, 
and Costa Rica. In September 1984, the negotiating process 
produced a draft treaty, the Contadora Acta, which was judged 
acceptable by the government of Nicaragua but rejected by the 
other four Central American states concerned. The govern- 
ments of Peru, Uruguay, Argentina, and Brazil formed the 
Contadora Support Group in 1985 in an effort to revitalize the 
faltering talks. The process was suspended unofficially in June 
1986 when the Central American governments refused to sign 
a revised Acta. The Contadora process was effectively supersed- 
ed by direct negotiations among the Central American states. 

Contra — Short form of contrarevolucionario (counterrevolutionary). 
Member of the Nicaraguan Resistance, an armed resistance 
movement in the 1980s supported by the United States and 
fighting against the national Sandinista government. 

Creole — In Honduras a term used for an English-speaking person 
of African or mixed African and indigenous ancestry. 

Enterprise for the Americas Initiative (EAI) — A plan announced 
by President George H.W. Bush on June 27, 1990, calling for 
the United States to negotiate agreements with selected Latin 
American countries to reduce their official debt to the United 
States and make funds available through this restructuring for 
environmental programs; to stimulate private investment; and 
to take steps to promote extensive trade liberalization with 
the goal of establishing free trade throughout the Western 
Hemisphere. 

European Currency Unit (ECU)— Instituted in 1979, the ECU is 
the unit of account of the European Union. The value of the 
ECU is determined by the value of a basket that includes the 
currencies of all European Union member states. To establish 
the value of the basket, each member's currency receives a share 
that reflects the relative strength and importance of the mem- 
ber's economy. One ECU was equivalent to about US$1.22 
in July 1994. 

fiscal year (FY) — Honduras' s fiscal year is the calendar year. Where 
reference is made to United States aid appropriations or dis- 
bursements, the United States government's fiscal year, which 
runs from October 1 to September 30, is used, with the date 
of reference drawn from the year in which the period ends. For 



286 



Glossary 



example, FY 1992 began on October 1, 1991, and ended on 
September 30, 1992. 

Garifuna — An ethnic group descended from the Carib of the 
Eastern Caribbean and from Africans who had escaped from 
slavery. The Garifuna resisted the British and the French in 
the Windward Islands until they were defeated by the British 
in 1796. After putting down a violent Garifuna rebellion on 
Saint Vincent, the British moved the Garifuna across the Carib- 
bean to the Bay Islands (present-day Islas de la Bahfa) in the 
Gulf of Honduras. From there the Garifuna migrated to the 
Caribbean coasts of Nicaragua, Honduras, Guatemala, and 
southern British Honduras. The term Garifuna also refers to 
the group's language. 

gross domestic product (GDP) — A measure of the total value of 
goods and services produced by the domestic economy during 
a given period, usually one year. Obtained by adding the value 
contributed by each sector of the economy in the form of profits, 
compensation to employees, and depreciation (consumption of 
capital). Only domestic production is included, not income aris- 
ing from investments and possessions owned abroad; hence the 
use of the word domestic to distinguish GDP from gross nation- 
al product (q-v.). 

gross national product (GNP) — The total market value of all final 
goods and services produced by an economy during a year. 
Obtained by adding the gross domestic product (q. v. ) and the 
income received from abroad by residents and subtracting pay- 
ments remitted abroad to nonresidents. 

import-substitution industrialization (ISI) — An economic develop- 
ment strategy that emphasizes the growth of domestic indus- 
tries, often by import protection using tariff and nontariff 
measures. Proponents favor the export of industrial goods over 
primary products. 

International Monetary Fund (IMF) — Established along with the 
World Bank (q.v.) in 1945, the IMF is a specialized agency 
affiliated with the United Nations (UN) that takes responsi- 
bility for stabilizing international exchange rates and payments. 
The main business of the IMF is the provision of loans to its 
members when they experience balance of payments difficul- 
ties. These loans often carry conditions that require substan- 
tial internal economic adjustments by the recipients. 

lempira (L) — Honduras monetary unit from 1926 to present. For 
most of that period, the lempira' s value was pegged at 
US$1 = L2. Devalued in 1990; in December 1993, the official 
rate was US$1 =L5.9. 



287 



Honduras: A Country Study 

Paris Club — The informal name for a consortium of Western cre- 
ditor countries (Belgium, Britain, Canada, France, Germany, 
Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland, and the 
United States) that have made loans or have guaranteed ex- 
port credits to developing nations and that meet in Paris to dis- 
cuss borrowers' ability to repay debts. Paris Club deliberations 
often result in the tendering of emergency loans to countries 
in economic difficulty or in the rescheduling of debts. Formed 
in October 1962, the organization has no formal or institutional 
existence. Its secretariat is run by the French treasury. It has 
a close relationship with the International Monetary Fund (q. v.), 
to which all of its members except Switzerland belong, as well 
as with the World Bank (q. v.) and the United Nations Confer- 
ence on Trade and Development (UNCTAD). The Paris Club 
is also known as the Group of Ten (G-10). 

San Jose Accord — An agreement between Mexico and Venezue- 
la, signed in 1980 in San Jose, Costa Rica, whereby the two 
oil producers committed themselves to supply crude oil on con- 
cessionary terms to ten Central American and Caribbean 
nations. 

Sandinista — Originally a member of the Marxist group attempt- 
ing to overthrow the Somozas or their hand-picked president 
in the 1960s and 1970s. The group took its name from Au- 
gusto Cesar Sandino, who led a guerrilla struggle against the 
United States occupation of Nicaragua in the 1930s. The po- 
litical arm of the group, the Sandinista National Liberation 
Front (Frente Sandinista de Liberation Nacional — FSLN), was 
the national government of Nicaragua from July 1979 to April 
1990. After the late 1970s, the term Sandinista came to be used 
to designate a member or supporter of the FSLN or as the ad- 
jectival form of the FSLN (the "Sandinista" government). 

World Bank — The informal name used to designate a group of four 
affiliated international institutions: the International Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), the International 
Development Association (IDA), the International Finance Cor- 
poration (IFC), and the Multilateral Investment Guarantee 
Agency (MIGA). The IBRD, established in 1945, has the 
primary purpose of providing loans at market-related rates of 
interest to developing countries at more advanced stages of de- 
velopment. The IDA, a legally separate loan fund but ad- 
ministered by the staff of the IBRD, was set up in 1960 to 
furnish credits to the poorest developing countries on much eas- 
ier terms than those of conventional IBRD loans. The IFC, 
founded in 1956, supplements the activities of the IBRD 



288 



Glossary 



through loans and assistance designed specifically to encourage 
the growth of productive private enterprises in less developed 
countries. The MIGA, founded in 1988, insures private for- 
eign investment in developing countries against various non- 
commercial risks. The president and certain officers of the 
IBRD hold the same positions in the IFC. The four institu- 
tions are owned by the governments of the countries that sub- 
scribe their capital. To participate in the World Bank group, 
member states must first belong to the International Mone- 
tary Fund (q.v.). 



289 



Index 



AAA. See Alliance for Anticommunist 
Action 

acquired immune deficiency syndrome 
(AIDS), 103 

Ad Hoc Commission for Institutional Re- 
form, 166-67, 196, 245 

AFL-CIO. See American Federation of 
Labor-Congress of Industrial Organi- 
zations 

agrarian reform, 82, 148, 155, 179, 187; 
under Cruz, 187; lobbying for, 186; 
nullified, 37-38; under Villeda Mo- 
rales, 36-37 

Agrarian Reform Law (1962), 183 

agricultural exports, 10, 110, 127; at- 
tempts to develop, 18; diversification 
in, 110; growth of, 110 

Agricultural Modernization Law (1992), 
127, 188 

agricultural products {see also under in- 
dividual crops): bananas, xxvi, 18, 19, 
23, 28, 29, 110, 112, 125, 127-28; 
coffee, xxvi, 32, 110, 112, 125, 127-28; 
nontraditional, 128; sarsaparilla, 9; 
sugar, 87, 110, 127-28; tobacco, 18 

agriculture (see also cattle industry), 10, 
123-31; assistance for, 198; diversifi- 
cation of, xxiv; earnings from, 119; em- 
ployment in, 115; energy used by, 132; 
expansion of, 125; in Great Depression, 
29; land available for, 65, 94; land de- 
struction by, 125; modernization of, 
110; as percentage of gross domestic 
product, 125; percentage of work force 
in, 87, 118; promotion of, 25; subsis- 
tence, 18, 70, 87, 100, 119; techniques 
in, 94, 125; unions in, 88 

Aguilar Cerrato, Enrique, 178 

AID. See United States Agency for Inter- 
national Development 

AIDS. See acquired immune deficiency 
syndrome 

AIFLD. See American Institute for Free 

Labor Development 
Air Force of Honduras (Fuerzas Aereas 

de Honduras), 223-25; aircraft of, 199; 

assistance for, 235; established, 214, 

235; headquarters, 224; improvements 



in, 29; insignia, 232; materiel, 224; 
modernization of, 215; number of per- 
sonnel in, 212, 224; organization of, 
224; political role of, 223; ranks, 232; 
training, 29 
airports, 142 

Air Service of Honduras (Servicios Aere- 
os de Honduras, Sociedad Anonima — 
SAHSA), 225 

air travel, 142 

alcalde. See mayor 

alcoholism, 103 

Alfonso XIII, 19 

Alianza de Accion Anticomunista. See Al- 
liance for Anticommunist Action 

Alianza Liberal del Pueblo. See Popular 
Liberal Alliance 

Alipo. See Popular Liberal Alliance 

Alliance for Anticommunist Action 
(Alianza de Accion Anticomunista — 
AAA), 181 

Alliance for Progress, 187, 198, 261 

Alvarado, Pedro de, 8 

Alvarez Martinez, Gustavo, 48, 182, 195; 
assassinated, 179; ousted, 50, 51, 53, 
204; role of, in politics, 50, 197; ter- 
rorism by, 189, 191 

Amapala Free Zone, 135 

Amapala Naval Base, 225 

American Federation of Labor-Congress 
of Industrial Organizations (AFL- 
CIO), 122, 184 

American Institute for Free Labor De- 
velopment (AIFLD), 122, 185 

Anach. See National Association of Hon- 
duran Peasants 

Andean Group, 257 

ANDI. See National Association of Indus- 
trialists 

Anglo-Spanish Convention of 1786, 12 
Anti-Terrorism Assistance program, 241 
Aproh. See Association for the Progress of 

Honduras 
Arabs, 98, 100, 183 
Arbenz Guzman, Jacobo, 33, 34 
Arce, Manuel Jose, 14 
Arcos, Cresencio, 195, 197, 200, 202, 244 
Argentina: in Contadora process, 56 



291 



Honduras: A Country Study 



Arias, Juan Angel: in elections of 1923, 26 

Arias Plan (Central American Peace 
Agreement), 57-58, 59, 265 

Arias Sanchez, Oscar, 57 

Armed Forces of Honduras (Fuerzas Ar- 
madas de Honduras— FAH), 221-33; 
alliance of, with National Party of Hon- 
duras, 172; attitudes toward, 41, 147; 
autonomy of, 157; background of, 212; 
businesses of, 196, 227, 234-35; civic- 
action role of, 225; chief of, 42, 43, 161, 
215, 218-19, 234; conditions in, 229; 
under constitution of 1957, 215; under 
constitution of 1982, 152-53; con- 
straints on, 219; corruption in, 44, 148, 
195; creation of, 212; drug trafficking 
by, xxvii, 44; economic role of, 147, 
234; in elite class, 86; evolution of, 212; 
expansion of, 215; extremist groups 
and, 181; and foreign policy, 197; 
general commander of, 157; human 
rights abuses by, 186, 191, 204, 211, 
244-45; income of, 234; intimidation 
by, 191, 193; investments by, 234; joint 
exercises of, 38, 50, 51, 148, 199, 211, 
235-38, 241; materiel of, 221; missions 
of, 211, 213, 216; modernization of, 32; 
number of personnel in, 212; organi- 
zation of, 213, 216; pay and benefits in, 
229; political role of, 54-55, 59, 82-83, 
147, 196, 211,213-14, 215; and presi- 
dent, 216-18; professionalization of, 
xxvi, 29, 214-15; promotions in, 233; 
recruitment for, 227-29; reduced, xxix, 
211; reform of, 194-95; reserves, 227; 
restructuring of, 50; retirement funds, 
234; social class in, 83; Supreme Coun- 
cil of, 43; training, 214, 215, 229-32; 
uniforms, ranks, and insignia of, 
232-33 

Armed Forces Command and General 
Staff School, 232, 233 

Army of Honduras (Ejercito de Hon- 
duras — EH), 221-23; assistance for, 
235; deployment of, 237; insignia, 232; 
materiel of, 223; number of personnel 
in, 212, 221, 223; organization of, 
221-23; political role of, 213-14; 
professionalization of, 214-15; ranks, 
232; uniforms, 232-33 

Asociacion Hondurena de Empresas Pe- 
quenas y Medianas. See Honduran As- 
sociation of Small and Medium 



Industry 

Asociacion Nacional de Campesinos de 

Honduras. See National Association of 

Honduran Peasants 
Asociacion Nacional de Industrials . See 

National Association of Industrialists 
Asociacion para el Progreso de Honduras. 

See Association for the Progress of 

Honduras 
Assemblies of God, 101 
Association for the Progress of Honduras 

(Asociacion para el Progreso de 

Honduras— Aproh), 49-50, 181-82 
Atlantida department, 167; migration to, 

75; political affiliations in, 175 
Aurelio Soto, Marco, 17 
Azcona Hoyo, Jose, 175, 241; in elections 

of 1985, 55, 147, 172; as president, 55, 

59 

Azcona Hoyo administration, xxviii, 192; 
congress under, 162 



banana industry, xxiii, 109, 198; employ- 
ment in, 77, 87; government favors for, 
33; growth of, 18-20; investments by, 
xxvi, 110; labor unions in, 184; land 
use by, 65; plant diseases in, 29; strikes 
against, 88, 110, 183, 190; taxes on, 43; 
wages in, 119-120, 183 

bananas, 28; export of, xxvi, 18, 19, 28, 
29, 110, 127; income from, 112; prices 
for, 23; production, 125, 127 

Banco Central de Honduras. See Central 
Bank of Honduras 

Banco Centroamericano de Integracion 
Economica. See Central American Bank 
for Economic Integration 

Banco de las Fuerzas Armadas. See Bank 
of the Armed Forces 

Banffaa. See Bank of the Armed Forces 

banking, 136-37 

Bank of the Armed Forces (Banco de las 

Fuerzas Armadas — Banffaa), 234 
Basic Arms School, 214 
Battalion 3-16, 181, 194, 226 
Bay Islands. See Islas de la Bahia 
BCIE. See Central American Bank for 

Economic Integration 
Belgium: materiel from, 223 
Bertrand, Francisco, 22; opposition to, 
24; resignation of, 24 



292 



Index 



Big Pine military exercises, 236; Big Pine 
II, 236-38; Big Pine III, 238 

Bilateral Treaty on Immigration (1967), 
39 

Black Caribs, xxiv, xxv, 98, 100, 192 

black market, 117 

Bogran, Francisco: as president, 24 

Bogran, Luis: as president, 17 

Boletin Informativo, 194 

Bonaparte, Napoleon, 12 

Bonilla, Manuel, 20, 174; as president, 19 

Bonilla Vasquez, Policarpo, 17; death of, 

27; in elections of 1923, 26; imprisoned, 

19; as president, 150 
border disputes, 66-69; with El Salvador, 

3, 39, 43-44, 66-69, 149, 203-4, 206; 

with Guatemala, 28; with Nicaragua, 

8, 17, 19-20, 30 
borders, 3-4, 66, 74 
Bourbon dynasty, xxiv; reforms under, 1 1 
Brazil: in Contadora process, 56; materiel 

from, 241-42 
Bricero, Ramoi! Antonio, 189 
Britain: debt to, 27, 33; invasion by, 15; 

materiel from, 223, 241-42; rivalry of, 

with Spain, xxiv, xxv, 11-12 
British rule, 14; end of, 16 
British settlements, 12 
Brockett, Charles, 187, 188 
budget deficit, 1 18; as percentage of gross 

domestic product, 114 
Bueso Arias, Jorge: in elections of 1971, 

42 

Bush, George H.W., 59, 202 
business associations, 181-83; under 
Cruz, 43 

Cabanas, Trinidad: overthrown, 15; as 

president, 15 
Cabanas 93 military exercises, 241 
cabinet, 157 

CACM. See Central American Common 
Market 

CAHDEA. See Honduran Advisory 
Council for Autonomous Ethnic De- 
velopment 

Calderon, Abraham Williams: in elec- 
tions of 1954, 34 

Callejas Romero, Rafael Leonardo: in 
elections of 1985, 55; in elections of 
1989, 147, 172 

Callejas Romero administration, xxviii; 



armed forces under, 196; congress un- 
der, 162; corruption under, 197; econ- 
omy under, 112-14, 117; foreign policy 
under, 198; human rights under, 192; 
inflation under, 114-15; land reform 
under, 126; presidential commissions 
under, 158 

Camara Centroamericana de Compensa- 
tion de Monedas. See Central Ameri- 
can Clearing House 

Camara de Comercio de Industrias de 
Tegucigalpa. See Tegucigalpa Chamber 
of Commerce and Industry 

Camara de Comercio e Industrias de 
Cortes. See Cortes Chamber of Com- 
merce and Industry 

Camarena, Enrique, 201 

Cambria Oil, 132 

CAMS. See Central American Microwave 
System 

Canada: in North American Free Trade 
Agreement, 202, 266 

Canahuati Larach, Jorge, 194 

capital flight, 111, 117, 262 

C arias Andino, Tiburcio, 214; in elections 
of 1923, 25, 26; in elections of 1932, 
28; in elections of 1954, 34 

C arias Andino administration, xxvi, 
28-33; attempts to overthrow, 30; con- 
stitution under, 150 

Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI), 142, 
199, 202 

Caribbean Community (Caricom), 266 
Caribbean Free Trade Association (Carif- 
ta), 257 

Caribbean lowlands, 70-71; climate of, 
72, 72; employment in, 87; population 
growth rate of, 78-80 

Caricom. See Caribbean Community 

Carifta. See Caribbean Free Trade As- 
sociation 

Carney, James, 180 

Casas, Francisco de las, 6 

Castillo Armas, Carlos, 33; as president, 
34; rebellion led by, 34 

Castle and Cook. See Standard Fruit 
Company 

Catholic Church, Roman, xxv, 97, 
100-101, 182; activism of, 9, 83, 101; 
evangelical campaign of, 101; relations 
of, with government, 9, 58, 100; role 
of, 83 

cattle industry, xxiv, 9, 10, 84; exports 



293 



Honduras: A Country Study 



by, 18, 65, 110, 130; land degradation 
by, 125; production in, 84, 128-30 

caudillos, 49; armed forces under, 213 

Cayos Cochinos, 66 

Cayos Zapotillos, 66 

CBI. See Caribbean Basin Initiative 

GCIC. See Cortes Chamber of Commerce 
and Industry 

CCIT. See Tegucigalpa Chamber of Com- 
merce and Industry 

CCOP. See Coordinating Committee of 
Popular Organizations 

Cecilio del Valle, Jose, 14 

Cedoh. See Honduran Documentation 
Center 

Cefas. See Female Center of Social Adap- 
tation 

CEM-H. See Honduran Center for Wom- 
en's Studies 

Center of the Investigation and Promo- 
tion of Human Rights (Centro de 
Investigation y Promotion de los De- 
rechos Humanos — Ciprodeh), 191, 
192, 246 

Central America (see also United Provinces 
of Central America): economic integra- 
tion of, 148, 204, 205, 258; regional in- 
tegration, 148-49, 198, 204, 257; union 
of, with Mexico, 13 

Central American Bank for Economic In- 
tegration (Banco Centroamericano de 
Integration Economica— BCIE), 203, 
260 

Central American Clearing House 
(Camara Centroamericana de Compen- 
sation de Monedas), 260, 263-64, 265 

Central American Committee of Trade 
Union Unity (Comite de Unidad Sindi- 
cal de Centroamerica— CUSCA), 185 

Central American Common Market 
(CACM), 41, 110-11, 181, 203, 257- 
66; created, 257; decline of, 258, 261- 
64; end of, 264; objectives of, 203; 
problems in, 263; withdrawal from, 110, 
258, 264 

Central American Congress, 13 

Central American Corporation of Air 
Navigation Services (Corporation Cen- 
troamericana de Servicios de Navega- 
cion Aerea — Cocesna), 261 

Central American Court of Justice, 206; 
established, 21 

Central American Defense Council 



(Consejo Defensa Centroamericana — 

Condeca), 232; formed, 38; members of, 

38; military exercises of, 38 
Central American Economic Action Plan 

(Plan de Action Economica de Centro- 
america — Paeca), 148, 205 
Central American Free Trade Zone, 205 
Central American Integration System (Sis- 

tema de Integration Centroamericana — 

Sica), 205, 266 
Central American Maritime Commission 

(Comision Centroamericana de Trans- 

porte Maritimo — Cocatram), 261 
Central American Microwave System 

(CAMS), 138 
Central American Monetary Council 

(Consejo Monetario Centroamericano), 

260, 263-64 
Central American Parliament (Parlamento 

Centroamericano — Parlacen), 149, 

205-6 

Central American Payments System, 265 
Central American Peace Agreement. See 

Arias Plan 
Central American Peace Conference 

(1907), 21 

Central American presidential summits, 

204, 266; of 1990, 205; of 1991, 204, 

205, 266; of 1993, 205 

Central American Railways Commission 
(Comision Centroamericana de Ferro- 
carriles — Cocafer), 261 

Central American Tariff Equalization 
Convention (Convenio Centroameri- 
cano sobre Equiparacion de Grava- 
menes a la Importation), 259 

Central American Technological Univer- 
sity, 102 

Central Bank of Honduras (Banco Cen- 
tral de Honduras), 136, 159 

Central Federation of Honduran Free 
Trade Unions (Federation Central de 
Sindicatos Libres de Honduras), 184 

Central General de Trabajadores. See 
General Workers' Central 

central highlands. See interior highlands 

Central Latinoamericana de Trabajadores. 
See Latin American Workers Central 

Central National de Trabajadores del 
Campo. See National Central of Farm 
Workers 

Centro de Documentation de Honduras. 
See Honduran Documentation Center 



294 



Index 



Centro de Estudios de la Mujer- 
Honduras. See Honduran Center for 
Women's Studies 

Centro de Informatica y Estudios Legis- 
latives. See Data Processing and Legis- 
lative Studies Center 

Centro Feminino de Adaptation Social. 
See Female Center of Social Adaptation 

Centro Regional de Entrenamiento Mili- 
tar. See Regional Center for Military 
Training 

Cerezo Arevalo, Marco Vinicio, 57 

Cerro de Las Minas, 70 

CGT. See General Workers' Central 

children: mortality rate of, 65; social ser- 
vices for, xxix; support of, 91, 96 

Chiquita Brands International (see also 
United Fruit Company), 120; invest- 
ment by, 142; land owned by, 125; 
production by, 127 

Choluteca department, 167; political af- 
filiations in, 177 

Chorotega people, 98 

Chortf people, 97-98 

Christian Democratic Movement of Hon- 
duras (Movimiento Democrata Cris- 
tiano de Honduras— MDCH), 83, 122, 
178, 185, 186 

Church of God, 101 

CIDH. See Inter-Institutional Commis- 
sion on Human Rights 

CIEL. See Data Processing and Legisla- 
tive Studies Center 

Cinchoneros Popular Liberation Move- 
ment (Movimiento Popular de Libera- 
ci6n Cinchoneros— MPLC), 178, 180 

Ciprodeh. See Center of the Investigation 
and Promotion of Human Rights 

civil aviation, 225 

Civil Guard (Guardia Civil) (see also Pub- 
lic Security Force), 216; creation of, 37, 
225 

civil service, 158-59; number of em- 
ployees in, 159; politicization of, 159 

civil war (1924), 26 

class. See social class 

CLAT. See Latin American Workers 
Central 

climate, 71-72; rainfall, xxiii, 71, 72; 

temperature, 71-72 
CNC. See National Peasants Council 
CNTC. See National Central of Farm 

Workers 



Cocafer. See Central American Railways 
Commission 

Cocatram. See Central American Mari- 
time Commission 

Cocesna. See Central American Corpora- 
tion of Air Navigation Services 

Cocoh. See Coordinating Council of Hon- 
duran Peasant Organizations 

Codeh. See Committee for the Defense of 
Human Rights in Honduras 

Codeimuca. See Council for Integrated 
Development of Peasant Women 

Cofadeh. See Committee of the Families 
of the Detained and Disappeared in 
Honduras 

coffee: exports of, xxvi, 32, 110; income 
from, 112; prices, 111, 127; produc- 
tion, 125, 127 

Cohdefor. See Honduran Corporation for 
Forestry Development 

Coloma Free Zone, 135 

Colombia, 266; in Contadora process, 56 

Colon department, 167; migration to, 75; 
population density in, 74; population 
growth rate of, 78-80 

Columbus, Christopher, xxiv, 5 

Comayagua: rivalry of, with Tegucigal- 
pa, 12-13 

Comayagua department, 167 

Comision Centroamericana de Ferroca- 
rriles. See Central American Railways 
Commission 

Comisi6n Centroamericana de Trans- 
porte Marftimo. See Central American 
Maritime Commission 

Comisi6n Inter-Institucional de Derechos 
Humanos. See Inter-Institutional Com- 
mission on Human Rights 

Comision Nacional para la Protection de 
Derechos Humanos. See National Com- 
mission for the Protection of Human 
Rights 

Comisi6n Tenica de las Telecomunica- 
ciones de Centroam6rica. See Techni- 
cal Commission of Central American 
Telecommunications 

Comit6 Coordinadora de las Organiza- 
ciones Populares. See Coordinating 
Committee of Popular Organizations 

Comite de las Familias de los Detenidos 
y Desaparecidos Hondurenos. Com- 
mittee of the Families of the Detained 
and Disappeared in Honduras 



295 



Honduras: A Country Study 



Comite de Unidad Sindical de Centro- 
america. See Central American Com- 
mittee of Trade Union Unity 

Comite para la Defensa de Derechos Hu- 
manos de Honduras. See Committee for 
the Defense of Human Rights in 
Honduras 

Commando School, 223 

Commission for Institutional Reform, 158 

Committee for the Defense and Support 
of Democratic Institutions, 182 

Committee for the Defense of Human 
Rights in Honduras (Comite para la 
Defensa de Derechos Humanos de 
Honduras— Codeh), 191, 246; at- 
tempts to discredit, 200-201 

Committee of Economic Cooperation, 
258-59 

Committee of the Families of the Detained 
and Disappeared in Honduras (Comite 
de las Familias de los Detenidos y 
Desaparecidos Hondurefios — Cofa- 
deh), 191-92, 246; attempts to dis- 
credit, 200-201 

common external tariff. See tariff, com- 
mon external 

communications. See telecommunications 

Communist Party of Honduras (Partido 
Comunista de Honduras— PCH), 29, 
179 

compadrazgo, 90 

Comtelca. See Technical Commission of 
Central American Telecommunications 

Conadin. See National Corporation for In- 
vestment 

Conaprodeh. See National Commission 
for the Protection of Human Rights 

Concorde. See Coordinating Council for 
Development 

Condeca. See Central American Defense 
Council 

Confederacion de Trabajadores de Hon- 
duras. See Confederation of Honduran 
Workers 

Confederacion Unitaria de Trabajadores 
de Honduras. See Unitary Confedera- 
tion of Honduran Workers 

Confederation of Honduran Workers 
(Confederacion de Trabajadores de 
Honduras— CTH), 122, 184, 185 

Congreso Permanente de Unidad Sindi- 
cal de Trabajadores de America Lati- 
na. See Permanent Congress for Latin 



American Workers Trade Union Unity 
conquistadors, xxiv, 6-9; invasions by, 6 
Consejo Asesor Hondureiio para el 
Desarrollo de las Etnicas Autoctona. See 
Honduran Advisory Council for Au- 
tonomous Ethnic Development 
Consejo Coordinador de Desarrollo. See 
Coordinating Council for Development 
Consejo de Desarollo Integrado de 
Mujeres Campesinas. See Council for 
Integrated Development of Peasant 
Women 

Consejo Defensa Centroamericana. See 
Central American Defense Council 

Consejo Hondurefio de la Empresa Priva- 
da. See Honduran Private Enterprise 
Council 

Consejo Monetario Centroamericano. See 
Central American Monetary Council 

Consejo Nacional de Bienestar Social. See 
National Council of Social Welfare 

Consejo Nacional de Campesinos. See Na- 
tional Peasants Council 

Consejo Superior de las Fuerzas Arma- 
das. See Supreme Council of the Armed 
Forces 

conservatives, 13-14; and foreign affairs, 
15; uprising by, 14 

Constituent Assembly, 149 

Constituent Law of the Armed Forces 
(1975), 216 

Constituent Treaty (1987), 205 

constitution: of 1825, 149; of 1839, 14, 
149; of 1848, 15; of 1865, 150; of 1880, 
150; of 1894, 17, 150; of 1924, 150; of 
1936, 30; of 1957, 150, 215; of 1965, 
150 

constitution of 1982: amendments to, 151, 
153; armed forces under, 152-53, 211, 
216, 233; drafting committee for, xxvii, 
149; economy under, 153; elections un- 
der, 151; elements of, 150-53; execu- 
tive under, 151, 152, 155; government 
organization under, 152; human rights 
under, 149; judiciary under, 151, 152; 
legislature under, 151, 152, 155-56; 
municipalities under, 168; penal system 
under, 242; practical application of, 
149; promulgated, 149; religion under, 
100; rights under, 151 

construction, 135-36; as percentage of 
gross domestic product, 136; percent- 
age of work force in, 87 



296 



Index 



Consuffaa. See Supreme Council of the 
Armed Forces 

consumer goods, 261, 263 

Consultative Committee, 206 

Contadora process, 55-57; demands in, 
56; mediation in, 56 

Contras (Nicaraguan Resistance), 50, 
147, 148, 198; aid to, 59, 235; attitude 
toward, 52; United States support for, 
52, 55, 211 

Convenio Centroamericano de Incentivos 
Fiscales al Desarollo Industrial. See 
Convention of Fiscal Incentives for In- 
dustrial Development 

Convenio Centroamericano sobre Equi- 
paracion de Gravamenes a la Impor- 
tation. See Central American Tariff 
Equalization Convention 

Convention of Fiscal Incentives for Indus- 
trial Development (Convenio Cen- 
troamericano de Incentivos Fiscales al 
Desarollo Industrial), 261 

Coordinating Committee of Popular Or- 
ganizations (Comite Coordinadora de 
las Organizaciones Populares — 
CCOP), 123, 185, 189 

Coordinating Council for Development 
(Consejo Coordinador de Desarrollo — 
Concorde), 83 

Coordinating Council of Honduran 
Peasant Organizations (Consejo Coor- 
dinador de Organizaciones Campesinas 
de Honduras — Cocoh), 186 

Copan, xxiv, 4 

Copan department, 167 

Copan National Park, 104 

Corporacion Centroamericana de Ser- 
vicios de Navegacion Aerea. See Cen- 
tral American Corporation of Air 
Navigation Services 

Corporacion Hondurena de Bananas. See 
Honduran Banana Corporation 

Corporacion Hondurena de Cafe. See 
Honduran Coffee Institute 

Corporacion Hondurena de Desarrollo 
Forestal. See Honduran Corporation for 
Forestry Development 

Corporacion Nacional de Inversiones. See 
National Corporation for Investment 

corporatism. See political system, cor- 
poratist 

corruption: in armed forces, 44, 148, 195; 
in customs, 158, 197; in ecological 



groups, 104; in government, xxvii, 42, 
44, 117, 174, 176, 195; injudicial sys- 
tem, 165; in media, 193; in mining 
industry, 11; and moral revolution, 
xxviii, xxix, 176, 197; in political sys- 
tem, xxvii, 42, 44, 117, 174, 196- 
97 

Cortes, Hernan, 6 

Cortes Chamber of Commerce and In- 
dustry (Camara de Comercio e Indus- 
trias de Cortes— CCIC), 182 

Cortes department, 167; migration to, 75; 
political affiliations in, 175; population 
density in, 75; population growth rate 
of, 78-80 

Costa Rica: in Central American Com- 
mon Market, 203, 257; in Contadora 
process, 56; free trade agreement with, 
258, 266; relations with, 57; treaties 
with, 260 

Coto, Eduardo, 194 

cotton, 84; export of, xxvi, 110 

Council for Integrated Development of 
Peasant Women (Consejo de Desarrollo 
Integrado de Mujeres Campesinas — 
Codeimuca), 190 

Council of Ministers, 157-58 

coups d'etat, xxv; attempted, xxv, xxvi, 
25, 30; of 1956, xxvii, 36, 215, 223; of 
1963, 37, 186, 215, 225; of 1972, 43, 
215, 187; of 1978, xxvii, 44 

courts: of appeal, 164; of first instance, 
164-65; supreme, 45, 152, 156, 164 

CPUSTAL. See Permanent Congress for 
Latin American Workers Trade Union 
Unity 

CREM. See Regional Center for Military 

Training 
Creole people, 192 
crime, 65 

Cruz, Ramon Ernesto, xxvii; in elections 
of 1963, 37; in elections of 1971, 42; 
opposition to, 42-43 

Cruz administration: agrarian policy un- 
der, 187; interest groups under, 43 

CTH. See Confederation of Honduran 
Workers 

currency: attempts to stabilize, 36; 
devaluation of, xxviii-xxix; exchange 
rate of, 117; overvaluation of, 113 

CUSCA. See Central American Commit- 
tee of Trade Union Unity 

Custodio, Ramon, 191, 246 



297 



Honduras: A Country Study 



Customs Directorate: corruption in, 158, 
197 

CUTH. See Unitary Confederation of 

Honduran Workers 
Cuyamel Fruit Company, 22; bought out, 

28; strikes against, 23 



dairy industry, 130 

Data Processing and Legislative Studies 
Center (Centro de Informatica y Estu- 
dios Legislativas — CIEL), 162 

Davila, Gil Gonzalez, 6; invasions by, 6 

Davila, Miguel: efforts to overthrow, 21; 
modernization under, 21; as president, 
20-22; resignation of, 22; uprising 
against, 22 

Dawson, Thomas, 22 

Diaz Arrivillaga, Efram, 178 

debt, external, 113; forgiveness of, 118; 
as percentage of gross domestic 
product, 118 

defense spending, 111; budget, 233-34; 
military assistance as percentage of, 53; 
pattern of, 233 

Democratic University United Front 
(Frente Unido Universitario Democra- 
tico— FUUD), 189 

demography, 74-80 

demonstrations. See political demon- 
strations 

Depart amento de Investigacion Criminal. 
See Department of Criminal Investi- 
gation 

Departmental Elections Tribunals, 171 

Department of Criminal Investigation 
(Departamento de Investigacion 
Criminal— DIC), xxix, 167, 196, 245 

departments (see also under individual depart- 
ments): administration of, 167; gover- 
nors for, 167; municipalities in, 
167-68; population density of, 74 

DIC. See Department of Criminal Inves- 
tigation 

DIN. See National Directorate of Inves- 
tigation 

Direcci6n Nacional de Establecimientos 
Penales. See National Directorate of 
Penal Establishments 

Directorate of Administrative Probity, 
152, 162 



Directorio de Investigacion Nacional. See 
National Directorate of Investigation 

Directorio Nacional Unificado-Movi- 
miento de Unidad Revolucionario. See 
National Unified Directorate-Move- 
ment of Revolutionary Unity 

disappearances, 48, 49, 84, 179, 182, 191, 
194, 195, 226, 244 

Discua Elvir, Luis Alonso, xxix, 196, 229, 
245 

divorce, 90-91 

Dole Food Company (see also Standard 
Fruit Company): investment by, 142; 
land owned by, 125; production by, 127 

drought, xxix 

drugs: addiction, 103; trafficking, xxvii, 
44, 202-3 



EAI. See Enterprise for the Americas In- 
itiative 

ECLAC. See Economic Commission for 
Latin American and the Caribbean 

ecological groups, 104 

Economic Action Plan for Central Ameri- 
ca (Plan de Accion Economico de 
Centroamerica — Paeca), 264 

economic: austerity, 113, 120, 159; 
depression, 262; development, 35, 
257-58, 262; growth, xxvii, 114; 
modernization, 262; planning, 117; 
policy, 155; reform, 117; support funds 
(ESF), 199 

Economic Commission for Latin Ameri- 
can and the Caribbean (ECLAC), 
257-59 

economy: under Callejas Romero, 
112-13; under Carias, 32; under con- 
stitution of 1982, 153; diversification of, 
xxvi; in Great Depression, 29; impact 
of mining on, 109-10; informal, 119; 
under L6pez Arellano, 39; in 1980s, 
xxviii, 65, 80, 88; problems in, xxviii- 
xxix; role of armed forces in, 147, 234 

ecotourism, 104 

education, 101-2; access to, 17, 101-102; 
assistance for, 198; budgets for, 17; un- 
der Carias, 32; efforts to promote, 15, 
36; of elite, 95; government spending 
on, 33; improvement in, 32, 33; poli- 
cy, 155; problems in, 102; reform, 101; 
under Villeda Morales, 36 



298 



Index 



EEC. See European Economic Com- 
munity 

EH. See Army of Honduras 

Ejercito de Honduras. See Army of 
Honduras 

Ejercito Popular Sandinista. See Sandinis- 

ta Popular Army 
El Boqueron, 70 
El Cajon, 134 

elections: under constitution of 1982, 151; 
frequency of, 171; mood of, 194; of 
1923, 25-26; of 1924, 27; of 1938, 27; 
of 1948, 32; of 1954, 34-35; of 1956, 
36; of 1957, xxvii, 36; of 1963, 37; of 
1965, 38; of 1968, 39; of 1971, xxvii, 
41-42; of 1980, 45, 175; of 1981, xxvii, 
46, 147, 175, 177-78; of 1985, 53-55, 
147, 172, 175, 177-78; of 1989, 164, 
175, 177-78; role of armed forces in, 
213-14 

elections of 1993, 147, 172, 194; cam- 
paign for, 176-77, 229; nomination 
process for, 176-77; Liberal Party of 
Honduras in, xxviii, 176; National 
Party of Honduras in, xxviii, 147, 
176-77; turnout for, xxviii 

Electoral and Political Organizations 
Law, 171, 180 

electoral law: reform of, 169-70, 180; uni- 
tary ballot under, 163 

electoral process, 170-72 

electric power, 132-34; access to, 134; 
hydro, 134; rates, 134 

El Heraldo, 193, 194 

elite class, 84-86; armed forces in, 86; 
corruption among, 113; education of, 
95; factions in, 86; housing of, 95; liv- 
ing conditions of, 95; under Spanish 
rule, 82; weakness of, 84 

El Mochito mine, 132; strike against, 189 

El Paraiso department, 167; population 
density in, 74; political affiliations in, 
175 

El Periodico, 193 

El Progreso: growth of, 75 

El Salvador: border dispute with, 3, 39, 
43-44, 66-69, 149, 203-4, 206; in Cen- 
tral American Common Market, 203, 
257; in Central American Defense 
Council, 38; in Central American 
Parliament, 149; in Contadora process, 
56; free-trade agreement with, 258, 
266; immigrants from, 39, 77, 264; 



leftist insurgency in, 46; military train- 
ing for, 50, 197, 204, 240; refugees 
from, 77; relations with, 24, 39, 204, 
206; rivalry with, xxv, 15; trade liber- 
alization with, 135; treaties with, 19, 
39, 260; war with, xxvii, 39-41, 66-69, 
203-4, 215-16, 224, 258, 264 
El Tiempo, 193-94 

El Tigre island, 66, 71; dispute over, 66, 
206 

employment: and job creation, 116; in 
middle class, 86; in urban areas, 
115-16; of urban migrants, 77; of wom- 
en, 77 

Empresa Hondurena de Telecomunica- 
ciones. See Honduran Telecommunica- 
tions Enterprise 

Empresa Nacional de Energfa Electrica. 
See National Electric Energy Enterprise 

encomienda system, xxiv, 8; terms of, 8 

energy (see also electricity; see also under in- 
dividual energy sources): crisis, xxix-xxx; 
demand for, 132; resources, 132-34 

Enrique Soto Cano Air Base {see also 
Palmerola Air Base), 148, 199, 202; 
intelligence- gathering operations at, 
238-40; upgraded, 224; upkeep of, 240 

Enterprise for the Americas Initiative 
(EAI), 202 

enterprise zones, 135 

enterprises: mixed, 159; public, 159 

environment, 104 

environmental groups, 148, 189 

EPS. See Sandinista Popular Army 

ESF. See economic support funds 

Esquipulas II. See Arias Plan 

ethnic groups (see also under individual 
groups), 96-100, 192; in Islas de la Ba- 
hfa, 98, 100 

EU. See European Union 

European Economic Community (EEC), 
265 

European Union (EU), 127 

exchange-rate policy, 117 

executive branch (see also president), 
153-59; cabinet in, 157; decentralized 
agencies of, 159; dominance of, xxvii, 
151, 153, 162-63, 165-66; powers of, 
153, 216-18 

exploration, xxiv, 5-6 

export processing zones, 135 

exports (see also under individual products), 
199; of agricultural products, 10, 18, 



299 



Honduras: A Country Study 



110; of bananas, 18, 19, 28, 109, 110, 
127; of cattle, 18, 65, 110, 130; of 
coffee, xxvi, 32, 110; of cotton, xxvi, 
110; income from, 112; intraregional, 
260; of minerals, 18, 109, 132; of su- 
gar, 110; taxes on, 43; value of, 127, 
142 

Exposicion island, 66 



FAH. See Armed Forces of Honduras 
families, 88-91; assistance among, 90; 

loyalty in, 90; parent-child relations in, 

91; rural, 91 
Farabundo Marti National Liberation 

Front (Frente Farabundo Marti de 

Liberation Nacional— FMLN), 46, 199 
farms, 94 

Fecorah. See Honduran Federation of 
Agrarian Reform Cooperatives 

Federacion Central de Sindicatos Libres 
de Honduras. See Central Federation of 
Honduran Free Trade Unions 

Federacion de Camaras de Comercio e 
Industrias de Honduras. See Honduran 
Federation of Chambers of Commerce 
and Industry 

Federacion de Cooperativas de la Refor- 
ma Agraria de Honduras. See Hondu- 
ran Federation of Agrarian Reform 
Cooperatives 

Federacion de Sindicales Maritimas Na- 
cionales de Honduras. See Federation 
of National Maritime Unions of 
Honduras 

Federacion Hondurefia de Asociaciones 
Femininas. See Honduran Federation of 
Women's Associations 

Federacion Hondurefia de Mujeres 
Campesinas. See Honduran Federation 
of Peasant Women 

Federacion Independiente de Trabaja- 
dores de Honduras. See Independent 
Federation of Honduran Workers • 

Federacion Nacional de Agricultores y 
Ganaderos de Honduras. See National 
Federation of Agriculturists and Stock- 
raisers of Honduras 

Federacion Nacional de Campesinos de 
Honduras. See National Federation of 
Honduran Peasants 

Federacion Sindical de Trabajadores Na- 



cionales de Honduras. See Federation 
of Unions of National Workers of 
Honduras 

Federacion Unitaria de Trabajadores de 
Honduras. See Unitary Federation of 
Honduran Workers 

Federation of National Maritime Unions 
of Honduras (Federacion de Sindicales 
Maritimas Nacionales de Honduras), 
122 

Federation of Unions of National Workers 
of Honduras (Federacion Sindical de 
Trabajadores Nacionales de Hondur- 
as— Fesitranh), 122, 184 

Fehaf. See Honduran Federation of Wom- 
en's Associations 

Fehmuca. See Honduran Federation of 
Peasant Women 

Female Center of Social Adaptation (Cen- 
tro Feminino de Adaptation Social — 
Cefas), 242 

Fenach. See National Federation of Hon- 
duran Peasants 

Fenagh. See National Federation of 
Agriculturists and Stockraisers of 
Honduras 

Fernandez, Miguel Andonie, 177 

Ferrera, Francisco, 14; as president, 15 

Ferrera, Gregorio, 27; death of, 28 

Ferrari Case, 44, 45 

Ferrocarril Nacional de Honduras. See 
Honduras National Railroad 

Fesitranh. See Federation of Unions of Na- 
tional Workers of Honduras 

FHIS. See Honduran Social Investment 
Fund 

financial: liberalization, 136; policy, 117, 

155; sector, 136 
Fiscal Intervention Commission, 158, 197 
fishing, 71, 130; subsistence, 100 
FITH. See Independent Federation of 

Honduran Workers 
Flores Facusse, Carlos, 176, 194 
FMLN. See Farabundo Marti National 

Liberation Front 
FMS. See Foreign Military Sales 
FNH. See Honduras National Railroad 
Fondo Hondurefio de Inversion Social. See 

Honduran Social Investment Fund 
Fonseca, Juan Rodriguez de, 6 
foreign assistance, 118, 198; decline in, 

148; dependence on, 111, 115, 200; as 

percentage of gross domestic product, 



300 



Index 



113; from the United States, xxviii, 49, 
111, 148, 199, 201 

foreign debt, 112; attempts to reschedule, 
22, 27; to Britain, 27, 33; forgiven, 201; 
servicing, 262 

foreign exchange, 18 

foreign intervention, 3 

foreign investment, 84, 142-43, 201-2; 
as percentage of gross domestic 
product, 142 

Foreign Military Sales (FMS), 233, 240 

foreign policy, 155; under Lopez Arel- 
lano, 38-39; under Suazo Cordova, 48 

foreign relations, 197-206 

forestry, 130-31; products, export of, 110; 
reforestation schemes in, 131 

forests, 70, 94, 125, 131; exploitation of, 
131; reserves, 111, 131 

Framework Free Trade Agreement 
(1992), 266 

France: materiel from, 241-42 

Francisco Morazan dam, xxix 

Francisco Morazan department, 167; po- 
litical affiliations in, 175 

Francisco Morazan Military Academy, 
214, 223, 229; admission to, 232; cur- 
riculum of, 229; established, 229 

freedom of expression, 83, 84, 193 

Frente de Reforma Universitaria. See 
Reformist University Front 

Frente Farabundo Marti de Liberacion 
Nacional. See Farabundo Marti Nation- 
al Liberation Front 

Frente Morazanista para la Liberacion de 
Honduras. See Morazanist Front for the 
Liberation of Honduras 

Frente Sandinista de Liberacion Na- 
cional. See Sandinista National Liber- 
ation Front 

Frente Unido Universitario Democratico. 
See Democratic University United Front 

Friedreich Ebert Foundation, 122, 185 

FRU. See Reformist University Front 

FSLN. See Sandinista National Liberation 
Front 

Fuerza de Seguridad Publica. See Public 

Security Force 
Fuerzas Aereas de Honduras. See Air 

Force of Honduras 
Fuerzas Armadas de Honduras. See 

Armed Forces of Honduras 
Fuerzas Populares Revolucionarias- 

Lorenzo Zelaya. See Lorenzo Zelaya 



Popular Revolutionary Forces 
fuerzas vivas (living forces), 41 
Fusep. See Public Security Force 
FUTH. See Unitary Federation of Hon- 

duran Workers 
FUUD. See Democratic University Unit- 
ed Front 



G-3. See Group of Three 
Gaceta Judicial, 156 

Galvez, Juan Manuel, xxvi, 33; in elec- 
tions of 1948, 32; exiled, 35 
Galvez, Roberto: as president, 36 
Gamero, Manuel, 193 
Garbi, Fairen, 191 
Garcia, Graciela, 190 
Garifuna people. See Black Caribs 
GDP. See gross domestic product 
General Army Headquarters, 223 
Generalized System of Preferences (GSP), 
142, 202 

General Peace Treaty (1980), 44, 69 

General Staff of the Armed Forces, 219; 
chief of, 220; functions of, 220 

General Treaty of Central American In- 
tegration, 203 

General Treaty of Central American Eco- 
nomic Integration (Tratado General 
de Integration Economica Centroameri- 
cana) (1960), 259; signed, 257, 260 

General Treaty of Peace and Amity: of 
1907, 21; of 1923, 25 

General Workers' Central (Central 
General de Trabajadores — CGT), 
122-23, 184, 185, 186 

geography, xxv, 66-74; coastline, 66; 
land area, 66; location, 66 

geostrategic situation, xxv, 197, 211, 235 

Germany: materiel from, 241-42 

Giron, Efram Bu, 175 

Godmez, Saul, 191, 195, 244 

gold: discovery of, 8; exports of, 18, 132; 
mining of, xxiv, 9 

Golfo de Fonseca, 6, 66, 206 

government: under constitution of 1982, 
152; corruption in, xxvii, 42, 44, 117, 
174, 195; factions in, 213; fiscal poli- 
cies, 117; local, 167-70; parallel unions 
of, 188; relations of, with Catholic 
Church, 9, 100, 101; role of, 117-18; 
women in, 190 



301 



Honduras: A Country Study 



government spending, 118; on armed 
forces, 111; on education, 17; need for 
reform in, 24-25 

Gracias a Dios department, 167; popu- 
lation density in, 74, 75; population 
growth rate of, 78-80 

Grenada: invasion of, 51 

grassroots organizations, 65, 84 

Great Depression, 28; agriculture in, 29; 
economy in, 29 

gross domestic product (GDP): and 
agriculture, 123-25; and budget deficit, 
114; and construction, 136; and eco- 
nomic development, 257; and external 
debt, 118; and foreign assistance, 113; 
and foreign investment, 142; growth of, 
115; and manufacturing, 134, 263; and 
mining, 132; and tax revenues, 118 

Group of Three (G-3), 266 

GSP. See Generalized System of Pref- 
erences 

Guanaja island, 66 

Guardia Civil. See Civil Guard 

Guardiola, Santos: assassinated, 16; at- 
tempts to overthrow, 16; as president, 
15 

Guatemala, 57; border dispute with, 28; 
in Central American Common Market, 
203, 257; in Central American Defense 
Council, 38; in Central American 
Parliament, 149; in Contadora process, 
56; free-trade agreement with, 258, 
266; invasion by, 15, 20; refugees from, 
77; rivalry with, xxv, 15; trade liber- 
alization with, 135; treaties with, 19, 
260; and United States, 33, 34 

Guatemala, audiencia of, 9 

guerrilla groups, 178-79, 180; amnesty 
for, 180; membership of, 179 



health, 102-4; assistance for, 198; poli- 
cy, 155 

health care, 65; access to, xxx, 102-3; 

public, 103-4; quality of, 102-3 
health problems, xxx, 103; causes of 

death, 103; malnutrition, xxx, 95, 103 
Hernandez Martinez, Maximiliano, 30; 

deposed, 32 
Higueras (province), 8 
homosexual rights association, 189 
Honduran Advisory Council for Autono- 



mous Ethnic Development (Consejo 
Asesor Hondureno para el Desarrollo de 
las Etnicas Autoctonas— CAHDEA), 
192 

Honduran Association of Small and 
Medium Industry (Asociacion Hon- 
durefia de Empresas Pequefias y Me- 
dianas), 135 

Honduran Banana Corporation (Cor- 
poration Hondurana de Bananas), 159 

Honduran Black Fraternal Organization 
(Organization Fraternal Negra Hon- 
durefia— Ofraneh), 192 

Honduran Cement Industry (Industria 
Cementera de Honduras, Sociedad 
Anonima — Incehsa), 234 

Honduran Center for Women's Studies 
(Centro de Estudios de la Mujer- 
Honduras— CEM-H), 190 

Honduran Christian Democratic Party 
(Partido Democrata Cristiano de 
Honduras — PDCH): constituency of, 
177; created, 41, 178; in elections of 
1981, 46; in elections of 1989, 164 

Honduran Coffee Institute (Corporacion 
Hondurefia de Cafe), 159 

Honduran Committee for the Defense of 
Human Rights, 48-49 

Honduran Corporation for Forestry Devel- 
opment (Corporacion Hondurefia de 
Desarrollo Forestal— Cohdefor), 131, 159 

Honduran Documentation Center (Cen- 
tro de Documentation de Honduras — 
Cedoh), 194 

Honduran Federation of Agrarian Re- 
form Cooperatives (Federacion de 
Cooperativas de la Reforma Agraria de 
Honduras — Fecorah), 186 

Honduran Federation of Chambers of 
Commerce and Industry (Federacion 
de Camaras de Comercio e Industrias 
de Honduras), 183 

Honduran Federation of Peasant Wom- 
en (Federacion Hondurefia de Mujeres 
Campesinas — Fehmuca), 190 

Honduran Federation of Women's As- 
sociations (Federacion Hondurefia de 
Asociaciones Femininas — Fehaf), 190 

Honduran Military Training Academy, 
223 

Honduran Private Enterprise Council 
(Consejo Hondurefio de la Empresa 
Privada— Cohep), 181 



302 



Index 



Honduran Revolutionary Party (Partido 
Revolucionario Hondurefio — PRH), 
180 

Honduran Revolutionary Party of Cen- 
tral American Workers (Partido 
Revolucionario de los Trabaj adores 
Centroamericanos de Honduras — 
PRTC-H), 49, 178 

Honduran-Salvadoran Binational Com- 
mission, 206 

Honduran Social Investment Fund (Fon- 
do Hondurefio de Inversion Social — 
FHIS), 120 

Honduran Social Security Institute (In- 
stituto Hondurefio del Seguro Social — 
IHSS), 103-104, 159 

Honduran Telecommunications Enter- 
prise (Empresa Hondurena de Tele- 
comunicaciones — Hondutel), 235 

Honduran Temporary Import Law, 135 

Honduras-Higueras, 8 

Honduras National Railroad (Ferrocarril 
Nacional de Honduras — FNH), 141 

Honduras This Week, 194 

Hondutel. See Honduran Telecommuni- 
cations Enterprise 

housing: of elite, 95; in rural areas, 
94-95; shortage of, 76, 77; in urban 
areas, 76, 77 

human rights, 84, 202, 244-45; abuses, 
xxviii, 167, 195, 211, 244; advocacy 
groups, 148, 189, 191-93, 195, 200, 
245-47; under constitution of 1982, 149 

hurricanes, 72; Fifi, 43, 72, 112; France- 
lia, 72 

hydrography, 74 



IACHR. See Inter- American Court of 
Human Rights 

ICFTU. See International Confederation 
of Free Trade Unions 

ICITAP. See International Criminal In- 
vestigative Training Assistance Pro- 
gram 

ICJ. See International Court of Justice 
IHSS. See Honduran Social Security In- 
stitute 

IMET. See International Military Educa- 
tion and Training 



IMF. See International Monetary Fund 
immigration {see also migration; refugees), 

77-78; from El Salvador, 39, 77, 264; 

illegal, 39; from Middle East, 98, 100 
imports, 142; tariff rate, 117 
import-substitution industrialization. See 

industrialization , import-substitution 
IN A. See National Agrarian Institute 
Incehsa. See Honduran Cement Industry 
income: from agriculture, 119; in middle 

class, 86; per capita, xxx, 65, 111, 113, 

200 

independence, xxv, 14 

Independent Federation of Honduran 
Workers (Federation Independiente de 
Trabajadores de Honduras — FITH), 
123, 185 

indigenous peoples, xxiv, xxv, 4-5, 
97-98, 192-93; assimilation of, 10; ex- 
ploitation of, 8; extermination of, xxiv, 
6, 8, 9, 82; forced relocation of, 11; as 
percentage of population, 96-97; popu- 
lation of, xxiv, 5, 8; as slaves, 8; trade 
by, 5; uprisings by, 8, 9 

Industria Cementera de Honduras, So- 
ciedad Anonima. See Honduran Ce- 
ment Industry 

industrialization, import-substitution, 
135, 257 

industry, 111, 134-36; construction, 
135-36; energy used by, 132; manufac- 
turing, 134-35 

infant mortality, xxix, 65, 103 

inflation, xxviii, 24, 114-15, 136, 137; 
under Callejas, 114-15 

INFOP. See National Institute of Profes- 
sional Training 

infrastructure: development of, 36, 110, 
113; investment in, 110; under Ville- 
da Morales, 36 

Innovation and Unity Party (Partido de 
Inovacion y Unidad — Pinu), 177; con- 
stituency of, 177; in Constituent As- 
sembly, 149; in elections of 1981, 46, 
177; in elections of 1985, 177; in elec- 
tions of 1989, 164, 177; formed, 45, 177 

Institute of Municipal Development, 169 

Instituto de Pensi6n Militar. See Military 
Pension Institute 

Instituto Hondurefio del Seguro Social. 
See Honduran Social Security Institute 

Instituto Nacional Agrario. See National 
Agrarian Institute 



303 



Honduras: A Country Study 



Instituto Nacional de Formation Profe- 
sional. See National Institute of Profes- 
sional Training 

Integration Industries Convention (Regi- 
men de Industrias de Integration — 
RII), 259, 263 

intellectual property, 202 

Intelsat. See International Telecommuni- 
cations Satellite Corporation 

intendencias, 11 

Inter- American Court of Human Rights 

(IACHR), 176, 191, 195, 244 
Inter-American Foundation, 200 
Inter-American Regional Organization of 
Workers (Organization Regional Inter- 
americana de Trabajadores — ORIT), 
122, 184 
interest groups, 148, 181-90 
interest rates, 136-37, 262-63 
Inter-Institutional Commission on Hu- 
man Rights (Comision Inter- 
Institucional de Derechos Humanos — 
CIDH), 192, 246-47 
interior highlands, 69-70; area of, 69; cli- 
mate of, 71-72; elite in, 84; labor sur- 
plus in, 88; population growth rate of, 
78-80; topography of, 70 
International Confederation of Free 

Trade Unions (ICFTU), 122, 185 
International Court of Justice (ICJ), 176 
International Criminal Investigative Train- 
ing Assistance Program (ICITAP), 241 
International Military Education and 

Training (IMET), 233, 240 
International Monetary Fund (IMF), 
136; assistance from, 36; austerity plan 
of, 113 

International Police Academy, 232 

International Telecommunications Satel- 
lite Corporation (Intelsat), 138 

Intibuca department, 167; migration 
from, 75; population density in, 74 

investment, 111; by armed forces, 234; 
decline in, 114, 15 

IPM. See Military Pension Institute 

Iriarte Arita, Marcos Orlando, 178 

irrigation, 125 

islands, 66 

Islas de la Bahfa, 66, 167; British control 
of, 14, 16; British settlements in, 12; 
ecotourism in, 104; ethnic groups in, 
98, 100; exports from, 18; language in, 
98 



Israel: materiel from, 216, 224, 241; mili- 
tary training by, 241 
Iturbide, Augustm de, 13 
Ivry, David, 241 



Japan: trade with, 142 
Jesuits: activism of, 83-84 
Jicaque people, 5, 10, 98, 192 
Johnson, Lyndon B., 38 
Joint Task Force Bravo QTFB), 199, 202, 
240 

Jose Cecilio del Valle University, 102 
JTFB. See Joint Task Force Bravo 
judges, 54, 161, 164, 165; requirements 

for, 171; selection of, 171 
Judicial Career Law (1980), 166 
judicial system, xxvii, 65, 164-67; budget 
for, 165; under constitution of 1982, 
151, 152, 165; corruption in, 165; 
courts in, 164; executive branch domi- 
nation of, 165-66; personnel in, 166; 
politicization of, 147; power of, 151; 
public prosecutors in, 166 
Junta Nacional de Bienestar Social. See 

National Board of Social Welfare 
justices of the peace, 164, 165 



labor, forced, 8 
labor cases, 164 

labor code, 82; under Lozano Diaz, 35; 
under Villeda Morales, 36 

labor disputes: under Lopez Arellano, 39 

labor movement, 148, 179; origins of, 22; 
strategies of, 88 

labor unions, 88, 120-23, 183-89; al- 
lowed to organize, 33; under Cruz, 43; 
demonstrations by, 44; environmental 
concerns of, 104; legislation for, 33; 
parallel, 188; percentage of work force 
in, 120, 183; political power of, 82; vio- 
lence against, 184 

La Ceiba: political affiliations in, 177 

La Ceiba Air Base, 224 

La Ceiba Free Zone, 135 

ladinos, 97 

Lago de Yojoa, 74 

La Mesa International Airport, 142 

land: arable, xxiii, 123; area, 66, 123; 



304 



Index 



commandeered, 126, 184, 188; concen- 
tration of, 87; cultivated, 65, 94; 
forested, 94; reform, xxvii, 126-27, 
187-88; use, xxiii, 65, 111, 123-25 

language {see also under individual languages): 
in Islas de la Bahia, 98; in pre- 
Columbian societies, 4, 5 

La Paz department, 167; migration from, 
75; population density in, 74 

La Prensa, 58, 193, 194 

Lardizabel, Fernando, 176 

Latin American Conference of Bishops 
(1968), 83 

Latin American Free Trade Area, 257 

Latin American Workers Central (Central 
Latinoamericana de Trabaj adores — 
CLAT), 122, 185 

La Tribuna, 193, 194 

Law of Criminal Rehabilitation (Decree 
Law Number 173-84), 242 

Law of Municipalities (1990), 168-69 

Law of the Organization and Attributions 
of the Courts (1906), 166 

laws: introduction of, 155-56; promulga- 
tion of, 156 

legislative branch {see also National Con- 
gress), 159-64; under constitution of 
1982, 151, 152; power of, 151 

Leiva, Ponciano: as president, 17 

Lempira, 8 

Lempira department, 167; migration 

from, 75; population density in, 74 
Lenca people, 5, 97, 192 
Liberal Party of Honduras (Partido 
Liberal de Honduras — PLH), xxviii, 
147, 172, 213; constituency of, 174-75; 
in Constituent Assembly, 149; dis- 
solved, 17; in elections of 1923, 25; in 
elections of 1928, 27; in elections of 
1932, 28; in elections of 1948, 32; in 
elections of 1954, 34; in elections of 
1963, 37; in elections of 1965, 38; in 
elections of 1980, 45, 175; in elections 
of 1981, 46, 147, 175; in elections of 
1985, 147, 175; in elections of 1989, 
164, 175; factions of, 175; freedom for, 
33; origins of, 172-74; party unity in, 
176; platform of, 174; popular support 
for, 174, 175 
liberals, 13-14; and foreign affairs, 15 
Lindo Zelaya, Juan: as president, 15 
literacy rate, xxx, 65, 83, 102 
livestock, 128-30: cattle, 9, 110, 128-30; 



exports, 130; as percentage of agricul- 
ture, 130; sales, 130 
living forces. See fuerzas vivas 
Local Elections Tribunal, 171 
Logistical Support Center, 227 
Lopez Arellano, Osvaldo, 223; as airline 
head, 225; as chief of armed forces, 42, 
43, 219; as president, xxvii, 37-39, 43, 
186, 187, 215 
Lopez Arellano administration: constitu- 
tion under, 150; foreign affairs under, 
38-39, 264; problems in, 39, 41, 43; 
ties of, with National Party of Hon- 
duras, 38 
Lopez Contreras, Carlos, 197 
Lopez Gutierrez, Rafael, 24 
Lopez Reyes, Walter, 51, 172, 204 
Lorenzo Zelaya Popular Revolutionary 
Forces (Fuerzas Populares Revolucio- 
narias- Lorenzo Zelaya — FPR-LZ), 49, 
178 

lower class, 87-88; occupations of, 87; in 
rural areas, 87 

Lozano Diaz, Julio: ambitions of, 35; 
overthrow of, 36, 215, 223; as presi- 
dent, 35-36; support for, 35 



McDonald, Ronald H., 174 
Mancha Brava (Tough Spot), 38 
manufacturing, 134-35; attempts to 
stimulate, 109; as percentage of gross 
domestic product, 134, 263; percentage 
of work force in, 87, 119; unions in, 88 
MAP. See United States Military As- 
sistance Program 
maquiladoras, 134; attempts to stimulate, 
109; employment in, 77; number of 
employees in, 119, 134; wages in, 134 
Marina de Honduras. See Navy of 
Honduras 

marriage: class in, 91; forms of, 90; in- 

terethnic, 100 
Martinez, Riccy Mabel, 147, 195, 196, 

244, 245 

Marxist- Leninist Communist Party of 
Honduras (Partido Comunista 
Marxista-Leninista de Honduras — 
PCMLH), 179 
Mata Ballesteros, Juan Ramon, 201 
materiel: air force, 199; from Belgium, 
223; from Britain, 223; embargo on, 



305 



Honduras: A Country Study 



27; foreign, 221; from Israel, 216, 224, 
241; limitations on, 25; from United 
States, 199, 224 

Maya people, xxiii-xxiv, 3, 98; disap- 
pearance of, xxiv, 3; immigration of, 3 

mayors (alcalde), 168; election of, 169-70 

MDCH. .SW Christian Democratic Move- 
ment of Honduras 

MDP. See People's Democratic Move- 
ment 

Meanguera island: dispute over, 66 
media, 193-94; corruption in, 193; 

newspapers, 193; radio, 83, 138, 193; 

television, 138, 193 
Medina, Jose Maria, 16-17; as president, 

17 

Mejia Arellano, Oscar, 53, 55, 175 

Mejia Colindres, Vicente: in elections of 
1928, 27; in elections of 1932, 28; as 
president, 28 

Melgar, Nora Gunera de, 177 

Melgar Castro, Juan Alberto: as chief of 
armed forces, 43; overthrown, 44; as 
president, 43, 187 

mestizos, xxiv, 17; culture of, 82; as per- 
centage of population, xxv, 96 

Methodist church, 101 

Mexico, 21, 266; Central American union 
with, xxv, 13; in Contadora process, 
56; free-trade agreement with, 266; in 
North American Free Trade Agree- 
ment, 202, 266 

Meza, Victor, 194, 204 

middle class, 80, 86-87; employment of, 
86; members of, 86; politics of, 86-87; 
size of, 86 

migration (see also immigration; urban 
areas), 74; demographic traits in, 77; 
incentives for, 77 

military: conscription, xxix, 214, 227-29; 
finances, 233-42; recruitment, 227-29; 
relations, 241-42; training, 214, 
229-32, 235-41 

military assistance, 235; amount of, 53, 
233-34; to Contras, 235; decline in, 
148; from United States, xxviii, 34, 38, 
50, 53, 111, 148, 198, 199, 201, 211, 
221, 233, 235-41 

Military Assistance Agreement (1954), 51 

Military Aviation School: founded, 29, 
214 

military exercises: with Central American 
Defense Council, 38; with United 



States, 50, 51, 148, 199, 235-38, 241 
military officers: expansion of, 216; fac- 
tions of, 216; number of, 221; profes- 
sionalization of, 214; promotions of, 
233; rebellion by, 51; recruitment of, 
229; training of, 214, 215, 229 
Military Pension Institute (Instituto de 
Pensi6n Militar— IPM), 196, 227, 234 
military personnel: conditions, 229; pay 
and benefits of, 227, 229; training of, 
214 

minerals, 111, 132; export of, 18, 109, 
132 

Minimum Government Plan (Plan Mfni- 
mo de Gobierno), 42 

mining, 132; of gold, xxiv, 9; of silver, 
xxiv, 9, 109 

mining industry, 17-18, 109; corruption 
in, 11; economic effects of, 109-10; ef- 
forts to revive, 17; growth of, 9-10; as 
percentage of gross domestic product, 
132; profits in, 18 

ministeries, 157 

Ministerio Publico. Prosecutor Gener- 
al's Office 

Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 45, 157, 
197-98 

Ministry of Government and Justice, 157, 
167, 242 

Ministry of National Defense and Public 

Security, 45, 157, 220, 226 
Ministry of the Public, xxix 
Ministry of Work, 242 
Miskito people, 11-12, 19, 98-100, 192 
MLR. See Rodista Liberal Movement 
MNR. See National Revolutionary 

Movement 
Mobile Training Teams (MTTs), 240 
Modernization of the State Commission, 

158, 166, 169 
Monarca. See National Movement of 

Rafael Callejas 
Montana de la Flor, 70 
Monte El Boqueron, 70 
Moon, Sun Myung, 182 
moral revolution, xxviii, 176, 197 
Morazan, Francisco, 14, 203; over- 
thrown, 14; killed, 14 
Morazanist Front for the Liberation of 
Honduras (Frente Morazanista para la 
Liberation de Honduras — FMLH), 
178 

Morazanist Liberation Party (Partido 



306 



Index 



Morazanista de Liberation — PML), 
180 

Morazanist Patriotic Front, 180 

Morgan, J.P., 22 

Morris, James, 175 

Mosquitia, 71; rainfall in, 72 

Motion Picture Exporters Association of 

America, 202 
mountains, 70 

Movimiento Democrata Cristiano de 

Honduras. See Christian Democratic 

Movement of Honduras 
Movimiento Democratico del Pueblo. See 

People's Democratic Movement 
Movimiento Liberal Rodista. See Rodis- 

ta Liberal Movement 
Movimiento Nacionalista Rafael Callejas. 

See National Movement of Rafael 

Callejas 

Movimiento National Revolucionario. See 
National Revolutionary Movement 

Movimiento Popular de Liberation Cin- 
choneros. See Cinchoneros Popular 
Liberation Movement 

Moya Posas, Horacio, 42 

MPLC. See Cinchoneros Popular Liber- 
ation Movement 

MTTs. See Mobile Training Teams 

Multilateral Treaty on Free Trade and 
Central American Economic Integra- 
tion (Tratado Multilateral de Libre 
Comercio e Integration Economica 
Centroamericana), 259 

municipal corporations, 167-68; mem- 
bers of, 167-68; sessions of, 168 

Municipal Development Council, 169 



NAFTA. See North American Free Trade 
Agreement 

Napoleonic wars, xxv 

National Agrarian Institute (Instituto Na- 
tional Agrario— INA), 37-38, 126, 
159, 187 

National Air Transport (Transportes Ae- 
reos Nacionales, Sociedad Anonima — 
TAN), 225 

National Association of Honduran 
Peasants (Asociacion National de Cam- 
pesinos de Honduras — Anach), 88, 
122, 184, 186 

National Association of Industrialists 



(Asociacion National de Industrials — 
ANDI), 182 

National Autonomous University of Hon- 
duras (Universidad Nacional Autono- 
ma de Honduras— UN AH), 83, 159; 
enrollment of, 189 

National Banking and Insurance Com- 
mission, 155 

National Board of Social Welfare (Junta 
Nacional de Bienestar Social), 242 

National Central of Farm Workers (Cen- 
tral Nacional de Trabaj adores del 
Campo— CNTC), 123, 185 

National Commission for the Protection 
of Human Rights (Comision Nacional 
para la Protection de Derechos 
Humanos — Conaprodeh), 158, 192, 
247 

National Congress, xxvii, 159-64; budget 
under, 162; committees in, 160-61; 
election to, 171; eligibility for, 171; for- 
eign policy under, 161; members of, 
xxvii, 160, 171; national security un- 
der, 161; oversight by, 161; powers of, 
155-56, 161; public view of, 163; quo- 
rum in, 160; sessions of, 160; terms in, 
152, 160; treason in, 54 

National Corporation for Investment 
(Corporation Nacional de Inversio- 
nes — Conadin), 126 

National Council of Social Welfare (Con- 
sejo Nacional de Bienestar Social), 159 

National Directorate of Investigation 
(Directorio de Investigation Nacional — 
DIN), xxix, 158, 196, 226 

National Directorate of Penal Establish- 
ments (Direction Nacional de Estableci- 
mientos Penales), 242 

National Elections Tribunal (Tribunal Na- 
cional de Elecciones— TNE), 46, 151, 
171-72; legislative activities of, 156; 
members of, 171-72; problems in, 172; 
responsibilities of, 171 

National Electoral Census, 172 

National Electric Energy Enterprise (Em- 
presa Nacional de Energia Electrica), 159 

National Federation of Agriculturists and 
Stockraisers of Honduras (Federation 
Nacional de Agricultores y Ganaderos de 
Honduras— Fenagh), 37, 39, 182-83 

National Federation of Honduran Peasants 
(Federation Nacional de Campesinos de 
Honduras— Fenach), 88, 186 



307 



Honduras: A Country Study 



National Institute of Professional Train- 
ing (Instituto Nacional de Formation 
Profesional— INFOP), 119 

National Movement of Rafael Callejas 
(Movimiento Nacionalista Rafael Calle- 
jas — Monarca), 176 

national parks, 104 

National Party of Honduras (Partido 
Nacional de Honduras — PNH), xxviii, 
30, 122-23, 147, 172, 185, 213; armed 
forces alliance with, 172; constituency 
of, 174-75; in Constituent Assembly, 
149; in elections of 1923, 25; in elec- 
tions of 1924, 27; in elections of 1928, 
27; in elections of 1932, 28; in elections 
of 1948, 32; in elections of 1963, 37; 
in elections of 1965, 38; in elections of 
1980, 45, 175; in elections of 1981, 46, 
175; in elections of 1989, 147, 164, 175; 
factions in, 176; origins of, 19, 174; 
party unity in, 176; popular support 
for, 174; ties of, with Lopez Arellano 
administration, 38 
National Peasants Council (Consejo Na- 
cional de Campesinos — CNC), 186 
national police. See Public Security Force 
National Registry of Persons, 172 
National Revolutionary Movement (Movi- 
miento Nacional Revolucionario — 
MNR), 34 
national security, 197, 211 
National Superior Planning Council, 117 
National Unified Directorate-Movement 
of Revolutionary Unity (Directorio 
Nacional Unificado-Movimiento de 
Unidad Revolucionario— DNU-MUR), 
179 

National Union of Peasants (Union Na- 
cional de Campesinos — UNC), 38, 
123, 185, 186 

National Unity Party (Partido de Unidad 
Nacional— PUN), 35 

natural resources, xxiii, 132-34 

Navarro, Julio, 175, 176 

Navy of Honduras (Marina de Hon- 
duras), 225; bases of, 225; fleet of, 225; 
headquarters of, 225; insignia, 232; 
number of personnel in, 212, 225; 
ranks, 232 

New York and Honduras Rosario Min- 
ing Company (NYHRMC), 18, 109, 
132 

Nicaragua: accord in, 58-60; border dis- 



putes with, 8, 17, 19-20, 30; in Cen- 
tral American Common Market, 203, 
257; in Central American Defense 
Council, 38; compliance of, with Ar- 
ias Plan, 58; in Contadora process, 56; 
elections in, 58; free-trade agreement 
with, 258, 266; invasion of, 8; politi- 
cal conflict in, 206; refugees from, 44, 
77-78; relations with, 30, 37, 39, 44, 
206; rivalry with, xxv, 15; Sandinistas 
in, 44, 46; security of border with, 3; 
suit by, 59; treaties with, 19, 260 
Nicaraguan Resistance. See Contras 
North American Free Trade Agreement 

(NAFTA), 202, 266 
NYHRMC. See New York and Honduras 
Rosario Mining Company 



OAS. See Organization of American 
States 

Ocotepeque department, 167; migration 
from, 75; population density in, 74 

Odeca. See Organization of Central 
American States 

Office of the Attorney General, 152, 166 

Office of the Comptroller General, 152, 
162, 166 

Office of the Paymaster General, 227 

Office of the President, 157 

Office of the Public Prosecutor, 166 

Office of the United States Trade Repre- 
sentative (USTR), 202 

Officer Candidate School, 223 

Ofraneh. See Honduran Black Fraternal 
Organization 

Olancho department, 167; population 
density in, 74 

Olid, Cristobal de, 6 

Omoa Free Zone, 135 

Operation Solid Shield military exercises, 
238 

Operation Urgent Fury (1983), 51 

Organizacion de Estados Centroameri- 
canos. See Organization of Central 
American States 

Organizacion Fraternal Negra Hondure- 
na. See Honduran Black Fraternal Or- 
ganization 

Organizacion Regional Interamericana 
de Trabaj adores. See Inter- American 
Regional Organization of Workers 



308 



Index 



Organization of American States (OAS), 
39; intervention by, 43-44 

Organization of Central American States 
(Organizacion de Estados Centro- 
americanos — Odeca), 258 

ORIT. See Inter- American Regional Or- 
ganization of Workers 

Ortega Saavedra, Daniel Jose, 58, 59, 238 

Overseas Security Assistance Manage- 
ment Program, 240 



Pacific lowlands, 71; climate of, 71, 72 

Padilla, Visitacion, 189-90 

Paeca. See Central American Economic 

Action Plan 
Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), 

241 

Palmerola Air Base (see also Enrique Soto 
Cano Air Base), 51, 148, 197, 199 

Panama: in Central American Common 
Market, 258; in Contadora process, 56 

Panama Canal: built, 20 

Pan American Highway, 141 

Paris Club, 118 

Parlacen. See Central American Par- 
liament 

Parlamento Centroamericano. See Central 
American Parliament 

Partido Comunista de Honduras. See 
Communist Party of Honduras 

Partido Comunista Marxista-Leninista de 
Honduras. See Marxist-Leninist Com- 
munist Party of Honduras 

Partido de Inovacion y Unidad. See In- 
novation and Unity Party 

Partido de los Trabaj adores. See Workers' 
Party 

Partido Democrata Cristiano de Hon- 
duras. See Honduran Christian Demo- 
cratic Party 

Partido de Renovacion Patriotica. See 
Patriotic Renovation Party 

Partido de Unidad Nacional. See Nation- 
al Unity Party 

Partido Liberal de Honduras. See Liber- 
al Party of Honduras 

Partido Morazanista de Liberation. See 
Morazanist Liberation Party 

Partido Nacional de Honduras. See Na- 
tional Party of Honduras 

Partido para la Transformacion de Hon- 
duras. See Party for the Transformation 



of Honduras 
Partido Revolucionario de los Trabaja- 

dores Centroamericanos de Honduras. 

See Honduran Revolutionary Party of 

Central American Workers 
Partido Revolucionario Hondurefio. See 

Honduran Revolutionary Party 
Party for the Transformation of Hon- 
duras (Partido para la Transformacion 

de Honduras— PTH), 180 
Patriotic Renovation Party (Partido de 

Renovacion Patriotica— PRP), 180 
Pavon, Miguel Angel, 191, 246 
Paz Aguilar, Ernesto, 157, 204 
Paz Barahona, Miguel, 27; as president, 

27 

Paz Barnica, Edgardo, 48, 52 
Paz Garcia, Policarpo: as head of junta, 
44-45 

Paz Garcia administration, 45, 149, 177 
PCH. See Communist Party of Honduras 
PDCH. See Honduran Christian Demo- 
cratic Party 
PDVSA. See Venezuelan Petroleum, Inc. 
Peace Corps, 200 

peasant groups, 65, 82, 88, 148, 183-89; 
and agrarian reform, 186, 187; at- 
tempts to unify, 186; under Cruz, 43; 
divisions among, 186; environmental 
concerns of, 104; parallel, 188; violence 
against, 184 

peasants, xxiv; employment of, 87, 94; 
land takeovers, 188; living standards of, 
88 

Pech people, 192 

Pedraza, Cristobal de, 9 

penal code (1983), 242 

penal system. See prison system 

People's Democratic Movement (Movi- 
miento Democratico del Pueblo — 
MDP), 180 

Permanent Congress for Latin American 
Workers Trade Union Unity (Congreso 
Permanente de Unidad Sindical de 
Trabaj adores de America Latina — 
CPUSTAL), 123, 185 

Peru: in Contadora process, 56 

Petroleos de Venezuela, S.A. See Vene- 
zuelan Petroleum, Inc. 

Pico Bonito, 70 

Pico Congolon, 70 

Pina, Eduardo, 194 

Pinu. See Innovation and Unity Party 



309 



Honduras: A Country Study 



Pipil people, 4, 98 
pirates, 11 

Plan de Accion Economica de Cen- 
troamerica. See Central American Eco- 
nomic Action Plan 
Plan Mmimo de Gobierno. See Minimum 

Government Plan 
Plan of National Unity (1970), 41 
Platform of Struggle for the Democrati- 
zation of Honduras, 187 
PLH. See Liberal Party of Honduras 
PLO. See Palestine Liberation Organi- 
zation 

PML. See Morazanist Liberation Party 

PNH. See National Party of Honduras 

police {see also Public Security Force), 225 

political: activity, 82, 86-87; demonstra- 
tions, 32, 44, 192; killings, 48-49, 179, 
182-83, 184, 186, 189, 191, 195, 196, 
244; parties, 172-81; patronage, 
158-59; reform, 11, 172-74; repres- 
sion, 84, 179-80; rights, 151; unrest, 39 

political system: corporatist, 65, 82; cor- 
ruption in, xxvii, 42, 44, 117, 174, 
196-97; democratic rule in, 194-97; ex- 
ecutive power in, 153-55; nepotism in, 
174; role of armed forces in, 54-55, 59, 
82-83, 147, 196, 211, 213-14, 223 

political uprisings, xxvi, 9, 36; by conser- 
vatives, 14; by liberals, 29; of 1537-38, 
8; of 1808, 12; of 1812, 12; of 1911, 22; 
of 1924, 27; of 1925, 27; of 1935, 29; 
of 1956, 35 

Pomares, German, 44 

Popular Liberal Alliance (Alianza Liberal 
del Pueblo— Alipo), 175; formed, 45, 175 

population: composition, xxv, 96-97; 
density, 65, 74-75; distribution of, 69, 
74-75, 78-80; of El Progreso, 77; of in- 
digenous peoples, 5; of La Ceiba, 77; 
in 1914, 17; in nineteenth century, 14, 
17; rural, 74, 115; of San Pedro Sula, 
75, 76; of slaves, 9; of Tegucigalpa, 75, 
76; urban, 75, 112 

population statistics: birth rate, 78; child 
mortality rate, 65; fertility rate, 78; 
growth rate, 65, 74, 75-76, 78-80, 112; 
infant mortality rate, xxix, 65, 103; life 
expectancy, 103 

ports, 141 

poverty, xxix, 65, 82; in urban areas, 87 
Prebisch, Raul, 257, 258 
pre-Colombian society, 4-5 



president {see also executive branch): agrar- 
ian policy under, 155; appointments by, 
155; and armed forces, 216-18; 
dominance of, xxvii, 151, 153, 162-63, 
165-66, 197; duties of, 155-56; econo- 
my under, 155; education under, 155; 
financial policy under, 155; foreign poli- 
cy under, 155, 197; as general com- 
mander of the armed forces, 157, 
216-18; health policy under, 155; legis- 
lative activities of, 155; order of succes- 
sion to, 170; powers of, 170, 216-18; 
qualifications for, 170; security decisions 
by, 156-57; term of, 152; veto powers 
of, 156 

presidential commissions, 158 

presidential designates, 170 

press {see also journalists; media; 
newspapers), 193-94; control of, 83; cor- 
ruption in, 193; freedom of, 33, 83, 193; 
military intimidation of, 193 

PRH. See Honduran Revolutionary Party 

prices, xxx 

prisoners: illegal detention of, 179; num- 
ber of, 242 

prison system, 242-44; conditions in, 
242-44; incarceration in, 242; men's, 
242; women's, 242 

private sector: armed forces in, 196, 227, 
234-35; rivalries in, 183; weakness of, 
181 

Prosecutor General's Office (Ministerio 

Publico), 166-67 
prostitution, 77 

Protestantism {see also under individual 

denominations), xxv, 97, 101; number of 

followers in population, 101 
PRP. See Patriotic Renovation Party 
PRTC-H. See Honduran Revolutionary 

Party of Central American Workers 
PT. See Workers' Party 
PTH. See Party for the Transformation of 

Honduras 

public sector: corruption in, 117; spend- 
ing, 113-14; unions in, 88 

Public Security Force (Fuerza de Segu- 
ridad Publica — Fusep) {see also Civil 
Guard; police; Special Security Corps), 
65, 167, 212, 216, 225-26; aid to, 241; 
control of, 220; number of personnel in, 
212, 226; organization of, 226; training 
of, 232, 241; uniforms, ranks, and in- 
signia, 232-33 



310 



Index 



Puerto Castilla, 141, 204; naval base at, 
225 

Puerto Cortes, 141; naval base at, 225 
Puerto Cortes Free Zone, 135; labor 

unions in, 184 
PUN. See National Unity Party 
Puntos de Vista, 194 



railroads, 138-41, 141; construction of, 
xxvi, 21-22; control of, 22; land sub- 
sidies for, 22-23 

Ramos Soto, Osvaldo, xxviii, 176, 189, 
201; campaign of, 177, 182, 194 

Reagan, Ronald W., 51, 235 

Reformist University Front (Frente de 
Reforma Universitaria— FRU), 189 

refugees, 115; from El Salvador, 77; from 
Guatemala, 77; from Nicaragua, 44, 
77-78 

Regimen de Industrias de Integracion. See 

Integration Industries Convention 
Regional Center for Military Training 

(Centro Regional de Entrenamiento 

Militar— CREM), 50, 197, 204, 236; 

closed, 51 
Regional Highway Program, 261 
Regional Office for Central America and 

Panama (ROCAP), 261 
Reina Idiaquez, Carlos Roberto, 175; in 

elections of 1993, 176, 194, 197, 229 
Reina Idiaquez, Jorge Arturo, 175 
Reina Idiaquez government, xviii; moral 

revolution under, xxviii, 197 
religion (see also under individual sects), 

100-101 

RII. See Integration Industries Con- 
vention 

Rio Coco, 74 

Rio Goascoran, 74 

Rio Lempa, 74 

Rio Platano Reserve, 104 

Rio Sumpul massacre, 204 

Rio UMa, 71, 74 

Rio Ulua valley, 74, 75 

roads, 141; construction of, xxvi, 19, 
32-33, 36 

ROCAP. See Regional Office for Central 

America and Panama 
Rodas Alvarado, Modesto, 175; death of, 

45; in elections of 1963, 37 
Rodista Liberal Movement (Movimien- 



to Liberal Rodista— MLR), 175 
Rodriguez, Oscar Andres, 158 
Roman Catholic Church. See Catholic 

Church, Roman 
Rosenberg, MarkB., 159, 162, 174, 181, 

197 

Rosenthal, Jaime, 175, 176 

Rufino Barrios, Justo, 17 

Ruhl, J. Mark, 174 

rural areas: assistance for, 198, 199; diet 
in, 95; families in, 90; health care in, 
xxx; housing in, 94-95; labor unions 
in, 88; living conditions in, 94, 95; low- 
er class in, 87; politics in, 174; popu- 
lation in, 74, 115 

rural cooperatives, 126, 127 



SAHSA. See Air Service of Honduras 

Salcedo, Diego Lopez de, 6-8; as gover- 
nor, 6-8 

Salomon, Leticia, 193 

Sambo people, 11-12 

Sandinista National Liberation Front 
(Frente Sandinista de Liberacion 
Nacional — FSLN), 44, 46, 48, 49 

Sandinista Popular Army (Ejercito Popu- 
lar Sandinista — EPS), 52; incursions 
by, 53 

Sandoval, Roberto, 42 

San Lorenzo: air base at, 224; port of, 141 

San Miguel Archangel funeral home, 234 

San Pedro Sula, 3; AIDS in, 103; growth 
of, 75; labor unions in, 184; living con- 
ditions in, 95; political affiliations in, 
177; population in, 75; rivalry of, with 
Tegucigalpa, 183 

San Pedro Sula air base, 224 

Santa Barbara department, 167 

Santos Zelaya, Jose, 17 

Schulz, Donald, 179 

Secretaria Permanente del Tratado 
General de Integracion Economica 
Centroamericana. See Secretariat of the 
General Treaty on Central American 
Economic Integration 

Secretariat of the General Treaty on Cen- 
tral American Economic Integration 
(Secretaria Permanente del Tratado 
General de Integracion Economica 
Centroamericana— SIEC A), 203, 260 

Secretary of State for National Defense 



311 



Honduras: A Country Study 



and Public Security, 220 
service sector, 136-42; percentage of work 

force in, 87 
Servicios Aereos de Honduras, Sociedad 

Anonima. See Air Service of Honduras 
Seventh Day Adventist church, 101 
Sharon, Ariel, 241 
shrimp industry, 128, 130 
Sica. See Central American Integration 

System 

SIECA. See Secretariat of the General 
Treaty on Central American Econom- 
ic Integration 
Sierra, Terencio, 17; as president, 19 
silver: boom, 9-10; discovery of, 8; ex- 
ports of, 18, 109, 132; mining of, xxiv, 
9 

Sistema de Integration Centroamericana. 
See Central American Integration 
System 

slaves: indigenous people as, 8; introduc- 
tion of Africans as, 9; population of, 9 

Soccer War (1969), xxvii, 39-41, 203-4, 
258, 264; air force in, 224; casualties 
in, 41; legacy of, 41, 215-16; origins 
of, 39-40, 66-69 

social change, 82-84 

social classes (see also under individual class- 
es): conflict among, 80; structure of, 
xxiii, 80-88 

Social Democratic International, 177 

social security: under Reina, xxix; under 
Villeda Morales, 36 

Society of Jesus. See Jesuits 

solidarismo associations. See solidarity as- 
sociations 

solidarity (solidarismo) associations, 188 
Solis, Juan Diaz de, 5 
Solis Corrales, Yolanda, 191 
Somoza Debayle, Anastasio, 44 
Somoza Garcia, Anastasio, 30 
Soto, Fernando, 224 
Soviet Union: in Contadora process, 56 
Spain, xxiv; rivalry of, with Britain, xxiv, 

xxv, 11-12 
Spanish language, xxv, 97, 98 
Spanish rule, xxiv-xxv, 6-12; collapse of, 

12-13; elite class under, 82 
Special Security Corps (see also Public 

Security Force), 225-26 
Special Foreign Currencies Fund, 265 
squatters, 126, 131 

Standard Fruit and Steamship Company. 



See Standard Fruit Company 
Standard Fruit Company (see also Dole 

Food Company): earnings of, 24; 

founded, 19; power of, 3; railroads built 

by, 141; strikes against, 23, 34, 110 
standard of living, 65, 88, 94-96; in rural 

areas, 94-95; in Tegucigalpa, 95-96; 

in urban areas, 95-96 
stock exchange, 137 
strikes, 23, 88; general, 39; in 1954, 

33-34, 88, 110, 183, 190; in 1969, 39; 

in 1990, 120; in 1991, 189; teachers', 

39 

students: assassinations of, 189; associa- 
tions of, 148, 189; demonstrations by, 
44, 201 

Suazo Cordova, Roberto, 45, 175, 241; 
background of, 46; in elections of 1981 , 
46, 147; in elections of 1985, 53, 172; 
role of, in Suazo Cordova administra- 
tion, 50 

Suazo Cordova administration, xxviii, 
46-54; congress under, 162; constitu- 
tion under, 149; international affairs 
under, 46-48, 51; role of armed forces 
in, 147 

suffrage. See voting 

sugar industry, 128; employment in, 87; 
exports by, 110 

summit meeting of 1922, 25 

Sumu people, 5 

Superior Defense Council, 219 

Supreme Council of the Armed Forces 
(Consejo Superior de las Fuerzas 
Armadas — Consuffaa), 43, 50-51, 153, 
216; members of, 219; power of, over 
armed forces, 219; role of, 219-20; ses- 
sions of, 219 

Supreme Court of Justice, 45, 164; un- 
der constitution of 1982, 152; justices 
of, 53-54, 152, 161, 164; justices re- 
moved from, 53-55; legislative activi- 
ties of, 156; powers of, 53-54, 164 

Switzerland: debt forgiven by, 118 

TAN. See National Air Transport 

tariff, common external, 257 

taxes, 118; avoidance of, 11; collection of, 
11; export, 43; income, 33; on mining, 
11; reform of, 11; revenues from, 118 

teachers: strikes by, 39; training of, 102; 
wages of, 102 



312 



Index 



Technical Commission of Central Ameri- 
can Telecommunications (Comision 
Tenica de las Telecomunicaciones de 
Centroamerica — Comtelca), 261 

Tegucigalpa: founded, 10; growth of, 
75-76; housing in, 76; isolation of, 3; 
living conditions in, 95-96; location of, 
3; migration to, 75; political affiliations 
in, 177; population in, 75, 76; rain in, 
72; rivalry of, with Comayagua, 12-13; 
rivalry of, with San Pedro Sula, 183; 
uprisings in, 12; water in, 76 

Tegucigalpa Chamber of Commerce and 
Industry (Camara de Comercio de In- 
dustrias de Tegucigalpa— CC IT), 182 

Tela Free Zone, 135 

Tela Railroad Company, 22, 141; strike 
at, 120 

telecommunications, 137-38; develop- 
ment of, 110 
telephones, 138 
terrorism, 49, 180 
Texaco, 132 

Tigra Cloud Forest Park, 104 

TNE. See National Elections Tribunal 

tobacco industry, 11 

Tol people, 98 

Toltec people, 4 

Toncontm International Airport, 142, 
224 

topography, xxiii, 69-71; Caribbean 
lowlands, 70-71; interior highlands, 
69-70; Pacific lowlands, 71 

Torres Arias, Leonidas, 48 

Tosta, Vicente, 26-27 

Tough Spot. See Mancha Brava 

tourism, 104, 137 

Towaka people, 192 

trade (see also exports; imports), 142; 
deficit, 142, 264; free, 258; by in- 
digenous peoples, 5; intraregional, 
260-61, 263; liberalization, 135; value 
of, 260 

Transitional Multilateral Free Trade 
Agreement (1992), 204, 266 

transportation, 138-42; airports, 142; at- 
tempts to improve, 138; development 
of, 110; energy used by, 132; ports, 
141; railroads, 138-41; roads, 141 

Transportes Aereos Nacionales, Sociedad 
Anonima. See National Air Transport 

Tratado General de Integration Econom- 
ica Centroamericana. See General 



Treaty of Central American Econom- 
ic Integration 

Tratado Multilateral de Libre Comercio 
e Integration Economica Centro- 
americana. See Multilateral Treaty on 
Free Trade and Central American Eco- 
nomic Integration 

Tratado Tripartite See Tripartite Treaty 

Tribunal National de Elecciones. See Na- 
tional Elections Tribunal 

Tripartite Treaty (Tratado Tripartito), 
260 

tropical storms, 72; Alleta, 72 
Trujillo: British invasion of, 15 
Trujillo Railroad Company, 22 
turcos. See Arabs 



Ubico, Jorge, 30; deposed, 32 

UNAH. See National Autonomous Uni- 
versity of Honduras 

UNC . See National Union of Peasants 

underemployment, 87, 115; in urban 
areas, 115-16 

unemployment, 87, 115-16; growth of, 
114; and job creation, 116; in rural 
areas, 115 

Unification Church, 50, 181 

Union National de Campesinos. See Na- 
tional Union of Peasants 

Unitary Confederation of Honduran 
Workers (Confederation Unitaria de 
Trabajadores de Honduras — CUTH), 
122, 123, 184 

Unitary Federation of Honduran Work- 
ers (Federation Unitaria de Trabaja- 
dores de Honduras— FUTH), 123, 
185, 189 

United Brands. See United Fruit Company 

United Fruit Company (see also Chiquita 
Brands International): government 
favors for, 33, 43; and international af- 
fairs, 33; power of, 3, 28; railroads of, 
22; strikes against, 33-34, 110 

United Provinces of Central America, xxv, 
13-14, 69, 203; dissolved, xxv, 14 

United States: aid from, xxviii, 50, 111, 
199, 201, 211; arms embargo by, 27; 
base rights, 240; in Central American 
Defense Council, 38; Central American 
policies of, 111; civic-action projects of, 
199; in Contadora process, 56; debt 



313 



Honduras: A Country Study 



forgiven by, 118; exports to, 199, 
201-2; geostrategic importance of Hon- 
duras to, 21 1 , 235; and Guatemala, 33, 
34; intervention by, in internal affairs, 
xxiii, xxvi, 20-24, 37, 48, 59, 110; 
materiel from, 199, 224; military ad- 
visers from, 36, 214; military assistance 
from, xxviii, 34, 38, 50, 53, 111, 199, 
201, 211, 221, 224, 225, 233, 235-41; 
military exercises with, 50, 51, 148, 
199, 211, 235-38, 241; military forces 
stationed in, 148, 202-3, 211, 241; 
military intervention by, 20, 23, 26; 
military training by, 29, 36, 50, 197, 
204, 235-41; in North American Free 
Trade Agreement, 202, 266; relations 
with, 21, 39, 198-203, 259; role of, in 
Suazo Cordova administration, 50; 
support by, for Contras, 52, 56; trade 
with, 142 

United States Agency for International 
Development (AID), 113, 131, 162, 
261 

United States Army School of the Ameri- 
cas, 214, 232, 235, 240 

United States Embassy in Honduras, 195, 
244 

United States Military Assistance Pro- 
gram (MAP), 214, 233, 240 

Universal Trek military exercises, 238 

Universidad Nacional Autonoma de 
Honduras. See National Autonomous 
University of Honduras 

University of San Pedro Sula, 102 

upper class. See elite 

urban areas: employment in, 115-16; 
growth of, 75; health care in, xxx; labor 
unions in, 88; living conditions in, 
95-96; migration to, 75-77, 87, 112; 
military recruitment in, 227-29; poli- 
tics in, 174-75; population in, 75; 
poverty in, 87 

Urrutia, Juan Pablo, 176 

Uruguay: in Contadora process, 56 

USTR. See Office of the United States 
Trade Representative 



Valle department, 167; migration from, 

75; population density in, 74 
Valle de Sula, 74 

Velasquez, Angel Manfredo, 191, 195, 

244, 246 
Velasquez, Zenaida, 191, 246 
Venezuela, 266; in Contadora process, 56 
Venezuelan Petroleum, Incorporated 
(Petroleos de Venezuela, Sociedad 
Anonima— PDVSA), 132 
Villeda Morales, Ramon: agrarian re- 
form under, 187; education under, 101; 
in elections of 1954, 34; in elections of 
1957, xxvii; in elections of 1980, 45; ex- 
iled, 35, 215; as president, 36-37, 150 
Visitation Padilla Committee, 190 
voters: registration of, 45; turnout of, 45, 
46; women, 30, 190 



Walker, William, 15-16; death of, 16; op- 
position to, 16 

WCL. See World Confederation of Labor 

Welles, Sumner, 26 

WFTU. See World Federation of Trade 
Unions 

women: associations of, 148, 189-90; 
demonstrations by, 32; in government, 
190; as household heads, 90, 96; roles 
of, 91; voting by, 30, 190 



Women's Cultural Society, 189 
Workers' Party (Partido de los Trabaja- 

dores— PT), 180 
workforce: composition of, 87, 118-19; 

living standards of, 88; unionized, 88, 

120, 183 

World Bank, 136, 200; aid from, 36; 

austerity plan of, 113 
World Confederation of Labor (WCL), 

122, 185 

World Federation of Trade Unions 

(WFTU), 123, 185 
World War I, 23-24 



Vaccaro family, 19, 21-22 
Valladares, Leo, 192, 246, 247 
Valladares, Olban, 178 
Valladares Soto, Ramon, 54 



Yanez Pinzon, Vicente, 5 
Yoro department, 167; migration to, 75; 
political affiliations in, 175 



314 



Index 



Young, Arthur N., 24 Zelaya, Lorenzo, 20; assassinated, 186; 

Yuscaran Mining and Milling Company, as president, 15, 20 
18 Zemurray, Samuel, 22 

Zuniga Augustinius, Ricardo, 38; in elec- 
tions of 1980, 45 
Zuniga Huete, Angel: in elections of 1932, 
Zacate Grande island, 66, 71 28; in elections of 1948, 32; exiled, 30 



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